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SUMMARY 
This thesis provides a survey and an analysis of South Africa's 
relations with the British Commonwealth (Commonwealth of Nations) 
between the years 1945 and 1961. It outlines and explains the 
deterioration of this relationship in the context of the crisis 
in South Africa's foreign relations after World War II. 
Documentary evidence is produced to throw more light on the 
relationship with Britain and, to a lesser extent, other 
Commonwealth countries. This relationship is analysed in the 
context of political, economic and strategic imperatives which 
made it necessary for Britain to continue to seek South Africa's 
co-operation within the Commonwealth. 
This thesis also describes how the African and Asian influence 
began to be felt within the Commonwealth on racial issues. This 
influence was to become particularly important during the crucial 
period after the Sharpeville incident. The attitudes of Britain 
and other Commonwealth countries at the two crucial conferences 
of 1960 and 1961 are re-examined. 
The attitude of extra-parliamentary organisations in South Africa 
towards the Commonwealth connection is an important theme of this 
thesis in addition to the other themes mentioned above. It is 
demonstrated how Indian and African opinions became increasingly 
hostile towards what was seen as British and "white" Commonwealth 
"appeasement" of South Africa. These attitudes are surveyed in 
the context of an increasing radicalisation of black politics in 
South Africa. The movement by English and Afrikaans-speaking 
white South Africans toward a consensus on racial and foreign 
policy is also examined. 
Finally, the epilogue to this thesis discusses the return of 
South Africa to the Commonwealth in 1994. It includes a brief 
survey of developments in the Commonwealth attitude to South 
Africa since 1961. 
VII 
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PREFACE 
In this thesis the author has presented an overview and an 
analysis of the changing relationship between South Africa and 
the British Commonwealth (or, as it is more simply known today, 
the "Commonwealth of Nations") between 1945 and 1961. The period 
from 1961, when South Africa left the Commonwealth, up to the 
readmission of South Africa to the Commonwealth in 1994, is 
summarised and evaluated in an epilogue. 
The year 1945 was chosen as a useful opening date for this 
analysis because it marked a clear historical dividing point 
between the old and the new in terms of British Commonwealth 
history in general and in South Africa's external relations in 
particular. The dominions and Britain emerged from the war into 
a new world order dominated by the superpowers of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. Even though Britain remained a 
power of the first rank, with her empire and Commonwealth intact, 
it had become clear during the war that she could not match the 
resources and scale of industrial output of her two allies. 
Furthermore, the strategic problem of trying to protect an empire 
scattered across the globe had proved to be beyond Britain's 
capabilities as evidenced by the fall of Singapore and the life 
and death struggle in the Mediterranean and Europe. Britain had 
come out on the winning side but greatly weakened. The dominions, 
on the other hand, had greatly increased their relative economic 
strength and their influence within the Commonwealth although on 
the world stage their role would soon prove to be much diminished 
compared to the pre-war years. 
It soon became clear that centrifugal forces within the 
Commonwealth were accelerating after the war and that those who 
sought a united, federal empire were doomed to fail. The 
dominions, while still remaining loyal to the Commonwealth, were 
determined (with the possible exception of New Zealand) to go 
their own way politically, economically and militarily and this 
was soon revealed by the Commonwealth bloc's voting record at the 
XI 
United Nations. Inevitably, the expansion of the Commonwealth in 
the late forties and fifties (with the accession of new Asian and 
African members) would weaken the cohesiveness of the 
organisation even more, making it difficult to present a united 
Commonwealth front on any important issue, even if such a display 
of unity was by then really desired. 
South Africa, despite its loyal, pro-Commonwealth government 
under General Jan Smuts, was ranged on the side of those 
dominions (Canada and, briefly, Ireland) that desired greater 
autonomy for the 
Nationalists after 
Commonwealth after the war. 
1948 forced the pace even more 
republic inside or 
D.F. Malan's 
as their long-
outside the term aim of achieving a 
Commonwealth fold gathered 
racial policies, before and 
strength. But it was South Africa's 
after 1948, which chiefly determined 
her increasing distance from the rest of the "family" in the 
post-war years and which have been recognised by most 
commentators as being the main factor in driving her towards 
eventual separation from the Commonwealth in 1961. Authors such 
as Nicholas Mansergh, W.K. Hancock, J.D.B. Miller, Dennis Austin 
and others, writing from a British or wider Commonwealth 
perspective, have concentrated largely upon the latter factor in 
their explanation for South Africa's gradual move away from the 
Commonwealth fold. 1 
The present writer aims to place South Africa's relations with 
the Commonwealth in the context of the general loosening of 
Commonweal th ties after the war, the increasing strength of 
Afrikaner nationalism and republicanism and, most importantly, 
N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London, Mackay 
and Chatham, 1969). W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol.2, The Fields of 
Force. 1919-1950 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1968). 
J.D.B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions (London, Chattus and 
Windus, 1966) and Survey of Commonwealth Affairs. Problems of 
Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969 (London, Oxford University 
Press, 1974). Dennis Austin, The Commonwealth and Britain. 
Chatham House Papers: 41 (London,Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, 1988) and Britain and South Africa (Oxford, OUP, 1966). 
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in the context of the post-war "crisis" in South Africa's 
foreign relations. This crisis, which had its origins in the 
changed international environment provided by the establishment 
of the United Nations and the massive emphasis on national 
freedom and human rights after the war, greatly affected South 
Africa's external relations in general and her Commonwealth 
relations in particular. It was what some writers have termed a 
''crisis of legitimacy" 2 - a massive challenge to the national 
identity (South Africa as a "colonial" or "African" country) and 
to the legitimacy of white rule in South Africa which 
preoccupied those responsible for the formulation of external 
policy for over four decades after the war. Among other 
consequences, it led to South Africa's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth in 1961. 
As Spence has put it, South African foreign policy (after 1948) 
was "primarily concerned with defending domestic policy and by 
implication the very structure of South African society and the 
values underpinning it" . 3 As Vale has noted in reference to 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth, the importance of the 
"retirement-under-pressure" of South Africa from the Commonwealth 
was that it was the "first aggressive enforcement" of the 
doctrine of denial of legitimacy. 4 In the process an implicit 
questioning of the South African national identity and of the 
"sovereignty" of the white-ruled state occurred. This led, in 
turn, to the consolidation and mobilisation of the power of 
post-colonial Africa in shaping the campaign against apartheid. 
While similar themes are found in the works of other authors 
2 See Jack Spence , South Africa and the Modern World", in 
M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of South 
Africa, Vol.2, South Africa 1870 1966 (London, OUP, 
1971) ,pp.525-526 and Republic under Pressure (London, OUP, 1965) 
and C.A. Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid 1945-63" 
(D.Phil.thesis, Stellenbosch University, 1992), pp.422-425. 
3 Spence, "South Africa and the Modern World", p.526. 
4 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.425. 
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focusing upon South Africa's foreign relations after World War 
II, such as S. Nolutshungu, J. Barber and J. Barratt, R. 
Davenport and 
policy making 
others, 5 those concentrating on South African 
such as Deon Geldenhuys, 6 or on the history of 
South Africa's departure from the Commonwealth, such as O. 
Geyser, have given closer insights into the policy-making 
decisions of the politicians most closely involved in the 
republican and Commonwealth issues in South Africa. 7 
Those writing from a broader "Commonwealth" perspective (Miller, 
Austin, Mansergh and others) rather than a more South African 
perspective (Geyser, Kruger, Barratt and Barber, Vale, etc.), 
while placing South Africa's departure in the context of the 
growing independence movement in Africa in the late 1950's, 8 have 
stressed the attitude of Britain and the other "white" dominions 
as being crucial. The conclusion was generally reached that, on 
the whole, these countries were, with qualifications in the cases 
of Britain and Australia, not ultimately prepared to sacrifice 
Commonwealth unity and the membership of the new Afro-Asian 
countries for the sake of keeping South Africa in the family. 9 
5 S. Nolutshungu, South Africa in Africa (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1975), and "The Impact of External 
Opposition on South African Politics", in L. Thompson and J. 
Butler (eds), Change in Contemporary south Africa (Los Angeles, 
University of Los Angeles Press, 1975). J. Barber and J. Barratt, 
South Africa's Foreign Policy. The Search for Status and Security 
1945-1988, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990). R. 
Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History (ch.18, "Salesmanship: 
Ethnasia contra Mundi 1945-1984"), (Johannesburg, MacMillan, 
1987)' pp.476-50. 
6 Deon Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation. South African 
Foreign Policy Making (Johannesburg, Macmillan, South African 
Institute of International Affairs, 1984). 
7 O. Geyser, Watershed for South Africa, London 
1961, (Pretoria, Butterworths, 1983) and SuidAfrika se Rolin die 
Britse Statebond 1921-1961 (Bloemfontein, Instituut vir Eietydse 
Geskiedenis, UOVS, 1983) 
8 See for example, Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, 
p.126 
9 D. Austin, The Commonwealth and Britain, p.8. 
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Britain was reluctant to lose South Africa given her longstanding 
and wide-ranging ties with that country, but "for the first 
time ... forces outside the British-South African relationship 
exerted pressure on the United Kingdom to break formal links with 
South Africa". 10 In 1961, the combination of international 
obloquy, denunciation from liberals in Britain and the 
"intransigence" of the Afrikaner Nationalist government had 
forced South Africa and Britain apart. 11 
This study will suggest, however, that considerably more emphasis 
must be placed on British attempts to maintain a working 
relationship with South Africa in the Commonwealth for economic, 
strategic and political reasons and that no less important than 
the factors which authors such as Miller see as forcing Britain 
and South Africa apart were those forcing them together. It will 
be shown that British governments, whether Labour or 
Conservative, were placed in the position of continually having 
to placate or appease South African governments, whether that of 
the loyal Commonwealth statesman, Jan Smuts, or those of the 
Nationalists under Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd. Drawing on an 
analysis of British cabinet and dominions office files relating 
to South Africa, it can be demonstrated how British policy-
makers, from Attlee to Macmillan (or, in the case of the high 
commissioners in South Africa, from Baring to Maud), were 
constantly aware of the weakness of their position in relation 
to South Africa and how issues such as South Africa's attempts 
to achieve transfer of the high commission territories were 
linked to strategic economic and military considerations such as 
co-operation in the sterling area, gold and uranium supplies and 
the maintenance of the military connection. 
In comparing the relations of South Africa and Britain with those 
of the other dominions and Britain, Miller notes that British-
South African relations never shared "the same family atmosphere" 
10 Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.97. 
11 Ibid., p. 98. 
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as relations between Britain and the other three (Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand) . 12 The major issues between Britain 
and South Africa such as the disposition of the high commission 
territories, the status of Indians in Natal, the question of 
neutrality, etc. had been more "formidable" and "more the kinds 
of things that constitute traditional diplomacy than the 
arguments over trade which have been for so long the stuff of 
negotiations with the other dominions". This was especially the 
case after 194 8 al though during Smuts's post-war government there 
were already signs of a more formal relationship. Nevertheless, 
what it meant in practice was a redoubling of the efforts of 
British governments to retain South Africa's co-operation in the 
Commonwealth by adopting policies towards her that aimed to 
mollify and placate rather than distantiate. This is illustrated 
in the interpretations of authors such as G.R. Berridge 13 and 
Michael Dutfield, 14 interpretations which have thrown much light 
on aspects of the British relationship with South Africa 
concerning military connections and to economic and strategic 
factors in this relationship. Their interpretations will be 
supplemented by further evidence of British attempts to maintain 
South African co-operation in the Commonwealth by making 
concessions in areas of policy concerning the high commission 
territories, decolonisation and defence issues. 
In tandem with the mounting hostility displayed by the outside 
world to South Africa's race policies and with the decreasing 
influence of Britain over the Commonwealth a~d over South 
Africa's political future was a movement by the English- speaking 
sector of the white population towards a less emotional 
attachment to the British (and, therefore, Commonwealth) 
12 Ibid. ,p.102. 
13 G.R. Berridge, South Africa. the Colonial Powers and 
'African Defence'. The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 1948-
60 (New York, St.Martin's Press, 1992). 
14 Michael Dutfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience. The 
Persecution of Seretse and Ruth Khama (London, Unwin and Hyman, 
1990). 
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connection. This is evidenced not only in the voting figures 
which showed increasing support for the Nationalists in general 
elections throughout this period but also in the opinion columns 
of major English-language newspapers. On issues such as the 
"Indian Question" in the UN and later the apartheid issue, 
English-language newspapers, while remaining loyal to the 
opposition United Party, were expressing increasing frustration 
with the attacks of the Afro-Asian Commonwealth on South Africa 
and with the inability of the "old'' (white) dominions to stop 
these attacks. 
Inevitably, the strength of opposition to the Nationalist 
republican programme by the English-speaking sector was weakened 
in the process and was further damaged, as will be shown, by the 
British government's ambivalence (and impotence) in relation to 
the Nationalist programme. The gradual loss of the symbols of the 
British connection meant the growth of a white South African 
nationalism defined, negatively, by an opposition to black 
nationalism, communism and a hostile world opinion. 
Miller has noticed this phenomenon of English-speaking South 
Africans being increasingly marginalised in the political arena 
and having to take "second place" in their country's politics -
partly a result, he says, of their minority position and partly 
of their ultimate inability to formulate "a distinctive position 
on the colour question" . 15 There was no defence against the 
demands of Afrikaner extremists that the English acquiesce in 
Afrikaner standards for the sake of preserving a white front 
against black encroachment. It is easy "to trace the melancholy 
movement of South African politics towards a white consensus on 
Apartheid" . 16 This "toenadering" of the English and Afrikaans 
on race issues will be noted further in this study by placing it 
in the context of the general crisis in South Africa's 
international race relations after World War II and its effects 
u Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.100. 
16 Ibid., p.101. 
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on South African attitudes to the Commonwealth connection in 
particular. 
Nationalist economic policies after 1948 and the general context 
of loosening Commonwealth trading links in the post- war years, 
further contributed to the weakening of South Africa's post-war 
Commonweal th ties. Smuts's post-war government was also not 
immune to the dictates of economic nationalism. It had already 
encountered political criticisms from the Nationalist opposition 
(and from some of its own supporters) for giving Britain too much 
and not getting enough in return during the negotiations over the 
gold loan to Britain in 1947 and 1948 - criticisms which centred 
on the lack of reciprocal arrangements for access to the British 
colonial market for South African exports. Successive sterling 
crises in the late forties and early fifties and the declining 
value of Commonwealth preferences in the post-war years 
stimulated policies of market diversification and import 
substitution in several Commonwealth countries, and South Africa 
was no exception. 17 
English mining, financial and industrial capital still dominated 
the economy during the 1950s and 1960s but the Nationalists 
embarked on a programme of promoting Afrikaner economic interests 
through expansion of the bureaucracy and parastatal sector which 
successfully raised the Afrikaner share of per capita income and 
which increased the pressure on English capital to soften its 
attitude to the Nationalist government. 18 The Nationalists' 
encouragement (despite some ambiguity at first) of foreign 
investment and their decision to remain committed to continued 
co-operation within the sterling area system were further 
inducements to English business interests to modify their 
17 See Brindley Thomas, "The Evolution of the Sterling Area", 
in N. Mansergh and R. Wilson (eds), Commonwealth Perspectives, 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp.192-197 and 
Miller, Survey, pp.438-453. 
18 N. Nattrass and E, Ardington (eds.), The Political Economy 
of South Africa (Cape Town, OUP, 1990), pp.10-12. 
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hostility to the new government. 
Foreign investment was critical to South Africa's developing 
industrial infrastructure throughout the period under examination 
but was vulnerable to political uncertainties created by the 
coming to power of the Nationalists in 1948. This was illustrated 
dramatically by capital outflows during political upheavals such 
as the ANC Defiance Campaign of the mid-1950s and, in particular, 
by the Sharpeville incident and circumstances surrounding 
withdrawal from the Commonweal th. 19 Nevertheless, the 
Commonwealth remained South Africa's main trading and financial 
partner throughout the period under review and British 
investments remained overwhelmingly predominant. 20 
Spence has argued that it was the increasing influence of the 
African and Asian Commonwealth countries that enabled Verwoerd 
to demonstrate convincingly to his English minority in 1961 that 
the "old Commonwealth of white dominions linked to the mother 
country existed no more" . 21 Thus, Verwoerd could argue that in 
the place of the old club was a multi-racial association of 
states, "the majority of which were bitterly hostile to South 
African racial policies and cared little for the so-called rights 
of an English-speaking minority". Thus the English minority was 
able to accept the end of the Commonwealth relationship and to 
draw closer to Afrikaner opinion on foreign relations and race 
relations in general. As Miller puts it, the attempt to assert 
British values and solutions in South Africa had "rebounded upon 
those who tried it whether in early anglicisation efforts or in 
the later commitment to the United Kingdom in two world wars" . 22 
The post-war deterioration of South Africa's position in the 
19 Ibid. , p. 14 . 
20 Miller, Survey, pp.448-450. 
21 Wilson and Thompson (eds), Oxford History of South Africa, 
p.487. 
n Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.98. 
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Commonwealth also affected African and Indian opinions in South 
Africa towards the British connection, the monarchy and the 
Commmonwealth. The reasons, however, were very different and the 
reactions much greater than those elicited from the white English 
South African community. It will be shown how organisations such 
as the African Nationalist Congress and its allies became 
increasingly disenchanted with Britain and the other "white" 
dominions for what were seen as their attempts to appease the 
South African government over various aspects of racial policy. 
In inverse proportion, on the other hand, was the rise of African 
nationalist fervour and support for the newly independent members 
of the Afro-Asian Commonwealth such as India, Ghana and Nigeria. 
Inevitably the strong feelings against colonialism in general, 
and British rule in Africa in particular after World War II, had 
affected South African black opinion in ways which tended to 
colour its view of the Commonwealth which, until an Afro-Asian 
majority was achieved in 1961, was still seen as a ''White Man's 
Club". It was not surprising, therefore, that on the eve of the 
withdrawal conference of 1961, the main organs of African and 
Indian opinion were calling on the Afro-Asian members to put 
pressure on the others for South Africa's expulsion from the 
"Club". It had become clear by then that Britain and most of the 
white dominions were not prepared to take measures that would 
force South Africa to change its policies and so exclusion from 
the organisation was seen as the first step on the road to the 
total isolation of the apartheid government. 
o. Geyser23 (and historians such as D. W. Kruger) 24 have tended 
to emphasize what they saw as unjustifiable and largely Afro-
Asian inspired interference in South Africa's internal affairs 
as being the main cause of South Africa's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth in 1961. This explanation was for many years 
23 Geyser, Watershed, pp. 76 -98. 
24 D.W. Kruger, The Making of a Nation. A History of the 
Union of South Africa. 1910-1961, (Johannesburg, Macmillan, 1969), 
pp.333-335. 
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supported by what one might call "conservative" opinion in 
Britain and the old "white" Commonwealth countries and was based 
largely on the memoirs of important statesmen of the time such 
as Harold Macmillan of Britain and Robert Menzies of Australia. 25 
It has been challenged by recent analyses which have 
concentrated, in particular, on the role of the Canadian prime 
minister, John Diefenbaker, who is seen as less important in the 
forcing out of South Africa from the Commonwealth than was 
previously thought to be the case. 26 
This study aims, further, to supplement this interpretation with 
a view which places more importance on the role of the British 
government under Harold Macmillan in its attempts during the 
crucial months after Sharpeville to maintain British economic, 
strategic and political interests in South Africa. Ultimately, 
this was Macmillan's overriding concern, more important even than 
that of keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth and it led to 
a policy of equivocation and ambivalence which, in the end, 
contributed to the republican cause and weakened the case of 
those arguing for a change in South Africa's racial policies as 
a condition for keeping her in the Commonwealth. 
This thesis, therefore, attempts to introduce a broader outline 
of the factors contributing to the decline and deterioration of 
South Africa's Commonwealth relations in the period 1945 to 1961. 
25 Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Wav (London, Macmillan, 
1972) and Robert Menzies, Afternoon Light (London, Cassell, 
1967) . 
26 See, for example, H. Basil Robinson's biography of 
Diefenbaker entitled Diefenbaker's World. A Populist in Foreign 
Affairs (London, University of Toronto Press, 1989) , and the 
summary of his views in Peter Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth 
Policies and Attitudes to South Africa" (Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, London) , Paper presented to South African 
Historical Society Conference, University of Potchefstroom, 
February 1993. Most succinct in his review of Diefenbaker's role 
at the 1960 and 1961 conferences is J. R. T. Wood's article 
entitled "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd in the 
Withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth", Journal of 
Contemporary African Studies, Vol.6, No.1/2, April/October 1987, 
pp.153-179. 
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It accounts for the views of African and Indian organisations 
on the Commonwealth connection and introduces a closer look at 
economic, political and strategic themes in the relationship. 
While not significantly deviating from the explanations based 
upon political and diplomatic factors mentioned by authors such 
as Miller, Austin, Barber and Barratt and others, somewhat more 
emphasis has been given to the role of successive British 
governments in adopting what a few writers and commentators have 
referred to "appeasement" strategies27 in relation to South 
Africa's racial policies. 
The effect of British reluctance to put economic or other forms 
of pressure on South Africa before and after 1961 was an 
important factor in driving black nationalist opinion towards 
a redefinition of strategy relating to the application of 
international pressure on the South African government. The 
United Nations became the main forum for the ANC, the SAIC and 
the PAC in their appeals to international opinion. Before 1961 
the main aim was to appeal to the newly-independent members of 
the Commonwealth to use their influence to try and force a change 
in South Africa's polices, or failing that, to get her excluded 
from the Commonwealth. When the latter had been achieved, the 
Commonwealth remained an important forum (especially after 1961 
when the organisation acquired an Afro-Asian majority of members) 
to put pressure on Britain and the other white dominions to 
isolate South Africa even further. It is true to say that during 
the long years of exile the South African liberation movements 
achieved an intimate and sympathetic hearing among Commonwealth 
circles in London and of course in African and Asian Commonwealth 
capitals. At times the Commonweal th was at the forefront of 
international attempts to isolate South Africa diplomatically, 
politically and in the sphere of sport (notwithstanding the 
27 See, in particular, Dutfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience, 
and, for example, the discussion in M. Legum, et al, Against All 
Reasons: Britain and South Africa in the Eighties (London, Fabian 
Society, 1981). 
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opposition from Britain towards any form of economic pressure) 
and London remained the headquarters of the most important 
liberation movement in exile between 1961 and 1990. 
The epilogue of this thesis will briefly discuss the effect which 
southern African issues in general and South Africa, in 
particular, had on the development of the Commonwealth after 1961 
in the wider context of an organisation which was rapidly losing 
its British-centred nature and becoming more of a "mini-UNO" in 
terms of its size, diversity of opinions and methods of 
operation. The factors leading to the return to the Commonwealth 
fold in the much-changed circumstances of the 1990's will be 
discussed as will the reception given to the readmittance of the 
country to the "Club" by the main organs of white and black 
opinion in 1994 and 1995. The implications of renewed 
Commonweal th membership for South Africa's trading and diplomatic 
relations will also be touched upon. 
The archival sources of use to this study were drawn primarily 
from the Transvaal Archives in Pretoria, the Cape Archives in 
Cape Town, the Public Record Office in London and the Institute 
for Contemporary History in Bloemfontein. Restrictions were still 
in place in South Africa when this study was under-way (1990-
1995) on access to relevant cabinet files and foreign affairs 
department files. This made it necessary to concentrate upon the 
private collections of prominent South African statesmen who 
contributed to the formation of government policy towards Britain 
and the Commonwealth in general during the period 1945 to 1961. 
The files of the Smuts and Te Water collections in Pretoria were 
of considerable use for the immediate post-war years and revealed 
a mass of relevant information on government attitudes to 
Britain and the Commonwealth during the Smuts and Malan periods. 
The Strijdom collection contained some useful private and 
official correspondence which gave insights into Strij dom' s 
earlier and later feelings concerning republicanism and the 
Commonweal th connection. The Geyer collection in the Cape 
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Archives contained a wealth of correspondence between Malan and 
Geyer (in London) revealing much of Malan's feelings concerning 
British decolonisation policy and his response to that policy. 
The Donges collection was useful on matters pertaining to 
immigration and citizenship during Malan's premiership and on 
some economic and financial implications of republican 
independence in 1960 and 1961. 
In Bloemfontein the Eric Lauw collection contained some useful 
correspondence as well as collections of manuscripts and articles 
written by the minister and revealing much of his private and 
public attitudes before and after 1948. It also contained a mass 
of local and overseas press cuttings that were valuable for a 
study of the period between the Sharpeville incident and the May 
1960 Commonwealth prime ministers' 
collection did not reveal much 
conference. The H.F. Verwoerd 
about 
official and private 
up to the withdrawal 
sentiments during the 
the prime minister's 
crucial period leading 
conference in 1961 but contained some useful 
correspondence on the issue of the high commission territories. 
It also provided a wealth of press cuttings on various aspects 
of relevant internal and external policy, including the 1961 
conference itself. 
The files of the ANC collection based in the Historical Papers 
section of the William Cullen library at the University of the 
Witwatersrand contained reports of annual conferences and 
national executive committee meetings of the ANC which contained 
some useful information on the organisation's attitudes towards 
British imperialism, decolonisation and aspects of foreign policy 
in general. Pamphlets and official statements on the National 
Party's republican campaign and on the Commonwealth connection 
in the period 1960-61 were particularly valuable. Some useful 
references to the attitude of the PAC, in copies of speeches and 
statements by various spokesmen of the latter organisation, were 
also noted. 
The files of the dominions (later Commonwealth Relations) office 
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in London, together with those of the British cabinet between 
1945 and 1961 provided most of the foundation material on which 
the important arguments and deductions of this study are based. 
Only a handful of the files selected proved to be restricted 
(usually those relating to aspects of defence policy) and it was 
fortuitous that the thirty-year rule coincided with the opening 
of files for 1960 and some for 1961 when the author was in 
London. Most useful for this study was the correspondence between 
British high commissioners in South Africa from Baring to Maud 
between the years 1945 and 1960 (although time and financial 
constraints made it impossible to extend the study of the latter 
up until the 1961 Commonwealth conference) . The nuances of 
British policy towards Verwoerd's unfolding republican programme 
and the concerns relating to South Africa's Commonwealth 
membership in the period 1958 to 1961 are revealed in the 
correspondence between the high commissioner and his secretary 
of state. These were supplemented by some particularly useful 
cabinet discussions relating to the 1960 conference and its 
aftermath. 
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PART 1: SMUTS, SOUTH AFRICA AND THE POST-WAR 
COMMONWEALTH, 1945-1948 
2 
Introduction 
General Jan Smuts's last four years as prime minister represented 
the high point of South Africa's post-war Commonweal th relations. 
They were the last years (before 1994) in which South Africa 
enjoyed a reasonably intimate and cordial relationship with the 
British Commonwealth of Nations. Yet, even under the man who 
personified the spirit of Commonwealth solidarity in peace and 
in war and who can be considered in some ways as the architect 
of the Commonwealth concept itself, forces antagonistic to South 
Africa's Commonwealth relations were gathering strength. The 
country's deteriorating race relations proved to be the most 
important of these forces and provided the context within which 
other factors of an economic, political and ideological nature 
operated. 
It was the relationship with Britain that was the crucial 
defining point of South Africa's Commonweal th relationship during 
Smuts's premiership (and thereafter). The British response to 
South African issues and the effect of this response on public 
opinion in South Africa towards the Commonwealth will therefore 
provide much of the material of this section's study. 
Smuts's post-war government faced increasingly awkward relations 
with the new Labour government in Britain over issues such as the 
treatment of Indians in South Africa, the incorporation of the 
high commission territories as well as the thorny problem of 
South West Africa. But at the same time the weakness of the 
Commonwealth trading system became glaringly evident in 
successive sterling crises which Smuts's government was called 
upon to help resolve by giving loans to Britain and by boosting 
the gold reserves of the sterling area. Britain's response to the 
South African "problem" was thus narrowly circumscribed by 
economic and strategic factors militating against any sort of 
harsh criticism of a valued Commonwealth ally. Britain's support 
of Smuts at the UNO over the Indian and South West African 
questions would in turn begin to alienate African and Indian 
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opinion in South Africa from the British (and, thus, the 
Commonwealth) connection, a process that would intensify during 
the years of Nationalist rule that followed. 
The war-time stimulus to the South African economy had boosted 
industrialisation and had increased the forces of economic 
nationalism and protectionism in South Africa. In the long term, 
post-war world economic trends favoured a lessened dependence on 
the Commonwealth economic nexus for South Africa and the other 
dominions but in South Africa's case these trends were reinforced 
by ideological factors (Afrikaner economic nationalism) and 
political factors (trading interests within Smuts's own party). 
Much the same could be said for other areas of South Africa's 
Commonwealth relations such as military connections and 
Commonwealth political co-operation, areas in which Smuts had to 
tread warily in the face of a vociferous anti-British opposition 
in parliament. 
At home Smuts faced the growing strength of Afrikaner nationalism 
on the one hand, and African nationalism on the other. Both 
nationalisms had received enormous stimulus during World War II 
and drew upon conditions in South Africa after the war to garner 
further support. While African nationalists condemned Smuts's 
policy of indefinite trusteeship and pushed for equal voting and 
civic rights with the white population, using the principles 
enunciated in the war-time Atlantic Charter to back up their 
claims1 , Afrikaner nationalists were pushing for exactly the 
opposite - an Afrikaner republic in which the African, Indian and 
coloured population would be forever subordinate to white 
control. 
Thus, the dilemma which faced Smuts in terms of South Africa's 
Commonwealth relations and foreign relations in general was that 
1 See Tom Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945 
(Johannesburg, Ravan Press, 1985), chapters 1 and 2 and T.R.H. 
Davenport, South Africa: A Modern History (London, Macmillan, 
1977), pp.244-251 for a useful summary of developments in black 
politics during Smuts's post-war period of government. 
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which has been faced by every South African government since 
how to reconcile the "Colour Question" with the need to maintain 
normal relations with the outside world. "Colour queers 
pitch everywhere" was Smuts's much- quoted lament 
testimony to the difficulties which race relations at 
my poor 
bearing 
home had 
caused him in his diplomatic dealings at the United Nations and, 
to a lesser extent, in Commonwealth circles by 1947. 2 The irony 
is that Smuts's philosophical leanings and the whole history of 
his engagement with and contribution to the Commonwealth ideal 
had not prepared him for the storm facing his government over 
race policy. In order to understand the background to this crisis 
in South Africa's international relations it is necessary to take 
a brief look at the history of Smuts's involvement with the 
Commonwealth "ideal" since the end of the South African War of 
18 99-1902 and his evolving interpretation of South Africa's 
position within the British Empire. 
Defeat and reconciliation at the turn of the century had given 
Smuts his faith in the Commonwealth ideal and his vision of the 
Commonwealth as an "equal brotherhood of those who had ruled with 
those who had been ruled". 3 That these concepts of 
reconciliation and equal brotherhood applied only to English and 
Afrikaner in South Africa was self-evident in terms of the 
context of the time and Smuts's own thinking. "Race relations" 
was a term which, until the end of the Second World War, referred 
to the relations between the two white language groups in South 
Africa and not between the white and black races. Smuts's faith 
in the Commonwealth, undimmed by 1945, rested primarily on the 
premise that it represented the continuing basis for Anglo-
Afrikaner reconciliation at home and the chief hope of peace 
abroad. The question of the relations between white and black at 
home did not enter into the definition of Commonwealth and was 
entirely a different, and to Smuts, subsidiary issue of domestic 
2 Quoted in W.K. Hancock, Smuts, Vol.2, The Fields of Force, 
1919-1950 (Cambridge University Press, 1968), p.473. 
3 N. Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience (London, Mackay 
and Chatham, 1969), p.377. 
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significance only. 
To Smuts the only way in which real and meaningful freedom for 
South Africa could be achieved was within the British Empire. 4 
As Geyser puts it, "he saw in the British Empire the imperium 
within which his holistic concept could be realised in 
practice" . 5 His negotiations with the Liberal British government 
of Henry Campbell-Bannerman after 1906 for the self- government 
of the former Boer republics had formed the background and the 
basis for this belief. Thereafter he was convinced that South 
Africa as part of the British Empire would "gain the necessary 
standing so that she could maintain herself as a small nation in 
international politics". 6 
By the time of the outbreak of the First World War the dominions 
of South Africa, New Zealand, Australia and Canada were in full 
control of their own internal affairs. By 1920 they were 
practically autonomous in external as well as internal matters. 
During and after the First World War Smuts had joined with the 
Canadians and Australians in asserting the rights of the 
dominions vis-a-vis Britain and had also shared the expansionist 
aims of the others by demonstrating his desire to annex South 
West Africa and to extend South African influence into Equatorial 
Africa. His assertion of South African status at Versailles in 
1919 and in the League of Nations was a further indication of his 
desire for equality for South Africa within the British Empire. 
His "shrewdness" was to co-operate with an empire which was 
transforming itself into a Commonwealth, notes Hancock. 7 
The Commonwealth, Smuts believed, was the embryo from which the 
League of Nations should grow because it was based on the 
4 O. Geyser, "A Commonweal th Prime Minister. General Jan 
Christiaan Smuts", The Round Table, No. 320, 1991, p.432. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, p.5. 
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principles of national freedom and political decentralisation. 
This vision was not shared by his Afrikaner Nationalist enemies 
at home where he was criticised by for being a traitor to his 
people and the "handmaiden of Empire". "Holism", his obsession 
with larger political entities, was labelled by his enemies as 
"imperialism". But to him the Commonwealth was a secure toehold 
which humanity had already won "upon the cliff of world unity and 
freedom". 8 
Smuts hated the "disruptive nationalism" which Hertzog's views 
represented as opposed to what he called "constructive" 
nationalist sentiment or true "patriotism". The Nationalists 
under Hertzog were by 1920 proposing independence and republican 
status outside the Empire, to be achieved by the gradual 
conversion of the majority of white voters to the republican 
cause. Smuts vigorously opposed this aim. He saw secession from 
the Commonwealth as implying the break-up of the Union into 
Afrikaans, English (and even black) provinces. Secession would 
mean, in other words, "political suicide" for the Afrikaner and 
all whites in South Africa. But at the same time he remained a 
strong supporter of Irish independence and saw that freedom for 
Ireland was as necessary as it had been for South Africa. 9 
In 1920 he said that the Empire had to change into a 
Commonwealth of independent states in which the only method of 
taking decisions would be by the imperial conference system. The 
leaders of the autonomous dominions would agree to take 
resolutions on issues that concerned them and there would be no 
Empire foreign policy without consent of a member state. In this 
belief, which was expounded in a memorandum to the 1921 imperial 
conference, he anticipated the Balfour Declaration of 1926. But 
he was defeated on the issue in 1921 by Hughes of Australia and 
Massey of New Zealand who saw no need for "constitutional 
8 Ibid. , p. 1 7. 
9 Ibid. , p. 4 9. 
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tinkerers''. 10 It was left to his Nationalist opponent, J.B.M. 
Hertzog, to negotiate in 1926 the status of autonomy Smuts had 
envisaged for South Africa. By 1934 the Statute of Westminster 
and the Status Acts had taken the constitutional development of 
the Union within the Commonwealth even further by removing the 
theoretical superiority of the British parliament in legislation 
and by acknowledging the doctrine of the divisibility of the 
crown. 
Smuts, according to Mansergh, had been the first to attribute the 
term "British Commonwealth of Nations" to the self-governing 
states of the Empire, 11 to the "white" dominions which had 
achieved virtual autonomy by the end of the First World War. The 
word "Commonwealth" had been used in a similar context by other 
statesmen but Smuts emphasized it in opposition to the idea of 
imperial federation which was being strongly propounded by Lionel 
Curtis during and after the war. Smuts, in 1917, was using the 
term to describe an existing situation - the co-operation of 
autonomous states within the Empire. But it had its origins in 
what was seen as the successful experiments in self-government 
by white, colonial communities in Canada, New Zealand, Australia 
and South Africa since the mid-nineteenth century. 
By the early 1920 's the idea was already being extended to 
incorporate the possibility of non-white communities such as 
India achieving dominion status, and thus Commonweal th 
membership. 12 But it was only after the enormous boost given to 
non-European nationalism in Asia by the Second World War that the 
first non-white state, India, was given such status. The idea of 
Empire thus existed side by side with the idea of Commonwealth 
for many years, right up to the point, in fact, where 
Commonwealth superseded Empire in the 1960's. In 1949, the 
10 Ibid., p.49. 
11 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p.23. 
12 Ibid., p.25. 
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Commonwealth had received its greatest post-war constitutional 
shift in definition with the acceptance of republics into its 
midst. By then the term "Commonwealth" meant different things to 
different people as the British Labour prime minister, Clement 
Attlee, had pointed 
of the king as head 
out in a speech explaining 
of the Commonwealth. In the 
the new status 
speech he had 
used three different terms ("Empire", "British Commonwealth" and 
simply, "Commonwealth") ·to describe the same phenomenon. 13 Smuts, 
who had been replaced by the Nationalist leader, D.F. Malan, 
never quite came to terms with these new developments and 
remained bitterly opposed to the precedent of republicanism 
within the Commonwealth and its extension to South Africa. 
Smuts's first encounters with international opinion concerning 
his handling of racial problems at home had come in the early 
1920's and were a foretaste of what, on a much greater scale, was 
to come after the Second World War. Hancock notes that by the 
early 1920's the stream of ''pro-Boer'' sentiment in Britain was 
rapidly drying up and a stream of "pro-Native" sentiment was 
rising. 14 Much of this was a result of publicity surrounding the 
Bondelswarts rebellion in South West Africa and Smuts's harsh 
actions in response to the rebellion. South Africa's actions had 
been discussed and condemned in the League of Nations and helped 
to accelerate a long-term change in the direction of British 
public opinion on South Africa. 
It was in the early 1920's, also, that South Africa's Indian 
policies first attracted attention in the Commonwealth context. 
At the 1921 imperial conference the Indian delegate, T.B.Sapru, 
had noted that if the Indian problem in South Africa were allowed 
to "fester" much longer it would pass beyond the bounds of a 
domestic issue and would become a question of foreign policy "of 
such gravity that upon it the unity of the Empire may founder 
13 Ibid., p.29. 
14 Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force, p.109. 
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irretrievably" . 15 This, as Hancock points out, signalized the 
reopening of a quarrel which twenty years later was to prove 
"ruinous" to Smuts. 
But by the beginning of the Second World War, having defeated 
Hertzog's supporters on the issue of neutrality, Smuts's faith 
in the Commonwealth was undiminished and, in fact, had been 
greatly enhanced. In January 1940 he was predicting the 
Commonwealth as "the first tentative beginnings of great things 
for the future of the World". 16 In 1943, after a dramatic three 
years of war in which Britain and the Empire had come close to 
destruction, he recognised that the Commonwealth would emerge 
materially weakened from the war. This fact had suggested to him 
a grouping of the states of western Europe with the Commonwealth 
to form a third force in world affairs between the increasingly 
powerful United States and Russia. 17 
By 1945 it was becoming clear that there was a drift towards a 
looser form of Commonwealth association. This was demonstrated 
by the fact that most member countries were opposed to closer 
forms of co-operation in defence and economic matters. Smuts 
himself had opposed the idea of a unified General Staff or the 
revival of the Imperial war Cabinet during the war. He had also 
rejected the idea of the Labour prime minister, Clement Attlee, 
that British heavy industry should be shifted for strategic 
reasons to the dominions (because it implied greater strategic 
and economic unity) . 18 
After the United Nations San Francisco conference in 1945, Smuts 
gave the British high commissioner, Evelyn Baring, an interview 
in which he outlined his view of international affairs in the 
u Quoted in Hancock, Smuts: Fields of Force, p.139. 
16 Mansergh, Commonweal th Experience, p. 3 77. 
17 b. d I l ., p.293. 
18 G. Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in My Time (London, Allen 
and Unwin, 1961), p.410. 
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post-war world and expressed his unshaken conviction that the 
Commonwealth, as a mature institution, with great experience all 
over the globe, should act as "honest broker" between the 
inexperienced United States and the Russians. 19 The United 
Kingdom would have to maintain its leading role in the 
Commonwealth and in the world at large, he said, in order to 
prevent "disruptive forces" from gaining an upper hand in the 
world. He regarded the new Labour leaders in Britain as "good and 
sincere men" 20 but the dangers were their lack of experience and 
their tendency to see the Russians through "rose-tinted 
spectacles" . 21 Attlee, though a "good man", "lacked personal 
vision and the quality of international leadership''. 
Smuts's view of the Labour government in Britain had been 
coloured, to some extent, by his strong friendship and identity 
of views with the war-time Conservative leader, Winston 
Churchill. The accession of a Labour government had shocked him 
as much as it had Churchill and it meant a certain reduction of 
intimacy and the beginnings of a greater degree of formality in 
the relationship between the new government and South Africa. 
Nevertheless, it soon became clear that Attlee's government was 
as strongly pro-Commonwealth and Empire as Churchill's had been. 
As Bullock points out, Labour's years of coalition with the 
Tories meant that Commonwealth and Empire were no longer 
criticized as "imperialism" and were seen instead as providing 
powerful support to Britain in war. 22 Labour realised the 
Empire's importance as a guarantee of Britain's continued 
influence as a great power. 
The Labour view of self-government and independence differed from 
19 Charles Douglas-Home, Evelyn Baring. the Last Proconsul 
(London, Collins, 1978), p.143. 
20 Ibid. 
21 b. d I l ., p.144. 
22 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary. 1945-1951 
(London, W.M.Norton, 1983), pp.64-65. 
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that of the Tories but Attlee did not intend, any less than 
Churchill, to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire. 
In any case, it soon became clear how much the new government 
needed South Africa's economic co-operation within the 
Commonwealth and Empire. There could be no talk of a lessening 
of British support for Smuts, who was seen as a loyal 
Commonwealth statesman, in 
nationalism in South Africa 
a period of 
and declining 
influence in the post-war world. 
rising 
British 
Afrikaner 
power and 
The dominions, which had emerged from the war greatly 
·strengthened relative to Britain, were even less inclined towards 
accepting direction from the centre of Empire than before. The 
signing of military alliances with the United States by some 
Commonwealth countries after the war reflected this loosening of 
the Commonwealth strategic relationship. South Africa was no 
exception to this general trend towards a more decentralised 
Commonwealth after the war. However, in South Africa certain 
unique factors existed that were to reinforce the trend towards 
a more distant and formal relationship with Britain in particular 
and with the rest of the Commonwealth in general. South Africa's 
racial policies, the growth of Afrikaner nationalism, Smuts's 
aims concerning the high commission territories and economic 
protectionism were factors which contributed to a lessening of 
the intimacy between Britain and South Africa in this period. 
Smuts, described by one commentator as "quintessentially, a pro-
Commonwealth man" 23 (in contrast to the Nationalist opposition 
leader, Dr D.F. Malan, who "initially, at 
on the defensive 
least, was not") , found 
against attacks from his government to be 
Commonweal th sources in 
unofficial Commonwealth 
the UNO and even, 
conferences. British 
on occasions, in 
support for South 
Africa concerning the "unwritten rule" of non-interference in the 
23 Peter Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies and Attitudes 
to South Africa, 1948-1991 and beyond" (Institute of Commonwealth 
Studies, University of London, 1992), Unpublished paper presented 
to the South African Historical Society Annual Conference, 
University of Potchefstroom, February, 1993, p.32. 
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domestic affairs of Commonwealth member states would prove, 
already in Smuts's post-war premiership, to be inadequate to stem 
the tide of criticism from India and from other sources (although 
there was, as yet, no official expression of such views from 
prime ministers' conferences until the early 1960's) 
13 
Chapter 1: Smuts, the Indian Question and the Commonwealth. 
Evelyn Baring, the British high commissioner in South Africa from 
1944 to 1951, reported to his government in London soon after the 
war had ended that the real problem facing South Africa was the 
relationship between "European" and "non-European" . 1 According 
to Baring, the desire of the Nationalist Afrikaners to exclude 
English speakers from any say in the government of the country 
was basically related to their desire to have full control over 
"Native" policy. But he foresaw many problems for Britain in the 
future relationship with South Africa because of the racial issue 
and burgeoning Afrikaner nationalism. During his period of office 
he had had to deal with Smuts's government over the "Indian 
Question", South West Africa and the issue closest to his own 
heart, the high commission territories. All of them created 
special difficulties for Attlee's Labour government and none more 
so perhaps than the issue of South Africa's treatment of its 
Indian population. On the Indian issue Smuts's views were seen 
as only "re la ti vely more liberal" 
Nationalists. 2 
than those of the 
The reaction of individual Commonwealth countries to South 
Africa's racial policies varied according to the extent to which 
these policies impacted on certain political, economic and 
emotional interest in those countries. Thus India, with its 
descendants bearing some of the brunt of discriminatory laws in 
South Africa, was inevitably at the forefront of the campaign 
against South Africa in the UN and in the Commonwealth, at least 
until Ghana and other African countries joined the organisation. 
At the other extreme, Britain, Australia, New Zealand and, to 
a lesser extent, Canada, were anxious to avoid a split in the 
Commonwealth along racial lines and also not to antagonise South 
Africa by condemning her racial policies too strongly. 
1 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, pp.146-147. 
2 Ibid., p.147. 
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During Smuts's post-war premiership it was the Indian and South 
West African questions which preoccupied Commonwealth statesmen 
the most in terms of relations with South Africa. The broader 
problem of South Africa's treatment of her non-white population 
in general only attracted attention in the early 1950's when the 
apartheid item was added to the agenda of the UNO. The Indian and 
South West African questions created severe problems for South 
Africa's Commonwealth relations during the immediate post-war 
years. What appeared at first as a dispute between two member 
states, India and South Africa, broadened into a question of 
principle upon which the other countries were forced, however 
reluctantly, to take sides. In the process, the Commonweal th 
suffered a blow to its cohesiveness (already weakened by the 
decentralising tendencies taking place in the economic and 
military fields) . In South Africa the loyalties of many whites 
and blacks to the Commonwealth were strained and called into 
question even by some of its most strident supporters. What one 
commentator had called the "melancholy movement" towards a white 
consensus on racial matters3 began to supersede ethnic 
allegiances even during the Smuts period; while among Indians and 
blacks a sense of betrayal at the hands of the white Commonwealth 
grew. 
It was the Indian question which provided the most important 
challenge to South Africa's Commonwealth relations in the period 
of Smuts's post-war premiership. During the Second World War the 
seeds of the increasingly bitter conflict between India and South 
Africa had been laid when Smuts introduced the Pegging Act in 
1943 4 which restricted further the residential and trading rights 
of Indians in the urban areas. The Act was largely a result of 
the stridently anti-Indian agitation in the ranks of the Natal 
section of the United Party and from Colonel C. F. Stallard' s 
3 J.D.B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions (London, 
Chatto and Windus, 1966), p.101. 
4 M. Wilson and L. Thompson (eds), The Oxford History of 
South Africa, Vol. II, South Africa 1870-1966 (London, Oxford 
University Press, 1975), p.457. 
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Dominion Party. By 1944 it had come to the attention of the 
Indian legislative assembly and had created a major intra-
Commonwealth row that threatened to derail the allied war effort 
in the Far East. In 1944 resolutions were introduced in the 
Indian assembly calling for economic sanctions against South 
Africa. There were also calls for the withdrawal of the Indian 
high commissioner from the Union and, more significantly, for 
Britain as the controlling power in India to apply pressure on 
South Africa to amend its discriminatory laws. 5 
The heated nature of the debates in the Indian legislature in 
November and December of 1944 is illustrated by some of the 
speeches made. There were calls for Indian troops "to drive some 
sense into South African Whites in the way they did to Italians 116 
and ominous references were made to the future of the 
Commonwealth and the allied war effort if Britain did not step 
in to put pressure on South Africa. The deputy leader of the 
Muslim League Party in the assembly remarked, for example, that 
he "did not care for the war effort", nor did he care of the 
"Commonwealth of Nations" if his position in that Commonwealth 
was to be that of a "hewer of wood and a drawer of water" . 7 He 
suggested that an ultimatum be sent to the British government to 
the effect that if they did not exert pressure on the South 
Africans "India would not give any help in the prosecution of the 
war". 
In the same Indian debate some speakers had noted the role played 
by "British South Africans" in the agitation for discriminatory 
laws in South Africa. One member asked whether it was expected 
of Indians "to have greater regard for the solidarity of the 
Commonwealth of Nations than those English settlers in Natal 
5 Indian Opinion, 5 January 1945. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid., 12 January 1945. 
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have?" 8 The Hindustan Times commented that there could be 
"nothing more damning" than this 
of the so-called Commonwealth 
directly responsible". 9 
"open breach between two members 
for which General Smuts was 
The way in which the South African government have 
deliberately gone back on their solemn commitments and 
are now seeking to oppress and humiliate the coloured 
races within their territory will remain as one of the 
most bitter ironies of Empire history. It is curious 
that neither General Smuts not the South African 
Government appear to realise the blatant hypocrisy in 
talking of fighting for democracy and world peace and 
at the same time following an unabashed racial policy 
calculated to crush the Indian community economically 
and politically. 
It is clear that in India South Africa's racial policies had been 
recognised as a Commonwealth problem of great importance for the 
post-war period. Smuts (and the British) were to be faced with 
a seemingly intractable political problem that promised to 
disturb the functioning and co-operation of the Commmonwealth in 
the crucial years immediately after the war. It would prove to 
be difficult to maintain the unwritten Commonwealth code of non-
interference in domestic affairs of member states in the face of 
anti-racialist feeling in India and elsewhere. 
An example of this was soon provided. In February 1945 it was 
announced that representations regarding the position of Indians 
in South Africa would be made to the Commonwealth relations 
conference in London. Although this was to be an unofficial 
conference with no decision-making powers (unlike prime 
ministers'conferences), considerable publicity was given to its 
discussions and Indian Opinion claimed that "Never at any time 
8 Ibid., 5 January 1945. 
9 Quoted in Indian Opinion, 12 January 1945. 
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has the case of Indians been placed as strongly as it was placed 
before the Commonweal th of Nations on the present occasion." 10 
The Indian representative at the conference was quoted as saying 
that "unless visible steps were taken to put an end to the 
present inequalities from which Indians suffered [in South 
Africa] the Commonwealth would one day split". It was, however, 
also recognised in the official communique at the end of the 
conference that if the British were to attempt to bring pressure 
to bear on the South Africa it would mean "repudiating one of the 
basic principles on which the Commonwealth rested". 11 
Britain's response to the dispute between India and South Africa 
was from the beginning one of strict non-intervention. On 27 
April 1945 the secretary of state for India, L.S. Amery, stated 
in the House of Commons that as far as Britain was concerned "the 
matter is entirely one for the Government of India" . 12 This 
statement was noted unfavourably in South Africa by Indian 
Opinion which asked what Britain and other allied nations would 
do "if the settlers enforce their anti-Indian policy which 
closely resembles Hitler's anti-Jewish policy? .... Racial 
intolerance is as undesirable in South Africa as in Germany''. 13 
As one commentator has noted, the clash between South Africa and 
the Asian Commonwealth left Britain in an "invidious position". 14 
It symbolised the "clash of loyalty to an old Dominion versus 
the demands of newly independent states''· The British response 
was to try to maintain the unity of the Commonwealth by means of 
a delicate balancing act between those who advocated a strong 
10 Ibid., 16 March 1945. 
11 Ibid., 13 April 1945. 
12 Ibid., 27 April 1945. 
13 Ibid., 18 May 1945. 
14 J. Barber and J. Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy. 
The Search for Status and Security. 1945-1988 (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.26. 
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line against South Africa and those who wished to continue with 
a form of official neutrality but discreet support for the Smuts 
government. At cabinet level the two sides were represented by 
the India office and the colonial office (CO), on the one hand, 
and the dominions office (DO), or after 1949 the Commonwealth 
relations office (CRO), on the other. 
Usually the views of the dominions secretaries (Viscount Addison, 
Philip Noel-Baker and Patrick Gordon Walker, during the Labour 
government's period of office) prevailed and were strongly 
influenced by representations from the high commissioner in South 
Africa, Evelyn Baring. The strategic and economic value of the 
South African connection was valued so highly that Attlee's 
labour government was prepared to place a higher priority on 
Smuts's continued co-operation in the Commonwealth than the need 
to mollify India's outraged feelings, even in the crucial period 
leading up to Indian independence in 1947. 
As Pel ling has pointed out, the difficulties and constraints 
under which the post-war Labour government operated in the 
economic, military and diplomatic fields led to a dilution of 
socialist principles and an inevitable dependence on the United 
States. 15 Commonweal th and colonial issues did not always receive 
the undivided attention of the government and after India had 
announced its republican intentions not all members of the 
Commonwealth affairs' committee of cabinet were "equally 
enthusiastic about the desirability of keeping the [Commonwealth] 
association in existence 11 • 16 The India secretary, F. W. Pethick-
Lawrence (1945-46) was noted as being "too old and too 
gentlemanly" (by Lord Wavell) 17 and was not prepared to press his 
opposition to South Africa to the point of creating a breach with 
his colleagues. Felling notes that there was a lack of concern 
15 Henry Felling, The Labour Governments. 1945-51 (London, 
Macmillan, 1984), p.266. 
16 Ibid., p. 162. 
17 Ibid. , p. 149. 
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with "black-white issues" in the immediate post-war period and 
that Labour was more worried, for instance, about the effect on 
South Africa if E. Shinwell, a Jewish cabinet minister, was 
shifted from the electricity and power portfolio to the 
Commonwealth relations portfolio than about broader racial 
issues. 18 
The rationale for British non-intervention in South Africa's race 
policies was usually couched in terms of the Commonwealth non-
interference rule or in terms of Article 2(7) of the UN Charter. 
The communique at the end of the 1945 Commonwealth relations 
conference had expressed this principle but as the dispute 
between India and South Africa intensified it became more 
difficult for Britain and other Commonwealth countries to 
maintain a strictly neutral stance. In 1946 the Indian government 
brought the dispute to the United Nations for the first time (in 
response to the passing of the Asiatic Land Tenure and 
Representation Act in South Africa) . 
Smuts's high commissioner in London, G. Heaton Nicholls, 
predicted that the British would be sympathetic to the Indian 
complaint "since they will wish to do nothing which will in the 
least antagonise the newly formed Indian Government in the early 
stages of its authority". 19 He felt that if South Africa were to 
stand firm on her "legal rights" under Article 2 (7) the UNO would 
be confined to a discussion of the legal and procedural aspects. 
On both counts he was wrong, however, for as it turned out 
Britain supported South Africa in the domestic jurisdiction 
argument but the General Assembly threw out the request by South 
Africa to refer the dispute to the International Court. It 
declared instead that friendly relations had been impaired 
18 Ibid., p.181. 
19 Transvaal Archives Depot (TA) , J.C. Smuts Collection 
(JCS), B. (Public papers; Union of South Africa papers),Vol.165, 
May-September 1946, No.62, Telegram, High Commissioner, London -
Acting Prime Minister, Pretoria, August 1946. 
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between states and that both countries should abide by the Cape 
Town Agreement of 1927. 20 It also claimed that the treatment of 
Indians in South Africa came within the provisions of the UN 
Charter. 
The British cabinet discussions of the India-South Africa dispute 
(and the South West Africa problem which parallelled it at that 
time) reveal one important policy motivation prevailing above all 
others: that is, the desire not to offend Smuts's government to 
the point that it would consider leaving the Commonwealth. The 
dominions office seems to have been convinced that the latter was 
a very real possibility even under a government as friendly to 
the Commonwealth as that of General Smuts's. 21 
Addison argued in a memorandum prepared for his cabinet 
colleagues on 21 October 1946 that Britain should support South 
Africa's domestic jurisdiction argument at the UNO because 
"complete silence" on the issue would "inevitably cause 
resentment in the Union and would be highly prejudicial to our 
relations with the Union Government" . 22 In contrast the India 
secretary, Pethick-Lawrence, argued that "absolute neutrality" 
was necessary in order to make the Indian government believe that 
"there is room for India within the British Commonwealth on a 
20 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign policy, p.25. 
21 Even before the Indian complaint at the UNO had been laid 
a despatch from Baring to Addison at the end of 1945 predicted 
that relations with South Africa would pass through a "critical 
phase" in the "next few years" largely as a result of the growth 
of Afrikaner nationalism. It also expressed concern at the 
problem of a successor to Smuts. Addison enclosed the despatch 
for cabinet perusal and discussion. (Public Record Office (PRO), 
London, Cabinet Office (CAB) Papers 129/2, Cabinet Memoranda, 6 
September - 10 October 1945, C.P. (45)179, "Political Affairs in 
South Africa." Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, 18 September 1945). 
22 PRO, CAB 129/13, C.P. (46)394, 
United Nations: Indian Complaint 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State 
October 1946. 
"General Assembly of the 
Against South Africa", 
for Dominion Affairs, 21 
21 
basis of equality and community of interests". 23 
On 25 October the British cabinet decided to support South 
Africa's domestic jurisdiction case despite arguments from 
Pethick-Lawrence to the effect that Indians would regard such 
support as direct opposition to them. 24 It was also decided to 
inform the Indian delegation in advance of the British line at 
UNO and to instruct British delegates "to avoid expressing any 
views on the merits of the dispute" unofficially and officially. 
On 4 November the matter was discussed again by cabinet by which 
time it had become clear that feelings in the General Assembly 
were against the domestic jurisdiction argument. Pethick-Lawrence 
again argued for a policy of abstention in the debate saying that 
if the British delegation took a line that was unfavourable to 
the Indian case "there would be serious repercussions in 
India" . 25 Addison, in contrast, again stressed the importance of 
British support for the domestic jurisdiction argument and argued 
that if the Assembly did not accept it, the International Court 
would have to make a decision. 
The cabinet again came down on Addison's side. The feeling was 
expressed that it was important to "avoid setting a precedent for 
intervention by the UNO in matter like this, which had hitherto 
been regarded as within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign 
states". It was also noted that the USA, with its "Negro 
Question" and India, with its "differential treatment" of various 
communities, should "see the importance of this". British 
delegates should be made aware of the "possible repercussions on 
India herself and on other parts of the British Commonwealth if 
it were held that the United Nations was competent to intervene 
23 CAB 129/13, C.P. (46)397, 23 October 1946. 
24 CAB 128/6 (Cabinet conclusions: 1 July - 31 December 
1946), C.M.91(46)3, "United Nations: Indian Complaint against 
South Africa", 25 October 1946. 
~ C.M.94(46)1, 4 November 1946. 
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in matters of this kind".u 
When the matter came before the General Assembly on 8 December 
for a final vote, it decided by 32 votes to 15 with 7 abstentions 
to reject the South African domestic jurisdiction argument. 27 Of 
the Commonwealth countries, New Zealand and Canada supported the 
British vote in favour of South Africa while Australia abstained 
and India voted against South Africa. The British foreign 
minister, Ernest Bevin, noted that India had won a "moral 
victory" but that the UNO discussions "might have served a useful 
purpose'' by bringing home to the South African government "the 
strength of feeling in ~he world about their native policy".a 
Britain's position on this first UN resolution on South Africa's 
racial policies was widely reported and commented upon in South 
Africa and may be presumed to have symbolised in the public eye 
the "Commonwealth" attitude towards South Africa (which, of 
course, invoked very different responses among the country's 
various communities). The attitude of the other Commonwealth 
countries, although noted, was not as widely commented upon. 
Among the Indian community in South Africa the British and other 
"white" Commonwealth countries' support for South Africa's 
position had been noted as early as May 1946 when the Indian 
complaint had been lodged at UNO. In that month Indian Opinion 
predicted that the British and dominion delegations to the UN 
were likely to argue that the Indian question was a domestic 
matter "concerning only the South African government". 29 It also 
reported an editorial from the Hindu of Madras accusing Britain 
of not saying anything in protest to South Africa and of using 
the "excuse" of the dominions being "sovereign states". In June 
26 Ibid. 
27 T.B. Millar, The Commonwealth and the United Nations 
(Sydney, Sydney University Press, 1967), p.141. 
28 PRO, CAB 128/9, C.M.1(47)4, 2 January 1947. 
29 Indian Opinion, 3 May 1946. 
23 
1946 Indian Opinion stated that the British government, by 
claiming non-interference in the domestic affairs of South 
Africa, "has committed the gravest betrayal in history" and hoped 
that the Indian delegation to UNO would ensure that the British 
"toe the line with them" . 30 The latter hope proved to be illusory 
and in December Indian Opinion joined the growing call among 
African and Indian organisations for a boycott of the royal tour 
of South Africa scheduled to begin in January 1947. 
The English-speaking press in South Africa generally supported 
Smuts's domestic jurisdiction argument but the Natal Mercury had 
expected Britain and the United States to apply pressure on 
South Africa and warned that such pressure would be resented. 31 
The Sunday Times, under the heading "No Appeasing the East", 
noted that South Africa was in the "uncomfortable" position "of 
being alone in a world of colour" and lamented that "no one 
... understands our problem". 32 But it expressed relief that "we 
had enough friends with the required diplomatic skill to get the 
Indian Question shelved for a period". A week later it noted that 
Australia "curiously abstained" on the vote and explained it by 
presuming that a certain Mr Makin, the chief Australian delegate 
to the UN, had felt that a vote in favour would have "prejudiced 
Australia's trusteeship agreement for New Guinea" . 33 
Thus there was considerable relief when it became clear that most 
of the white Commonwealth was behind Smuts at the UNO and that 
a measure of Commonwealth unity had been preserved. The prospect 
of imminent Indian independence within the Commonwealth had not 
been greeted with equanimity in the English South African 
community and the developments in the UNO in 1946 added to their 
sense of disquiet. Smuts had to mollify these fears with 
30 Indian Opinion, 7 June 1946. 
31 Reported by Indian Opinion, 15 February 1946. 
32 Sunday Times, 8 December 1946. 
33 Sunday Times, 15 December 1946. 
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statements to the effect that South Africa's race policies would 
not be discussed formally in the Commonwealth and that whenever 
pressure had been exerted at Commonwealth conferences the 
response had always been clear: 
Namely, that we in South Africa did not recognise 
equal rights, that we did not recognise such a thing 
and had never recognised it and would never recognise 
it. 34 
Whether such reassurances had any effect on white voters' 
attitudes to the Commonwealth connection is difficult to gauge. 
National Party supporters remained hostile to the Empire and the 
Commonwealth for reasons which went far beyond the immediate 
post-war crisis in South Africa's race relations 
case, preferred not to distinguish between the 
and, in any 
concepts of 
"Empire" and "Commonwealth". The latter was seen by republicans 
as a disguised form of British imperialism. 35 
African opinion, while not commenting directly on the role of 
Britain and the dominions in protecting South Africa in the UNO 
during the Smuts premiership, made it clear that Britain would 
continue to lose the trust and goodwill of the black population 
if the British government did not play a more active part in the 
struggle for human rights in South Africa. As we shall see later, 
the royal tour of 1947 offered the best opportunity to express 
these views. Organisations such as the African National Congress 
and its South African Indian Congress ally decided to boycott the 
tour in protest against Smuts's policies. 
34 Quoted in Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign 
Policy, p.26. 
35 See, for example, the views of Eric Louw, the future 
economic affairs minister in Malan's government, in his article 
"The Republican Issue in South African Politics. The National 
Party Viewpoint", Eric Louw Collection (PV 4), Institute of 
Contemporary History (INCH), Bloemfontein, File No.71 (Published 
articles), 1947, p.7. 
25 
The leading moderate organ of African opinion in the townships, 
Bantu World, also warned on a number of occasions that Britain 
was likely to lose the affection of blacks if a sufficiently 
strong stand in opposition to Smuts's policies was not taken. An 
editorial in June 1945 claimed that Britain, because of the war, 
had "forgotten her mission in Africa, a policy which made her the 
hope of the oppressed and the despair of the oppressor". 36 It 
argued that racial discrimination in South Africa had caused a 
school of thought to arise which called for "Africa for the 
Africans• and reminded Britain of her paramount aim in Africa of 
developing the peoples f·or self-government. In somewhat stronger 
terms, the Youth League of the ANC declared a year late that the 
only •true antidote• to imperialism in Africa was a "national 
awakening among Africans" . 37 In 1946 the ANC and SAIC chose the 
UN as their forum of appeal against the Smuts government and the 
speech by Dr A.B. Xuma, president of the ANC to the General 
Assembly, gave considerable 
attending the same session of 
embarrassment to 
the world body. 38 
36 Bantu World, 2 June 1945. 
Smuts who was 
37 T. Karis and G.M. Carter (eds), From Protest to Challenge. 
A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-
1964, Vol.2, T.Karis, Hope and Challenge, 1935-1952 (Stanford, 
Hoover Institution Press, 1973), p.317. 
38 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 21. 
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Chapter 2: South West Africa, the High Commission Terri tori es and 
Other Issues 
(al South West Africa 
The South West Africa dispute represented Smuts's second nemesis 
at the UN in the years immediately after the war. Once again 
Britain and the Commonwealth were faced with a problem in their 
relations with South Africa that held wider implications for 
their dealings with colonial peoples, trust territories and world 
opinion. Once again Britain came down on South Africa's side 
(after some initial hesitation) and much the same reasons for 
supporting the South African case were advanced: the need to 
retain Smuts's friendship and co-operation in the Commonwealth 
and in bilateral dealings with Britain. 
In April 1946 Addison argued that there was a good case for 
Commonweal th support of South Africa's desire to incorporate 
South West Africa in view of the territory's proximity to South 
Africa and the "desire of the European population to annex the 
territory". 1 So far as the United Kingdom was concerned 
it is of great political importance to maintain 
cordial relations with the South African Government on 
this question. 
Unexpectedly, however, strong criticism of the South African 
position had come from New Zealand at San Francisco in 1945 and 
again at the first session of the UN General Assembly in January 
1946. The Labour Party prime minister, Peter Fraser, had stated 
at San Francisco that all powers holding mandated territories 
should "as the test of sincerity demands ... acknowledge the 
1 PRO, CAB 129/9, C.P. (46)157, "Trusteeship", Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 10 January 1946. 
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supervision of the Trusteeship Council". 2 In January 1946 Fraser 
condemned South Africa's announcement to the UN that the opinions 
of the inhabitants of the territory would be canvassed. He said 
that it had never at any time been suggested or recognised that 
mandated territories belonged to the mandated powers. 3 
Fraser's stand was based partly on liberal conviction and partly 
on his political commitment to place the New Zealand mandate of 
Western Samoa under the Trusteeship system of the UN. New Zealand 
had been one of the first mandatory powers to place her island 
mandate under trusteeship and her government felt bound by 
pledges made during the war to advance the territory towards 
self-government. South Africa's response was dismissive: Heaton 
Nicholls, who represented the Union at the first sessions on 
trusteeship noted that 
the little Western Samoan mandate held by New Zealand 
was merely a hothouse of tropical administration ... 
and if there was one spot in the world where 
harmonious and civilised advancement under trusteeship 
could be speedily effected it was in Western Samoa. 4 
The view of the Smuts government was that South West Africa was 
a special case in view of its size and strategic importance as 
well as the "primitive" state of its inhabitants. Annexation was 
seen as the only logical course following on the demise of the 
League and was regarded almost as a matter of right for South 
Africa. The British view was similar, although Attlee's colonial 
secretary, G.D. Hall, expressed contrary opinions during the 
April 1946 cabinet discussions on the issue. Hall argued that 
it was "unwise" to support South Africa in view of the fact that 
2 Quoted in the Report of the New Zealand Delegation on the 
Proceedings and Decisions of the United Nations Conference On 
International Organisation, Department of External Affairs 
Publication No.11. (Wellington, 1945), p.70. 
3 Auckland Star, 22 January 1946. 
4 Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, p.399. 
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the South African line had been much criticised at the 
United Nations and in view of New Zealand's criticisms 
which had also been rather strongly announced by Peter 
Fraser, the New Zealand Prime Minister. 5 
Hall argued further that liberal opinion in Britain would not 
accept South Africa's argument and that the French would be all 
the more "difficult to resist" over their desire to incorporate 
Togoland and the Cameroons. 
After taking these arguments into account and those of Addison 
(in favour of South Africa), the British cabinet decided that it 
would be "more reasonable" to support South Africa's case if the 
consent of the "Native" as well as the European population had 
been sought and obtained by methods agreeable to the United 
Nations. It was advised that discussions with Smuts at the next 
prime ministers' conference would be held on these lines. 
Addison reported on 13 May that he had spoken with Smuts and that 
he had been "glad" to find that Britain had the support of "at 
least some of the other Dominions 116 on the South West Africa 
issue. He claimed that only the Herero tribe seemed to be opposed 
to incorporation although some opposition had come from the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate in the form of Chief Tshekedi of the 
Bamangwato tribe. The latter had claimed that the incorporation 
of South West Africa would create a "precedent" for incorporation 
of the high commission territories. Nevertheless, said Addison, 
the balance was in favour of incorporation and "our support of 
General Smuts in this matter would strengthen his hand against 
the secessionists in South Africa whose activities were causing 
5 PRO, CAB 128/5, C.M.37 (46) 3, "Colonial Trusteeship", 24 
April 1946. 
6 PRO, CAB 128/5, C.M.45(46)8, "South West Africa", 13 May 
1946. 
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him considerable difficulty". 7 
Addison's reference to Smuts's difficulties with "secessionists" 
in the Union was to become a familiar refrain in discussions by 
British officials in South Africa. It was mainly inspired by the 
British high commissioner in South Africa, Evelyn Baring, who had 
noted in a despatch to the dominions office the strength of the 
"extremist" republican faction under the Transvaal leader, J.G. 
Strijdom, in the National Party. 8 The argument was frequently 
expounded thereafter that unless Smuts and, later, Malan, were 
given crucial British support on certain issues such as South 
West Africa, Strijdom's faction would gain the upper hand and 
Britain would lose South Africa's co-operation on other broader 
Commonwealth issues. 
In the case of South West Africa, Addison's assumption was that 
by supporting Smuts the extreme republicans would modify their 
demands for a republic outside the Commonwealth. He encountered 
some opposition in the British cabinet from the colonial 
secretary, Hall, who noted that "there was much concern in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and in other territories against South 
Africa's Native policies and in Africa as a whole" . 9 Smuts "might 
not get a majority in the General Assembly" and "India might well 
object on account of her troubles with South Africa" . The foreign 
secretary, Ernest Bevin, also thought the case against South 
Africa was "very strong" and that the cabinet should not commit 
itself in support of the proposal at that stage. 
On that occasion (13 May 1946) the cabinet decided that it would 
only support South Africa's case if the consent of the "Natives" 
as well as the Europeans in South West Africa had been obtained 
"in ways agreeable to the United Nations". But two weeks later 
Addison's advice was accepted to the effect that the Bamangwato 
7 Ibid. 
8 PRO, CAB 129/6, C.P. (46)12, 10 January 1946. 
9 CAB 128/5, C.M.45(46)8, "South West Africa", 13 may 1946. 
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Chief Tshekedi should be warned not to come to London to make 
representations against the South African case. 10 The reasons 
given by Addison were significant. Smuts would "take great 
exception" to such a visit and it "might very well raise the very 
question of incorporation in the Union of the high commission 
territories which Tshekedi was anxious to avoid". In other words, 
the cabinet was being advised to mollify Smuts on one issue, 
South West Africa, in order to avoid problems over another, the 
high commission territories. 
In October 1946 Smuts put some pressure on the British government 
to amend its formula on consultation of native opinion in South 
West Africa. He asked his high commissioner in London, Heaton 
Nicholls, to "assist" the British Government in framing a reply 
to a parliamentary question concerning Britain's attitude to the 
proposed referendum in the territory. 11 He noted that the 
attitude of the British government 
generally ... is unsatisfactory and if known in Union 
will cause much mischief. Incidentally it would 
increase the pressure for immediate incorporation of 
Protectorates. A hint by you might be helpful. 
The hint was taken up by Addison who argued in a cabinet 
memorandum of 8 October that the previous formula concerning 
South West Africa adopted by cabinet had been rendered 
"inappropriate" and that the South African government had given 
the British "full and frank information".u He asked cabinet to 
agree that Smuts's methods of consultation of the inhabitants of 
10 CAB 128/5, C.M.52 (46) 4, "South West Africa: Proposed Visit 
by Chief Tshekedi to London", 27 May 1946. 
11 TA, JCS, B. (Union 
(October - December 1946), 
October 1946. 
of South Africa Papers), Vol .166 
No.17, Smuts - Heaton Nicholls, 7 
12 PRO, CAB 129/13, C.P. (46) 371, "South West Africa", 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 8 
October, 1946. 
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South West Africa were "agreeable" to Britain and to instruct the 
United Kingdom delegation in New York "to state its support for 
the South African case". He noted that 
South Africa might not get her way at the United 
Nations General Assembly ... but if they do not, it is 
of the highest importance to our relations with them 
that they should not feel that their lack of success 
was in any degree due to our failure to do all that we 
reasonably could on their behalf. 
At the cabinet meeting of 10 October, however, not much support 
was in evidence for Addison• s line. "Serious doubts" were 
expressed about the expediency of "committing ourselves at this 
stage 11 to support the South African government. 13 It was noted 
that there were no independent observers of Smuts• s proposed 
referendum and that it would be "an embarrassing precedent if we 
say it was sufficient consultation". The cabinet felt that while 
it was important to avoid "embarrassment" to South Africa, the 
problem was how "to secure this without causing themselves 
embarrassment in other directions". It was decided therefore to 
gain time for discussions with Smuts by postponing a reply to the 
parliamentary question on the issue and by trying to have it 
withdrawn from the Order Paper. 
By the time the issue was next discussed the British government 
had reached consensus on a position that was mu~h more in favour 
of the South African line. Once again it seems that Smuts's 
intervention was decisive. Addison told the cabinet on 18 October 
that he had discussed the matter with Smuts and with Attlee . 14 
Smuts had told him that he regarded it as unacceptable that the 
UN should prescribe the method of consultation with the 
inhabitants and had said that he intended to press forward with 
13 CAB 128/9, C.M.85(46)5, "South West Africa", 10 October 
1946. 
14 CAB 128/9, C.M.88(46)2, "South West Africa", 18 October 
1946. 
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incorporation "whatever was said in the United Nations General 
Assembly". This time, with little discussion, the cabinet came 
to the conclusion that 
it was inexpedient to refrain from supporting the 
South African case since it was just a notification of 
the wishes of the inhabitants and not a support for 
the South African case in advance. 
It was also noted that South Africa was prepared to continue to 
''observe the principles of the mandate system in its 
administration of the territory". 
The British had misjudged the temper and mood of the General 
Assembly, however. On 14 December 1946 it voted 37 to O with 9 
abstentions on a resolution to the effect that it was unable to 
accede to the incorporation of South West Africa into the Union. 
Instead the assembly recommended trusteeship for the territory 
under UN supervision . 15 Of the Commonwealth countries, India and 
Canada voted against South Africa while Britain, Australia and 
New Zealand abstained. The vote, together with that on the 
Indian question, had shaken Smuts's faith in the UN. But the 
tacit support of most of the dominions was some comfort to him. 
As was the case with the Indian question and, later, the 
apartheid issue, the "white" dominions usually kept in step with 
Britain at the UN, at least until anti-colonial sentiment had 
become overwhelming in the early 1960 's. In the case of New 
Zealand, which had initially given strong opposition to South 
Africa over South West Africa, the development of the Cold War 
and the need to show solidarity with the other administering 
powers in the Trusteeship Council came to outweigh questions of 
principle. Sir Alistair Mcintosh, the external affairs department 
secretary in New Zealand under Fraser's government, wrote that 
15 Millar, Commonwealth and United Nations, p.174. 
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Fraser always thought the South Africans were wrong 
but as the Cold War developed we found ourselves 
having to support the other Trusteeship powers on many 
issue on legal grounds against the USSR - even though 
we acted very differently in Samoa. 16 
In those early years, the UN meetings of Commonwealth 
representatives were held each week when the General Assembly was 
in session and members could test the reactions of other 
Commonwealth countries to proposed courses of action. 17 
Compromise resolutions could be 
would 
agreed 
abstain 
upon 
from 
which 
rather 
some 
than Commonwealth representatives 
casting a negative vote. India 
and, on South African issues, 
also took part in these meetings 
was prepared to co-operate with 
the rest of the Commonwealth. A British cabinet memorandum which 
summarised the proceedings of the UN General Assembly for the 
year 1947 noted that: 
Even in the disagreeable South African business the 
Indians behaved with great moderation and kept us 
informed all the time of what they were going to do. 18 
Thus, Commonwealth membership helped to mitigate (from the South 
African government's view) the harshness of the Indian attacks 
against South Africa in the UN. It is significant also that 
Jawarhal Nehru, the first 
after 
prime Indian independence in 
minister, opposed calls 
194 7' 
from 
leave the Commonwealth or to 
some members of his parliament to 
apply pressure on South Africa at 
Commonwealth conferences. Nehru was aware of the precedent that 
such pressure could give in the case of India's own difficulties 
16 Letter to the author, 26 September 1978. 
17 Leslie Munro, " The Commonwealth's Unomanship", 
Commonwealth Journal, Vol.4, No.2, April 1961, p.59. 
18 PRO, CAB 129/22, C.P. (47)335, "Proceedings of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, 1947", Memorandum by the Minister 
of State, 17 December 1947. 
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over the question of Kashmir. 19 
(bl Smuts and post-war South African expansionism 
Smuts had long harboured the idea of extending South African 
influence northwards over territories which were mainly British 
colonies and protectorates.w He did not see this aim as being 
in any way antagonistic to British policy for the African 
colonies but rather saw it as being complementary to that policy. 
Smuts had envisaged a partnership between Britain and South 
Africa in the establishment of larger and therefore more 
efficient groupings of territories within the Empire in general 
and in Africa in particular. 
During World War II Smuts had elaborated on the idea in a speech 
in which he suggested that the dominions should participate in 
the control of colonial territories which were adjacent to or 
geographically near to them. 21 In parliament in 1945 he explained 
further that this suggestion did not mean annexation of such 
territories and Africans in those territories ''had to get it out 
of their heads that we want to absorb them, that we are out for 
annexation and to dominate". 22 Instead he compared his ideas to 
the Pan-American Union in South America, meeting every year to 
discuss "general interests". He admitted there was a big 
difference in "native policies" in the northern states compared 
to South Africa but claimed that Africans "were rushing to work 
in South Africa" and that "nothing like as so much is done for 
the material development of the natives as we are doing in South 
Africa". In response to Dr Malan's assertion that he was heading 
19 J.D.B. Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs. Problems 
of Expansion and Attrition, 1953-1969 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p.129. 
20 R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion 1908-1948 
(New York, Africana, 1972), p.23. 
21 Hancock, Smuts: Fields of Force, p.407. 
22 House of Assembly Debates, col. 3951, 22 March 1945. 
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for a clash with Britain over colonial policy, he stated that 
although his views were not always in agreement with British 
policy in Africa which "sometimes left much to be desired", he 
was supported in his idea of larger groupings of colonies by the 
then colonial secretary, Oliver Stanley. 
Smuts's plans had also always envisaged the incorporation of the 
high commission territories but in this aim he had encountered 
some opposition from Britain. The British had always based their 
response to South African incorporation demands on the clauses 
in the Act of Union which had insisted on consultation with the 
inhabitants and with the British parliament before any decision 
could be made. In the 1930's a deal had come close to being made 
with Hertzog but increasingly 
Britain together with the 
unsympathetic public opinion in 
passing of the Hertzog Bills 
disenfranchising Cape "native" voters had caused a postponement 
of any British decision.n 
Smuts had made two further appeals to Britain for incorporation, 
one on the eve of World War II and the other during the war, but 
on both occasions Britain had said that it had to postpone a 
reply until hostilities were over. Hyam notes the "shock'' with 
which these requests were received in Britain, the government 
thinking the whole matter was in abeyance because of 
preoccupation with the war. 24 The problem for Britain was much 
greater with Smuts than with Hertzog because of Smuts's status 
in Britain. Smuts, in turn, thought the possibility of obtaining 
at least one territory, Swaziland, was high, and that Britain 
would not oppose him because of the South African war effort. It 
would also help him in his battle with the "secessionist" 
Nationalists who saw the continued existence of the territories 
as an infringement of South Africa's sovereignty. He was 
encouraged in his belief by the attitude of Lord Harlech, British 
high commissioner from 1941 to 1944, who thought it better to 
23 See Hyam, The Failure, ch.7 and ch.8. 
24 Ibid., pp.163-164. 
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make a deal with Smuts than with republican Nationalists over 
Swaziland. 
Soon after taking office in 1944, Baring, the new high 
commissioner, had to report on several speeches by Smuts which 
demonstrated a desire to incorporate the territories once the war 
was over. He wrote to Lord Cranbourne, dominions secretary in 
April 1945, saying that Smuts had used the question of their 
migrant labour as a justification for transfer but a counter 
argument by Baring pointed out that the flow of Irish workers to 
Glasgow did not justify annexation of Ireland to Scotland. 25 
Although Baring felt it necessary not to sacrifice the 
territories to a desire for good relations with Smuts's United 
Party government, he was aware of the difficulties of reconciling 
"a proper native policy with keeping on good terms with English 
speaking South Africa" . 26 He reported to the dominions office in 
September 1945 that every educated African that he had met in the 
Union opposed transfer and he intended to use that fact to press 
home the argument. Before he left office Cranbourne wrote to 
Baring to say that he was not sure of the future of the 
territories and that he had always thought it possible to do a 
deal with South Africa over Swaziland at least and that it would 
be difficult to refuse Smuts after all he had done for Britain 
during the war. 27 
Smuts's aims in respect of the high commission territories did 
not differ much from the Nationalists, except, as Hyam points 
out, in the question of timing. 28 The Nationalists could not wait 
while Smuts's reply was that "At the right time, if I am there 
25 Douglas-Home, The Last Pro-consul, p.165. 
26 Ibid. 
v Ibid., pp.165-6. 
28 Hyam, Failure. p.177. 
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I shall tackle the matter and try to dispose of it."a 
Soon after Labour took over, Attlee answered a question in the 
Commons in a way which showed no enthusiasm for transfer at least 
until Britain had satisfied itself about Union native policy. 30 
Attlee's government was "kept on its toes" by the left-wing 
section of his party and by the Anti-Slavery Society, the 
Aborigines Protectionist Society and by petitions and memoranda 
received from Africans in South Africa. 31 During the war and 
immediately after the ANC had voiced its concern that Britain 
might hand over the high commission territories to South 
Africa32 • Dr xuma of the ANC had personally stated his 
opposition to transfer to Baring in 1945 by arguing that if 
Britain caved in on the issue it would be taken by Africans to 
imply 
a tacit acknowledgement of the soundness 
Native policy; would strengthen the hand of 
favour that policy and hasten on 
consequences . 33 
of Union 
those that 
its evil 
Bantu World published, during the royal tour of 1947, a plea to 
Britain not to hand over the protectorates~ and its editor noted 
during the tour of Basutoland that Basuto loyalty to the crown 
was a result of their being •saved from European occupation by 
29 House of Assembly Debates, col.4026, 21 March 1946. 
30 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p .166. 
31 Hyam, Failure, p.177. 
32 This was mentioned in the document summarising African 
political and economic rights which was drawn up by the ANC 
during the war. It was entitled "Africans' Claims in South 
Africa" ( Karis, Hope and Challenge, p.213). 
33 PRO, CAB 129/6, C.P. (46)12, "Political Affairs in South 
Africa", Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, 10 January 1946. 
34 Bantu World, 22 March 1947. 
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the protecting hand of Britain". (The Basuto paramount's speech 
in welcome to the king had been watered down by Union officials 
because it had produced what was seen as a strong and 
embarrassing plea for British protection from the Union to 
continue) . 35 
As Douglas-Home points out: 
One notices in all the official documents of the day 
that the hypothetical possibility of transfer and the 
soundness of its juridical basis were still respected. 
This was in spite of the fact that it was being made 
clear ... that, in Southern African terms, transfer was 
inconceivable to all blacks.~ 
But the British never wanted to spell this out for fear of 
offending Smuts or undermining his position and inducing an 
incoming Nationalist government to take over the territories by 
force or by economic blockade - which Britain was powerless to 
prevent. A 1946 Draft White Paper in response to South Africa's 
demands would not commit itself to an answer if consultation 
unearthed a negative opinion in the territories and was as 
lacking in a categorical refusal to allow transfer as most 
British responses. This was a result of "weakness on the ground", 
and desire not to "make life more difficult" for Smuts. (The 
issue of the various gold and uranium agreements was another 
factor) . 37 
Smuts appears not to have pressed the issue with Britain before 
he left office in 1948, perhaps because he realised the strength 
of feeling against transfer and did not want to embarrass his 
Commonwealth ally. One of his last comments on the question came 
in 1950 when, as leader of the opposition, he advised his friend 
~Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.153. 
36 Ibid. , p. 16 6 . 
37 Ib"d 168 1. • ' p. . 
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Churchill not to provoke Malan over the Seretse Khama affair (see 
chapter 5) and claimed it would harden public opinion behind 
Malan's aim of incorporating the protectorates. If this aim were 
refused, he said, the "extreme course of declaring South Africa 
a republic would at once become a live issue". 38 This advice 
reinforced British perceptions of the need to appease the 
Nationalists and thus prevent a clash with Malan that could, in 
their eyes, have led to South Africa leaving the Commonwealth. 
( c) Smuts and Nationalist opposition to a centralised 
Commonwealth 
At the end of the Second World War Smuts had felt that the bonds 
between the Commonwealth countries were stronger than ever and 
that the sort of intimate and almost unquestioning co-operation 
that had been achieved between them would continue into the post-
war period. 39 What he did not bargain for, however, was an 
aggressively questioning National Party opposition which was 
determined to ensure that the country would not continue to be 
tied down, both economically and militarily, to the detested 
"Empire". Smuts found himself on the defensive in parliament by 
having to deny that South Africa was committed to a military 
alliance with Britain. From some of his own front benches, 
however, he found himself to be under fire for not doing enough 
to promote Empire defence while English-language newspapers, such 
as The Star, called for greater co-operation with Commonwealth 
countries in general.• 
Smuts had never believed in a centralised Commonwealth and had 
opposed the idea of an imperial General Staff during the Second 
38 J. Van der Poel (ed), =S~e=l~e~c=t~i=o=n~s~~f=r~o~m~~t=h~e~-=S=m=u=t=s~P=a~p~e=r~s~ 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973), Vol.7, No.878, 
Smuts - Churchill, 16 March 1950, p.358. 
39 N. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches 
Commonwealth Affairs 1931-1952, Vol.1 (London, 
Institute of International Affairs, 1952), p.568. 
•The Star, 14 February 1945. 
on 
OUP, 
British 
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World War. The Nationalists, however, accused him in 1945 of 
discussing a "new Commonwealth unity approach" at Commonwealth 
conferences and plans for a "Commonwealth General Staff in peace 
and war". 41 In 194 7, F. C. Erasmus, the opposition spokesman on 
defence, alleged that Smuts had discussed "agreements in relation 
to common plans" at the 1946 Commonwealth conference. 42 In reply 
Smuts claimed that he had only discussed matters which had arisen 
out of the war and that "no future plans and no new obligations 
were discussed". 43 The opposition leader, D. F. Malan, asked him 
if there had been any "violation" of South Africa's "right to 
neutrality" at the conference and Smuts replied that there had 
been none at all and that all that had been discussed was the 
share that the dominions might have to bear in defending 
themselves in future.« 
These remarks indicate the sensitivity with which any military 
co-operation with Britain and the Empire was viewed in 
Nationalist circles. It was, in retrospect, ironic considering 
the later attempts of the National Party government to make 
military alliances with the West and with Britain in particular. 
In 1947, however, Britain was still regarded as an "enemy" by 
many Nationalists and the right-wing Afrikaans newspaper under 
Dr H.F. Verwoerd's editorship, Die Transvaler, protested in that 
year against the visit of Field Marshal Montgomery to the Union. 
It criticised the "secret machinations of General Smuts" ("die 
geheime konkelwerk van Generaal Smuts") . 45 In 1948 Malan again 
asked Smuts about his attitude to commonwealth centralisation in 
the light of a speech made in the British parliament a few days 
previously calling for a "supreme council" for the Empire. Smuts 
stated in reply that the speech was only calling for closer 
41 House of Assembly Debates, col.3716, 19 March 1945. 
42 Ibid., cols. 2463-2466, 10 April 1947. 
43 Ibid., col.2264, 14 April 1947. 
« Ibid., col.2662, 14 April 1947. 
45 Die Transvaler, 9 October 1947. 
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relations within the Commonwealth and that his government was 
"completely against" the proposal for a supreme council. 46 
Smuts's visit to the preparatory conference of the UN in San 
Francisco in 1945 and his alleged support for a Commonwealth 
"unity" approach had also been discussed in parliament. 
Nationalist MPs suggested that he would go to San Francisco with 
a ready-made plan for greater Commonwealth unity and that the 
plan had been hatched at the "Caucus Conference" of Commonwealth 
prime ministers that preceded the San Francisco meeting.~ 
From the left benches of parliament, however, came a differently 
worded attack on Smuts's attendance at San Francisco. Senator 
H.M. Basner, the natives' representative for Transvaal and Orange 
Free State, stated that the British Empire had been founded on 
"the exploitation of the coloured people" and that Smuts should 
go to San Francisco with the aim of making the Empire "adjust to 
the new world" and of working out a plan whereby "economic 
justice could be accorded to the coloured races of the world''·g 
The Bantu World, for its part, welcomed the call by "Negroes" of 
America for the San Francisco conference to outlaw racial 
discrimination in the USA, South Africa and India. 49 It also 
reported Dr Xuma's statement that Smuts would be "committing all 
of South Africa, Black and White" at the San Francisco 
deliberations and that there was all the more reason for Africans 
to "place their full confidence upon their true leaders to 
champion their cause and protect their interests". 50 
46 Department of External Affairs Policy Review No.1, March 
1948, p.4 ( TA, Charles te water Collection , A78, Vol.4. Union 
External Policy, File AE 2/1/1, External Affairs Dept. Policy 
Reviews) . 
47 House of Assembly Debates, col.3716, 19 March 1945. 
48 Senate Debates, col.618-619, 23 March 1945. 
49 Bantu World, 28 April 1945. 
50 Bantu World, 19 May 1945. 
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The role of Smuts at San Francisco in helping to draft the 
preamble to the Charter and thus, ironically, committing South 
Africa to obey all the liberal provisions concerning human 
rights, has been frequently commented upon. Nevertheless, the 
accusation from the Nationalists in South Africa that he.would 
go to the conference with a well-worked out plan for Commonwealth 
unity is not justified by the record of his statements at the 
prime ministers' meeting before the conference. In his opening 
remarks at that conference in April 1945 Smuts dealt with the 
accusation that the Commonwealth was "ganging up" against the 
other nations of the alliance and claimed that the prime 
ministers were only attempting to "come to some unity of outlook 
and action" which could only be "helpful to the Greater 
Conference to which we are all moving". 51 He pointed out that the 
smaller Commonwealth countries would inevitably have to make 
concessions and that this would be "disappointing" to some, 
especially Canada. Most significantly, on the question of the 
great power veto and the principle of collective security he 
insisted that national parliaments have the ultimate say over 
whether to commit forces to the UN in an emergency. 52 
Thus, to say that Smuts went to San Francisco as something of an 
"imperialist in disguise" is clearly an exaggeration. Moreover, 
if the record of subsequent Commonwealth disunity on major world 
issues is taken into account, the charge is even less valid. On 
the vote taken in the General Assembly concerning the partition 
of Palestine in 1947, for example, Britain absta:!.ned, South 
Africa and the "white" dominions voted in favour and the Asian 
dominions voted against partition. 53 Smuts telegraphed Attlee to 
say that much as he disliked disunity in Commonwealth action 
51 TA, JCS, A., Vol. 91 (Miscellaneous numbered papers 1940-
1946), British Commonwealth Meeting (B.C.M. (45), 1st 12th 
meetings, April 1945. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Round Table, Vol:38, 1947-1948, p.622. 
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"from a long range point of view it may prove to be an 
advantage for the Commonwealth not to be unanimous in 
this tangled situation and South Africa's de facto 
recognition [of Israel) now may prove advantageous" . 54 
54 TA, JCS, A. British Government Papers, Vol. 94 (Office of 
the High Commission for the United Kingdom in South Africa), 
No.660, Smuts - Attlee, 21 May 1948. 
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Chapter 3 : Decolonisation, Economic issues, Immigration and the 
Royal Tour 
(al Decolonisation 
It has been noted that up until the Second World War the approach 
was for the United Kingdom alone to accept new members into the 
Commonwealth once dominion status had been achieved. 1 Thus 
Ireland was accepted into the Commonwealth by the terms of the 
Anglo-Irish treaty on 1921 without any reference being made to 
the other dominions. The war, however, had brought a shift in the 
power relations between Britain and the dominions. The British 
Labour government felt it necessary to consult them over policy 
regarding the Asian colonies in 1947-8, realising, perhaps, that 
developments in that part of the world were crucial for the 
Commonwealth in general. 
Despite this, practical difficulties concerning consultation 
proved insurmountable during the fast-moving and delicate 
negotiations preceding Indian independence and inevitably some 
complained that they had been left out. Smuts was one statesman 
who had helped with advice for Attlee's government over India but 
who complained of inadequate consultation concerning the decision 
to grant independence. 2 He said that Britain should have paused 
before considering independence 
and "chaos" ahead. In public 
private felt it had been an 
with the prospect of "civil war" 
he praised the decision but in 
"awful mistake". When Ceylon's 
independence became imminent in 1947 he wrote, "Ceylon a Dominion 
this year? Am I mad or is the world mad?" 3 Although he later came 
to accept Britain's retreat in Asia as being for the best, 4 and 
1 H. Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth. A History of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations (London, van Nostrand Reinhold, 1971) , 
p.767. 
2 Ibid., p.786. 
3 Hancock, Smuts: Fields of Force, p.447. 
4 Ibid., p.449. 
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that the Commonwealth provided the best link between the Asian 
ex-colonies and Britain, it is clear that he never fully endorsed 
the concept of a multi-racial Commonwealth and that he preferred 
the closely-knit "White Man's Club" of pre-war years. After he 
left office he strenuously opposed the idea of granting India 
republican status within the Commonwealth, not only because he 
saw it as the inevitable dilution of the common loyalty to the 
crown but also because he thought that Malan would use the 
precedent as a "stepping stone to full secession in due course". 5 
(b) Economic issues 
While Britain remained the chief source of South Africa's imports 
and the chief destination for her exports, as was the case for 
many years after world War 2, any argument over Commonwealth co-
operation was largely futile. Furthermore, as the sterling area's 
gold producer, and as an important war-time supplier of primary 
products, South Africa was undisputedly and intricately involved 
in the Commonwealth economic and trading system. 
Although in retrospect a long-term decline in the share of South 
Africa's post-war trade with Britain and the Commonwealth was to 
become evident, in the immediate post-war years there was an 
artificially high reliance on British and intra-Commonwealth 
trade for South Africa and for the Empire in general. Cut off 
from European markets and sources of supply during the war, 
Britain had to concentrate on her colonial, Commonweal th and 
United States sources. She thus made bulk-purchase arrangements 
for the supply of various raw materials and foodstuffs from the 
Empire, products that did not have to meet Japanese or European 
competition because of the wartime situation. As Miller points 
out, this was an artificial situation from a long-term point of 
view because before the war Europe accounted for more of 
Britain's exports than all of the dominions and the USA 
5 Van der Poel, Selections, vol.7, pp. 296-297. 
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combined. 6 
The world-wide economic downturn immediately after the war meant 
that Britain and the st~rling area maintained wartime controls 
on supplies and markets and foreign exchange. Trade in sterling 
was preferred to any other alternative and Britain restricted new 
overseas investments to the sterling area. This arrangement 
amounted to a "siege economy" for the Commonweal th and the 
colonies although Canada remained a "dollar" country because of 
its close relationship with the United States. 7 For South Africa, 
the trade figures reveal a high degree of reliance on 
Commonwealth trade in the immediate post-war years. Some 69% of 
her exports went to Britain and other Commonwealth countries in 
the years 1945-48 and 48% of her imports were from the 
Commonwealth. 8 The reliance on exports to the Commonwealth was 
particularly significant because the comparative pre-war figure 
(1935-39) was only 48%. 9 This heavy trading bias in favour of 
Britain (in particular), while a function of the post-war 
economic crisis, was something that attracted criticism from the 
Nationalist opposition. 
During the war the National Party, or HNP ("Herenigde Nasionale 
Party") as it was then known, had called for the termination of 
preferential economic links with the British Empire and had 
recommended that foreign trade be handled on a "quid pro quo" 
basis. 10 This meant, in effect, that Britain would be treated as 
a foreign country in terms of economic status. The Nationalists 
6 J.D.B. Miller, Survey, p.441. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland (South African Bureau of 
census and Statistics), No. 25, 1949, pp.1052-1055. 
9 Ibid. 
10 INCH, PV 93 (Verwoerd Collection), Vol. l 
File 1/12/92 (1943-1951), Economic Affairs: 
Chairman and Members of the Federal Council 
National Party, Cape Town, 1943, p.89. 
(Subject Files) , 
Report to the 
of the Reunited 
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called for the system of tariff preferences to be ended and for 
"special facilities" which had been given to Britain in the past, 
such as government contracts and British Standards, to be 
withdrawn. Africa was seen, instead, as the natural preference 
area for South Africa's products. 
In 1945 Eric Louw wrote that South Africa had to be a "free and 
independent country in the fullest sense of the word" ("'n vrye 
en onafhanklike land in die volste sin moet wees") and went on 
to claim that Britain was trying to make the Empire into a 
"political as well as economic unity" by discouraging the 
dominions from trading with foreign countries. 11 South Africa, 
he wrote, was prepared to trade with all countries, including 
Britain, but solely on "business principles". In that same year, 
Smuts was criticised in parliament by a Nationalist spokesman on 
finance for being prepared to sign the Bretton Woods agreement 
which allowed Britain to maintain a preferential tariff for the 
Empire. The reason given was that 
there was no justification for our tying ourselves to 
a nation in such a way that it will eventually land us 
in a war again. 12 
The Nationalists opposed the arrangements made by Smuts in 1947, 
during a severe balance of payments crisis for Britain, to help 
the British save dollar reserves by providing her with a special 
loan of gold from South Africa's reserves (amounting to £80 
million) . Die Transvaler said the loan "was not in the interests 
of South Africa First but Britain First" . 13 In parliament, the 
Nationalists stated that "No country, and England least of all, 
is entitled to expect charity from us. " 14 Even some of Smuts's 
11 Die Kruithoring, 28 November 1945. 
12 House of Assembly Debates, col.8881, 17 May 1945. 
8 Die Transvaler, 11 October 1947. 
14 House of Assembly Debates, col. 522, 28 January 1948. 
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own supporters criticised the loan at a time when Britain was 
shutting certain South African products out of her colonial 
markets in response to the terms of the post-war American loan 
agreement. 15 
Britain had been forced during the war to make certain 
concessions in regard to opening up the imperial trading system 
to United States commercial interests. Article 7 of the Mutual 
Aid Agreement of February 1942 provided for the final settlement 
of Lend-Lease and the elimination of discriminatory tariffs and 
trade barriers. 16 After the war a new loan agreement was drawn 
up which stipulated further restrictions on British sterling area 
trade. Article 9 of the 1946 Anglo-American loan agreement stated 
that if Britain were to impose any restrictions on imports from 
the USA she should impose the same restrictions on imports from 
all countries, including those in the sterling group. 17 
This meant, in effect, that South African exports to Britain and 
to British territories in Africa would be automatically 
restricted in line with dollar saving measures taken by Britain 
in relation to American imports. Hence, the restrictions that 
were imposed during the economic crisis of 1947 that affected 
South Africa's footwear exports (among other exports) and the 
consequent uproar in the South African parliament when the gold 
loan to Britain was being debated. 
15 The United Party MP for Port Elizabeth North said on 29 
January 1948 that he was "not prepared to swallow the story about 
the clause in the American Loan Agreement which shuts out our 
footwear from Great Britain" and that 11 as a member of the 
[Commonwealth] family we are entitled to family considerations" 
(House of Assembly Debates, col.535, 29 January 1948.) 
16 Brindley Thomas, "The Evolution of the Sterling Area", in 
N. Mansergh and R. Wilson (eds), Commonwealth Perspectives 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958), pp. 185-186. 
17 TA, A78 (Te Water), Vol.9, (1947-9: Economic Development 
in South Africa), File AE 3/1 (1948 August 1949 August: 
General) , I. M. F. Staff Memorandum No. 229, "The Economic Position 
of the Union of South Africa: 1947", pp. 13-16. 
49 
The gold loan agreement contained certain off-setting benefits 
in terms of British capital for gold production and in terms of 
continued access for South African farmers to the British market 
at guaranteed prices . 18 In October 1947 Baring wrote to Sir Eric 
Machtig, the permanent secretary at the dominions office, to say 
that he had conversed with the governor of the South African 
Reserve Bank who had just returned from London, where the gold 
loan agreement had been signed. Baring told him the main aim had 
been to secure an agreement which would be honoured by a 
Nationalist government in future, so the main idea was to provide 
Britain with an inducement to assist gold production in South 
Africa . 19 The Nationalists, he said, would have opposed both a 
loan of gold and any undertaking to sell a set quantity to the 
British, so the agreement incorporated a "rather subtle scheme" 
for encouraging gold production while securing for a single 
customer (Britain) most of the gold that would be produced. 
The Nationalists tried to force through 
parliament that would have made the gold 
an amendment 
loan dependent 
in 
on 
revised terms which would have secured, as Dr Stals put it, "the 
proper protection of South Africa's interests".w But they were 
defeated by 79 votes to 28. 21 This victory for Smuts's government 
was ascribed, by one daily newspaper, to J.H. Hofmeyr's 
assurances that every effort was being made to solve the problem 
of Britain's embargo on South African goods in her African 
colonies. 22 It was also a result of many Nationalists realising 
that th~ loan held certain off-setting benefits for farmers in 
the citrus and wine-producing areas and that these benefits would 
be endangered if the loan did not go ahead. 
18 The Star, 10 October 1947. 
19 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.150. 
20 House of Assembly Debates, col.522, 28 January 1948. 
21 Rand Daily Mail, 3 February 1948. 
22 Ibid. 
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The successful conclusion of the gold loan debate did not, 
however, end the problem of the embargo of South African goods 
in British African colonies. A month before the general elections 
of 1948 in which the United Party lost power to the National 
Party, the external affairs department was reporting little 
progress in talks with a visiting British official on the matter 
and felt it necessary to issue a veiled threat to retaliate with 
import restrictions against British and American goods unless 
"satisfactory arrangements" were concluded. 23 
The gold loan debate reflected, like so many other issues of the 
time, a "whites only" approach to political problems in South 
Africa. Black opinion on this issue was neither consulted nor 
quoted. It was only indirectly referred to by one of the natives' 
representatives, Donald Molteno, in parliament. The latter 
mentioned, during the second reading debate, the effect on the 
"masses of the people of this country" if there were a financial 
collapse in South Africa as a result of the crisis in the British 
economy being allowed to continue through lack of help from South 
Africa and elsewhere. 24 The Bantu World commented on the British 
economic crisis in August 1947 when the effects were at their 
worst. It accused "many shortsighted people" of rejoicing in 
Britain's problems and of not realising "how much the British 
taxpayer was contributing to colonial development in Africa". 25 
(c) Immigration 
During Smuts's post-war premiership immigration policy became a 
hotly debated issue and one which contributed to his election 
defeat in 1948 at the hands of the Nationalists. Since 
immigration was by statutory definition only a "European" 
phenomenon, the argument between Smuts and the opposition 
23 TA, A 78 (Te Water) , Vol. 4, File AE 2/1/1, External 
Affairs Policy Review, No.8, April 1948. 
24 House of Assembly Debates, cols.537-539, 28 January 1948. 
25 Bantu World, 9 August 194 7. 
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centred on the question of which European element in the 
population should predominate. 26 The Nationalists accused Smuts 
of trying to "plough the Afrikaner under" by inviting thousands 
of immigrants from Europe into South Africa after the war. They 
promised to stem the flow once they came to power and to balance 
the flow with the country's "absorption capacity". They also 
hinted at a policy which would reduce the proportion of 
immigrants from Britain and increase the proportion from Holland, 
Germany and Northern Europe - areas which were regarded as having 
more of an affinity with the Afrikaners. 27 
Immigration policy was therefore very pertinent to the future of 
the Commonweal th connection which could be strengthened or 
weakened by altering the composition of the white population. 
Both main political parties were aware of this. In 1946 Heaton 
Nicholls had expressed concern that "political pressure" in the 
Union had forced Smuts to introduce "unnecessary" interviewing 
procedures in London for prospective immigrants. 28 He felt that 
a change in government would herald a period of systematic policy 
discrimination against the British element in the immigration 
laws and that an attempt would be made to change the composition 
of the white population even more to the Nationalists' advantage. 
The Nationalists, on the other hand, constantly criticised 
Smuts's immigration policy in parliament and accused him of 
placing Britain before South Africa and of not being "selective 
enough" . 29 
26 F.G. Brownell, "British Immigration to South Africa, 1946-
1970", Archives Year Book for South African History, Vol. 48, 
No. 1, 1985, pp. 8, 16-17. (The Immigration Act of 1913 and 
subsequent legislation effectively excluded non-Europeans from 
the definition of legal immigrants by providing for the 
discretionary exclusion by the Minister of any persons or class 
of persons deemed on social or economic grounds to be 
"unsuited"). 
n Ibid., pp.29-32. 
28 Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, p.407. 
29 Brownell, "British Immigration", p. 2 9. 
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In 1946 at Smuts's request, a confidential cabinet memorandum was 
drawn up which had as its main aim the finding of ways to 
"increase the European population through immigration" and the 
meeting of demand for manpower in mines and industry. 30 The 
memorandum noted the severe shortage of skilled manpower in South 
Africa and that the country could not meet the shortage from its 
own labour resources. Thus it recommended that "every effort 
should be made to attract to South Africa promising immigrants 
from Europe and other countries" . A screening process for 
intending immigrants would be applied and an "advisory" committee 
for those from the United Kingdom was suggested. 
The government went ahead in following years with this plan and 
established an Immigrants Selection Committee in European 
embassies while at the same time initiating interviewing 
procedures at South Africa House in London. Heaton Nicholls had 
described the latter as unnecessary because, as Smuts explained 
to his deputy, Hofmeyr, British migrants were not required by law 
to fulfil any conditions before emigrating to South Africa. 31 
Heaton Nicholls may also have resented the fact that the new 
committee operated independently of South Africa House. 32 
Nevertheless Smuts mentioned that he had given the go-ahead for 
Heaton Nicholls to negotiate with the shipping ministry in 
Britain to release ships from the Union Castle Line to "bring 
roughly 20, 000 intending settlers, all approved by the 1820 
Settlers Association" to the Union. 
It would of course be a great fillip to our policy if 
this could be done Only overall general 
supervision in South Africa is called for in their 
case. They are otherwise no liability to our 
30 TA, JCS, Vol. 165, No. 3 7, Memorandum for the Prime 
Minister on Immigration, 10 August 1946. 
31 TA, JCS, Vol.165, No.137, Smuts - Hofmeyr, 18 September 
1946. 
32 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.24. 
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government. 33 
The Nationalists immediately attacked Smuts in parliament for 
giving preferential 
accusations which 
encouragement 
were strenuously 
to British migrants, 
denied although the 
immigration figures revealed an overwhelming preponderance of 
British and Commonwealth migrants in the years 1947-1948. 34 Eric 
Louw took up the cudgels in the 1947 session against what he 
called the "large scale, State-sponsored immigration" scheme 
initiated by Smuts and promised that "when we are in power .. we 
shall see that an end is made to it". 35 He claimed that the 
immigrant selection committees were not doing their job and that 
"as far as English people are concerned, advice is merely given 
to immigrants, there is no control". 36 When asked if he was 
adverse to British immigrants, Louw replied, "I am not opposed 
to them provided they are decent people and not just England's 
misfits. These are the people we are getting." 
These remarks were 
"resentment" and 
reported by The Star which claimed that Louw' s 
that of the Nationalists in general 
1946. 
derives almost wholly from a race antipathy towards 
newcomers of British stock, and it has roots in a 
secret fear that the entry of the newcomer may sound 
the death-knell of that medieval concept of political 
separatism which the Party still hogs to itself.n 
33 TA, JCS, Vol.165, No.137, Smuts - Hofmeyr, 18 September 
34 Statistical Year Book 1964, Central Statistical Services 
(Pretoria, Department of Statistics). "Migration statistics 1924-
63". The figures showed that out of a total of 50,458 migrants 
received in the period 1940-47, British migrants accounted for 
70,2% of the total. 
35 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 3512-3513, 29 April 1947. 
36 Ibid., col.3519, 29 April 1947. 
n The Star, 2 May 1947. 
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As Brownell points out, much of the 
Nationalists to Smuts's policy stemmed from 
opposition 
the fear that 
of the 
British 
migrants would end up voting for Smuts.• As early as 1944, as 
Eric Louw had pointed out, NP policy had been to make the Aliens 
Act of 1937 apply to British immigrants as well as others and had 
opposed any "Imperial" or Union assisted immigration schemes. 39 
The Dominion Party, on the other hand (more vociferous in its 
defence of the British connection than Smuts and the UP) , 
criticised the government in the same debate for not doing enough 
to aid British immigration and for not shutting the last loophole 
to Indian immigration into the Union.~ Mainly representing Natal 
English voters the Dominion Party feared that Natal would be 
swamped by Indian immigrants if the clause of the Cape Town 
Agreement allowing wives and children of already established 
immigrants were not closed. It was this sort of attitude that had 
enraged the Indian government and which had demonstrated the 
difficulties facing Smuts in his relations with other 
Commonwealth countries which wanted normal relations with the 
newly independent India. 
It was left to Margaret Ballinger, natives' representative for 
Eastern Cape, to express the views of the "two thirds majority 
of the population who had a "very special and direct interest" 
in the government's immigration policies. 41 Criticising the 
stated aim of Smuts's policy to increase the European population, 
she expressed the "deepest resentment" of the African population 
who saw it as the government's assumption that there could never 
be "peaceful, happy co-operation between the African population 
and the European population". The policy merely deflected 
attention from the "most urgent task of adjusting the 
38 Brownell, "British Immigration'', p.29. 
39 Ibid. 
40 House of Assembly Debates, col.2634, 10 April 1947. 
41 Ibid., cols.311-314, 3 March 1947. 
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relationship between Europeans and Africans" by a growing 
confidence and co-operation instead of "driving us further 
apart". 
(d) The Royal Tour 1947 
Douglas-Home notes that Smuts had been pressing for a visit by 
the royal family to South Africa long before the war ended and 
that he had proposed 1946 as a date. 42 The king had refused then 
on the grounds that it was too early and there was too much for 
him to do in Britain after the war, so the two governments agreed 
on 1947. The tour was thus not conceived as a special trip to 
save South Africa for the Empire, as some had alleged. 43 All the 
dominions were to be visited after the war to thank them for 
their contribution to allied forces. Baring, however, hoped that 
the tour would yield some diplomatic benefit for British/South 
African relations that .were still then "much coloured" by the 
Boer War and the divisions caused at the outbreak of World War 
II. 44 
The visit of the British royal family to South Africa in 1947 
brought out all the different latent feelings in the South 
African population concerning the monarchy as a symbol of the 
British connection. White society was split, largely on language 
lines, between those who rejoiced in the affirmation of the 
monarchy as a symbol of English-speaking South African links with 
Britain and the Empire and those (Afrikaner Nationalists) who 
rejected the monarchy as the symbol of defeat and denial of 
republican independence since the Anglo-Boer War of 1899-1902. 
The dispute over South African participation on Britain's side 
during the Second World War had sharpened these feelings on both 
sides and so political tensions between government and opposition 
were inevitably bound to be expressed in the context of the royal 
42 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.151. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
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visit. 
Indian and African opinions concerning the tour were also 
divided. On the one hand were those "moderate loyalists" who 
supported the royal visit and who expressed their hopes and 
affections for the monarchy as a symbol of a fast-disappearing 
non-racial tradition dating from Victorian 
Colony. Then there were those who were 
rule in the old Cape 
represented by the 
mainstream African and Indian political movements who felt the 
tour should be boycotted as a sign of protest against Smuts's 
racial policies and what was seen as British complicity in those 
policies. The crown, they argued, was the ultimate constitutional 
authority in South Africa, and had to take responsibility for 
South Africa's discriminatory political system, despite the 
niceties of convention and protocol. 
Aside from those with political views about the tour were the 
hundreds of thousands on both sides of the racial divide who 
turned up out of sheer curiosity to see the royal party as it 
progressed through the Union and the protectorates. Many simply 
defied or were ignorant of the various boycott calls by 
organisations purporting to represent them. Some prominent 
Afrikaner republicans declared themselves to be "charmed" by the 
royal family45 and some prominent officials of the ANC and SAIC 
had to be repudiated by their respective organisations for 
attending welcoming functions. A.W. Champion, the Natal leader 
of the ANC, had to be reprimanded for appearing at the official 
Durban welcome for the royals. 46 
Baring reported to Addison in February that one of the SAIC 
delegates to the UN had remarked in New York that he supported 
45 
"The Crown Itinerant: Notes on the Royal Tour of south 
Africa", Round Table, Vol.37, 1946-1947, pp.205-211. 
% University of the Witwatersrand, William Cullen Library 
(Historical Papers), Champion Papers (A 922), File Da 48 (ANC 
Official Correspondence), c. Mbonambe -S.P. Hlatshwayo, 29 March 
1947. 
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the tour and was promptly repudiated by Dr G.M. Naicker and Dr 
Y. Dadoo, two executive colleagues. 47 
In considering the official response of the ANC and SAIC to the 
tour, two important factors influencing their attitudes become 
apparent; firstly, the discriminatory arrangements made by the 
Smuts government for blacks before and during the tour 
(complaints about which were voiced even by the loyalist Bantu 
World) 48 and secondly, the broader political factors relating to 
the repressive situation in the country and, thus, the 
inappropriate timing of the tour. 
In relation to the first, Baring, the high commissioner, also 
noted how the arrangements for the tour effectively excluded the 
black population who seemed always to be behind a wall of white 
policemen. 49 The Union officials refused to allow the king to 
shake hands with blacks or to pin medals on them himself during 
investiture ceremonies and Baring had to intervene when they 
tried to extend the same prohibition to his visit to the 
territories. He said that if the king was not going to shake 
hands with the Africans he was not going to shake hands with the 
Europeans either, whereupon the king proceeded to shake hands and 
pin medals on everyone, an action which was favourably received 
by the local press in the territories. 
According to Baring, the royal party noted a contrast between 
the freedom and openness with which they had been exposed to the 
Africans in the high commission territories and the "slightly 
peremptory way" in which they had been exposed to Union 
47 PRO, DO 119 {Dominions Office: High Commissioner for South 
Africa, Original Correspondence), File 1429 {Visit of the Royal 
Family to South Africa 1946-47), Telegram from High Commissioner 
to Secretary of State, 12 February 1947. 
48 Bantu World, 26 April 1947. 
•Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.153. 
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Africans. 50 
In relation to the second, more broadly political reason for 
African and Indian opposition to the tour, the secretary of the 
Natal Indian Congress referred to the fact that although the 
Indian community had the "greatest respect" for the royal family, 
at that time Indians were passing through one of the "most 
critical moments in their history" and that it was therefore 
"unreasonable 
rejoicing" . 51 
to expect Indians to participate in any 
The ANC' s posit ion was given at the annual conference in 
December 1946 in a resolution which stated that: 
As a protest against the barbarous policy of the Union 
government of denying the elementary democratic rights 
to Africans and in view of the fact these injustices 
are perpetuated and maintained in the name of His 
Majesty King George VI of the Union of South Africa, 
this Conference instructs the incoming Executive 
Committee to devise ways and means likely to bring 
about the abstention of the Africans from ... the 
welcoming of the Royal Family during its tour of the 
Union. 52 
Nevertheless, as was evidenced by the Champion case, it proved 
difficult to prevent many in the organisation and those who were 
uncommitted to stay away. 
"Loyalist" African opinion had its voice in the Bantu World. Its 
editor, Selope Thema, was strongly opposed to the ANC's boycott 
50 Ibid. 
51 TA,JCS, Vol.166, No.41, S.A. Police Memorandum: Indian, 
Native and Communist Boycott in Connection with the Royal Visit, 
7 February 1947. 
D Karis, Hope and Challenge, p.266. 
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policy and from the beginning took up a position of belligerent 
loyalty to the monarchy. Historical links between the reigns of 
Queen Victoria "the Good" and George VI were explained. The 
British monarchy was described as the "best example of just 
treatment of and better relations between old civilisations and 
new" and the Commonwealth ideal was praised as an evolution from 
"crude Empire" to "a nobler conception of diverse peoples linked 
together in a single Commonwealth and dwelling in freedom and 
peace" . 53 In its farewell statement to the royal family Bantu 
World claimed that the ANC and SAIC boycott calls had been 
ignored because of the realisation that the royals "weren't 
responsible" for the oppressive conditions under which Africans 
and Indians laboured. 54 Then, in May, it reported approvingly 
that the ANC' s national anthem, "Nkosi Sikelel 'i Afrika" had been 
played "at the King's request", on board H. M. s. Vanguard by a 
band of the Royal Marines. 55 
In contrast to these sentiments was the cautiously non-committal 
stance of Malan's Nationalists. In March 1946, when Smuts first 
announced in parliament the visit of the royals to South Africa, 
Malan set out his party's official attitude. He criticised Smuts 
for seeking "political advantage" out of the tour and said that 
Afrikaners would accord the royals a "polite welcome" but would 
boycott all official celebrations (unless "constitutional 
considerations" required the presence of the official 
opposition) . 56 But Nationalists then boycotted the "Loyal 
Address" to the king by both houses of parliament on 17 February 
1947. 
Baring noted that it was the King's "essential ordinariness" that 
carried him through the "protocolaire nightmares" which hovered 
53 Bantu World, 15 February 1947. 
54 Bantu World, 26 April 1947. 
55 Bantu World, 3 May 1947. 
56 House of Assembly Debates, col.3990, 21 March 1946. 
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about the early ceremonies.~ Malan, next to whom Baring's wife 
sat during the main banquet, refused to sing "God Save the King" 
after "Die Stem" and at the end of the banquet it was not played 
at all. Col. Stallard leapt up and started singing it on his own 
at which point everyone else "including the orchestra" started 
singing it. 58 
Nevertheless, it was noted by Baring that further "embarrassing 
incidents" were few during the tour and that the only Nationalist 
politician to stay away from all the official functions 
concerning the visit was J .G. Strijdom. 59 In his general 
impressions of the tour, written in a despatch of 10 March, 
Baring noted the attitudes of the "two wings" of the National 
Party. 60 The one under Strij dom' s leadership he saw as being 
"unrelenting" in its hatred of the British connection. The other, 
under Malan, he saw as being "moderate" and was reflected by 
newpapers such as Die Burger. Die Transvaler, on the other hand, 
reflected the extremist view. (Under its editor, H.F. Verwoerd, 
it had proposed a complete boycott of the royal tour, to the 
extent that it refused to report on the tour's progress. Even 
Strijdom had disagreed with this editorial policy). 
Baring had noted further that there were "divisions" in the 
response of non-European organisations to the tour but claimed 
it was too early to judge its effects on the organisations 
boycotting the tour. 61 Towards the end of the tour, in response 
to a question from the queen about the results of the visit, 
Baring said he felt it would not change any votes but might make 
57 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.152. 
58 Ibid. 
59 PRO, DO 119, File 1429, M/70/105, Baring - Addison, 19 
February 1947. 
60 DO 119, File 1429, M/70/112, Baring - Addison, 10 March 
1947. 
61 Ibid. 
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the Nationalists more disposed to be friendly to the English.fil 
As to whether, in conclusion, one could agree with Smuts who said 
that the royal tour had had "a soothing, healing effect" on South 
Africans, or whether it ended up dividing them even more is 
difficult to judge. However much the king might have been seen 
as a symbolically unifying figure for many South Africans, it is 
clear also that each community placed in the king its own 
separate hopes or fears. For many Africans and Indians the king 
represented the last link with that fast- disappearing world of 
Victorian liberalism and the forlorn hope that it could still 
be resurrected. For many English speakers, the strength of their 
loyalty was in direct proportion to the growth of Afrikaner 
nationalism and reflected the fear that links with the 
Commonwealth and Empire were under threat. 
For most Afrikaners, however, the tour revived the resentments 
and bitter memories of less compromising and more hostile periods 
in Anglo-Afrikaner relations. Afrikaner Nationalists accused 
Smuts of using the tour to bolster his faltering political 
support. The severe defeat suffered by the UP at the Hottentots-
Holland by-election just before the royals arrived may have 
boosted that perception, although, in fact, the dates of the tour 
had been arranged many months previously. 
In terms of South Africa's relations with Britain and the 
Commonwealth the overall assessment of the royal tour could be 
that the temporary euphoria and excitement it created may have 
masked the reality of a relationship that was slowly drifting 
apart.fil As had become clear by 1948, it was the racial question 
that had come to predominate in South Africa's relations with the 
outside world. Although appeals to ethnic and racial sentiment 
had dominated the parliamentary debates during the Smuts era, 
ultimately it was the issue of race relations that caused Smuts's 
& Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.157. 
63 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.25. 
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political fortunes to founder in 1948. Smuts's view of black 
political development had been encapsulated in his statement to 
Lord Athlone, the governor-general, some 25 years previously: "I 
never turn my attention to native affairs until I have to."M By 
1948, of course, it was already too late. 
~Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.146. 
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PART 2: THE MALAN YEARS, 1948-1954 
• 
64 
Introduction. 
The accession to power of the National Party/Afrikaner Party 
alliance in May 1948 marked the beginning of a new period in 
South Africa's Commonwealth relations. Committed to a policy of 
eventual republican independence and ideologically hostile to the 
symbolism of British imperial hegemony in South Africa, D. F. 
Malan's government embarked, somewhat cautiously at first, upon 
a course which would lead inexorably towards secession. Although 
never consciously intended by Malan himself, the precedent 
created by Ireland's republican independence outside the 
Commonwealth in 1948, rather than by India's republican 
independence within the Commonwealth in 1949, was the eventual 
path followed by South Africa during H.F. Verwoerd's premiership 
in 1961. 
Malan's government was by no means secure at first in its victory 
over Smuts's United Party in 1948 and was thus restrained in its 
public attitude to republicanism and the Commonwealth connection. 
With a majority of only 5 seats over the combined opposition and 
heavily dependent upon N. C. Havenga' s moderate (in terms of 
republicanism) Afrikaner Party to achieve a parliamentary 
majority, Malan had to reassure English voters that there would 
be no attempt in the current parliament to introduce republican 
independence and certainly not by means of a bare parliamentary 
majority. White voters would be tested in a referendum and the 
question of the Commonweal th relationship would be treated 
separately, the latter proviso being eventually accepted, albeit 
reluctantly, by the anti-Commonwealth faction in Malan's cabinet 
under the leadership of J.G. Strijdom. 
As we shall see in this section, there were other constraints 
upon Malan' s republicanism that were not wholly related to 
domestic political opinion. South Africa's financial position 
after 1948 was not conducive to policies that aimed at a radical 
break with the past, as the Te Water mission soon indicated. 
Charles te Water, former South African high commissioner and head 
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of the South African delegation to the League of Nations, was 
appointed by Malan to act as South Africa's roving ambassador in 
1948 and 1949 to calm fears overseas about the new government's 
policies and to try and negotiate a loan to overcome the balance 
of payments difficulties of those years. 
Global politics also played a part in helping Malan's government 
to rethink its attitude to Commonwealth co-operation. The 
deteriorating relations between East and West exemplified by the 
Berlin Crisis and the outbreak of the Korean War made many 
Nationalists wary of being isolated in an increasingly dangerous 
world. As we shall see, relations with Britain and, thus, the 
Commonwealth, assumed new importance in the strategic sense and 
Malan's government soon proved even more amenable (in British 
eyes) to the idea of defence commitments than Smuts's government 
had ever been after 1945. 
It will be argued in this section that the British attitude to 
the new Nationalist government, defined as it was by economic and 
strategic constraints on British policy makers under the first 
post-war Labour government, gave mixed signals to the South 
Africans. On the one hand, the placatory attitude of the British 
on issues such as the Seretse affair (examined in chapter 5) , 
decolonisation (chapter 6) and defence issues (chapter 9) 
encouraged the Nationalists to believe the British would remain 
a stalwart ally of South Africa in the Commonwealth and UNO. It 
also heJ.ped to modify their hostility to the Commonwealth and 
eventual secession (although internal political factors were, 
perhaps, of greater importance concerning the delays over the 
republican campaign) . On the other hand, British moves towards 
self-government for colonies in West Africa aroused considerable 
alarm and protest from Malan' s government that contributed to the 
increasing formalisation of relations between the two governments 
noticed already in the Smuts period. 
A further "toenadering" of the English and Afrikaans sectors of 
the white population on foreign and domestic issues is a further 
66 
theme of this section. It was helped by the fact that Malan's 
moves towards republicanism were piecemeal during his period of 
office and were largely confined to symbolic acts of assertion 
of South Africa's right to complete independence within the 
developing framework of the Commonwealth's constitutional 
processes (the London Declaration of 1949 being the defining 
point of reference in this regard) . Legislative measures passed 
by South Africa's parliament such as the Citizenship Act of 1949 
could thus be def ended by the Nationalists as merely bringing 
South Africa into line with the latest developments elsewhere in 
the Commonwealth. 
This did qot, however, prevent a storm of protest breaking out 
among those who valued the British connection in South Africa and 
who saw such measures as being the first steps towards secession. 
Those who questioned the Nationalists' commitment to not just the 
letter but also the spirit of the Commonwealth relationship were 
able as well to point to other less formal measures taken by 
Malan's government such as the seemingly deliberate exclusion of 
English-speakers from high positions in the civil service and 
military. 
The formation of the Torch Commando in opposition to what was 
perceived as a deliberate attempt by the Nationalists to 
undermine the constitution marked a high-point in uniting 
disparate but mainly white English-speaking groups against the 
government in the years 1952-1953. However, the energies of this 
opposition front were soon dissipated in squabbles over what had 
always marked the fault line in white politics in South Africa: 
the role of non-whites in any alternate system of government. The 
coup de grace was administered by the official opposition party 
itself, the United Party, which turned its back on any form of 
extra-parliamentary protest in 1953 and which moved even closer 
to the Nationalist position on race relations in general. 
As we shall see, the question of South Africa's relations with 
Britain and the Commonwealth seemed to most commentators at the 
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time to be a whites-only affair and this perception was bolstered 
by the lack of attention paid in parliament and in the 
overwhelmingly white-owned media to black views on this subject 
and on other political topics in general. At a time of increasing 
radicalisation of black politics under the pressure of the 
apartheid programme adopted by the Nationalists, both main white 
population groups moved closer together to counter what was 
perceived to be a threat to their existence on the continent of 
Africa and at home. Debates in parliament on the need for a 
common front with the colonial powers against Communism and 
stirring African nationalism showed that the opposition and 
Nationalists had much the same concerns in foreign policy and it 
was rare to hear the voice of a Margaret Ballinger or a Sam Kahn 
expressing the need for co-operation with the excluded majority. 
The perceived threat to white security and living standards in 
the cities posed by black urbanisation after the war was an 
important factor in driving the two largest white political 
parties towards consensus on internal and external issues. 
Authors such as Deborah Posel 1 have shown how concerned the new 
Nationalist government was to contain the size of the African 
presence in the cities in the 1950s and 1960s and how the state's 
capacity to realize its aims during the 1950s was hindered by "an 
unwitting internal contradiction in the formulation of apartheid 
policy, which widened the space for resistance on several 
fronts''. 2 This contradiction lay in the policy of ''urban labour 
preference" which proved largely unsuccessful and had the 
unintended result of increasing the African migrant labour 
population throughout the 1950s and 1960s. In the immediate post-
war period the anxieties of whites about being "swamped" by 
Africans in the cities were "heightened by rising levels of 
1 Deborah Posel, The Making of Apartheid 1948-1961. Conflict 
and Compromise (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1991) and "Curbing 
African Urbanization in the 1950s and 1960s" in M. Swilling, R. 
Humphries and K. Shubane (eds), Apartheid in Transition (Cape 
Town, Oxford University Press, 1991), pp.19-32. 
2 Posel, "Curbing African Urbanization", pp.19-20. 
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political turbulence and often militant protest in urban African 
communities, provoked largely by appalling living conditions". 3 
The Nationalists were only partly successful in curbing black 
urbanisation and political turbulence in the black community 
during the years 1949 to 1961 and this indicated how 
opportunities for independent black political action still 
existed despite massive police and military intervention. Often, 
black resistance (or protests from the mainly English-speaking 
business community) caused the government to modify its influx 
control plans in the early 1950s (as the debates and subsequent 
amendments to Section 10 of the Urban Areas Act indicated) . 4 The 
hesitancies and "mistakes'' made in the 1950s were to cause a 
significant change in the direction of Nationalist urbanization 
policy in the 1960s which led to a more thorough-going (and, 
inevitably, more brutal) programme of population removals and 
controls. 
The negative effect on black opinion about the British (and, 
initially, the Commonwealth connection caused by what was 
perceived as British vacillations in policy towards the 
Nationalists, will be noted in this section. The leaders of the 
main African and Indian nationalist parties such as the ANC and 
SAIC professed, at first, to see no difference between the 
governments of Malan and Smuts as far as blacks were concerned 
although it was acknowledged that apartheid posed a greater 
threat to black aspirations than anything previously experienced. 
As the black opposition mobilised itself for confrontation with 
the government on a scale never seen before, the adoption by its 
spokesmen of the anti-colonial rhetoric of contemporary African 
and Asian nationalist movements became increasingly apparent. The 
internal changes within the main extra-parliamentary political 
movement, the ANC, were mirrored in the shift towards a more 
assertive anti-colonial stance on foreign affairs which, 
inevitably, resulted in a deteriorating attitude to the main 
3 Ibid., p.20. 
4 Posel, The Making of Apartheid, pp.95-99. 
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colonial power, Britain (and her "white" Commonweal th partners) . 
The increased influence of the Youth League and the Communist 
Party within the Congress Alliance after the ousting of the 
"liberal" A.B. Xuma in 1949 had resulted in a more militant 
programme of action against white hegemony and the adoption of 
a more socialistic ideological orientation. 5 
British moves to appease white South African opinion over the 
protectorates and to protect South Africa at the United Nations 
continued to be noted. On the other hand, British moves towards 
decolonisation in Africa and Asia were welcomed by black opinion 
in general and the concept of Commonwealth as opposed to Empire 
(greatly strengthened by the accession to Commonwealth status of 
the three Asian dominions of India, Pakistan and Ceylon), was 
favourably received because, as one black newspaper put it, the 
Empire had "metamorphasized" into a new "flowering" the 
Commonwealth, which meant Britain had seen the wisdom of "bowing 
to and anticipating the inevitable [decolonisation] ". 6 Similarly, 
British royalty seemed still to hold the affections of many as 
was evidenced by the reaction in the African and Indian press to 
the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. 
In the economic field, as we shall see, the crises of 1948 and 
1949 (and other global economic factors) helped the Nationalists 
to modify or postpone plans for a downgrading of links with the 
sterling area and with the Commonwealth preference system in 
general. Although the radical break with the imperial trading 
system proposed in 1943 and by anti-British spokesmen such as 
Eric Louw had already been watered down by the time of the 1948 
election, the ultimate aim of complete independence in the 
economic field was not entirely shelved. It was encouraged by the 
world-wide move towards a multi-lateral trading system after the 
5 See Tom Lodge's discussion of effects of these changes on 
ANC policies (culminating in the adoption of the Freedom Charter 
of 1955) in his book, Black Politics in South Africa Since 1945, 
pp.28-73. 
6 Ilanga Lase Natal, 25 April 1953. 
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Second World War which gathered strength in the 1950's as the 
sterling area started to recover from its initial crises and as 
the United States economy expanded. The Nationalist government, 
however, continued to commit South Africa to full co-operation 
with the sterling Commonwealth, a policy which, with few 
exceptions, was seen to be in the country's interests. 
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Chapter 4: The 1948 Election: Implications 
(a) Initial response 
In its commentary upon the campaign and results of the 1948 
elections, the leading journal of Commonwealth opinion, Round 
Table, noted that no mention had been made in the pre-election 
manifesto of the National Party about relations with the 
Commonwealth.' It also noted the absence of any real "harsh, 
anti-English propaganda" and that concessions had been given on 
the issue of an immediate republic in that it had been promised 
that a republic would not be introduced by means of a bare 
parliamentary majority. 
However, the fact that not one English speaker could be found in 
the new cabinet was also commented upon and that the parliament 
was "divided more solidly than ever before" between English and 
Afrikaner. All the Afrikaans constituencies of the United Party, 
it noted, had crossed to the Nationalists. "Nationalism was now 
firmly in the saddle" and the "mere passage of time" combined 
with the effects of the Nationalists' "anti-colour" campaign had 
resulted in Smuts's defeat. 2 
Malan, it was noted, had acknowledged in his victory broadcast 
of 4 June that "the uniquely friendly relations existing between 
South Africa and the United Kingdom and other members of the 
British Commonweal th of Nations ... should be continued" . 3 
However, he had also referred to India's recent accession to 
Commonwealth membership with less than wholehearted enthusiasm, 
saying that it meant "more emphasis, perhaps, on separate 
contacts between individual members of the commonwealth", rather 
1 
"South Africa: Nationalism in the Saddle", Round Table, 
vol.38, 1947-8, pp.814-817. 
2 Ibid., p.815. 
3 Ibid. 
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than on discussions "at joint and inclusive conferences" . 4 
It was unclear, continued the writer, whether Malan would himself 
attend the next Commonwealth prime ministers' meeting. 
Furthermore, the release of Robey Leibrandt, the "notorious Nazi 
spy", had aroused the anger of ex-servicemen's associations and 
following closely was the decision to allow civil servants to 
join the Ossewa Brandwag and the Broederbond. All these measures 
taken together, said the writer, had increased the "lack of 
confidence" in the new South African government overseas. 
The above-mentioned views of Round Table on the results of the 
1948 elections were a fairly accurate summary of the reception 
given to the Nationalist victory in Britain and among opposition 
circles in South Africa. Anxiety at what the future held for 
English South Africans was combined with a certain amount of 
relief that Malan intended to maintain the Commonwealth 
connection and to postpone republicanism for the duration of the 
coming parliament. 
Geyser claims that there was "no alarm" among British business 
interests at the election results, nor about investments in South 
Africa, 5 but it has been pointed out that there was a "short-term 
adverse international economic reaction with reserves dropping by 
£3 7m and the withdrawal of some industrial investments". 6 That the 
new government must have been aware of the uncertainty overseas was 
shown by the alacrity with which it moved to reassure investors, 
sending Charles Te Water to Britain and the USA in August to smooth 
over ruffled feathers. In a press interview before he left, Te Water 
was asked whether he thought he could persuade people overseas that 
"democracy in South Africa had not disappeared" since the 
4 Ibid. , p. 816. 
5 0. Geyser, Watershed for South Africa. London 1961 
(Pretoria, Butterworths, 1983), p.23. 
6 Barratt and Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy. p.29. 
and n . 1 , p . 3 5 8 . 
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Nationalist victory. 7 He replied that he believed he would find it 
easy to convince people that "the present government, like its 
predecessors, had the interests of the country at heart and that its 
policy was democratic". By October, however, he was complaining of 
bad press coverage overseas and of "disturbing evidence of 
concerted attempt emanating from Union to damage Union's credit 
overseas 11 • 8 
In November The Star in Johannesburg said in an editorial that Te 
Water would have found his task easier "if Nationalists like 
Strijdom had left him free to say that South Africa would continue 
to govern itself along the lines of the British Parliamentary 
system", and that it was "useless" of him to assure the Americans of 
South Africa's continued desire to strengthen the Commonwealth 
"while Strijdom was proclaiming his party's republican objective". 9 
The response of black and Indian political organisations to the 
results of the 1948 election in South Africa was, not surprisingly, 
pessimistic. Some claimed that it would not make much difference 
whether Smuts was replaced by Malan or not since they were both seen 
as racialists intent on suppressing black rights. For example, Dr 
A.B. Xuma stated at a press conference in April 1948 before the 
elections that there was no democracy in South Africa, "just a white 
oligarchy" and that the National Party's proposed apartheid policy 
was just an "elaboration of Union Native Policy" with "improvements" 
to include Indians and coloureds. 10 
After the Nationalist victory at the polls the president of the Cape 
regional branch of the ANC, the Reverend J.A. Calata, stated in his 
presidential address to the regional congress of the party that 
7 Die Burger, 20 August 1948. 
8 TA, A 78 (Te Water}, Vol.9, File AE3/1 (Economic 
Development in South Africa - General, 1948 Jan.- 1949 Aug.}, Te 
Water- Forsyth, 29 October 1948. 
9 The Star, 19 November 1948. 
10 Karis, Hope and Challenge, p.274. 
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apartheid was just "old policies in new form" and that there was 
little difference in fact between the two main white parties. 11 He 
did, however, acknowledge that the change of government was received 
"with a certain amount of excitement and anxiety" by Africans. South 
Africa, he said, was a "funny country" in that its rulers were "full 
of fear". They feared the black people "who outnumber them three to 
one", and although it was supposed to be part of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations "yet it can have an anti-British 
government" . 12 
It soon became apparent, however, that a far greater threat to black 
aspirations was being posed by the Nationalists' apartheid policies 
than by the indefinite "trusteeship" policy of the Smuts era. Eddie 
Roux, a member of the banned Communist Party in the 1950's, noted 
that "the coming to power of the Nationalist Government in 1948 was 
the most significant event in South African history in recent 
times", 13 and that "there began for South Africa a period of racial 
legislation more thoroughgoing, more grotesque perhaps, than 
anything the country had yet seen". 
Reflecting the changes within the leadership of the ANC (towards a 
strengthening of the Youth League and Communist Party members in the 
executive) 14 and in response to the new policy of apartheid, the ANC 
adopted its most militant programme of defiance yet at the 1949 
annual conference and joined with other organisations to appoint a 
Joint Planning Council to co-ordinate the mass campaign of defiance 
of apartheid laws. Thus was set the stage for the greatest challenge 
since Union to South Africa's white power structures, the "Defiance 
Campaign" of the early 1950's, which was eventually crushed by a 
combination of repressive police action and organisational problems 
within the protesting alliance itself. In turn, the campaign 
11 Ibid. , p. 2 8 0 . 
12 Ibid., pp.280-281. 
13 Eddie Roux, Time Longer than Rope (Madison, University of 
Wisconsin Press, 1964), p.366. 
u Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, pp.27-28. 
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reinforced the trend towards a consensus on racial matters among the 
main white political parties and on the perceived threat posed by 
African nationalism to South Africa externally and internally. 
In the resolutions of the ANC and other extra-parliamentary 
organisations, on the other hand, a markedly more hostile attitude 
to British colonialism and towards "imperialism" in general, began 
to appear. A policy manifesto of the ANC Youth League in 1948 stated 
that Europeans had "carved up and divided Africans among themselves" 
and had "dispossessed, by force of arms, the owners of the land -
the children of the soil". It noted that "A few Europeans love 
justice and condemn racial oppression, but their voice is negligible 
and in the last analysis counts for nothing." 15 
By the time of the 1954 annual congress of the ANC the "decline of 
liberalism" in South Africa was being lamented in the address by the 
president-general, Chief Albert Luthuli, who claimed that it was a 
"sad commentary on the attitude of white South Africa that in the 
Union of South Africa liberalism should be held to such extreme and 
malicious scorn that any white person showing any leanings towards 
such liberalism is regarded as a renegade and so shunned if not 
completely ostracised". 16 He warned the Congress against being blind 
to the fact that the "baaskap spirit of the Boer Republics" was "in 
the ascendency in the Union", which, he said, accounted for the fact 
that "every day" the United Party was becoming "indistinguishable" 
from the National Party. 
After all both the United Party and the Nationalist Party 
vie for the position of being guardians of the traditional 
Native Policy of South Africa and the essence of this 
policy is the baaskap spirit of the Boer Republics where 
15 Karis, Hope and Challenge, p.328. 
16 William Cullen Library (WCL), University of the 
Witwatersrand, AD 2186 (ANC Collection), Box a (National Congress 
Meetings), 3. Annual Report of the National Executive Committee 
to the 42nd Annual Conference of the ANC, Durban, 16-19 December 
1954. Address by Chief A.J. Luthuli, President-General, pp.3-4. 
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each white farmer was a supreme lord over his African 
peasants. 17 
At that 1954 conference the ANC outlined the cardinal points of its 
foreign policy which were described as "an uncompromising stand for 
world peace and opposition to colonialism and white domination" . 18 
It noted that "the struggle to free South Africa and indeed all of 
Africa" was a "serious problem" that would mean a "struggle against 
six major imperial nations and their satellites such as Malan, Roy 
Welensky, Blundell and others". The ANC should ask itself, continued 
the report, certain questions concerning "any prospective ally": was 
that country or group in the "imperialist camp or in the 
anti-imperialist camp", was it for "equality or for racial 
discrimination", was it "pro-African or anti-African freedom'' and 
lastly, was it for or anti "Colonialism"? The ANC would base its 
attitude to any country on "the answer to all these questions". It 
recorded its thanks to the UNO Commission on Racial Discrimination 
and noted that the expulsion of the colonial powers from Asia was a 
"source of inspiration to the African people". Britain and France 
were called upon to withdraw their troops from Africa and to release 
the "gaoled leaders" in Kenya and elsewhere . 19 
Although these quoted statements were tempered with others more 
conciliatory towards the colonial powers and towards Britain in 
particular (which was acknowledged to be moving towards 
decolonisation in Africa) , the general tone was, as we have seen, 
hostile to imperialism and critical of any perceived support which 
other powers were giving to Malan's government in South Africa. To 
an increasing extent Britain and the Commonwealth in general would 
be judged in the light of their commitment to non-racialism and 
decolonisation in Africa. In the case of Britain, as we shall see, 
this commitment was, in the eyes of the ANC, found to be severely 
17 b"d Li_., p.4. 
18 Ibid., Report of the National Executive Committee, Part 
2, "World Situation", pp.5-6. 
19 Ibid. , p. 6 . 
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lacking. 
(b) Britain, the Commonwealth and apartheid - an "acute dilemma" 
In terms of British-South African relations it was undoubtedly true 
to say that the succession of Smuts by Malan in 1948 meant a 
significant change, that it brought a "new note of mutual 
reservation, of calculation and of reassessment" into the 
relationship. 20 As Peter Lyon has noted, "Smuts was quintessentially 
a pro-Commonwealth man; Dr Malan, initially at least, was not. 1121 It 
meant an "acute dilemma" for the British government which had to 
balance its awareness, on the one hand, of the sensitivities of the 
colonies and the Asian Commonwealth to apartheid, with, on the other 
hand, its need for maintaining friendly links with South Africa. The 
strategic and economic link meant that: "No British government would 
totally dissociate from South Africa", 22 especially in a time of 
increasing Cold War tensions and especially in view of South 
Africa's "stranglehold" on the high commission territories. Thus, 
Britain was determined to retain South Africa in the "Commonwealth 
system of the 1940 's" and so were the other dominions, as the 
"credibility" internationally of Britain and the Commonwealth could 
have been "seriously compromised" by the departure of a founder 
member . 23 
The above-mentioned dilemma faced by Britain after 1948 had also, as 
we have seen, been faced during Smuts's period albeit not as 
acutely. The exigencies of the post-war economic crisis together 
with the much-changed international strategic situation made 
Britain's "appeasement" of South Africa a policy imperative for both 
Labour and Conservative governments and the succession of Smuts by 
Malan in South Africa made it even more urgent. Patrick Gordon 
20 Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies and Attitudes to 
South Africa 1948-1991", p.32. 
21 Ibid. (See also Part 1, Introduction, p. 11) . 
22 b. d 
.I......!_., p.33. 
23 Ibid. 
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Walker, Commonwealth secretary in the last two years of the Attlee 
government, gave his forthright assessment of the situation facing 
Britain in South Africa after Smuts in a cabinet memorandum of 1950. 
He noted that the "accession to power of the National Party in South 
Africa after the general election in May 1948 had made the conduct 
of our relations a matter of some delicacy". 24 There were "extreme" 
elements in the National Party who were "anti-British". The 
Nationalists were republican in their aims, he noted, but they had 
a minority vote and only the "weightage" in the rural areas together 
with their Afrikaner Party alliance had given them a majority over 
the combined opposition. Although they still had no independent 
majority, he doubted whether Havenga could continue to prevent 
Nationalist measures such as those against the coloureds and the 
"Native Seats". The National Party had "consolidated its hold" (by 
winning the 6 seats in South West Africa) and "there seems no 
likelihood that it will be overthrown in the near future". Having 
lost Smuts (who died on 11 September 1950) , the United Party "may 
not find a first class leader for some time or a really challenging 
policy". 
It was apartheid, he continued, that really shocked the world and 
measures such as the Group Areas Act went "much further" than UP 
measures, although there seemed to be much support for them among 
the "British element". He went on to note how important India's 
attitude was for Britain: "Any suspicion that the United Kingdom 
sympathised in any way with South Africa's native policies would so 
deeply disturb African and Indian opinion in our African colonies as 
to constitute a threat to their internal security." 
Despite the latter statement, Gordon Walker went on to present a 
number of reasons why it was important for Britain to "preserve good 
relations with South Africa": strategic and defence reasons such as 
Simonstown, Middle East commitments and uranium supplies; Malan's 
24 PRO, CAB 129/42, C.P. (50) .214, "Relations with the Union 
of South Africa." Memorandum by the Secretary of State for 
Commonwealth Relations, 25 September 1950. 
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"staunch" anti-Communism, his help during the Berlin Crisis and his 
commitments to the UN effort in Korea; South African gold production 
which was "essential for the viability of the Sterling Area" and her 
value as an export market and investment field for the United 
Kingdom; the fact that the high commission territories could "at any 
time be economically strangled by the Union Government withholding 
essential facilities"; and, lastly, "our obligation to South Africa 
as a fellow Commonwealth member" which meant that even if she were 
to become a republic he hoped that she would remain in the 
Commonweal th. 25 
Though there were many differences with South Africa, he continued, 
there was also much in common "and forty percent of the white 
population" was "of British stock". The "Commonwealth partnership" 
rested on the principle of partnership and any attempts to reach 
"complete identity of views" between all of its members would "break 
up the association overnight". In spite of difficulties, the 
relationship with the National Party government was "surprisingly 
good" and here Gordon Walker referred to "successful economic talks" 
the previous summer and to "promising" defence talks. It was 
therefore necessary, he wrote, to "avoid polemics" and to hope that 
the "extreme" and "parochial" views of National Party leaders would 
be modified by world opinion: 
This is more likely to happen if we, for our part, show in 
our dealings with them that we appreciate the problem 
confronting them and do not simply adopt ~n attitude of 
condemnation. 
Similarly, on the Indian question, "strict non-interference" at UNO 
was recommended as well as an attempt to exercise a "conciliatory 
influence from the background" . 26 The United Kingdom should abstain 
from any "strongly condemnatory resolutions", as was the case with 
the South West African question. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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In conclusion, he said, the United Kingdom should "clearly" not 
associate itself too closely with South Africa's "native'' policies 
and apartheid. However, the British attitude should be stated "as 
politely as possible'' and should thus avoid "antagonising'' South 
Africa. Britain should work with other Commonwealth countries and 
the USA to exercise a •moderating influence" on disagreements 
between South Africa and •other parties•, ensuring "that we do not 
act alone as mediator in these disputes". Everything possible should 
be done to retain South Africa as a member of the Commonwealth, 
"preferably as one owing allegiance to the Crown" and, thus, to 
remain neutral in the Indian dispute and to try to persuade South 
Africa to secure agreement on South West Africa in the General 
Assembly. 27 
Ingham has stated that as far as the governments of Attlee, 
Churchill and Eden were concerned, "the significance of the 
apartheid policy on the "evolving international situation after 1948 
was not immediately evident in their relations with South Africa" . 28 
What Gordon Walker's cabinet memorandum shows, however, is that, in 
the case of the Labour government, the awareness of the effect of 
Britain's possible support for apartheid on public opinion in her 
African colonies was very much in evidence and that this was taken 
into account in her dealings with South Africa. 
The fact that, as Ingham states, ministers of both Labour and 
Conservative governments showed very little desire in the 1950's to 
criticise South Africa's racial policies in public29 was the result 
of a careful weighing-up of the possible alternatives and of the 
calculation that the benefits of not criticising South Africa 
outweighed the possible ill-effects. 
27 Ibid. 
28 K. Ingham, "The British Government 
presented to the S.A. Historical 
Potchefstroom, February, 1993, p.6. 
29 Ibid., pp.6-7. 
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The cabinet discussion of Gordon Walker's memorandum illustrated 
this aspect of British policy-making towards South Africa. The 
alternatives of support or opposition to South Africa were fully 
discussed but in the end it was decided to endorse Gordon Walker's 
recommendations despite the objections of the minister of health, 
Aneurin Bevan, and of the colonial secretary, James Griffiths. 30 The 
latter had said that he was disturbed by the effects which the 
domestic policies of South Africa were causing in colonial 
territories and also by the indications of South African ambitions 
for control over other parts of Africa. He gave as an example 
"Afrikaner immigration" into Northern Rhodesia and said (in reply to 
Gordon Walker's arguments for preserving good relations with South 
Africa) that while he appreciated the economic and strategic 
advantage "of our present relations with South Africa", he feared 
that "a time might come when we should be forced to weigh these 
against our Colonial interests in other parts of Africa". 
The minister of health, Aneurin Bevan, supported this view and 
referred to the "embarrassment" which the Union government caused 
United Kingdom ministers in their relations with their supporters in 
the United Kingdom and their international relations in the UNO. He 
suggested that if it continued the United Kingdom might have to 
consider whether she "lost more than she gained" by her present 
association with the Union government. Other ministers, however, 
stressed the importance of "securing South Africa's support in any 
struggle against Communism" and the "great value" of her likely 
military support in the Middle East. They referred to the "good 
progress" of defence discussions and "laid emphasis" on keeping 
South Africa in the Commonwealth. 
Similarly, in 1951, after a tour to southern Africa and the high 
commission territories, Gordon Walker again expressed the importance 
to Britain of keeping on good terms with the Nationalist government. 
He noted that politics in South Africa were "sharp and bitter" and 
that the NP had "many characteristics of a devoted movement of 
30 PRO, CAB 128/18, C.M.62(50)4, "Relations with South 
Africa", 28 September 1950. 
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liberation", using Afrikaans as a "weapon" and still politically 
"fighting the Boer War". 31 But as long as the NP maintained an 
anti-black attitude, he noted, they got "good British support in 
elections". This was needed to keep them in power but as soon as 
they pushed the anti-British line too far they lost good English 
support and then got more Afrikaner votes. Conscious of their 
isolation, they needed and valued British support, he said, 
especially in view of the "Communist danger", so they "flinch from 
a break" with the British and in defence matters, for example, the 
Nationalists were "more forthcoming than Smuts ever dared to be in 
peace-time". 
Finally, Gordon Walker's memorandum discussed future policy in 
regard to South Africa. His advice was to "refrain from provocation" 
and rather to develop relations with South Africa that "bind her to 
us and make her unwilling to risk a break" - not to ostracise her 
because that would "gravely harm" Britain in the defence and 
economic fields and weaken her ability to deter South Africa from 
"foolhardy acts". It would also reduce the chances of "holding on to 
the Territories".n 
Gordon Walker's memorandum reveals the nuances of the official 
perceptions of South African politics held at the time by the Labour 
government. Once again, what stands out is the desire to avoid 
offending the Nationalists too much by criticising them and, 
instead, to advocate a policy of what later came to be called 
"Constructive Engagement" - encouraging the Nationalists to continue 
co-operation with Britain in defence, economic affairs and in the 
administration of the high commission territories with the hope that 
this would also result in a modification of their more extreme 
policies. If this meant sacrificing the interests of the "local 
31 PRO, CAB 129/45, C.P. (51)109, "Visit by the Secretary of 
State for Commonwealth Relations to the Union of South Africa, 
Southern Rhodesia and the Three High Commission Territories of 
Basutoland, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland." 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
16 April 1951, p.7. 
32 Ib. d 14 l . , p. . 
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British", as Gordon Walker seemed to be hinting, and of the local 
black population in the process, it was not stated officially but 
was a logical deduction from the lack of importance assigned to such 
interests in the memorandum. The main priority was to keep South 
Africa in the Commonwealth and this meant, in effect, appeasing 
the Nationalist government instead of encouraging opposition to it 
inside the country. 
Churchill's Conservative government, which returned to power at the 
end of 1951, continued to adopt much the same sort of attitude to 
South Africa, endorsing the previous government's approach (after 
some hesitation) on the Seretse Khama affair and on relations with 
the Union in general. 33 Lord Swinton, the Conservative secretary of 
state for Commonwealth relations, stressed the importance of South 
Africa's position in the Commonwealth and was anxious in 
negotiations over the protectorates and defence to put Malan's mind 
at rest concerning British aims in the African colonies. 34 Both 
Malan and his high commissioner in London, A.L. Geyer, thought that 
the accession to power of the Conservatives would mean better 
relations with South Africa although Geyer later acknowledged that 
the difficulties over the protectorates would continue and that the 
Tories were more concerned than Labour had been over the possibility 
of South Africa becoming a republic. 35 
Peter Lyon notes that . despite the attitude of non-interference 
adopted by both Tory and Labour governments to South Africa's race 
policies, an increasing amount of private disquiet was being 
33 PRO, CAB 129/50, c. (52) 76, "Bamangwato Affairs", 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
13 March 1952. 
34 PRO, CAB 129/61, c. (53) 165, "Relations with South Africa", 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
5 June 1953. 
35 Cape Archives (CA), A1890 (Geyer collection), Vol .1 
(Correspondence: South Africa, 1950 Sept - 1953 Dec.) , Memorandum 
vir Ontmoeting met Malan Januarie 1954, deur A.L. Geyer, n.d. 
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displayed "in the offices and corridors of Whitehall". 36 He quotes 
Sir Thomas Lloyd, permanent under-secretary at the colonial office, 
complaining to Sir William Strang at the foreign office of "numerous 
and growing embarrassments" flowing from the failure to denounce 
what 
also 
he characterised as "reactionary South 
mentions Sir Charles Jefferies of 
African policies".n He 
the colonial off ice 
expressing the view ("some eight years before this in effect became 
British policy"), that if a choice had to be made, then Britain 
would support a "parti-coloured [sic] Commonwealth" rather than 
South African membership. 38 
But, Lyon notes, these 
British officials",w 
remarks 
which, 
were only 
although 
the "private 
discussed 
communings of 
were rather 
quickly brushed aside. For example, in 1952 a response by the 
under-secretary at the Commonwealth relations office, Sir Percival 
Liesching, to a request by Lloyd that some form of public statement 
at ministerial level should be made which would indicate Britain's 
disapproval of South Africa's policies, was that such a statement 
was impossible as it would "make our position worse off than before 
we started".• Liesching claimed that when Malan criticised British 
policy he usually was careful to do so in such a way as to make a 
statement on "matters that are legitimately the concern of South 
Africa [such as the Gold Coast's membership of the Commonwealth]". 41 
As Ingham has pointed out, both Labour and Conservative MPs on the 
whole seemed to have accepted this official line with only a 
36 Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies", p.35. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
• PRO, Dominions Office (DO), 35 (Miscelleneous 
Correspondence), File 2220 (1952: Constitutional Developments 
within the Commonwealth), No.3. Liesching - Lloyd, 15 September 
1952. 
41 Ibid. 
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"handful of except ions" . 42 The exceptions were Labour's 
"anti-imperialist franctireurs", the Labour party "watchdogs" who 
continued to raise in the House of Commons the question of what 
instructions were given to the British representative at the UNO 
regarding attempts by other countries to put the question of South 
Africa's race policies on the agenda of the General Assembly. They 
were invariably fobbed off with the reply that such a subject did 
not fall within the competency of the UNO. 43 
This cautious line on South Africa continued to be followed by 
British delegates to the United Nations and by those of other 
"white" Commonwealth countries. The non-interference clause of 
Article 2(7) was argued by Britain, Australia and New Zealand when 
in October 1952 the General Assembly decided to include "race 
conflict in South Africa" on its agenda for the first time. They 
voted against the resolution to have it included on the agenda, with 
the British delegate, Sir Gladwyn Jones, arguing that this was a 
matter of domestic jurisdiction and that it should be pursued 
individually but not through the channels of UNO.« An Australian 
observer, writing in Round Table, noted that "It would not be 
appropriate, nor possible for an Australian observer to pass 
judgment on South Africa's attempts to resolve her own domestic 
problems. 1145 
At Commonwealth prime ministers' conferences and other "official" 
meetings of Commonwealth members the non-interference rule continued 
to be obeyed as it had in the Smuts era. India complied with this 
rule as did the other Asian Commonwealth members, either because of 
a wish not to disrupt the fragile new association or because of 
42 Ingham, "The British Government and Apartheid", p.7. 
43 Ibid. , p. 8. 
« Commonwealth Survey (Central Office of Information, 
London), ld. (Political), "UNO and South Africa's Racial Policy", 
October 1952, pp.37-38. 
45 
"Commonwealth Relations: the Coronation Conference", Round 
Table, Vol. 43, 1952-53, pp.84-85. 
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local political reasons such as the Kashmir dispute between India 
and Pakistan. 
At the coronation conference of prime ministers in London (during 
the crowning of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953) Nehru was asked by a 
television interviewer why he had not raised the racial issue at the 
conference. He replied that he had not done so because the 
conference was an occasion and a body "for seeking agreement and 
friendship rather than pressing on differences" . 46 (The fact that 
the UNO provided an outlet for more bellicose criticism of South 
Africa must also have made it easier for Nehru to avoid it in 
Commonweal th circles) . 47 . 
However, when it came to less official kinds of Commonwealth 
contacts, such as the Commonwealth Relations conferences or the 
Parliamentary Association conferences, criticism of South Africa was 
much more in evidence.It was reported in 1949 from Ontario, where 
the third Commonwealth Relations Conference was being held, that 
speakers from the "African colonies" had expressed concern at South 
Africa's policies at the Ontario conference and that "frank and 
sincere" warnings had been given by Asian speakers. 48 South African 
speakers, on the other hand, "had not been convinced about the need 
for liberal policies". 
At a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association conference in New 
Zealand in November-December 1950 it was reported that the Indian 
delegate, Govind Das, "attacked Australia and South Africa with such 
vigour that the South African delegate left the room". 49 Similarly, 
at the 1954 Lahore Commonwealth Relations Conference, India and 
South Africa traded blows over immigration policy and the apartheid 
46 Round Table, Vol.43, 1952-53, pp.361-362. 
47 Ibid. , p. 3 6 3 . 
48 
"The Commonwealth Relations Conference: A Canadian View", 
Round Table, Vol.41, 1949-50, pp.21-24. 
49 
"New Zealand: Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference", 
Round Table, Vol. 41, 1950-51, pp.191-192. 
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system although a South African delegate dissociated himself from 
one of his colleagues' more abrasive remarks concerning 
"imperialist designs in Africa". 50 
India's 
These remarks and reports indicate how South Africa's racial 
policies were continuing to affect South Africa's "behind the 
scenes" Commonwealth relations although at the top level of 
government representation the unwritten code of non-interference was 
still being maintained. The Nationalist government's own concern 
about "interference" from Commonwealth sources in South Africa's 
affairs was soon made known in public statements by senior ministers 
and by Malan himself. The minister for economic affairs, Eric Louw, 
stressed in a broadcast from the prime ministers' conference of 
October 1948 in London that the talks could only be useful and 
profitable at an "informal and consultative level" and with "due 
regard" being paid to the "independent status" of the dominions. 51 
An indication of the worries facing Malan in South Africa's 
relations with the Commonwealth and Britain in particular is given 
in a series of letters between him and South Africa's high 
commissioner in London, A.L. Geyer, in the period 1950-54. In 
September 1950 he wrote to Geyer about the possibility of sanctions 
being passed against South Africa in UNO because of the South West 
Africa situation. He felt that such action was unlikely because of 
South Africa's assistance to UNO in Korea and because "in any case, 
the Security Council would have to consider a United Kingdom 
veto" . 52 It would be very difficult, he continued, "for Britain to 
have to choose between her Commonweal th and the UNO" ("om dan te 
moet kies tussen sy statebond en die WO"). 
50 N. Mansergh, The Fifth Unofficial Commonwealth Relations 
Conference. Lahore .Pakistan, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs (London, CUP, 1955), pp.99-100. 
51 Commonwealth Survey, ld (General), "Louw's Broadcast", 
October 1948 , p.6. 
52 CA, A 1890 (Geyer Collection) , Vol. 1, Malan-Geyer, 22 
September 1950. 
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After Gordon Walker's visit to South Africa in 1951 Malan wrote to 
Geyer noting that Gordon Walker "made a good impression with us" and 
that he hoped he had a "good and thorough understanding of our 
policies".g But he feared that it would be difficult to please the 
Labour Party in general because their "Fabian ideology" allowed 
them, he claimed, "to be led by the nose by Nehru" ( "aan die neus 
lei deur Nehru"). He predicted that relations between South Africa 
and Britain would be better if a Conservative government came to 
power. 
But in 1954, after three years of the new Tory administration, 
Geyer gave a more realistic assessment of British-South African 
relations, noting that the Conservatives "had no real love for us 1154 
("het geen danige liefde vir ons nie") and were scared that at some 
stage "we would ... declare a republic" which might well be outside 
the Commonwealth. In the context of the protectorates he noted the 
"unpleasant fact" that South Africa's colour policies had no 
supporters worth speaking of in the United Kingdom and that it would 
be "suicidal" for any. British administration to hand over the 
protectorates. He felt that South Africa was isolated on the "race 
question" and Britain's international position precluded any 
decision on handing over the protectorates. 
That the Nationalists were aware of how far they could go in testing 
British resolve on questions such as South West Africa, the 
protectorates and race questions in general, is quite clear from the 
correspondence quoted above. At least on one aspect, the 
incorporation of the protectorates, they seemed to have come up 
against a non-negotiable option for Britain, despite, as we shall 
see, a considerable amount of vacillation on Britain's part during 
the Seretse affair. As. to why the British refused to negotiate 
incorporation, the answer was partly given by Geyer in the 
memorandum quoted above: as he had said, no government in Britain 
53 A 1890, Vol.1, Malan-Geyer, 30 March 1951. 
~ A 1890, Vol.l, Memo vir Ontmoeting met Malan, Januarie 
1954, n.d. 
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could afford to risk electoral suicide by handing over the 
protectorates to a government in South Africa which had aroused such 
opprobrium in world circles. 55 
55 Ibid. 
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Chapter 5: Malan, the .Protectorates and Britain - the "Seretse 
Affair" 
(al Introduction 
During Smuts's post-war premiership considerable pressure had been 
applied in parliament by Nationalist speakers to try and persuade 
Smuts to take up the issue of incorporation of the high commission 
territories with Britain. Smuts had refused these representations 
and had only promised to take up the matter in a way which would not 
antagonise the British government and only when the time was 
"right•. Such was the position when the Nationalists took office in 
May 1948. 
To the National Party the high commission territories, or 
"protectorates", of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland, 
represented open sores upon the map of South Africa. Those areas, 
the Nationalists argued, belonged geographically to the Union and 
had been excised "unfairly• by Britain in the previous century. It 
was difficult for Malan and his party to accept that South Africa, 
a sovereign country, should "harbour territories within its borders 
which were completely dependent upon the Union, but still controlled 
by another Power• . 1 They felt that the appended schedule to the Act 
of Union, which had provided for the territories' incorporation 
subject to certain conditions guaranteeing land and other rights of 
the African inhabitants, was an insult to the integrity of white 
South Africans. How could Britain claim to treat South Africa as an 
equal member of the Commonwealth if she could not trust her in such 
an important matter at the same time? 
Baring pointed out in despatches to Lord 
secretary, that D.F. Malan's Nationalists 
Addison, dominions 
essentially wanted 
transfer as a symbol of British confidence in South Africa's 
sovereign independence and because they felt the Act itself did not 
D.W. Kruger, The Making of a Nation. (Johannesburg, 
Macmillan, 1969), p.259. 
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mention consultation2 (although Baring had on occasions pointed out 
that the Aide Memoire appended to the Act committed Britain to 
consultation with native opinion and that most Africans opposed it, 
not just the "pliable chiefs" claimed by Malan) . He concludes by 
saying that Baring succeeded well in preventing a clash with South 
Africa over the territories during his term and this in spite of 
little support from the dominions office and in the face of 
pressure from both Smuts and Malan. His "trump card" in discussions 
with Malan in 1949 had been the need for Union Africans to agree to 
persuade their cousins in the territories to consent to transfer, 
and as far as he could see that was out of the question. 3 
To the Nationalists, then, the issue became part and parcel of South 
Africa's constitutional position within the Commonwealth, a matter 
of prestige and a testing point for the assertion of status and 
sovereignty. In all of this they did not differ much from the aims 
and statements of many Smuts supporters and from Smuts's own 
frequent opinions on the matter over the previous forty years. What 
was different, however, was the force of Nationalist emotion behind 
it all and the determination to take matters further even if there 
was a risk of a rupture with Britain. 
What made the issue even more urgent for the Nationalists was the 
systematic application of the new apartheid policy in South Africa. 
The danger to Nationalist authority and to the legitimacy of 
apartheid posed by the existence of a separate and (at least in 
theory) , non-discriminatory system of colonial rule on South 
Africa's borders, was immediately apparent. While the high 
commission territories remained outside the net they represented 
potentially "subversive" examples of the "evils" of racial 
integration and miscegenation to the rest of the country. The latter 
fear became a distinct reality when the heir to the chieftaincy of 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate's largest chiefdom, the Ngwato, 
married a white woman and set in motion a crisis of the first 
2 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, pp.167-168. 
3 Ibid., p.168. 
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magnitude for South Africa's Commonwealth relations in the period 
1949-52. 
For the British Labour government the Seretse crisis could not have 
come at a more embarrassing time. Flushed with the success of the 
London Declaration of April 1949, which laid the groundwork for the 
new multi-racial Commonwealth, they now faced the first real test of 
their commitment to non-racialism in their own colonial backyard. In 
the eyes of the Empire's subject peoples they failed this test most 
dismally. In the eyes of majority black opinion in South Africa, 
Britain had sacrificed what was left of the loyalty of the African 
population by practising the most naked appeasement of the 
apartheid government. Liberal white opinion, while accepting the 
British rationale for the banning of Seretse, was disturbed by the 
increasing evidence of an official cover-up and of lies and deceit 
at the highest levels in Britain. Even Nationalist opinion in South 
Africa was upset by Britain's refusal to acknowledge the obvious -
that it was pressure from their intrepid leader, Dr D.F. Malan, that 
had forced the mighty Br1tish government to back away from its hated 
liberal policies in Africa. 
What emerges from a study of the motives and actions of British 
policy-makers during the Seretse affair is the desire to avoid at 
all costs a head-on collision with South Africa's new government. 
Such a collision could, it was claimed, have precipitated South 
Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the loss of the 
protectorates. The alternative possibility, that Malan might have 
backed down if the British had shown resolve to stand up for their 
liberal principles, was hardly even considered at cabinet level. 
This latter alternative, which would have given considerable moral 
support to the increasingly disheartened forces of liberalism in 
South Africa, would have also increased Britain's prestige in the 
colonial world and could have greatly eased the task of 
decolonisation elsewhere. But that is speculation. What is certain, 
however, is that Britain's appeasement of South Africa over the 
Seretse affair caused great damage to her honour and prestige among 
African peoples and, in the longer term at least, did not succeed in 
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its main aim - the prevention of South Africa's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth. It did not even succeed in preventing Dr Malan from 
raising the issue of incorporation although, arguably, the force of 
his demands may have been reduced somewhat by what was in effect a 
trade-off concerning Seretse. By the time the Conservatives came to 
power in Britain the British attitude to South Africa's 
incorporation demands seems to have hardened to the point where it 
had, as Geyer noted in 1954, become a non-negotiable option. 
At the same time, however, Churchill's government accepted virtually 
in toto the previous Labour policy on Seretse and refused to allow 
him back to the territory until 1956, using the same arguments about 
the need to avoid a head-on collision with South Africa as the 
Labour government had used when in power. 
The actions and motives of the British Labour government concerning 
the Seretse affair have been examined in an account by Michael 
Dutfield, published in 1990, of the marriage of the London typist, 
Ruth Williams, to the Bamangwato heir, Seretse Khama. 4 Drawing on 
cabinet and dominions office minutes and memoranda as well as 
newspaper reports and interviews with Lady Ruth Khama, the book was 
made into an Independent Television (ITN) documentary which aroused 
considerable controversy because of its focus on an aspect of 
British-South African relations long neglected and, perhaps, buried 
for the sake of diplomatic discretion. 
Dutfield's conclusions about the British motives for refusing to 
allow Seretse to take up the chieftainship of the Bamangwato were as 
follows: Attlee's government was primarily concerned with the 
possibility that South Africa could leave the Commonwealth if the 
marriage went ahead and was anxious to secure guaranteed supplies of 
uranium from South Africa in order to complete the British nuclear 
bomb programme on schedule. 5 The United States had, after the war, 
4 Michael 
Persecution of 
1990) . 
Dutfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience: the 
Ruth and Seretse Khama (London, Unwin Hyman, 
5 Ibid., pp. 99-100. 
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refused to allow her nuclear secrets 
countries, including her wartime 
uranium supplies represented the 
ally, 
only 
to be spread to other 
Britain. South Africa's 
significant Commonwealth 
sources of uranium for the British "A Bomb" programme and were 
necessary for the programme to be independent of US supplies. By 
1948, despite long negotiations with Smuts's government, no 
conclusive agreement concerning the long-term sale of uranium had 
been signed. 
Soon after the elections Malan's new government expressed the desire 
to conclude uranium negotiations as quickly as possible. This was 
mainly as a result of the South African balance of payments 
difficulties that emerged at the end of the year. However, in 
mid-1949 the Seretse affair came to the Nationalist government's 
unfavourable attention and Malan accordingly hinted at a delay in 
the convening of a conference on uranium supplies. 6 He tried to play 
the British off against the Americans concerning these uranium 
supplies by requesting "special status" for South Africa concerning 
nuclear development7 and linked this demand to the question of the 
protectorates in general. Britain responded by refusing to allow 
Seretse to take up his rightful position in Bechuanaland. Dutfield 
claims that the real motive for the British action was not revealed 
in public. 8 Officials such as Patrick Gordon Walker, secretary of 
state for Commmonwealth relations, denied that any pressure had been 
placed upon Britain by the South African government and lied to 
parliament by saying that "no communication" had been received from 
the latter. 9 The truth of the matter, claimed Dutfield , was that as 
the Labour back-bencher Fenner-Brockway argued, Britain had carried 
out a policy of naked "appeasement" of south Africa. 10 
6 Ibid., p.103. 
7 Ibid., p.104. 
8 Ibid., pp.162-3. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid., p.185. 
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While the present writer has been unable to confirm in detail any of 
Outfield's claims concerning uranium negotiations and their link 
with the Seretse affair, the central argument concerning British 
appeasement of Malan's government out of a fear that South Africa 
would leave the Commonwealth is amply justified and corroborated by 
even a cursory examination of the relevant British cabinet and 
dominions office files. It is also possible to offer the conjecture 
that atomic fuel considerations could well have played the part 
claimed by Outfield because of circumstantial factors such as the 
timing of negotiations between the CDA (Combined Development Agency) 
and South Africa concerning uranium supplies. 
In 1947 the British government was still reluctant to impart to 
Smuts's government information concerning the existence of the 
Combined Development Agency which was a US-British committee set up 
after the war to control and allocate uranium supplies. If its 
existence was known it was felt that South Africa and the US might 
come to some agreement or that the US might insist that South Africa 
fall within the. ambit of the Agreement. 11 It was also acknowledged 
that there was "as yet" no question of a definite agreement with 
South Africa regarding supplies and that only "three persons" 
(besides Baring, the high commissioner) should at that stage know 
about the CDA - Forsyth, Smuts and the SA scientific adviser, 
Professor B. Schonland. A little later it was decided that "it was 
better to give South Africa the whole story rather than leave them 
to guess at it"u and so to tell a "narrow circle" about it. 
South African scientists were already working with British and 
American counterparts at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
on the utilisation of low-grade uranium ores and British 
representatives in Washington believed that the South Africans must 
11 PRO, DO 35 (Original Correspondence 1926 - 1961), File 
2488 (Atomic Energy: Information to be given to South Africa on 
US/UK Arrangements, 1947), No.l D.E.H. Pearson-D.H.F. Rickett 
3 January 1947. 
12 Ibid., No.6. D.H.F. Rickett-Sir J. Stephenson, 20 January 
1947. 
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have already asked what interest the Americans had in South Africans 
ores and "may have received some hints" about the combined control 
by Britain and the US over supplies. 13 On 7 February 194 7 the Daily 
Express in London exposed a "British-US Plan" to develop atomic 
power from the South African gold mines and the British Embassy in 
Washington was asked to try and dampen the "speculation" caused by 
the article. 14 The existence of the CDA soon became public 
knowledge, however, and Britain's attempts to come to some sort of 
separate deal with South Africa over uranium supplies became 
impossible. 
It took almost three years before South Africa and the CDA came to 
an agreement. The delays by both the Smuts and Malan governments are 
discussed briefly in Dutfield's book and were, according to him, a 
result of attempts to play Britain and the United States off against 
each other in order to get the best possible terms for South Africa. 
The Seretse factor is also given as a reason for delay and Dutfield 
extrapolates that there is more reason to believe this because of 
the fact that he was not permitted to view files in South Africa on 
the Seretse affair which may have thrown more light upon the 
matter. 15 However, from· the terms of the agreement with the CDA 
signed in 1950 it is clear that some hard bargaining on South 
Africa's part must have taken place as Britain and the United States 
ended up guaranteeing South Africa the capital necessary to develop 
the uranium extraction process in return for defined annual 
tonnages of uranium to be shipped to those countries. 16 Britain was 
to bear one third of the capital costs and the USA the rest. 
In addition it is clear that South Africa was given continued access 
to defence research facilities in Britain. In 1952 Schonland, the 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid., No. 26.,C.L. Wilson - R. Gordon Munro, 4 March 
1947. 
15 Dutfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience, pp.213-215. 
16 Commonweal th Survey, Vol . 3 . , No. 5 . , 
Industry", 5 March 1957, p.224. 
"S.A. Uranium 
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scientific adviser to the South African government, was assured of 
such access after he had complained to a British representative that 
he was not getting enough information on UK defence research and was 
"contemplating resignation" . 17 The British representative noted that 
Schonland was a "friend of the United Kingdom", had been since World 
War II and "can be trusted". It was also noted that "in view of the 
South African political situation he can be of considerable use to 
us" and that "it could be worse" if he was not given information. 18 
As for the uranium agreement with the CDA, the British soon began to 
feel that they had been given a less than satisfactory deal. In 1953 
it was doubted whether Britain could afford to reach the allotted 
capital expense requirement 
uranium extraction mines. 19 
that year, noted "the 
of £53m for the further development of 
The British cabinet had, in April of 
unsatisfactory nature" of "American 
restrictions" on technical information on atomic matters and also 
the agreement by the CDA on joint purchases of raw materials. 20 It 
was suggested that there was a need to free the United Kingdom from 
"these arrangements" by "making approaches" to Australia for uranium 
supplies once the extent of Australia's uranium resources were 
known. It was noted that the Labour government had "rebuffed" 
Australian advances in this regard in 1951 (partly because of 
American restrictions on information) but that "times had changed" 
and that Churchill should telegram the Australian prime minister, 
Menzies, with a renewed offer of agreement. In 1955 British 
negotiations to buy the output of "one or two Australian uranium 
mines" had come to the attention of the South African press and the 
17 PRO,DO 35, File 2562 {Disclosure of Classified and 
Technical Information: Liaison with Prof. B. Schonland, 
Scientific Adviser to the South African Chiefs of Staff, 1952), 
No.l, F. Brundrett - Sir Ian Jacobs, 27 July 1952. 
18 Ibid. 
19 PRO, DO 119, File 1160 (Uranium Loan Agreements), Letter 
from the CRO, London to R.C.C. Hunt, Pretoria, 29 May 1953. 
20 PRO, CAB 
External Policy", 
128/26, C.C.28(53)5, 
21 April 1953. 
"Atomic Energy: Future 
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South African secretary of mines had asked the CRO for any 
information 
purposes" . 21 
concerning these negotiations for 
It was noted that even the South 
"public relations 
African official 
appreciated "that we will not want to have all our eggs in the South 
African basket 11 • 22 
What seems clear from the above negotiations concerning alternative 
Australian uranium supplies is that, firstly, the British had been 
unsure whether Australia's supplies would be reliable for the long-
term, both in terms of quantities and in terms of the Australian 
political and strategic link with the USA. Secondly, it seems the 
British had gambled upon South Africa (initially under the Smuts 
government) 
the doubts 
being more reliable than Australia on both counts and 
of the mid-1950's indicated something of a policy 
miscalculation about Malan's future attitude to uranium supplies. 
These doubts must have partially cleared, however, when it became 
obvious that the Nationalists were not intending to place undue 
difficulties in the way of uranium supplies for the foreseeable 
future. 
In the absence of further documentary evidence it is difficult to 
judge the significance of all the above-mentioned negotiations for 
British-South African relations in the period under review. It may 
well be, as Dutfield suggests, that the uranium negotiations were 
the deciding factor in the British decision to appease South Africa 
over the Seretse affair, but direct evidence of such a link at the 
highest levels of cabinet both in Britain and South Africa is 
lacking (in the case of the latter, because of the inaccessibility 
of cabinet documents). It is, perhaps, more useful to argue that the 
uranium factor was one among many, and definitely an important one, 
in the decision to ban Seretse from the chieftaincy of the 
Bamangwato tribe. It should be seen in the context of general 
economic, financial and strategic/military factors with the over-
21 PRO, DO 119, File 1165 (Uranium) , Telegram from High 
Commissioner, Liesching, to Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 10 September 1955. 
22 Ibid. 
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riding fear of South Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth 
predominating. 
(bl The Seretse affair and the transfer issue 
A study of the files of the British high commissioner in South 
Africa and of the British cabinet reveals just how important South 
African pressure (and to a lesser extent, pressure from Southern 
Rhodesia) was during the Seretse affair: pressure that was publicly 
and categorically denied by the British government. During 1948 and 
early 1949 it had gradually become known that the young heir to the 
Bamangwato, Seretse Khama, had, while studying in London, met and 
fallen in love with an English woman, Ruth Williams, and that he 
intended to marry her. He had ignored advice, both from the tribe 
itself (the regent chief Tshekedi opposed it on the grounds of 
tradition and the possible consequences for the tribe) and from 
political sources in South Africa and Britain, not to go ahead with 
the marriage. In July 1949 the high commissioner, Evelyn Baring, 
received a letter from the Southern Rhodesian prime minister, Sir 
Godfrey Huggins, concerning what the latter called "your White 
Chieftainess-to-be in Bechuanaland". The letter stated that 
we consider an official Native-European union in 
Bechuanaland would increase our difficulties here, and 
also add a little fuel to the flames of the fire kept 
burning by our, fortunately diminishing, band of anti-
na ti ve Europeans . 23 
Earing's initial inclination had been to accept Seretse's decision 
to marry and to argue that nothing could be done about it since the 
tribe had accepted it at a third Kgotla (meeting) held to discuss 
the affair early in 1949. But he suddenly changed his mind after a 
talk with South Africa's external affairs secretary, D.D. Forsyth. 
23 PRO, DO 119, File 1282 (Native Affairs: Bamangwato Tribe: 
Marriage of Seretse Khama and Accession to Chieftainship), No. 
12, Huggins - Baring, 7 July 1949. 
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On 30 June Lief Egeland, South Africa's high commissioner in London, 
had met Philip Noel-Baker, the Commonwealth secretary, and had 
communicated Malan's "grave view" of the marriage to the secretary 
of state. 24 Noel-Baker had asked Baring his advice and in Earing's 
initial reply of 5 July a policy of confirmation of Seretse' s 
appointment as chief was recommended as the "only course to 
follow". 25 But by 11 July he had changed his mind, noting that 
"completely to reject the representation made by Dr Malan would lead 
to a head-on collision with the Union at the worst possible time and 
for the worst possible reason". 26 
The high commission territories, he said, were economically 
dependent upon South Africa 
and their very existence gives rise to such strong 
feelings among South Africans that it has always been our 
policy to avoid such a collision if avoidance is possible 
without paying too great a price. 27 
His first reaction when he heard of the Bamangwato tribe's decision 
to recognise Seretse despite the prospect of having a "White Queen" 
was to recommend him, continued Baring. It was, he thought, better 
to face the "South African storm of criticism'' sooner rather than 
later. He had always felt there was a "straight and unavoidable 
choice in our territories" between fostering and preserving the 
confidence of Africans on the one hand and maintaining good 
relations with South Africa on the other. If such a choice had to 
be made "relations with South Africa should be sacrificed" . 28 But 
now, with great reluctance, he had come to the conclusion that he 
24 PRO, DO 119, File 1281 (1949: Native Affairs: Bamangwato 
Tribe.),No. 78, Noel-Baker - Baring, 2 July 1949. 
25 Ibid., No.BO, Baring - Noel-Baker, 5 July 1949. 
26 File 1282, No. 10, Baring - Liesching, 11 July 1949. 
27 Ibid. 
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had to advise otherwise because of the "disastrous results" such a 
collision with South Africa could have. As regards the Union, he 
said, the situation was "the gravest" he had faced since he first 
came to the country and the "impetus" for transfer of the 
protectorates had greatly increased. 
He had sought Forsyth's help on 7 July and the latter had discussed 
it with Malan who had in turn instructed Forsyth to telegraph 
instructions to Egeland following the receipt of "the most forceful" 
representations from the executive council of the general assembly 
of the Dutch Reformed Church. 29 What was most important to South 
Africa was the official recognition of. Seretse, not so much the 
possibility of him living there unrecognised with his wife. Godfrey 
Huggins had had the same meaning, he claimed. The political results 
of recognition would be to strengthen the hand of the NP against the 
UP and, "worse still", to strengthen the hand of the "Strijdom 
faction" against the "Malan faction" inside the NP itself. Strijdom, 
he noted, already had a majority in the NP caucus. Now that feelings 
were already "inflamed" over the Citizenship bill (which the UP was 
attacking as an attempt to destroy South Africa's Commonwealth 
connection 30 ) Seretse would add "fuel to the fire" of the 
extremists. They would be able to say, he continued, that 
our action demonstrates the folly of allowing the 
existence side by side in Southern Africa of two systems 
of Native Administration diametrically opposed to one 
another. 31 
They would say, Baring continued, that South Africa could not remain 
associated with a country which officially recognises an African 
chief married to a white woman and they would make Seretse' s 
recognition " the occasion of an appeal to the country for the 
establishment of a republic, but of a republic outside the 
29~. 
30 See p.181. 
31 Baring-Liesching, 11 July 1949. 
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Commonwealth". Malan "was worried" that he could not oppose an 
"extremist offensive" on these lines. Forsyth agreed with this and 
felt that the extremists would override the moderates, inflamed as 
they were by "constitutional developments in India" and exploiting 
the Nationalist emotions stirred up by the Citizenship bill, the 
unveiling of the Voortrekker Monument "next December", etc. 
They would, he claimed, "use our action in order to obtain a mandate 
from the electors for the severance of the Commonwealth tie" . 32 
Forsyth also felt defence discussions were in danger and Seretse's 
recognition "would provoke a reaction not against the Opposition in 
South Africa but against the Unitei Kingdom government". Baring had 
"never known Forsyth to speak with such feeling". Baring went on to 
advise the need for a "play for time" and for a commission of 
enquiry which might have the effect of a "change of mind by Ruth 
Khama and Seretse as well as the Bamangwato tribe". At any rate, he 
concluded, "we should avoid a snub to the Union government. We would 
show that we realised the seriousness of the dispute just before the 
Voortrekker Monument Cererr,ony and we would prevent a too sudden 
break between the old and the new Native Administration" . 33 
Noel-Baker telegrammed Baring on 17 July to say that he was "not yet 
adequately informed about several aspects of the Seretse Affair" and 
reported that Noel Monks of the Daily Mail had said that the affair 
was "headline news" in the Union "just as the Apartheid programme 
was beginning [to be published] in the Native Language 
newspapers". 34 He wanted more information on this and on "any 
notable divergences between British and Dutch opinions" or on NP 
versus UP opinions. He asked: 
Do you think that if we recognised Seretse and Ruth and if 
these events developed in the Union as Forsyth fears they 
might, the Nationalists would seize the opportunity to 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
~File 1282, No.24, Noel-Baker - Baring, 17 July 1949. 
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occupy the High Commission Territories by force? 35 
On the 20th Baring replied that recognition "would weaken the 
liberals [in S .A.] by enabling the Nationalists to argue that 
... there is no half way house between full apartheid and 
assimilation of races". 36 He said that "black opinion" in newspapers 
like Imvo and Ilanga had "ignored" the issue but that the Bantu 
World's editor, Selope Thema, a former natives' representative 
councillor, had in speeches "expressed himself against recognition" 
on the grounds "that the cause of Africans in the Union will thereby 
be damaged". Malan•s· moderates, he said, "may hope for 
non-recognition since they wish to preserve good relations with the 
United Kingdom" whereas Strijdom' s extremists "may be saying nothing 
and holding fire then strike at relations after a decision". Those 
prone to violence might be likely to take action "on a wave of 
emotion". 37 
By a false move we may damage both our case for retaining 
the High Commission Territories and the cause of all 
Africans in the South Africa. 
Thus Baring hoped for a commission of enquiry to gain time "to judge 
the consequences of recognition and the development of the opinions 
of all Africans in Southern Africa and European well-wishers". 
Baring felt strengthened in his opinion because of indications of 
support £or it from the ranks of "Black opinion" and from celebrated 
liberals such as Archbishop Trevor Huddleston who had advised him to 
remove Seretse (but who reportedly regretted giving such advice much 
later) . 38 Baring based his analysis of "Black opinion" on a survey 
of some prominent African newspapers like Bantu World, Imvo and 
35 Ibid. 
36 File 1282, No.29; Baring - Noel-Baker, 20 July 1949. 
37 Ibid. 
38 Dutf ield, A Marriage of Inconvenience, p.93. 
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Ilanga Lase Natal whose editors, initially at least, were 
preoccupied about the challenge to traditional values posed by an 
inter-racial chieftaincy in Bechuanaland. Imvo's editor, according 
to Baring, had at first displayed a somewhat chauvinistic attitude 
by reportedly expressing "complete indifference" to the whole affair 
since it did not have anything to do with the Nguni peoples. 39 
Ilanga's editor, R.R. Dhlomo, reportedly expressed the "strongest 
distaste" for Seretse's marriage but also resented the attitude of 
the Dutch Reformed Church (which had protested to Malan about the 
marriage on racial and religious grounds). He did, however, hope 
that Britain would not recognise Seretse. 40 Baring also reported 
that the king of Swaziland, Sobhuza II, had said to him that he 
would be "content" with a British decision not to recognise Seretse 
although he disliked the idea of a government decision overriding a 
customary meeting in a matter usually decided by custom. 41 Selope 
Thema and Dr Xuma reportedly also opposed recognition , said Baring, 
and only a Mr Ngakane of the Bantu Welfare Trust in Johannesburg 
felt that he should be recognised although his children should not 
be allowed to succeed to the chiefdomship.a 
In November the attitude of Ilanga Lase Natal confirmed Earing's 
letter to Noel-Baker. In an editorial entitled "Is the African 
Doomed?" an oblique reference to the Seretse affair was made in 
which inter-racial marriage was condemned because "In the process 
the Black man as such loses his identity because he does not 
reproduce himself". 43 Selope Thema' s Bantu World meanwhile refrained 
from editorial comment but continued to report developments such as 
39 PRO, DO 119, File 1286, No.46B, "Some Aspects of Public 
Opinion in the Union Regarding the Recognition of Seretse", 
Memorandum by the High Commissioner, Baring - Noel-Baker, 10 
December 1949. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 
43 Ilanga Lase Natal, 19 November 1949. 
105 
the appointment of the Harrigan commission of inquiry into the 
effects of the marriage on the Bamangwato Tribe. 
Within the ranks of the CRO in London meanwhile, it was reported 
that Liesching (permanent secretary) had said to Noel-Baker that he 
supported the colour bar in South Africa and that the Seretse 
marriage would be an "inflammatory act" in the colonial 
territories. 44 
As far as Liberal opinion was concerned, Baring claimed that in the 
Cape, liberals would criticize non-recognition but that J.D. 
Rheinallt-Jones, the former Transvaal natives' senator, had told him 
that only a "small minority" in general would criticise it and a 
majority would welcome non-recognition "thinking that it would 
strike a blow at liberalism if allowed". 45 Baring then claimed that 
all he had spoken to thought it would give a "heaven-sent" 
opportunity to attack Britain's retention of the high commission 
territories and even South Africa's links with the rest of the 
Commonwealth. It was, he said, particularly "unfortunate" that it 
should happen at a time when Malan's "blundering tactics" made it 
impossible to present the case for incorporation as being from a 
"united South Africa". The Nationalists could say that the Seretse 
affair would justify their position even more because it encouraged 
mixed marriages. 
In October Malan had given advance notice to the British of his 
intention to press for incorporation again 46 and had made a speech 
to the Orange Free State NP congress on the 26th in which he said he 
had raised the question in London in April at the Commonwealth 
44 Dutfield, Marriage of Inconvenience, p.98. 
45 PRO, DO 119, File 1286, No.46B, "Some Aspects of Public 
Opinion in the Union Regarding the Recognition of Seretse", 
Memorandum by the High Commissioner, Baring - Noel-Baker, 10 
December 1949. 
46 PRO, DO 121/25 (Minutes to Prime Minister from the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations), File A14/49, 
Addison- Attlee, 31 October 1949. 
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conference and that he intended to press for a reply in a reasonable 
period of time. 47 He had also made a number of speeches condemning 
the marriage and calling on the British either to repudiate it or 
to the face the consequences of a demand by his government to 
incorporate the territories into the Union in the new year. 48 The 
South African government then declared Ruth and Seretse prohibited 
immigrants. 
These approaches had caused considerable consternation at the 
Commonwealth relations office and the acting Commonwealth secretary, 
Lord Addison, had advised Attlee to draw up a cautious reply to 
Malan because it was a "delicate and difficult" issue. 49 He noted 
that Malan had warned in his speech that Britain could not say no to 
an "official" Union government approach as opposed the previous 
"personal requests" of Smuts and Hertzog. Addison also noted that 
Malan had threatened to take the issue to the Privy Council if 
representations to the United Kingdom government failed (an 
incongruous statement considering his party's desire to abolish 
appeals to that same body) . 
In this memorandum to Attlee Addison enclosed a suggested draft copy 
of a reply to Malan saying that Britain was "anxious" about 
relations between Britain and South Africa 11 in a time of great 
danger in the field of international politics and economics" and 
that these relations could suffer if the issue of incorporation were 
to be raised.m The draft letter would also point out that Britain 
could not reach a solution without regard to pledges made at various 
times and without the approval of parliament. It would say to Malan 
that Britain would not want to intrude in the domestic affairs of 
South Africa but that at the "present time" there was "no prospect" 
47 Ibid. 
48 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.187. 
49 PRO, DO 121/25, File A14/49, Addison - Attlee, 31 October 
1949. 
m PRO, DO 121/25, File A14/49, Addison - Attlee, 31 October 
1949. 
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of proposals to effect a transfer being able to obtain appreciable 
support, "much less a majority", in parliament in Britain. It 
concluded by saying that the time was not "opportune" and the only 
practical outcome would be to ''place a severe strain" on the good 
relations between the two countries. 
While Malan was increasing his pressure on Britain for transfer the 
British cabinet was awaiting the report of a judicial enquiry into 
Seretse's position as chief: a report which the cabinet had 
commissioned after Noel-Baker had outlined the consequences (as seen 
from Baring' s point of view) for British-South African relations of 
recognising Seretse. 51 The terms of reference of the enquiry had 
been narrowly circumscribed to have nothing to do with race 
relations but only with the "well-being" of the Bamangwato and the 
"stability"· of the future administration. When the Report was 
presented, however, Noel-Baker immediately saw its potential for 
embarrassment and urged its suppression. 52 
The enquiry 
withholding 
had concluded that the only important reason for 
Seretse's candidature was that it might damage 
Bechuanaland' s relations with South Africa. Noel-Baker's cabinet 
memorandum of 26 January 1950 recommended that his reasons for the 
non-recognition of Seretse (damage to the tribe as a result of the 
split opinion on the marriage) be used, not those of the enquiry. 53 
He suggested an early a.nnouncement of Seretse' s removal from the 
Protectorate and the drawing up of a White Paper. It was, he felt, 
important to do this because Malan would soon announce his intention 
to press for transfer of the protectorates and "if we refused 
recognition of Seretse after this announcement it would seem that 
51 PRO, CAB 128/9, C.M.47 (49) 8, "Bechuanaland Protectorate: 
Chieftainship of the Bamangwato Tribe", 21 July 1949. 
52 Dutfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience, p.132. 
53 PRO, CAB 129/38, C.P. (50)13, "Bechuanaland Protectorate: 
Succession to the Chieftaincy of the Bamangwato Tribe", 
Memorandum by the Secret.ary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
26 January 1950. 
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South Africa forced us to". s• An early announcement might prevent 
these demands for transfer from taking place, he argued. 
Noel-Baker's memorandum was discussed by the British cabinet on 31 
January and there the Commonwealth secretary argued again that the 
enquiry's reasons for non-recognition could not be accepted.ss The 
enquiry, he said, had "underestimated" the risk that recognition 
would result in the "disruption" of the tribe and that liberal 
European opinion was against it as was "responsible" native opinion. 
It was not "wholly realistic" to ignore South African opinion and 
the future relations with South Africa. It seemed that "at present" 
South Africa was not going to press the issue of transfer but that 
this could change if Seretse were to be recommended. The colonial 
secretary, A. Creech-Jones, agreed with Noel-Baker and said the 
reasons given by the enquiry could "give rise to damaging 
controversy in this country or in Africa". After discussion the 
cabinet decided to invite Seretse and his wife to London to persuade 
him to relinquish the chieftainship and also to recall all copies of 
Noel-Baker's memorandum which had summarised the enquiry's report.s6 
Events thereafter moved swiftly to a head. At the meeting in 
February between Seretse and CRO officials Seretse accused 
Noel-Baker of refusing his chieftainship "for fear of annoying 
Malan' s government ... and the Southern Rhodesian government", both of 
which, he said, believed in the "persecution of native people".n 
Noel-Baker denied this "emphatically" and pointed to the British 
policy concerning the Central African Federation and to her refusal 
to hand over the protectorates as proof of Britain's intent "to do 
55 PRO, CAB 128/17, 
Protectorate:Chieftainship of the 
1950. 
56 Ibid. 
C. M .13 (50) 1, "Bechuanaland 
Bamangwato Tribe", 31 January 
57 PRO, DO 119, File 1288, No. 75, "Note of a Meeting at 
C.R.O. Office", 15 February 1950. 
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the right thing regardless of South African or Rhodesian views''.Y 
Seretse said he would respect confidence on the issue but he held to 
his views concerning Malan and South Africa. He asked to see the 
report of the commission of enquiry and Noel-Baker refused. It had 
already been decided to hold over any decision on what to do until 
the British general election was over if Seretse refused to step 
down. 59 It had also been decided to offer him what Outfield claims 
was a "bribe" to stay out of the territory6<l, but what Noel-Baker 
called an "allowance " (of £1100 a month) . 61 
In the meantime a draft White Paper had been circulated which 
announced non-recognition on the grounds of the well-being of the 
Bamangwato tribe but which, as Baring had suggested,~ denied that 
the effect of "impaired relations with the Union" was a factor, but 
which stated that the British government "were mindful" of such an 
effect. He was worried that it might "unnecessarily" aggravate 
European feeling in the Union "to indicate quite so pointedly that 
the Union Government's views were an irrelevant consideration". 
Baring had also suggested that Paragraph 12 of the Draft be amended 
to say that African opinion in the Union was not "unanimous" but 
that "responsible opinion" was against recognition. 63 
on 6 February Baring had told Noel-Baker that South African papers 
were reporting a 
On 13 February 
likely negative decision by the Judicial enquiry.M 
the Cape Argus reported that the British Cabinet 
58 Ibid. 
59 CAB 128/17, C.M.4 (50)2, 7 February 1950. 
6'l Outfield, A Marriage of Inconvenience. p.137. 
61 DO 119, File 1288, No.1, Noel-Baker - Baring, 2 February 
1950. 
62 DO 119, File 1287, No.33, Baring - Noel-Baker, 23 January 
1950. 
63 File 1287, No. 34, 23 January 1950. 
M DO 119, File 1288, No. 10, Baring- Noel-Baker, 6 February 
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would be likely to take into account the "bitter hostility" among 
the Europeans of South Africa and Rhodesia and it would most likely 
increase the "strained relations" in a part of the Commonwealth 
"where a delicate situation ... existed" . 65 On the other hand, it 
noted, rejection of Seretse "could provoke millions still under 
colonial rule". Therefore a compromise was likely because 
it is known that the Union's Prime Minister is holding up 
formal presentation of his case for the incorporation of 
the three British Protectorates ... until a decision on 
Seretse is taken. Non-recognition ... may strengthen the 
hands of the Bri_t ish Gove··nment in resisting these 
claims. 66 
After the general elections in Britain in late February 1950 (in 
which the Labour Party was returned to power with a considerably 
reduced majority) Noel-Baker, reportedly "sickened" by the whole 
Seretse affair, 67 was replaced by Patrick Gordon Walker as secretary 
of state for Commonwealth relations. Gordon Walker is described by 
Dutf ield as being considerably more ruthless than his predecessor in 
dealing with Seretse.~ One of his first actions was to insist to 
cabinet that Seretse be banned from the Protectorate. This decision 
was communicated to Baring in Cape Town on 6 March together with the 
draft text of a stateme11t to be read to the House on 13 March. 69 The 
draft statement stated that His Majesty's government "have decided 
after the most careful consideration of all relevant facts that in 
the present circumstances they cannot recognise Seretse as Chief and 
that recognition must be withheld for five years". Seretse had been 
told that HMG had to take into account "sources of information and 
1950. 
~ Cape Argus, 13 February 1950. 
66 Ibid. 
~ Outfield, Marriage of Inconvenience, p.149. 
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experience which were not available to the Tribe itself". Despite 
this, he had "still not agreed to voluntary relinquishment". 70 
On 7 March, Die Burger Teported that no reason had been given for 
Seretse's removal except that it would cause a disturbance if he was 
recognised and claimed that he had been offered £11000 p.a. to stay 
in Britain but had refused. 71 Seretse considered himself 
"double-crossed", the report noted and if he were to return he would 
most likely be "kicked out". "It was firmly believed in 
Bechuanaland that there was South African pressure behind the whole 
thing", it concluded. 
Baring telegraphed Gordon Walker on the following day to say there 
was a need to "correct" local press reports concerning the £11000 
offered to Seretse because "it should be £1100 " and it "makes [al 
very bad impression". n. He enclosed reports of local newspaper 
commentary and said that the UP paper, Die Suiderstem, had welcomed 
the British decision "on behalf of South Africa and all the white 
territories North of the Limpopo". 73 On the following day, however, 
he telegrammed Liesching to say that not all local comment was 
"favourable" and that after conversation with the Ballingers he was 
told the feeling was that Britain "might not be giving all reasons 
to public". 74 
On 10 February Baring reported a Manchester Guardian article which 
quoted the previous secretary of state, Noel-Baker, as saying that 
there hcid been "no communication" with South Africa over Seretse. 75 
The same article, however, stated that "we all know the attitude 
1950. 
7° File 1289, No. 34, Gordon Walker - Baring, 6 March 1950. 
71 Die Burger, 7 March 1950. 
72 DO 119, File 1289, No.42, Baring - Gordon Walker, 8 March 
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which is unhappily the attitude of many South Africans besides Dr 
Malan and his friends" and that the threat of the Nationalists to 
incorporate the high commission territories "hangs over the affair". 
The United Kingdom, had "sacrificed Seretse ... with compensation ... in 
order to defend the better all the peoples of the Protectorate•. 
Only "time would show" if the government had chosen the right 
course, the report concluded. 
Baring suggested to the 
response to this article, 
if asked by the press 
"incalculable effect upon 
regional commissioner in Mafeking, in 
that he should hint in "a personal view" 
that the press should realise the 
future well being of all inhabitants of 
High Commission Territories in view of repercussions which might 
have been aroused in Union". On the same day he telegraphed Gordon 
Walker to say that he was •most grateful for firm line taken by the 
United Kingdom Government. A major disaster has been avoided and 
effect upon our relations with Union has been admirable. "76 
As Baring himself admitted, however, local press reaction 
represented a "sharp cleavage of opinion". 77 The Cape Argus gave its 
"unqualified support" to the decision as the "wisest in unusually 
difficult circumstances", while Die Suiderstem and Die Volkstem 
•warmly supported it" (both UP newspapers) . 78 The Star, however, was 
critical of the methods used and the decisions taken "in strongly 
worded and general terms" . 79 The Cape Times, Baring reported, failed 
to see how the decision to ban Seretse "would be 
if it could not be justified now• and 
justified in five 
accused the UK of years time 
a "lack of frankness" in its •personal relations" with Seretse. Die 
Burger gave its "complete support" as did Die Volksblad of 
Bloemfontein, but Die Vaderland agreed "less strongly" while Die 
Transvaler, in an "obviously angry edition•, criticised the slowness 
76 Ibid. 
77 File 1289, No. 73, Baring - Gordon Walker, 10 March 1950. 
78 File 1289' No. 75A, Baring - Gordon Walker, 10 March 1950. 
79 Ibid. 
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of the UK in reaching a decision. 80 The latter, noted Baring, "lent 
colour'' to his view that Strijdom's followers, as distinct from the 
more moderate views of Die Burger, "hoped we would recognise 
Seretse" . 81 
South Africa's high commissioner in London, Lief Egeland, in the 
meantime wrote to Forsyth to say that Gordon Walker had told him 
confidentially that the UK would not •weaken its attitude" despite 
Seretse' s "premature" disclosure to the press on 7 March of the 
pressure put on him by the British government.~ Gordon Walker had 
told him, furthermore, that he was confident of being able to handle 
the "Left Wing" of the Labour Party and of securing the co-operation 
of the Tory opposition. The findings of the Harrigan Commission (the 
judicial enquiry) would not be published and Seretse "was fully 
aware he could be ejected if he set foot in Bechuanaland". 
Unfortunately, continued Egeland, there was "not anyone else to 
install as Chief .... since Seretse, besides Tshekedi, was the last of 
the Khama dynasty ... to which Bechuanaland was deeply attached". 83 
The decision to ban Seretse for five years had, however, been leaked 
to the press before Seretse had been officially told of it and 
consequently the Conservative opposition in Britain were "fiercely 
critical" . 84 Churchill concentrated on the "point of honour - or 
rather dishonour - involved in the possibility that Seretse did not 
know he was to be excluded from returning home when he was 
originally invited to London. Said The Times, in response, "No good 
can come of compromise involving injustice to individuals if its aim 
is to blur the outline of the truth." 85 
80 Ibid. 
81 Ibid. 
82 File 1289, No. 81A, Egeland - Forsyth, 8 March 1950. 
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On 15 March Baring wrote to Gordon Walker to say that there was 
"growing appreciation" in some English-language newspapers of the 
British point of view and that there was a "demand for more 
information". 86 Evidence of such appreciation was in the form of a 
"second favourable leader" in the Cape Argus urging the UK 
government to ''to maintain their position''.m 
A leading article in the Sunday Times had also approved of the 
decision, giving reasons for it "apart from the attitude to the 
colour bar" in South Africa and in Southern Rhodesia. 88 The Natal 
Mercury had given a "violent and confused" denunciation of the UK 
government before the British public statement. 89 From the Cape 
Times, however, there had been a "change of attitude" in a leading 
article of 13 March. It reportedly condemned the "inaccuracies, 
exaggerations and omissions'' about the Seretse "agitation".• 
The Sunday Times, however, had demanded more information in an 
article entitled "A Case for Candour" and asked for a fuller 
statement from the British government to avoid "further propaganda 
or detriment to Britain" . 91 It asked for the judicial enquiry report 
to be published or for a White Paper to be issued to bring the 
"unfortunate matter" into perspective. 
Baring reported further that at an interview with the press in 
Serowe, the Bamangwato headquarters, the representatives of The 
Star, the East London Daily Despatch and Rand Daily Mail had been 
critical of the lack of information and had made it clear that they 
considered what had really happened was the "sacrifice of Seretse to 
~PRO, DO 119, File 1290, No.18, Baring - Gordon Walker, 15 
March 1950. 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. 
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"shaken race relations throughout the world". 96 The article 
concluded with the words: "It is learnt that the attitude of the 
South African Government has not been overlooked by the British 
authorities. 1197 
Bantu World, however, continued to oppose the marriage on the 
grounds of tribal tradition and claimed in March that Seretse "must 
have known that he was putting that tradition in jeopardy". 98 The 
newspaper did note, however, that: "Until all facts are known, no 
correct judgment [on the British decision to ban Seretsel can be 
made. 1199 
Dutf ield describes the growing storm of protest in Southern Africa 
and in Britain after the official announcement of Seretse's five -
year ban on 13 March 1950. In the House of Commons the leader of the 
opposition, Winston Churchill, accused the Labour government of 
having "tricked" Seretse and asked for an assurance from the Labour 
Party that no South African pressure had been applied. 100 At the 
same time, however, Attlee was working with Conservative leaders to 
adopt a bi-partisan approach to the Seretse affair and it was agreed 
between them not to allow publication of the judicial enquiry 
report, 101 Gordon Walker denied again in parliament that there had 
been any South African pressure 102 and Baring himself refused to be 
drawn on the same question at a meeting of the Bamangwato Kgotla. 103 
The possibility of riots in Serowe was discussed by Baring who 
expressed the fear that South Africa might be tempted to send troops 
96 Ilanga Lase Natal, 4 February 1950. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Bantu World, 25 March 1950. 
99 Ibid. 
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to restore order104 • At a public meeting in London organised by 
Labour Party Independents, the accusation arose that Labour was "no 
better than the Tories" 105 and black .. organisations throughout the 
Commonwealth and Empire voiced their protests. 
The South African Labour Party weekly journal, Forward, commented on 
17 March under the title, "Disturbing Aspects of Britain's decision 
on Seretse", that Gordon Walker's statement in the House of Commons 
was "most unsatisfactory and reflects credit neither on the 
Commonwealth Relations Office nor on the British Government as a 
whole" . 106 It noted that the decision to exclude Seretse for five 
years "may or may not be justified" but that Gordon Walker gave "no 
single argument to show that it was". The editor concluded by 
affirming his distaste. (and that of most of the English white 
working class that he represented in his columns) for inter-racial 
matrimony and noted: 
Let me make it clear that this paper no more approves of 
mixed marriages than does anyone else in South Africa. But 
it does stand for fair play, especially by a trustee 
towards one of its wards. 
On 1 7 March the regional commissioner in Mafeking sent Baring 
further evidence of mounting opposition to the British decision. He 
enclosed a copy of the "Manifesto of Non-co-operation" drawn up by 
the leaders of the Bamangwato. 107 It talked of South African and 
Rhodesian pressure and stated: 
It is also commonly known that in recent years the 
attitude of the British Government has shown a tendency to 
uphold the Union's colour policy as evidenced by her stand 
104 Ibid., p.173. 
105 Ib' d 176 __ J._.' p. . 
106 Forward, 17 March 1950. 
IITT DO 119, File 1290, No.61A, Sillery - Baring, 17 March 
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in the UNO's discussions on Native policy. It has also 
become clear, generally speaking, that the maintenance of 
the paramountcy of native interests which has been the 
guiding principle in British Colonial Administration, is 
giving way, under continued white pressure, to the 
ascendency of the European interests in British African 
possessions south of the Sahara. It seems clear therefore 
that the claims of smaller territories to the right of 
self-determination in their domestic affairs can be 
trampled with impunity. IDS 
The manifesto went on to pledge loyalty to Seretse, to fight the 
British government with all the resources of the tribe, to refuse 
direct rule and to announce a policy of non-co-operation while 
Seretse was excluded from the Protectorate. It also appealed to the 
rest of the world to pressurise the United Kingdom. 
On the 20th March, Baring saw Smuts who told him that if Seretse 
were to be recognised, Malan 
would be able so to play on the emotions of White South 
Africans of both sections that their feelings would become 
inflamed and they would unite together to urge transfer of 
the High Commission Territories to the Union with a force 
and a persistence which we would not be able for long to 
resist. 109 
The Nationalist Party, Smuts had continued to say to Baring, would 
then discard its Afrikaner Party allies and fight an early election 
on transfer of the territories and on a republic outside the 
Commonwealth. It would argue the necessity of ensuring white 
supremacy by breaking the links with a country "which both 
officially championed mixed marriages and also gave way to agitation 
among Africans in a territory close to the Union and over which 
108 Ibid. 
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South Africans felt that they held a kind of option". uo Baring felt 
so "anxious" about what Smuts had told him and about a possible 
cave-in by the British government that he wanted to consult with 
Gordon Walker personally in order to stiffen the government's 
resolve concerning Seretse's banning order.u 1 
On the same day Gordon Walker wrote to Baring to say that Attlee had 
approved 
and that 
last-minute alterations to the draft White Paper on Seretse 
it 
the opening 
had been "rushed to publication". u2 He told Baring that 
sentence of Paragraph 16 had been altered to say that no 
representations had been received from the Union's government and 
that this alteration had met with Attlee's approval.ll3 A few days 
later he replied to Baring's telegram concerning Smuts's views and 
said he "appreciated the difficulties concerning the Union" and that 
if pressed he would take the line that the words he had used on 16 
March "speak for themselves" ( ie. Seretse would be banned for 5 
years at least) and that "we had nothing more to add 11 .ll4 He 
suggested that Baring visit London to discuss what would happen when 
the period covering Seretse's specific grounds for his presence in 
the Protectorate expired. There was, he noted, "a law suit to 
consider" as well as Seretse's wife's confinement. In case Baring's 
recall was "misconstrued" it would be called a "visit" unless a 
change of plans took place. 115 
In the meantime, a question had been asked in the South African 
parliament concerning the Seretse issue by the natives' 
representative for Western Cape, Sam Kahn. The Cape Argus reported 
that Kahn had asked Malan whether there had been any communication 
between his government and Britain concerning Seretse. Malan had 
llO Ibid. 
ll1 Ibid. 
ll2 File 1291, No.10, Gordon Walker - Baring, 20 March 1950. 
113 Ibid. 
ll4 File 1291, No.34, Gordon Walker - Baring, 24 March 1950. 
ll5 Ibid. 
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replied that he had nothing to add to what was said in the British 
White Paper which had been issued on 22 March. 116 When Kahn asked 
whether this reply meant that no communication had been received 
Malan said, "My reply has already been given". Kahn then stated that 
a direct reply had not been given to his question and the Speaker 
said, "A Minister is free to reply as he wishes." 
Gordon Walker, who had received notification of this question and of 
Malan' s reply wrote to Baring to say he had discussed it with 
Egeland who had sent a "comprehensive and useful" telegram to his 
government suggesting "how the matter should be handled if it is 
pursued further at their end" . 117 
On 27 March Baring wrote back to say that the effect of the 
publication of the White Paper had been "very good" in South Africa 
and that there was a "fuller appreciation" of the UK point of 
view. 118 The Star said (on 23 March) that it was unlikely that in 
five years' time the UK would reconsider the decision and hoped that 
by then the affair would be forgotten. 119 The Cape Argus said the 
White Paper presented a valid case for a UK decision and that 
although there had been no SA pressure "it is plain enough that the 
British Government has a shrewd notion of what the Union Government 
feels about the matter" . 120 Die Burger, on 23 March, praised the 
White Paper but hoped that the UK Government would not be influenced 
by an "inflamed, clamorous and uninformed mass of public opinion" to 
amend its decisions . 121 This, said Baring, showed there was an 
intention on the part of the Nationalists to use the Seretse affair 
in support of their demands for transfer "if there is any change in 
116 Cape Argus, 24 March 1950. 
117 DO 119, File 1291, No.39, Gordon Walker - Baring, 24 
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the attitude of the UK Government" . 122 
On 5 April Gordon Walker expressed his concern to Baring that if 
Southern Rhodesian troops were used to man armoured cars in the 
event of trouble in the Protectorate, there might be an "awkward 
reaction" from the Union. 123 The Union might object, he said, on the 
grounds that they themselves could readily have supplied Britain an 
armoured force. He was also concerned about the reaction in the 
Protectorate if Southern Rhodesian troops fired upon the Bamangwato 
and asked Baring whether it would be better to fly in British troops 
to man the armoured cars borrowed from Southern Rhodesia. 
A letter to Baring of 6 April by the Chairman of The Bantu Press Pty 
(Ltd), B.G. Paver in Johannesburg, summarised some comments in the 
black press and noted there was "a strong feeling" that the South 
African and Southern Rhodesian governments had "influenced the 
decision" . 124 Die Transvaler on 10 March had claimed that Gordon 
Walker's statement about South African and Rhodesian influence was 
not true and that there was no other reason than Seretse's marriage: 
While trying with words "to prop up the white-washed facade of 
liberalism", said the newspaper, the British Government had in 
practice conceded to the demands of apartheid. "This proves that 
reality wins as it always and increasingly must win against 
impracticable drawing-room theories of liberalism. " 125 
It described Gordon Walker's reasons as "pure diplomatic eyewash" 
and said that Malan had announced on 27 October 1949 that the 
British Government had been informed by telegram of the Union's 
attitude to the marriage. 126 The Bantu World, on the other hand, 
122 DO 119, File 12 91, No. 58, Baring - Gordon Walker, 27 
March 1950. 
123 File 1292, No.31, Gordon Walker - Baring, 5 April 1950. 
124 File 1292, No.43H, B.G.Paver (Chairman, The Bantu Press 
Pty (Ltd) ,Johannesburg) to Evelyn Baring, 6 April 1950. 
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had continued to argue on 25 March that the marriage was not in the 
interests of the welfare of the Bamangwatwo and that "neither Black 
nor White desire inter-marriage because both have a pride in their 
own race 11 • 127 
Baring wrote back to Paver asking him not to publish a particularly 
critical article which had been sent to him from the editor of "an 
independent weekly" called The Forum. 128 The article, entitled 
"Britain: a Jealous God" was written by L.D. Raditladi , an exile 
"of longstanding" from the Bamangwato Reserve and related to the 
Khamas. It accused the Labour government of dictatorial tendencies, 
scoffed at Gordon Walker's denial of Union influence and said that 
with Afrikaners "at least you know where you stand". Baring stated 
that the article, if published, "would not really do us any 
good". 129 Even if refuted in the next issue, he said, "some of the 
misstatements [were] bound to stick in people's minds and might do 
a lot of harm". He suggested withholding it on the grounds that "it 
was not signed" . 130 
By June the Labour government, which had been showing signs of 
"tottering 11131 under the pressure of hostile public opinion at home 
and abroad, had decided reluctantly to exile both Ruth and Seretse 
from Serowe. Dutfield described a mood of "self-congratulation" 
setting in, from Baring in particular, 
removed. 132 
now that Seretse had been 
It appears that Baring had been prepared to resign over the issue, 
particularly when he became aware that the government was "not 
in Bantu World. 25 March 1950. 
128 DO 119, File 1293, No.42, Baring - Paver, 2 May 1950. 
129 Ibid. 
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entirely happy with his advice" . 133 But according to his biographer, 
Douglas-Home, he "did not think that Nationalists' demands for the 
Territories would be properly fought by any successor, and it was 
that issue which he saw all along as his main objective in South 
Africa" . 134 He was "distressed" that he could not answer the 
accusation in Britain and elsewhere that he and the government "had 
yielded to the Union on a point of principle". He felt he had acted 
on principle all along, says Douglas-Home. He had objected to the 
marriage on principle the principle that the political 
consequences would have been disastrous for Seretse's people. 
But the problems for Bri.tain in the Protectorate were far from over 
as many years of non-co-operation from the Bamangwato, as well as 
violence, 135 followed. Gordon Walker noted after his tour of 
southern Africa that the Bamangwato wanted Seretse back and that 
there was "overwhelming evidence" of Tshekedi's unpopularity. He 
re-iterated that the government would reconsider the whole issue but 
only after the five-year period had elapsed. 136 At the same time, 
however, he congratulated himself and his government for taking a 
"firm" attitude on transfer which had "raised the morale of the 
Territories". He advised that more British money should be spent on 
them in order to "keep them out" of the Union and noted that the 
territories could not survive without a "solid block" of British 
territories behind them. 137 This, he said, strengthened the argument 
for closer union and for the proposed Central African Federation. 
He argued that it should be possible to keep South African opinion 
133 Douglas-Home, The Last Proconsul, p.192. 
134 Ibid. 
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"divided" on the question of transfer by stressing that it would 
mean a break with Britain. He was "surprised" at the strength of the 
opposition in the British press to a speech by Malan in Cape Town on 
incorporation and said that "we can confidently adopt a policy of 
indefinitely holding the territories but only if South African 
opinion continues to be divided" . 138 It was necessary to refrain 
from acts likely to "inflame public opinion" such as "the 
recognition of Ruth and Seretse" and he was convinced "we were right 
in the whole affair". 139 
Churchill's Conservative government came to the same conclusion in 
November 1951. Despite his statement in parliament in March 1950 
describing the Labour government's handling of Seretse as "a 
disreputable transaction", l4-0 Churchill endorsed the previous 
government's White Paper and the decision to exclude both Tshekedi 
and Seretse from Bechua·naland. 141 The new Tory secretary of state, 
Lord Salisbury, argued for the permanent exclusion of Seretse on the 
grounds that it would 
remove permanently from the Union Government a potentially 
powerful weapon in its campaign for incorporation of the 
High Commission Territories and the declaration of a 
republic. 142 
He noted that this had been the view of General Smuts and "of the 
present United Party leader in South Africa", that if Seretse were 
to return all whites would be united in the demand for transfer of 
the protectorates. The territories would be "defenceless" if South 
138 Ibid., p.13. 
139 Ibid. , p. 14 . 
l4-0 Quoted by Diana Wylie, A Little God ,p.191. 
141 CAB 128/23, C.C. (51)11,4, "Bechuanaland Protectorate: 
Chieftainship of the Bamangwato Tribe", 27 November 1951. 
142 CAB 129/48, C. (51)21, "Bamangwato Affairs", Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 19 November 
1951. 
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Africa imposed economic sanctions, he continued, and "we would 
probably lose the territories". 
In March of the following year Salisbury argued the same and noted 
that "Many African chiefs in the Territories and leading Africans in 
the Union are opposed to recognition for this reason and because of 
an innate dislike of miscegenation." 143 He suggested that Seretse be 
offered alternative employment in Jamaica. 144 The Cabinet endorsed 
all of Salisbury's arguments on 27 March 1952 and decided to issue 
a statement in the House "leaving out reference to South Africa or 
to outside pressure" and announcing that Seretse could never be 
recognised and should be "permanently excluded from the Reserve" . 145 
What should the verdict be on the whole Seretse affair? On at least 
two counts it should be quite clear that the evidence produced above 
indicates that: Firstly, Britain sacrificed Seretse as an act of 
appeasement of South Africa and, secondly, she did this on the 
assumption that it would keep South Africa in the Commonwealth and 
out of the protectorates. With hindsight both these assumptions 
seem to have been seriously flawed in both moral and political 
terms. The republican movement did not die down because it had a 
dynamic of its own which was not related to British acts of 
appeasement and although Strijdom's "extremists" came to accept for 
strategic reasons that the issue of a republic inside or outside the 
Commonwealth would be decided separately, it seems hardly likely 
that the Seretse affair had anything to do with such an acceptance. 
It had more to do with National Party electoral strategy and 
considerations of Party unity than any British policy decision. 
On moral grounds, even if one accepts that there is a need for a 
143 CAB 129/50, C. (52)76, "Bamangwato Affairs", 13 March 
1952. 
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modicum of "Realpolitik" in any nation's diplomatic dealings, the 
whole episode displayed a more than usual amount of shabbiness and 
deceit on the part of both British governments. Malan's government, 
although no less immoral in its motivation, on the other hand, 
displayed greater consistency and honesty, having made it clear from 
the beginning that it opposed the marriage. Furthermore, the banning 
of Seretse did not stop Malan from continuing to demand transfer; 
demands which were related to domestic political considerations and 
to considerations of national prestige and which could not have been 
fundamentally altered or satisfied by a compromise over Seretse. 
H.B. Thom's biography of D.F. Malan points out how strongly Malan 
felt about the issue of incorporation, how important it was to him 
personally to get rid of what he saw as a qualification on the 
autonomy of the Union and a sign of lack of faith in his 
government. 146 This was made clear to Gordon Walker at a banquet in 
his honour in Cape Town in February 1951 when Malan made strong 
representations for incorporation on the grounds that it affected 
"our equal status and place among the other members of the 
Commonwealth as well as our self-respect as a nation". 147 
Thom notes that there is 
understood the whole 
a question as to 
significance and 
whether Malan fully 
complexity of the 
incorporation issue in the light of warnings from Attlee, Churchill 
and his own high commissioner, Geyer, that his attempts were likely 
to fail. 148 More likely, explains Thom, is Malan' s feeling that 
whatever the outcome he had to raise the issue with Britain because 
its importance could not be neglected. 149 Bu+-. perhaps there is 
another explanation: that Malan genuinely felt he could succeed in 
his approaches, that Britain was likely to cave in on the question 
of incorporation as she had on the Seretse issue, and that this 
could be done by keeping up the pressure. British replies, after 
146 H.B. Thom, D.F. Malan (Cape Town, Tafelberg, 1980), 
p.247. 
147 Ibid., p. 231. 
148 Ibid. , p. 24 5 . 
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all, were never so uncompromising as to slam the door forever on the 
possibility of incorporation. They were usually qualified by the 
words "at the present time" which implied that at some future date 
it might be possible. 
Even Churchill's much quoted "No" to Malan in reply to a question in 
the House of Commons on 13 April 1953 was qualified in this way. 
Hyam notes (proudly) that Churchill went beyond the standard reply 
to this type of parliamentary question on the high commission 
territories by saying that he hoped the Union would not "needlessly 
press an issue on which we could not fall in with their views 
without failing in our trust" . 150 He added that there could be "no 
question" of transfer "at the present time" and hoped that the issue 
would not affect co-operation between the two countries in the 
territories and elsewhere. Hyam noted that the Labour opposition 
"thanked" Churchill for this reply but that African opinion was not 
mollified and that Tshekedi saw it as "procrastination".~ 1 
The Bantu World, while expressing "satisfaction" with Churchill's 
reply, said that the Union's hands "should be for ever kept off the 
Protectorates". 152 In parliament, the official opposition under 
Strauss adopted an ambiguous view, criticising the way Malan had 
gone about incorporation as "provocative" but affirming that "If 
there was a real genuine conflict, we would always place South 
Africa's interests first". 153 Margaret Ballinger pointed out that 
South Africa's apartheid policies were "certainly making the African 
population of the Territories more anxious about the future" and 
that "the British Government would no doubt negotiate with that as 
the background". 154 She was certain that the British would "not now" 
be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Schedule to the Act (of 
150 R. Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, p.191. 
151 Ibid. 
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1909) but even she was prepared to consider transfer "If the 
... Minister [of native affairs] ... can persuade the people of the 
Protectorates that they would be happier with us than where they 
are" 155 and she was sure that only on that basis would the British 
be prepared to negotiate as well. 
What is clear, however, is that although the British felt bound by 
their pledges of consultation of the inhabitants (as they frequently 
stated), this did not prevent them from holding out the possibility, 
however tenuous, of some future deal over the territories. As in 
other areas of concern to the British, such as the question of 
admitting newly independent African and Asian states to Commonwealth 
membership (see chapters 6 and 7) or defence and economic issues 
(chapter 9), the British were determined not to antagonise South 
Africa's Nationalist government to the point where it may have 
considered declaring a republic and leaving the Commonwealth at the 
same time. 
155 Ibid.,cols.3853-4, 12 April 1954. 
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Chapter 6: Malan and Africa: the Commonwealth Connection 
(a) Mixed signals from Britain 
South Africa's Commonwealth relations were affected in a number of 
ways by Malan' s African policy (excluding, for the moment, his 
policy towards the high commission territories). It placed, once 
again, some strain upon the relationship with Britain because of the 
clash of interests concerning the divergent policy aims of the two 
countries in Africa. 1 Anglo-South African friction in Africa 
directly affected South Africa's relations with her main 
Commonwealth partner and indirectly her relations with other 
Commonwealth countries interested in the decolonisation process. For 
example,it contributed to the worsening relationship between India 
and South Africa because of India's position as the leader of newly 
emerging nations in Africa and Asia and because of South African 
perceptions of what were seen as Indian designs in Africa. 
In the African region there were, however, also complementary and 
co-operative features of the relationship between South Africa and 
Western colonial powers, Britain in particular, that could be 
regarded as contributing to a strengthening (in the short term, at 
least) of the Commonwealth connection. Co-operation in the technical 
and agricultural spheres was welcomed by colonial powers and, 
initially at least, Malan's overtures in the direction of an African 
Charter and an African defence system for the continent were not 
dismissed out of hand. After all, Britain, even under the Labour 
government, was as concerned as South Africa was about the perceived 
communist threat to Africa and the Middle East and was keen to 
enlist South Africa's help in both areas. The Te Water mission to 
Africa in 1949 demonstrated this clearly, despite some hesitancy on 
the part of the Labour government. 2 Malan had sent Te Water 
northwards in order to get his idea of an African defence pact off 
1 Colin Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid 1945-
63" (D.Phil Thesis, Stellenbosch University, 1992), p.299. 
2 Ibid., pp.318-9. 
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the ground and had achieved a favourable response in African 
colonies and a mixed response in London (talks with officials there 
revealed some alarm at Malan' s intentions and a preference to 
discuss technical rather than political co-operation). Only when it 
had become clear to Britain and the other colonial powers that South 
Africa's racial policies and the conditions placed by her on defence 
co-operation in Africa had become insurmountable problems was the 
door to such co-operation eventually closed. But that only happened 
in the mid-fifties, during the Strijdom era. 
On the domestic front Malan's African policy did not arouse much 
hostile comment from the main white opposition party because it was 
not seen (except by a handful of far-sighted MPs) as threatening to 
South Africa's foreign relations in general or to her Commonwealth 
relations in particular. The UP was right behind Malan in his 
attempts to achieve an anti-communist and anti-African nationalist 
alliance with the colonial powers and tried to highlight the whole 
issue as an example of how indispensable Britain and the 
Commonwealth were to South Africa's interests in Africa. This 
approach was not followed by the black opposition, however, which 
bitterly accused Malan of attempting to hold up the process of 
decolonisation and of trying to form an alliance with settler 
regimes to the north. The ANC and other organisations viewed with 
suspicion any moves to include South Africa in a pan-African defence 
system and urged Britain not to be held hostage by Malan or by white 
settlers in the African colonies as she moved towards decolonisation 
in Africa. 3 
Various commentators have pointed out how Malan's government tended 
to assume in the early .1950 's that colonial rule to the north was 
there to stay for the indefinite future. They also point out that 
much of the disappointment, frustration and tension from the South 
African side emanated from this central misconception. Colin Vale, 
3 WCL,AD 2186 (ANC), Ba 3 (Annual Report of the National 
Executive Committee to the 42nd Annual Congress of the ANC, 
Durban, 19-19 December 1954,) Part 2 "International Situation", 
p.6. 
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for example, has shown how both Smuts and Malan misread the mixed 
signals coming from policy makers in the British Labour government 
concerning decolonisation in Africa. They were unable to 
"comprehend" the "revolution" in colonial policy which occurred 
after 1945 under the direction of Arthur Creech-Jones, secretary of 
state for the colonies, and Andrew Cohen in the colonial office. 4 
They "simply did not know what was going on in the Colonial Office" 
and "could not have believed" that, "in their view, such 
recklessness and irresponsibility" (the policy of rapid movement to 
self-government) was possible from Britain. They had taken comfort 
from what seemed to be a policy of continuity (because the colonial 
office was essentially "passive and reactive") and from statements 
like that of Sir Philip Mitchell, Governor of Kenya, who said he 
could not see Africans ruling themselves in the "foreseeable 
future". 5 
J.D.B. Miller notes that the problem was that of a lack of "a wider 
vision" by British policy-makers who had to keep on good terms with 
South Africa after 1948 and also with vocal white minorities in 
Kenya and Tanganyika. 6 It was aggravated, said Miller, by the 
fragmentary character of British departmental activity: the colonial 
office, the Commonwealth relations office (for relations with 
Southern Rhodesia, South Africa and the protectorates) and the 
foreign office for UNO diplomacy and Sudan's move to independence. 7 
So, departmental fragmentation together with the differing 
approaches of the right and left wings of both Labour and 
Conservative Parties as well as the belief that there was still 
"infinite time" (which Sir Andrew Cohen found typical of British 
colonial policy immediately after World War II) , all meant that the 
"wider vision" was missing from the British side. 
4 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp.302-314. 
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This could only have contributed to the misunderstandings from the 
South African side. It was not, however, purely a case of feeling 
"let down" or "bamboozled" by the British that led Malan to 
vociferous criticism of the British policy in Africa. It was active 
dislike of and apprehension at the consequences of British policy 
that motivated him to speak out so strongly in parliament and 
elsewhere against that policy. The hope must have been there of 
influencing Britain to abandon the plan for self-government in the 
Gold Coast and elsewhere if South Africa's opposition could be 
stated strongly enough. 
(bl Malan's African Charter, Britain and decolonisation, 1948-54 
Malan's "African Charter" provided the sort of answer which, in 
contrast to British policy, would, in the Nationalist view, ensure 
the survival of the "White Man" in Africa. In a policy statement in 
the House of Assembly on 1 September 1948 Malan had explained his 
African policy fully. 8 He had suggested that all European countries 
which had interests in Africa, including the United States (which 
had interests in Liberia), should get together and form a common 
Africa policy. For the African territories south of the Sahara the 
Government's intention was to give "the fullest co-operation in all 
conferences on research into problems affecting Africa as a whole 
and the Union in particular". Like Pan- Americanism in the Americas 
the question now arose whether it was necessary to create a "Pan-
African Charter". Peoples of Africa "who had not advanced far along 
the road of development" had to be led in the direction of 
"Christian civilisation". 
Africa would have to be held for the people of Africa and protected 
against the "grave danger of Asiatic penetration". There were parts 
of Africa - Kenya in particular - where the European population was 
alarmed about the open door policy to Asiatics and particularly 
Indian penetration. His Charter envisaged protection of Africa 
8 TA, A78 (Te Water), Vol.4, File AE 2/1 
Policy: General 1948 Sept. - March 1949), News 
State Information Office, 2 September 1948. 
(Union External 
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against this "threat". There was also the problem of the 
"militarisation" of the African people. It was of "great concern" to 
the Union and it was South Africa's duty to protect the people of 
Africa from that danger. 9 (In the light of later speeches on the 
topic of "militarisation" it seems that Malan was here criticising 
the colonial powers for arming Africans during the war and after) . 
This African Charter idea of Malans was not new and had been 
outlined by him in the House in 1945 when he was leader of the 
opposition.to It was originally, as Barber and Barratt note, almost 
an "off-the-cuff" idea" and was developed as a response to Smuts's 
federation scheme for colonies to the north. As Vale notes, it was 
not so much a plan to extend apartheid to the north as some critics 
claimed, but was more of a "foreign policy" for Africa. 12 It was a 
sort of Truman Doctrine for Africa aimed primarily at combating 
communism and "Asiatic penetration", the latter being something of 
an obsession for the N?-tionalists in the early 1950 's and which 
earned them considerable support from the English-speaking 
opposition. It was also designed to enlist the help of the colonial 
powers against the spread of African nationalism, the effects of 
which would be felt in South Africa itself. 
All these aspects of Malan's Charter are 
correspondence between 
of Africa in 1949. The 
Te Water and Malan during 
apparent in the 
the former's tour 
Te Water mission to Africa in 1949 had been 
designed as an attempt to promote Malan's African Charter and to 
obtain support for defence and technical co-operation with the 
colonies to the north. 13 While he was in Northern Rhodesia Te Water 
to Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.36. 
11 Ibid. 
12 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p. 316. 
13 See Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp.318-
9 and G. R. Berridge, South Africa. the Colonial Powers and 
'African Defence'. The Rise and Fall of the White Entente. 1948-
60 (New York, St.Martin's Press, 1992), pp.15-23, for a fuller 
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described the mission as •a gesture of good neighbourliness" 14 and 
claimed that expressions of •warm appreciation• were received from 
officials concerning the Union's technical assistance. He had tested 
•responsible opinion• on political questions such as •communist and 
Asiatic penetration• and had received •understanding and approval". 
Roy Welensky, the leader of the unofficial members of the Northern 
Rhodesian legislative council, had telegraphed him and had 
•violently reiterated• the resistance of •every Northern Rhodesian" 
to the policy of native paramountcy15 (which the British colonial 
secretary had just re-affirmed in the so-called "Creech-Jones 
Statement•). 
Welensky had asked Te Water what the Union was going to do about 
what he called "a policy which would end by the practical 
establishment on [the Union's] Northern borders of a black 
communistic state?". To whom, he had asked, could they look for 
guidance and assistance but the Union? Te Water noted in response to 
this that "the turning South at a moment of peril seemed 
instinctive• and that this gave him "hope for the conception of a 
Southern African hegemony" . 
In Britain earlier Te Water had found "extreme interest" from Attlee 
in his proposals 
penetration, soil 
British foreign 
understanding of 
... the problem of 
on common native policies, communist and Asian 
conservation programmes, etc. 16 The 
secretary, 
his African 
Bevin, 
thesis• 
had 
and 
expressed a "real 
seemed "conscious of 
Asiatic overpopulation, and t~e political dangers 
which were latent in that biological phenomenon". 17 
discussion of the aims and motives behind the Te Water mission. 
14 A 78, Vol.2, File AE 1/2/2 (Reports to Prime Minister, 
1948 September - 1962 March), te Water - Malan, 12 May 1949. 
15 Ib. d 5 __ l._. ,p .. 
16 A 78, Vol. 2, File AE 1/2/2 , Te Water - Malan, 16 February 
1949, p.1. 
17 Ibid. 
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In July, however, when he described the last phase of his "African 
and Mediterranean journey" to Malan he was not as sanguine about the 
British response. 18 He noted that he had last spoken to Bevin in 
February about an African defence pact, Asiatic penetration, 
militarisation of the natives, differing native policies and soil 
conservation and that since then Malan himself had discussed African 
policies with Whitehall. 
Te Water had found Bevin then "receptive" and "converted to the idea 
of a concerted organic policy" for Africa.~ But after talks with 
Creech-Jones, William Strang (the permanent head of the foreign 
office) and Andrew Cohen (head of the department of colonial 
affairs) he was told that an attempt in the circumstances of such 
divergent opinions and practice in African policies to find common 
agreement through the instrument of an "African Conference" would 
be "impolitic, unwise and foredoomed to failure" . 20 This, he said, 
was confirmed in talks with Philip Noel-Baker. 
What had become increasingly clear from the British response to Te 
Water's proposals concerning Africa was that co-operation at a 
political and military level was less welcome than technical and 
economic co-operation. Te Water himself realised the need to tread 
softly with Britain and he hoped that from issues such as soil 
conservation South Africa could later move 
those delicate questions on which it would be the height 
of folly immediately to attempt [an] approach or agreement 
- the native policies of the continent of Africa, the 
intrusion of Asia into Africa and the place of the African 
continent in the pattern of a world divided into East and 
West . 21 
18 File AE 1/2/2, Te Water - Malan, 12 July 1949. 
19 Ibid. , p. 2. 
20 Ibid. , p. 3 . 
21 File AE 1/2/2, Te Water - Malan, 16 February 1949, p.2. 
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At home Malan's Africa policy was receiving a mixed reaction. In 
parliament it was generally welcomed by both sides of the House. M. 
Kentridge (UP, Troyeville) in 1948 congratulated Malan for sending 
Te Water on his first mission and claimed that Britain was on South 
Africa's side in trying to prevent "UNO interference in South 
African affairs and in the Empire". 22 He expressed the hope that 
Malan would ensure South Africa's co-operation with the "three great 
colonial empires" to the north. Nationalist speakers like M. de Wet 
Nel (NP, Wonderboom) urged the government to "give a lead" on 
African affairs in the North especially in view of what were called 
"attempts to build up a new empire in Africa" by Britain and 
attempts to create a "non-European army" . 23 
In April 1950 the Rand Daily Mail applauded Southern Rhodesian 
"native policy" for being similar to that of the Union and claimed 
that "only tinpot societies and cranks" continued to support the 
traditional British policies in that regard.N But the opposition 
member for Yeoville, Dr H. Gluckman, struck a different note in 
parliament when he expressed concern that South Africa was "missing 
the bus in Africa" while new developments were occurring to the 
north (federation plans) . 25 He asked for a fuller statement from 
Malan on the results of the Te Water mission to Africa and wanted to 
know what the repercussions of "developments to the North" would be 
on South Africa. 
Some sections of black opinion expressed an unreserved aversion to 
Malan's Africa policy. The Non-European Unity Movement, for example, 
stated in 1951 that Malan's government had "earned the hatred of the 
masses in Africa" for casting "covetous eyes" on Rhodesia and the 
protectorates and for condemning the "liberal policies of the 
Imperialist powers who are conceding power as a result of the 
22 House of Assembly Debates, cols 1303-4, 31 August 1948. 
23 Ibid., col.1311, 31 August 1948. 
24 Rand Daily Mail 11 April 1950. 
' 
25 House of Assembly Debates, col.4218-19, 13 April 1950. 
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militancy of the masses•.• 
Even stronger was the condemnation of Malan' s "Pan-African Alliance" 
from the ranks of the West African press. Te Water enclosed a copy 
of an editorial in the weekly newspaper West Africa for Malan's 
attention in September 1948, soon after Malan's speech in parliament 
on his African Charter. The paper stated that Malan's idea should be 
"challenged in the interests of human decency, economic sanity and 
the future of the British Empire" . 27 It would not be challenged in 
South Africa because "all white parties were united in favour of 
white rule and the ... enslavement of 9 million Blacks within their 
own homeland". Only "Whitehall" could challenge Malan, said the 
editorial, and should do so "without delay• because of the danger to 
the welfare of Africa and the "continuity of the British Empire". 
British policy and thought was already moving in a radically 
different direction to that envisaged by Te Water and Malan. By 1950 
Gold Coast was on the verge of receiving responsible government and 
was becoming the test case of the Labour government's post-war 
decolonisati0n scheme. Malan had already expressed unease over the 
accession of new members to the Commonwealth in his post-election 
broadcast on 4 June 1948. 28 Duncan-Hall notes that in 1951, with the 
imminent prospect of Gold Coast membership after the elections 
there, he was to complain of a "preposterous absurdity in 
Commonwealth relations• . 29 He had complained then and later that 
the United Kingdom acted on its own in adding new members to the 
Commonwealth and that this was a process which waa changing the 
nature of the group. 
In reporting the speech by Malan on decolonisation in February 1951, 
Round Table noted that Malan had accused Britain of "killing the 
26 Quoted in Kar is, Hope and Challenge, p. 504. 
27 West Africa , 11 September 1948. 
u See Chapter 4, p.71. 
29 Quoted in H. Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth, p.768. 
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Commonwealth" by letting in new members without consulting the 
others. 30 Now the latest "outburst", which was apparently caused by 
the victory of Nkrumah's PLP Party in the Gold Coast elections, had 
resulted in Malan predicting that white leadership would be at an 
end in Africa and that there would be an elimination of British 
influence in Africa. 31 He had criticised the British colonial 
secretary for saying that the Gold Coast would be welcomed as a 
member of the Commonwealth in advance as would all other colonies. 
Malan asked how Britain could allow her colonies to get Commonwealth 
membership without consulting the others. 32 Round Table saw this 
speech as an advance notice of Malan's future attitude to 
decolonisation in Africa: 
In so far as Dr Malan intends his utterance as a threat of 
the Union's future attitude, therefore, it is a warning 
that Britain and other members may have to choose between 
a uni-racial Commonwealth with South Africa as a member 
and a multi-racial Commonwealth without her. 33 
The article went on to query whether Malan was using the issue "as 
a trump card against his political opponents" (by taking the wind 
out of the sails of the UP) and whether he was now claiming to have 
a veto over British colonial policy.M 
In the parliamentary debate on the issue in May 1951 Malan said that 
unless the interests of South Africa were "deeply affected" he did 
not normally interfere in matters "between England and her own 
colonies" . 35 But the British minister for the colonies had 
30 
"Dr Malan and the Commonwealth Britain and her 
dependencies", Round Table, Vol.41, 1950-51, p.219. 
31 Ibid., pp.219-220. 
32 Ibid., p.221. 
33 Ibid., p.223. 
34 Ibid., pp.223-226. 
35 House of Assembly Debates, col. 6787, 16 May 1951. 
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expressed the hope in his speech welcoming the results of the 
elections in Gold Coast that the territory would get "dominion 
status in the full sense of the word". This would mean that Gold 
Coast would enter the UNO and "it would not remain at that ... The 
next one would be the British West Indian Islands". The colonial 
secretary had said that Britain's whole colonial empire should 
become members of the United Nations and this affected South 
Africa: "We are a member of the United Nations and as such we are 
affected and as such we have the right immediately to react because 
it affects our country."• 
That was why he had made himself heard, he said, and why he had 
decided "to object from the point of view of our country, in the 
interest of the United Nations themselves and also in the interest 
of Great Britain herself". Britain's policy would lead to the 
"disappearance of the white man from the greater part of Africa". 37 
But England, was "indispensable as a civilising influence" in 
Africa. Her leadership and guardianship could not, in the interests 
of the natives themselves, be spared. 38 It was a "wrong step", he 
said, "to grant self-government to the Gold Coast". The territory's 
overpopulation and illiteracy would have the result that "it would 
sink into barbarism or alternatively become a dictatorship" . 39 He 
claimed to have no objection to self-government for such territories 
but that it should only happen when they had "reached such a level 
of civilisation and sense of responsibility that they [were] ripe 
forit". 40 
Malan went on to say that his government's policy in respect of the 
native territories inside South Africa was identical - gradual self-
36 Ibid. 
37 Ibid., col.6819, 16 May 1951. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid., col.6820, 16 May 1951. 
40 Ibid. 
140 
government in their own areas. 41 In answer to a question from the 
opposition leader, J.G.N. Strauss, as to whether he had consulted 
Britain before making his statement on the Gold Coast, he said "it 
was not for him to interfere" but that the British statement meant 
UNO membership would follow and he had an interest in the UNO not 
being changed "through new members being allowed to come in without 
the United Nations having any say". 42 
In March, Geyer, the South African high commissioner in London, had 
written to Malan regretting that the latter had not stated his 
position on what had happened in West Africa in a more "wide-
ranging" way ( "nie breedvoeriger gestel bet nie") 43 Since public 
opinion in Britain was such that it was felt South Africa was "out 
to suppress the Blacks", it would have been better to make it clear 
that his argument was that West Africa "was completely unready for 
self-government" ("nag gans en al onryp is vir selfbestuur") . 44 But 
now with all the "prejudice" which existed in Britain the left-wing 
reaction would be to say that Malan would never favour self-
government for West Africa, whatever its stage of development. The 
Tories "were just as worried as us" about the "foolish policy" 
("dwase beleid") in West Africa but they agreed, "of course", that 
the colonies should eventually get self-government. 
Geyer added that he had had to "watch his words" when speaking to 
the Royal Empire Society about the same question because he was "not 
allowed to say anything in criticism of the government'' in 
Britain. 45 However, he had been thanked by the acting Commonwealth 
secretary and "judging by the Hear, Hears!" he felt that many of 
those present had come to "their own conclusions". In his speech to 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid., col. 6821, 16 May 1951. 
43 CA, A1890 (Geyer Collection), Vol.1, Geyer - Malan, 5 
March 1951. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid. 
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the Royal Empire Society he had laid emphasis on what he called "our 
conviction that Black Africa would still for generations to come be 
ruled by European powers, in the interests as much of Africa as of 
Europe". 46 
In May, just before the parliamentary debate quoted above, Geyer 
told Malan that the admittance of the three Asian members of the 
Commonwealth had changed its character "more than what the British 
liked to admit" . 47 India did not co-operate as much (as was well-
known, he said) and the consequence was that the high commissioners 
were "hardly ever called together". The Indian high commissioner in 
London (Krishna Menon) "hated the West" and "could not be trusted" 
("is allermins te vertrou") . 48 
What all these letters and speeches indicate is how adversely the 
South African government viewed the new British moves towards 
decolonisation, and how keen the government was to seek reassurance 
that the policy was just a temporary aberration and that British 
policy-makers were basically sympathetic to the South African view 
of self-government for African colonies. The Labour government, 
before it left office in November 1951, did not have much time to 
deal with Malan's explosively hostile reaction to self-government in 
the Gold Coast but it is clear that Gordon Walker's memorandum on 
his visit to southern Africa must have been influenced by Malan's 
speech. In that memorandum, drawn up in April, Gordon walker argued 
strongly for a policy of closer union in Central Africa because, as 
he put it, "our whole work in Africa would be undone if Britain 
"intentionally or by default" threw the British communities of East 
and Central Africa "into the arms of the Union" . 49 The Union's 
"detested policies" 
Britain's colonial 
would spread far to the north, to the "heart" of 
empire and "millions of Africans" would be 
46 Geyer - Malan, 21 February 1951. 
47 Geyer - Malan, 15 May 1951. 
48 Ibid. 
49 PRO, CAB 129/45, C.P.51(109), "Visit by Secretary of 
State", 16 April 1951, p.10. 
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subject to •oppression and terrible wars•.~ 
The Labour government already suspected that Malan harboured designs 
on the Rhodesias and on the protectorates and so the argument for a 
Central African Federation was essentially that it would strengthen 
British influence in the area and keep South Africa out. Geyer was 
aware of this reason and had objected strongly to Gordon Walker 
about it. As he put it, South Africa was the "gogga" against which 
the Central African Federation was designed. 51 
The new Conservative government's response to Malan's anti-
decolonisation attitude was typically cautious. Officials such as 
Liesching in the CRO said in 1952 (in reply to colonial office 
concerns) that when Malan criticised British policy he usually did 
so on matters "that are legitimately the concern of South Africa, 
for example, the Gold Coast's membership of the Commonweal th•. 52 
Liesching advised against making any sort of public statement on 
British moves to abolish existing discrimination in the colonies as 
"this could stiffen European opinion in South Africa''g and he also 
agreed with Lloyd of the colonial office that they should avoid, as 
Lloyd had put it, •anything more than a passing reference" to the 
general policy of helping colonies to attain self-government.~ 
In fact, the Conservative government's colonial policies in Africa 
tended to proceed with one eye on Malan and another on the colonies 
themselves. In February 1952, for instance, Churchill's new cabinet 
met to consider an amendment to the constitutio~ of the Gold Coast 
which would "give an appearance of greater authority to the leader 
so Ibid. , p. 11 . 
51 CA, A1890, Vol .1, Geyer - Malan, 20 August 1951 
52 PRO, DO 35, File 2220, No. 3, Liesching - LLoyd, 15 
September 1952. 
53 Ibid., No.5, Liesching - Lloyd , 25 October 1952. 
54 Ibid., No. 4, Lloyd - Liesching, 13 October 1952. 
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of the Government party in the Legislature". 55 In discussion the 
colonial secretary noted that it was his predecessor, Griffiths, who 
had given these pledges and that they were not necessarily 
"disadvantageous". However, the Commonwealth secretary, Lord Ismay, 
noted that "these changes might excite some alarm in South Africa" 
and he requested some ttme to explain them to the Union government 
before any announcement was made. 
Similarly, in November 1952, in regard to the independence of the 
Sudan, the fear was expressed that South Africa would oppose any 
moves towards Sudanese membership of the Commonwealth (as would 
Australia, New Zealand and Canada), on the grounds that an increase 
in Commonwealth numbers would "weaken the coherence of the 
organisation" . 56 The Commonwealth secretary submitted a memorandum 
to the cabinet which stated that the Sudan was not suitable for 
Commonwealth membership for a variety of reasons, one of them being 
that 
she could not be admitted without prior consultation with 
all existing Members, of whom South Africa, at any rate 
under her present government would certainly not agree. 57 
In 1953 a revealing conversation took place between Malan and the 
new Commonwealth secretary, Lord Swinton, in which Malan again 
expressed his concerns about British decolonisation moves. In a 
memorandum to the British cabinet Swinton summarised his discussions 
with Malan and noted that the latter had wanted to talk about what 
he (Malan) called the "African Problem". 58 He had asked Swinton 
55 PRO, CAB 128/24, · C. C .16 (52) 6, "Gold Coast: Amendment of 
the Constitution", 12 February 1952. 
56 CAB 128/25, C.C.93(52)4, "Sudan", 6 November 1952. 
57 CAB 129/57, C. (52) 452, "Membership of the Commonwealth: 
the Sudan", Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 23 December 1952. 
58 CAB 129/61, C. (53) 165, "Relations with South Africa", 
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 
5 June 1953. 
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whether Africans would dominate in the colonies and whether this 
would affect southern Africa as well. Swinton had replied that there 
were differences between West and Central Africa and that West 
Africa "was not a White Man's country" whereas Rhodesia "was just as 
much white as well as black" , 59 
Malan had asked him whether Britain was going ahead with the Central 
African Federation and he had replied that he was. Malan then 
expressed worries about certain Africans who "wanted domination" and 
referred to newspaper ·reports of Nkrumah wanting a Pan-African 
conference. Swinton replied that this was "unlikely" and that Malan 
should not accept what the papers said uncritically and that Nkrumah 
was "too busy" in the Gold Coast and had too many differences with 
Nigeria etc., to worry about such a conference. Malan then expressed 
the need for more information on Britain's African policies in the 
colonies, information such as that which he received on defence, 
trade, the foreign office, etc. Swinton had agreed and had spoken 
with Lyttleton, the colonial secretary, who had also agreed. 
Malan had then spoken of the need for Britain, France, Belgium and 
Portugal to have conferences to discuss matters in Africa and had 
mentioned "his rather ·alarming idea" of an "African Charter". 
Swinton felt it was "not a good idea" to discuss the treatment of 
Africans but rather general defence measures, etc., with off-the-
record discussions of other things as well. (Malan then chuckled and 
said, ''You English are very illogical, but you have a lot of common 
sense. ") He then spoke of UNO interference in South Africa and 
Swinton emphasized support for the non-interference rule. He talked 
of Nehru's designs in Africa "which went far beyond any proper 
discussion of the position of Indians in his territories or ours". 
He claimed that Nehru aimed at "dumping" surplus Indians in South 
Africa, that Nehru was setting himself up as the champion of 
Africans and was attempting to create an Indian empire in Africa but 
had been beaten to the post by Mao Tse Tung. 00 
59 Ibid. 
00 Ibid. 
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The above conversation is revealing as an indication of the thinking 
of both Malan and the British on the decolonisation issue, with 
Malan still suspicious of British motives and obsessed by the Indian 
threat to Africa. The British, on the other hand, were adopting a 
mollifying role, trying to set Malan's mind at rest by assuring him 
of continued white rule in Central Africa (which is what the 
proposed Federation essentially amounted to) and promising him 
continued support at the UNO. The door would still be open to 
defence and technical co-operation in Africa although aspects of 
Malan' s Charter were clearly not acceptable because of racial 
considerations. Malan could only have gone away with the impression 
that South Africa could rely on a British-created buffer in Central 
Africa to ward off the tide of advancing black nationalism and that 
British support for South Africa at the UNO would continue 
indefinitely. 
In July 1953 Malan was reported as saying (in a welcoming speech to 
Robert Menzies, the Australian prime minister who was visiting South 
Africa) that he wanted to see Britain, with her "stabilising and 
civilising influence", remain in Africa together with the French, 
Belgians and Portuguese. 61 In parliament he rejected Strauss' s 
proposal of the idea of an "inner and outer " circle of 
Commonwealth membership (for old and new members respectively). He 
said that those in the "outer" would not be satisfied to stay "in 
the kitchen", as he put it, instead of in the "living room" and that 
in any case it would mean racial discrimination. 62 Echoing Smuts, he 
said that without a common outlook the Commonwealth was doomed and 
thus he had protested to the Labour government when it gave the Gold 
Coast its "strange" constitution. But now he had been assured by the 
new British government that no new members would join without the 
agreement of all the others. 
In May of the following year in parliament he was so fulsome in his 
praise of the British role in Africa that The Star called him "the 
61 Rand Daily Mail, 10 July 1953. 
62 Rand Daily Mail, · 8 July 1953. 
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last of the imperialists" and commended him for opposing "a hasty 
transfer of power to those who could only retard their own and 
Africa's development".~ The only proviso, as The Star noted in 
the same report, was that South Africa should not "embarrass" the 
imperial powers in Africa by her "domestic affairs". 
Clearly, then, by the time he left power in October 1954, Malan had 
not come to accept the inevitability of the decolonisation process 
(in Central Africa at least) and was not by any means reconciled to 
the idea of South Africa having to accept independent African 
dominions such as the Gold Coast within the Commonwealth. However, 
his high commissioner in London had given him notice of exactly 
that eventuality in the future. Geyer had written to him in October 
1953 to say that according to a source of his at the University of 
Accra in the Gold Coast, although the territory would "still for a 
long time need the help of senior white officials", Nkrumah had 
himself developed a "surprisingly strong sense of responsibility 
since he came to power" ( "n • verrassende sterk 
verantwoordelikheidsin ontwikkel het") . 64 
Geyer had been told that Nkrumah was determined to seek Commonwealth 
membership as an independent state and that he would not be 
satisfied with a "two level" Commonwealth membership (which was an 
idea being mooted in Britain at the time). Nkrumah was sure, he 
said, that South Africa would be the only state to oppose this but 
he felt sure India would give him strong support and that "it would 
be impossible for Britain to choose South Africa's side against 
India and the Gold Coast" . The source had warned Geyer that all 
hostile ministerial statements from the Union were widely reported 
in Gold Coast and would "achieve nothing" (which amused Geyer who 
saw parallels with what happened in the British press in regard to 
South Africa) . 65 
~The Star, 4 May 1954. 
64 CA, A1890, Vol.1., Geyer - Malan, 13 October 1953. 
65 Ibid. 
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The black press in South Africa in general took exactly the opposite 
attitude to decolonisation that the government and UP opposition had 
taken. Ilanga Lase Natal, for example, said in 1953 that all "right 
thinking Europeans" should be glad that the empire of Britain had 
metamorphosed into this new flowering [Commonwealth] 
without it sharing the fate of the empires of Babylon, 
Athens and Rome and other great empires or Powers that 
through their rigidity, stubbornness and failure to adapt 
themselves to changing conditions and developments 
perished .... Far from criticising Britain for her so-called 
"liberal" policies and her so-called abdication in Africa, 
the Union should admire and follow Britain in her wisdom 
of bowing to or anticipating the inevitable.M 
The Bantu World in an editorial of April the following year 
criticised Malan for saying in an interview with an American 
newspaper that much of the unrest in Africa apart from the Communist 
Party agitation came from the British policy of granting self-rule 
to the Gold Coast Africans.~ He had reportedly said that democracy 
was a "good thing" but .that people had to be educated for it. The 
Bantu World, on the other hand, argued that "democracy was its own 
school" and that self-rule in Gold Coast was an "excellent thing" 
even if it encouraged unrest, which, it said, was in any case a 
"symptom of a problem". Africans, it concluded, "see in the self-
government of the Gold Coast the fulfilment of their legitimate 
aspirations". 
In the same issue a message to the people of South Africa from Dr 
Nkrumah was printed. Nkrumah thanked the editor for asking him to 
send the message and said, "we are making great strides towards 
achieving independence within the Commonweal th ... and ... we are 
conscious of our task to the rest of the African continent" . 68 He 
M Ilanga Lase Natal. 25 April 1953. 
67 Bantu World, 24 April 1954. 
68 Ibid. 
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noted with "great pleasure and interest" the proposal to have a 
steamship link between Gold Coast and South Africa and said, "there 
would be a valuable opportunity [through trade] for increased 
understanding which can assist our peoples in the improvement of 
their living standards and ... political progress". 
As we shall see, this optimistic prospect of future relations 
between an independent Ghana and South Africa would soon prove to be 
premature. 
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Chapter 7: Malan and the Declaration of London: Constitutional 
Issues 
(a) The Irish precedent 
Before 1949 the achievement of a republic and the rejection of the 
Commonwealth connection had been logically connected in the minds of 
most Afrikaner nationalists. After 1949 this was no longer the case. 
The reason, of course, was the decision, agreed to by all member 
states at the April 1949 Commonwealth conference, to allow India and 
Pakistan into the Commonwealth as republics. No longer did the 
ideological and legal reasons for the Nationalist aim of secession 
coincide. 1 The ideological argument had been based on the notion 
that the attainment of a republic meant the defeat of British 
imperialism which had triumphed over the Boer republics in 1902. The 
British monarchy had symbolised the humiliation of that defeat. The 
legal argument had centred on the indivisibility of the crown and 
the feeling in Nationalist circles that the Statute of Westminster 
had not dispelled the notion of a legal clash between the 
republican ideal and allegiance to the monarchy. 2 As Miller has 
noted, the Nationalists feared that anti-Nationalists might still 
"fall back, as a last resort, upon Britain" . 3 These were arguments 
that derived from the 1920's and 1930's and that were aggravated by 
Smuts's stance on the outbreak of World War II. 4 
After the war, however, it was Ireland which became the precedent 
for republicanism within the Commonwealth, even though the Irish 
chose not to remain after becoming a republic. 5 General J.B. M. 
Hertzog had brought the matter forward as early as 1937 at the 
imperial conference of that year when Ireland had decided to adopt 
1 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.378. 
2 Miller, Survey, p.127. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Mansergh, The Commonwealth Experience, p.321. 
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republican status "in all but name". 6 Hertzog insisted then that 
there should be no decision to lay down conditions for Ireland's 
continued membership of the Commonwealth and that formula was not 
subsequently departed from. In 1948, when Ireland decided to become 
a republic and leave the Commonwealth at the same time, there was no 
Commonwealth consultation nor even advance knowledge (except, 
perhaps, for Canada) . 7 But, as Mansergh notes, there were two ways 
in which a Commonweal.th role took effect. 8 Firstly, the old 
dominions expressed consensus that Irish withdrawal should not 
damage relations with Eire. Secondly, they decided that the only 
difference was that now Ireland no longer attended prime ministers' 
meetings. This meant, according to Mansergh, that "a distinctive 
Irish/European voice was lost on many Commonwealth issues" 9 (such as 
Suez, Rhodesia, South Africa's decision to become a republic, etc), 
but twenty years later the decision was in a sense justified because 
there were more republics than monarchies in the Commonwealth. 
Malan's government approved of but did not take part in the 
decisions of October 1948 on Ireland and no doubt agreed whole-
heartedly with the settlement reached there. After all, it meant 
that South Africa might follow the same path later on without the 
danger of losing her important trade and other links with the 
Commonwealth. As J.D.B. Miller has noted, dominion pressure had 
ensured that Ireland had received "special treatment" - that trade 
preferences should continue and that the Irish should not be alien 
citizens and should not lose their privileges in Britain that were 
previously held. 10 Malan warmly welcomed Ireland's independence with 
the words: 
South Africa is gratified that the relations of the 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. , p . 3 2 2 . 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 J.D.B. Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.147. 
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Republic of Ireland with the Union as with other member 
states of the Commonwealth, will be characterised by 
special ties of understanding, friendship and goodwill 
which cannot but prove beneficial amidst the difficulties 
and complexities of today's international problems. 11 
If Ireland could remain intimately linked to the Commonwealth 
despite becoming a republic the way forward for a South African 
republic seemed that much easier. 
The October 1948 prime ministers' conference (which Eric Louw 
attended on Malan's behalf) adopted certain measures which made 
Commonwealth membership even more congenial to the Nationalist 
government. It was agreed upon, for example, to change the status of 
the high commissioners who would now rank with foreign ambassadors 
and would no longer have precedence over ambassadors in state 
functions. 12 Order of precedence for high commissioners would now be 
decided according to date of appointment and not according to 
seniority of countries (Canada having been seen as the "most senior" 
in the past) . The conference also agreed to change the term "British 
Commonwealth" to "Commonwealth of Nations", the latter term having 
been used by South Africa and Ireland since before the war. 13 
(Similarly, the Empire Parliamentary Association changed its name to 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association at its 1948 biennial 
conference) . 
All these changes were referred to approvingly by Malan in a speech 
in Port Elizabeth on 26 October 1948. The new status of the high 
commissioners confirmed that South Africa had reached its "full 
status of freedom and independence" he said, and it would give Union 
11 Commonwealth Survey, Jan.- Dec. 1950, Part 1, la 
(Constitutional) ,"Malan's Statement of Good Wishes to Ireland on 
becoming a Republic", 30 April 1949. 
12 TA, A78 (Te Water), Vol. 4, File 
Policy, General) , External Affairs 
November 1948, p.2. 
AE 2/1/1 (Union External 
Policy Review No. 15, 
13 Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth, p.644. 
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representatives abroad an equal footing with ambassadors 
representing other countries . 14 Noting that the recent prime 
minister's conference had dropped the term "British" from "British 
Commonwealth", he said that what used to be the British Empire when 
the Nationalist Party came into being had through peaceful evolution 
become the Commonwealth and even the terms Dominion and British 
Subject "were no longer used". He emphasised that belonging to the 
"family circle" did not mean a loss of independence and hoped that 
English and Afrikaans would unite as never before if a war "against 
Communism" took place. 
Malan noted further that South Africa had only two high 
commissioners at that time (Lief Egeland in London and Dr R. P. 
Viljoen in Ottawa) but none in any other Commonwealth capital. 
However, Australia and South Africa were likely to exchange high 
commissioners soon and new "important diplomatic appointments" were 
also soon to be announced. 15 He also stressed that the "King of 
South Africa" was separate from the king of New Zealand, etc., and 
14 Cape Times, 26 October 1948. It is worth noting that Te 
Water and Eric Louw had an even more radical view of the status 
of high commissioner than what was agreed to at the conference. 
Te Water wrote to Malan in September saying that he and Louw felt 
that the "right status" for the high commissioner in London was 
that instead of reporting to the dominions office he should be 
made an "ambassador" with relations direct to the foreign office 
"··.according to the now accepted principle of the division of 
the Crown". (A78, Vol.2, File AE 1/2/2 (Reports to PM 1948 Sept. 
-1962 March), Te Water - Malan, 8 September 1948, pp.l-2). 
15 Ibid. Deon Geldenhuys has noted that although the NP 
government embarked on a programme of expanding South Africa's 
representation overseas after 1948, in proportional terms the 
diplomatic network actually contracted if the growth in the 
number of missions was set against the increase in the number of 
states in that period. This, claims Geldenhuys, reflected South 
Africa's "growing international isolation". He also noted that 
London remained pre-eminent in importance as South Africa's 
diplomatic capital and that in 1950 Malan ruled that the high 
commissioner's office there should become a "de jure" institution 
of the department of external affairs responsible for handling 
"all political matters between Britain, South Africa and 
international issues involving both". (Deon Geldenhuys, The 
Diplomacy of Isolation. South African Foreign Policy Making, 
South African Institute of International Affairs (Johannesburg, 
Macmillan,1984), p.14. 
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that the prime ministers' conference had announced that there were 
different and "equal" centres of the Commonwealth, not just London. 
Ireland was likely to become a "full republic soon or draw nearer to 
the Commonwealth" as a result of "new developments" and Britain was 
now "as dependent" upon the dominions as they were upon it. 
This speech was criticised by one opposition newspaper more for 
"what was not said" than for what was said. 16 There was no guarantee 
that "tomorrow he [Malan], or his party, will not agitate for what 
they will be pleased to describe as a movement to liberate South 
Africa from the bands of British imperialism", claimed an editorial 
in The Friend of Bloemfontein. Republicanism still remained on the 
programme of Malan's party and Malan could "choose his own time and 
place, as political needs and tactics demand it, to fling the issue 
into the party arena". The Nationalists had "failed to reveal any 
real understanding" of the fact that Commonwealth membership 
"entailed wider obligations, not just national interests", it was 
argued. 
But what is clear, wider obligations or not, is that Malan and his 
party were beginning to find that the Commonwealth was becoming a 
more congenial organisation for a National Party government to 
belong to. As long as there was no interference in South Africa's 
affairs, Malan often said, and as long as South Africa's freedom and 
independence were guaranteed then Commonwealth membership was 
acceptable. Most important was the desire for Afrikaner nationalist 
republican sentiments to be accommodated constitutionally. If that 
could be achieved then only the "extremist" republicans in the 
party, led by J.G.Strijdom, would still not accept Commonwealth 
membership. 
The clash within the Nationalist party over the Commonwealth was 
only resolved in 1951 when Malan and Strijdom agreed to disagree 
over the issue and to accept that a republic and Commonwealth 
membership would be treated separately. At caucus meetings in March 
16 The Friend, 27 October 1948. 
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1951 Malan argued that a republic outside the Commonwealth would be 
seen as "anti-British" and that therefore there would be less 
support for it . 17 There would have to be a good reason for leaving 
the Commonwealth, he argued then, otherwise South Africa would end 
up being isolated. Strijdom had attacked him for not leaving the 
Commonwealth immediately and for not sticking to Nationalist policy 
which had always been that of breaking with Britain. They ended up 
agreeing that the republic and Commonwealth membership were separate 
issues to be decided separately when the time came to decide on 
them. 18 
(b) Malan and the Declaration of London, April 1949 
As one commentator has noted, the post-war developments towards a 
looser form of Commonwealth were favouring Malan's republican aims 
to an increasing extent. 19 It was the Commonwealth prime ministers' 
conference of April 1949 which provided the watershed in the 
development of the Commonwealth towards a looser form of 
association. By accepting India and then Pakistan as republics, the 
way was opened for the huge expansion of membership in the late 50's 
and 60's as colonies in Asia and Africa became independent. 
The key to it all was the acceptance of a formula which made 
allegiance to the crown an option instead of a requirement of 
membership as in the past. It was agreed that recognition of the 
king as a symbol of the free association between members of the 
commonwealth was sufficient and that the allegiance was no longer 
necessary. 2° For those members who wanted it, the king now became 
officially "Head of the Commonwealth" instead of king of India, 
17 INCH, PV 4 (Eric Louw Collection), File No.93 (1951: 
Republican Policy, Caucus Discussions), Dept.Commerce and 
Industry: Subject: Private, Republican Policy, Caucus Discussions 
13 March 1951 and 20 March 1951. 
g Geyser, Watershed, p.49. 
19 Kruger, The Making of A Nation, p.249. 
w Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.144. 
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Pakistan, etc. As Miller notes, the agreement left the status of the 
monarchy "entirely intact", in the United Kingdom and in other 
countries which wanted 'to maintain it intact. 21 It gave the king 
continued status as a Commonwealth institution, freed India from the 
crown "with all its associations of coercion and control" and it 
provided a "perfect face-saving [device] for Britain and India" . 22 
Most of the credit for devising this agreement has been given to the 
British prime minister, Attlee, and his Indian counterpart, Nehru. 
Both showed, according to Mansergh, "imagination and understanding" 
and there followed a "golden period" of a multi-racial Commonwealth 
in the 1950's. 23 For Britain the agreement was justified on 
strategic and economic grounds because it kept India in the 
Commonwealth and out of what Attlee feared she would join if she 
were not allowed membership as a republic an "anti-European, 
Asiatic union". 24 In India arguments for staying in or out of the 
Commonwealth had raged since independence; but what had been crucial 
in the decision to stay in was the fear of isolation and the fact 
that both Ceylon and Pakistan were determined to remain. There was 
general satisfaction in India with the 1949 agreement, claims 
Mansergh, although some socialists and communists in the Lok Sabha 
(Indian parliament) protested.~ Nehru's reaction was summarised in 
his statement to the Indian Constituent Assembly on May 16 1949: 
We join the Commonwealth obviously because we think it is 
beneficial to us and to certain causes in the world that 
we wish to advance: .. it is better to keep a co-operative 
association going which may do good in this world rather 
22 Ibid 
--· 
n Mansergh, Commonwealth Experience. p.337. 
24 Ibid., p. 336. 
~ Ibid. , p. 3 3 7 . 
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than break it. 26 
In the same debate Nehru had earlier been asked how he could join an 
organisation in which there was racial discrimination and he said in 
reply that he could have pressed for some changes in the final 
communique of the conference but chose not to because, 
I preferred to create an impression ... that the approach of 
India ... was not a narrow minded approach. I wanted the 
world to see that India is prepared to co-operate even 
with those with whom she had been fighting in the past. 
In March 1949 Sir Percival Liesching had been sent as an envoy to 
South Africa to discuss the admission of India as a republic and, 
although Malan was prime minister, Smuts's views were still "a 
powerful influence" . 27 Liesching talked with both Smuts and Malan 
between March 14 and March 16 and, according to Duncan-Hall, the 
arguments put forward b~ Liesching were crucial in changing Malan's 
initial opposition to the admission of India as a republic. 28 Malan 
admitted this in parliament on 11 May, saying that although he and 
Smuts had initially been in favour of a treaty relationship between 
India and South Africa he now saw the importance of keeping India in 
the Commonwealth as an anti-communist state; besides, he did not 
want to weaken Commonwealth links. 29 
Duncan-Hall himself met Malan in October 1954 and said that Malan 
then seemed "less sure" that it had been right to agree to India's 
admission as a republic. 30 However, one of the prime minister's 
advisers had told Duncan-Hall that Malan at the time "could not 
26 Commonweal th Survey, Jan. Dec. 1950, Part 1, 
Constitutional la, "India Approves London Declaration", 28 May 
1949. 
27 Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth, p. 844. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., p.845. 
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to have a republic (India) in the resist the 
Commonwealth 
Africa. 31 
temptation" 
because of its usefulness as a precedent for South 
Malan had good reason to welcome the decision to admit India because 
it did open the way to that combination of republicanism and 
Commonwealth membership without antagonising the English South 
African population to any significant extent. 32 Smuts, however, 
remained opposed to the arrangement saying that it gave Malan a 
"tarred road to the Republic" . 33 He was anxious to make it clear 
that the exception that had been made for India should not become a 
precedent for other cases, including South Africa. 
The 1949 conference did in fact place on record the view of all 
governments that the exception made in the case of India did not 
change the basis of their own membership of the Commonwealth. 34 
Clearly, however, the precedent had been established and all that 
was to be required in future was that a member state should notify 
the others of its intention to become a republic and that it should 
then request formal permission from the others to continue 
membership. As Miller points out, this proved to be the "stumbling 
block" that eventually precipitated South Africa's withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth in 1961. 35 
Smuts maintained that the only good thing to come out of the 1949 
conference was that the other members made a firm stand on 
maintaining allegiance to the King.~ He regarded symbolic kingship 
as a "constitutional fiction" and as an encouragement to others like 
South Africa to become republics. He saw it as a "disservice" to the 
31 Ibid. 
32 Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.144. 
33 Quoted in Miller, Survey, p .127. 
~ Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth , p.860. 
35 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p.145. 
36 Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth, p.863. 
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world and predicted that acceptance of more than one republic would 
strain the Commonwealth to the limit. 37 His close friend and 
confidant, Winston Churchill, disagreed, however, and told him that 
it was better for Britain and the Commonwealth to have India in 
rather than out. 38 In the end Smuts grudgingly agreed, although in 
reply to Churchill he reiterated that for political reasons he had 
had to oppose the republican precedent that had emerged from the 
Declaration of London (the summary of the decisions of the 1949 
conference) . 39 
Duncan-Hall noted that it was Malan who was instrumental in having 
one of the three minutes of agreement at the conference placed on 
record immediately after the meeting on 26 April 1949. 40 It referred 
to the designation of t:he king as "Head of the Commonwealth" and 
stated that at Dr Malan's request it was placed on record that this 
designation did not mean any change in the constitutional relations 
existing between the members of the Commonwealth. It also stated 
that it did not imply that the king discharged any constitutional 
function by virtue of the headship. 41 
This, says Duncan-Hall, was a point to which Malan had reverted on 
several occasions during the discussions. He distrusted the term 
"Head of the Commonwealth" because it could have laid him open to 
attack from "the left wing [sic] " of the National Party. 42 He feared 
that the formula might be regarded as implying that in some way the 
Commonwealth was a cons"titutional entity or a "super-state". As a 
result, the meeting placed on record the minute mentioned above in 
37 Ibid 
--· 
38 Van der Poel (ed. ) , Selections from the Smuts Papers, 
Vol.7, p.298. 
39 Ibid. , p. 2 9 9. 
~Duncan-Hall, Commonwealth, p.876. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ib"d 877 __ l._.' p. . 
159 
order to "set all such fears at rest". 43 
Duncan-Hall claims that the reception given to the Declaration of 
London throughout the Commonwealth was more or less "uniformly 
positive".« Of the prominent Commonwealth statesmen only Menzies of 
Australia and Smuts of South Africa were not happy with it. 45 
Menzies feared it had "damaged the family relationship under the 
Crown" while Smuts "held out sternly" in South Africa against the 
"general tide of opinion" in the Union which "found grounds for 
satisfaction in the saving of India for the Commonwealth and in the 
help South Africa was getting in her own drift towards a 
republic". 46 
The Nationalist press, says Duncan-Hall (quoting Die Burger) hailed 
the declaration as a defeat for Smuts and the end of "all thoughts 
of the Commonwealth as a constitutional entity, a sort of super-
state".~ Die Transvaler, however, confined itself at first to an 
analysis of why it thought Britain would accept India as a republic 
and noted that, if India were a republic but Pakistan remained a 
dominion, there could be no thought of war on India's part because 
it would involve Britain. 48 Then on 23 April an editorial supported 
"Malan' s standpoint" that there could be republics in the 
Commonwealth and criticised smuts ("the greatest imperialist of the 
twentieth century") , for declaring that the crown was the only 
binding factor in the Commonwealth. 49 
After India had been accepted as a republic on 28 April, Die 
43 Ibid. 
« Ibid., p.862. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Die Transvaler, 20 April 1949. 
49 Die Transvaler, 23 April 1949. 
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Transvaler hailed it as victory for the "group which said there 
could be continual constitutional growth in the Commonwealth" and 
the newspaper went on to state that Malan's views on the 
divisibility of the crown were now proved correct.~ The crown was 
no longer necessary for Commonwealth membership, it was claimed. 
"What can Smuts say now?", was the final comment. 
The Sunday Times stated on 1 May under the heading "In South Africa 
No Change", that India was a republic but all the other 
allegiances were unchanged. 51 However, it regretted the fact that "a 
precedent has been created for any other member who may care to take 
advantage of it" and it warned Malan not to press ahead with a 
republican campaign "at the risk of dividing Europeans more". 
The Star probably voiced the less than enthusiastic response of most 
English South Africans when it stated (in the context of the 
parliamentary debate on the new citizenship laws in June 1949): 
We can say that the British Commonwealth in regard to the 
Crown, is bound and linked as before and that this unity 
will be associated_ with the Republic of India which will 
take its own view of the Crown. 52 
The republican issue was not, of course, laid to rest after the 1949 
conference. Passions on both sides of the white political spectrum 
were fuelled in the months and years ahead as various issues 
highlighting the republican question came to light. In April 1950, 
for example, Malan made a speech at Citrusdal which aroused 
considerable controversy because of his suggestion that an "elected 
Governor-General" would be the next step on the road to a 
republic. 53 In parliament one opposition speaker responded to Malan 
50 Die Transvaler, 28 April 194 9. 
51 Sunday Times, 1 May 1949. 
52 The Star, 11 June 1949. 
53 Rand Daily Mail, 3 April 1950. 
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with the words 
if you are going to bring about the kind of republic as 
laid down at Citrusdal, then I say you are going to break 
faith with the English-speaking people in this 
country .... The blood of the people can rise over a 
question like this, that will sweep you people out.~ 
Nationalist speakers, on the other hand, accused the UP of using the 
issue of an elected governor-general as a "bogey" with which to set 
English against Afrikaans. 55 Opposition speakers then pointed out 
that the right wing of the Nationalist Party under the leadership of 
Advocate Strijdom still maintained that South Africa should become 
a republic and leave the Commonwealth at the same time. They quoted 
Strijdom as saying in parliament on 11 May 1949, when Malan had 
returned from the London Conference, that 
The Nationalist Party's policy is clear; it is the 
eventual creation of a republic separate from Britain and 
the Empire. It stands there quite plainly in our party's 
programme of principles; Articles 9, 10, 11 and 12. 56 
Malan eventually had to reassure the opposition that the question of 
a republic would not be.an issue at an "ordinary general election" 
and that what he had meant at Citrusdal was that the change from a 
governor-general to an elected president was the "only step left 
towards a republic" . 57 
In 1954 a flurry of ethnic white sentiment was roused by the 
introduction of a private member's motion in parliament on the 
54 House of Assembly Debates, col.4087, 12 April 1950. 
55 Ibid., col. 4083. 12 April 1950. 
56 Ibid, col.4095, 12 April 1950. 
51 Ibid., cols.4147-4149, 12 April 1950. 
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question of a new flag and anthem for South Africa. Malan stated in 
the House of Assembly that no country aspiring to nationhood could 
give allegiance to more than one flag and that having two anthems 
and flags ("God save the Queen" and the Union Jack as well as "Die 
Stem" and the South African flag) was "disruptive" . 58 He repeatedly 
stressed that the Union flag was South Africa's only flag, not the 
Union Jack which was Britain's and which should not, he said, be the 
flag of South Africa's association with the Commonwealth. Although 
the UP opposition stood by the 1927 Agreement (which after years of 
bitter debate had given the country two flags and anthems) , it was 
clear that this time the debate over national symbols no longer 
aroused a great deal of excitement in opposition circles. The Star 
commented: 
For our part we see little objection to the formal 
adoption of the Union Flag and "Die Stem" as the official 
symbols, the official use of the Union Jack and "God Save 
the Queen" being confined to specifically Commonwealth 
occasions. This would, indeed, differ little, if not at 
all from the official practice.~ 
It was noted, further, that "provocative flag waving" was a "symptom 
of a political disease", not the disease itself, and that "South 
Africanism" was too often obstructed by "anti-South Africanisms" of 
the kind that prompted some of the remarks in the debate in 
parliament. The debate on the flag and anthem was therefore 
symptomatic of the movement of the two white sections of the 
population towards each other, a "toenadering" that had become most 
prominent in the field of foreign affairs. 
(c) The coronation. republicanism and the Commonwealth 1953-54 
After the coronation conference of April 1953 the republican issue 
again flared up in parliament. Taking advantage of the strong pro-
58 The Star, 24 February 1954. 
59 Ibid. 
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royalty sentiments in South Africa aroused by the pomp and ceremony 
of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II (and by the fact that Malan 
had attended the ceremonies with little sign of reluctance or 
rancour) 00 , the leader of the opposition, J.G.N. Strauss, moved in 
the House on 7 July that "continued membership of the Commonwealth 
by the Union under its present Constitution is in the best interests 
of the Union and will promote national unity and the material 
welfare of our country". 61 Strauss declared his willingness in 
return to co-operate with the government "in the field of foreign 
affairs" and over "the danger of Bantu Nationalism". 
A rancorous debate followed in which the usual accusations and 
counter-accusations of ethnic antagonism were hurled at each other 
by government and opposition. Eric Louw declared that the republic, 
when it came about, would "not be a Communistic Republic nor will it 
be a Left Socialistic Republic and it will certainly not be a 
liberalistic Republic" 62 and went on to attack the Labour Party in 
Britain saying that the Nationalists were not likely "to co-operate 
in future with a Socialist Government in England" . 63 These remarks 
were described as "cheap and unnecessary" 64 by the opposition 
member for Salt River . (Harry Lawrence) who was joined by other 
members in defending the Labour Party in Britain for coming to the 
aid of South Africa at UNO. 
The minister of lands and leader of the right-wing of the National 
Party, J.G. Strijdom, then attacked the opposition motion for being 
what he called "the dart, the venomous sting" designed "to stab us 
under the cloak of friendship" and claimed that its aim was to 
distract the attention of the public from disunity in the United 
00 Geyser, Watershed, pp.24-25. 
61 House of Assembly Debates, cols.40-41, 7 July 1953. 
62 Ibid., col.90, 8 July 1953. 
63 Ibid., col.91, 8 July 1953. 
64 Ibid., cols.97-98, 8 July 1953. 
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Party and to sow dissension in the ranks of the government.~ The UP 
motion intended to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth even as a 
republic but that this would be decided later "when the time came to 
take the step" . 66 A republic, he said, would give South Africa 
"undivided loyalty" from the white population. 
The government's counter-amendment was then adopted and won by 89 
votes to 57. 67 It proposed that the issues of a republic and of 
Commonwealth membership would be decided separately and "not merely 
by a bare parliamentary majority" . 68 The latter would be decided "at 
any given time" in the light of the then existing "interests" of 
South Africa and her "position in the international world". 
It was left to the natives' representative, Robert Stuart for the 
Transkei, to give a black perspective on what was essentially a 
whites-only debate. Moving an amendment to Malan' s counter-amendment 
he said that a decision to declare a republic should be taken by 
"native and coloured voters" as well as by European voters. 69 He was 
supported by 
replace Sam 
the wake of 
Brian Bunting, one of the communist MPs elected to 
Kahn who had been ejected from parliament in 1952 in 
the passing of the Suppression of Communism Act. 
Bunting, who was similarly ejected a few months after the debate on 
the UP motion,m launched into a telling attack on the United Party 
claiming that the motion on Commonwealth membership ended up as an 
"embarrassment to themselves". 71 
The UP, claimed Bunting, had "failed the country" by not stating its 
65 Ibid., col.109, 8 July 1953. 
66 Ibid., cols.109-111, 8 July 1953. 
67 Ibid., cols.141-142, 8 July 1953. 
68 Ibid., cols.59-60, 7 July 1953. 
69 Rand Daily Mail, 9 July 1953 
70 Eddie Roux, Time.Longer than Rope, pp.382-3. 
71 House of Assembly Debates, cols.134-5, 8 July 1953. 
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"no confidence" in the government. It had "learnt nothing" from its 
election defeat and was "continuing with a policy of appeasement 
which can only lead to demoralisation and disintegration in their 
ranks". The whole issue of the Commonwealth had been a "series of 
red herrings before this House" . Strauss had claimed the 
Commonwealth was valuable firstly as a guarantee against the "rising 
flood" of African nationalism and secondly against the threat of 
communism. Thus the government and opposition "saw eye to eye 
really" on co-operation in the Commonwealth because "for them it is 
the means of preserving white domination" 72 : 
The African people, it is understandable, cannot take 
kindly to that view and if membership of the Commonwealth 
is understood to be a perpetual denial of their 
aspirations, they will look with different eyes on the 
Commonwealth from those with which 
the past. 73 
they looked on it in 
Bunting continued to say that Africans wanted "freedom, equality and 
national independence" in South Africa and Africa and although they 
wanted normal relations with Britain and admired many British 
institutions they were "opposed to" and "disappointed" with the 
tendencies which were developing within the British Commonwealth.~ 
They were disappointed over Gold Coast and over Seretse Khama and 
"suspicious" of the Central African Federation because it meant 
"white domination". They were "outraged", he said, by British 
actions in Kenya which was experiencing "a battle against British 
Imperialism similar to the Boers fifty years ago": 
The tragedy is that whereas fifty years ago the supporters 
of the present government struck a blow for freedom and 
independence in this country, today they have taken their 
stand in the ranks of the Imperialists in trying to deny 
72 Ibid., col.136. 
73 Ibid. 
74 Ibid. 
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national independence to the people of Africa. 15 
Bunting's statements all too accurately mirrored the feelings of the 
mainstream African press which was expressing its frustration with 
the impotence and alleged hypocrisy of the United Party in the wake 
of the 1953 general election results. The background to that 
election had been what seemed to be a promisingly strong stand taken 
by white opposition . groups to oppose the 1951 Separate 
Representation of Voters Act (which aimed at the removal of the Cape 
coloured franchise) but this movement fizzled out into squabbling 
over Natal separatism and the role of blacks in a new dispensation. 
The Torch Commando had been formed in April 1951 as an ex-
serviceman' s extra-parliamentary movement to oppose the government's 
coloured vote policy. It had formed a United Democratic Front with 
the United and Labour Parties and for a time achieved a paid up 
membership "which ran into six figures" . 76 It could never agree, 
however, on the question of coloured membership and that cost it the 
support of coloureds in November 1951. Thereafter it fell out with 
the United Party over the issue of Natal separatism. 
The latter movement was represented by G. Heaton Nicholls's "Natal 
Stand" which aimed at forcing the Nationalists to admit the 
illegitimacy of their constitutional manoeuvres by advocating the 
withdrawal of Natal from the Union.TI The Torch Commando actively 
supported this stand and earned the wrath of the United Party which 
feared a split in its ranks. Although the Torch Commando threw its 
weight behind the UP during the 1953 election i.:he Nationalists won 
with an increased parliamentary majority (but not a majority of the 
75 Ibid., col .137· 
76 T. R.H. Davenport, South Africa. A Modern History (1st 
Edition, Macmillan, London, 1977), p.260. 
77 See Heaton Nicholls, South Africa in My Time, , pp.435-442 
for a discussion of the actions and motives of those who formed 
the United Federal Party after the elections of 1953 and the 
reasons for its ultimate demise (for which Nicholls largely 
blamed the leadership of the United Party) . 
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votes cast) , taking 94 seats to the UP' s 58 and Labour's 4. 78 The 
Torch then faded with its "divided spirit" living on in the UP and 
two new opposition parties, the Union Federal Party (UFP) based in 
Natal and the non-racial Liberal Party. 79 
To voteless African onlookers all the above manoeuvres within the 
ranks of the White opposition were depressingly familiar: English-
speakers were once again displaying their ambivalence towards the 
principle of black political rights and when the chips were down 
were choosing rather to protect their own political privileges. 
Indian Opinion went so far as to say that it was a case of "better 
an enemy we know than a friend we do not know" . 80 It claimed that 
the Nationalists had a straightforward and definite policy and 
"meant what they said" but the UP, which formed the "bulk of the 
English-speaking people", were "hypocrites". They would have stood 
squarely with the Nationalists if their interests weren't being 
jeopardised. The country was "doomed to destruction" because of the 
"hypocrisy of English-speakers" and the "utterly narrow nationalism" 
of the Afrikaners. 
The Bantu World in its editorial of 25 April entitled "Election 
Results" said that: 
As far as Africans are concerned, no fundamental 
difference would have been made by the return of the 
United Party which was a faithful ally of the Nationalist 
Party in the passing of the recent anti-Defiance 
legislation and which seemed to have realised that a smile 
of friendship towards the African would have a repelling 
effect upon a good number of voters. 81 
78 Davenport, South Africa, p. 261. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Indian Opinion, 24 April 1953. 
81 Bantu World, 25 April 1953. 
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The same newspaper said in response to Heaton Nicholls' s "Natal 
Stand" and the proposal of the Union Federal Party to divide the 
country into English and Afrikaans areas that it was a "counsel of 
despair, utterly unwarranted by the facts" . 82 
To the African, Senator Nicholls's proposals are 
interesting ... they show what it feels like to have one's 
political wings clipped and the hope of realising one's 
ideals frustrated. Such feelings are infinitely more 
pronounced in an African who is still without the wings 
with which to fly. 
When we look, however, at African and Indian comment on the 
coronation of Queen Elizabeth in 1953, the strength of pro-
monarchical sentiment still seemed undiminished. Not surprisingly, 
the conservative Bantu ·world was foremost in its expressions of 
loyalty to queen and Commonwealth noting in April that "the Queen 
represents a bond which ties Dr Malan and Dr Nkrumah" and that "it 
is our duty to see that under that bond we all build better race 
relations". 83 In May the same newspaper somewhat naively expressed 
the hope that the coronation would be "the beginning of a permanent 
bridge across the differences that have placed such a severe strain 
on race relations in our country". 84 It stated that the coronation 
and its arrangements for representation from all parts of the 
Commonwealth, from "all colours and peoples", showed the "unifying 
power of the Crown" and how it "binds together the family of nations 
constituting the Commonwealth of Nations which enjoy independence 
and equality". 
It also quoted messages of loyalty and support from among others the 
editor of Ilanga Lase Natal, who had said that "All the hearts of 
the Zulu people are with the Queen in her Great Day" and that he 
hoped that "the reign of our beloved Queen Elizabeth II and her 
~Bantu World, 9 May 1953. 
~The Bantu World, 25 April 1953. 
84 The Bantu World., 30 May 1953. 
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royal husband [would] follow closely in the illustrious and glorious 
footsteps of her great grandmother 1185 A similarly warm message was 
sent by the old doyen of African conservative liberal politics, 
D.D.T. Jabavu, but that of Dr A.B. Xuma, ex-president of the ANC, 
was tempered with more circumspection: 
Generally speaking the coronations of Kings and Queens of 
England are of passing interest and have less meaning for 
Africans in South Africa. This is partly due to the fact 
that Africans here have no part to play in such functions 
and have little benefit from such events. 86 
But he went on to praise the new queen as the granddaughter of Queen 
Victoria "the Good" who had given Africans and others a common 
franchise and common citizenship "as far back as 1853". There was 
more interest for Africans in the coronation, he said, because the 
queen was personally associated with Africa through her South 
African tour of 1947 and because of her acceptance of the throne 
while in Kenya. Both Kenya and South Africa were "tension areas, 
yearning for democracy"; he concluded. 
Indian Opinion was markedly less enthusiastic about the coronation 
than it had been about the royal tour of 1947. In an editorial of 1 
May it merely contrasted what it called the splendour of the 
"British Pageant" with the "simplicity" of the inauguration 
celebrations of the American president, Eisenhower. 87 It noted that 
the latter "scorned the least relic of class snobbery" and that 
Eisenhower kept "in step with the common man and therewith 
justifies democracy". On 15 May Indian Opinion stated that "we are 
second to none in our loyalty to and our deep affection for Her 
Majesty the Queen. But [the King and Queen] are just figureheads who 
85 Ibid. 
~Quoted in Bantu World, 30 May 1953. 
87 Indian Opinion, 1 May 1953. 
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have no authority of any kind". 88 All the "pomp and ceremony" was a 
"farce" and a "squandering of money" for Britain. 
"Our woes as Non-Europeans hardly ever reach the ears of the Queen 
and she is anyway helpless to do anything about them'', claimed the 
editor. Furthermore, the very fact that the question had arisen as 
to whether non-Europeans should participate in the coronation "shows 
that there is something wrong somewhere". The coronation 
celebrations should be "enjoyed equally by all, irrespective of 
colour" but local authorities were arranging only "crumbs" for non-
Europeans while Whites "ate the cake". 
A few weeks later, however, a more laudatory editorial appeared 
under the title "Long Live the Queen" and the editor stated that 
June 2 (coronation day) "would be a great day for Great Britain and 
the Commonwealth" . 89 Indians felt proud that India for the first 
time would participate in the celebrations "not as the Empire's 
handmaid but as a free and independent nation". 
The prayers of every Indian man, woman and child will go 
out to her gracious Majesty but in South Africa we cannot 
express our joy outwardly because of discriminatory 
laws .. and .. in present circumstances .. Indians cannot be 
expected to be jubilant, much as they should like to be.~ 
M Indian Opinion, 15 May 1953. 
89 Indian Opinion, 29 May 1953. 
~ Ibid. 
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Chapter 8: Citizenship and Immigration 
(a) Introduction 
Citizenship laws and immigration policy were inextricably linked and 
were an important part of the National Party's programme of a 
gradually loosening of the bonds between South Africa and the 
British Commonwealth. We have seen how, during Smuts's post-war 
premiership, National Party spokesmen repeatedly promised to stem 
the flow of mainly British immigrants to South Africa and to balance 
the flow with immigrants from other parts of Europe which had more 
of a cultural affinity with the Afrikaner. This policy aim was 
usually couched in terms which made it difficult to accuse the 
Nationalists of direct discrimination against British and 
Commonwealth citizens b~t there is not much doubt that the main aim 
was to reverse what had been seen as a threat that the Afrikaner 
would be "ploughed under" by the UP's post-war immigration policy. 1 
Thus, it was not long before the Nationalists were announcing 
measures to restrict immigration in general, and more discreetly, 2 
British immigration in particular. 
Once new immigration procedures were in place, the Citizenship bill 
of June 1949 was passed. The bill aimed at abolishing the 
distinction between Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth citizens as 
regards the process of acquiring citizenship. Dr T. E. Donges, 
minister of the interior, was to justify this policy politically as 
bringing South Africa "u.p to date" or "in line" with the rest of the 
Commonwealth. 3 
(b) Immigration 
The measures undertaken by the Nationalists to restrict immigration 
in general and from Britain in particular were set out in the 
1 Kruger, The Making of a Nation, p.247. 
2 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.32. 
3 House of Assembly Debates, col.7574, 10 June 1949. 
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framework of draft policy documents which 
government's immigration policy for the period 
outlined the new 
1948 to 1951. 4 The 
main aim was the "maintenance of the existing composition of the 
European population as far as possible" and it was felt that 
the large scale immigration which has taken place under 
the state sponsored scheme and which has strained the 
Union• s absorptive capacity and aggravated very materially 
the housing and other shortages in the Union should be 
reviewed in the light of the aims set out above. 5 
It noted that the government was determined to enforce a more 
effective and discriminating screening of prospective immigrants by 
making all prospective immigrants "including those who are not 
obliged to be screened by the Immigrants Selection Board" ( ie. 
British subjects) liable to be screened. 
In a paper by the minister entitled "Wanted - European Immigrants on 
Selection Basis", 6 Donges set out in greater detail the government• s 
immigration policy. He claimed that: 
If the great experiment of creating an independent state 
under white supremacy should succeed and Western 
civilisation be maintained in Africa for centuries to 
come, the European population should be increased.' 
He suggested that an "absorptive capacity" of 2 per cent of the 
total population was a normal yardstick for annual immigration 
4 CA, A164 6 (Donges Collection) , Vol. 213 (Departmental 
Activities: Immigration Policies 1948 Dec. - 1951 April) ,"Draft 
Statement: the Aims of the Government's Immigration Policies" 
(n.d.) and "Program Insake Immigrasie" (n.d). 
5 Ibid. , "Draft Statement". 
6 Ibid. , Address by the Minister: "Wanted 
Immigrants on Selection Basis", n.d. 
7 Ibid. , pp. 6 - 7 . 
European 
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numbers but that in the case of the European population 0.6 per cent 
would be more appropriate if the natural increase in the population 
was to be taken into account. This would currently translate, he 
said, into 14000 immigrants per annum. Since "tens of thousands" 
were willing to come to South Africa the government would "of 
necessity" have to follow a selection policy. The aim of such a 
selection policy would be to maintain the European population 
composition and "way of life", which meant that "people who do not 
share our Western outlook and who have other ideas about 
Christianity and democracy than we have will certainly not assist us 
in maintaining our way Of life" . 8 
A separate statistical summary for the minister noted that 19058 
British immigrants came to South Africa on the Union Castle Line 
immigrant ships (arranged by the previous government) between May 
1947 and 2 June 1948. 9 Accordingly, in parliament in August 1948 
Donges gave notification that the scheme would be terminated. He 
gave as his reason the fact that the old government had gone too far 
in guaranteeing to the Union Castle Company a 100 per cent 
complement of passengers on the outward voyages and 33 per cent on 
the return voyages of the immigrant ships. 10 He said that the scheme 
had been initiated without the prior consultation of parliament and 
that it committed the country to financial implications that could 
only be met by ensuring a full complement of immigrants on board 
each ship. Accordingly there would be no more "Settler Ships" after 
the end of the year and there would be close screening in future in 
London and elsewhere. 11 
Die Burger reported on 20 August 1948 that the British press was 
"dissatisfied" with the Nationalist government's announced 
immigration policies but argued in response that "there was nothing 
8 Ibid., p.7. 
9 Ibid., "For the Minister", p.72. 
10 Cape Times, 17 August 1948. 
11 Cap§ Argus, 18 August 1948. 
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else we could do" because "it was the South African government's job 
to look after South African public interests not British public 
interests 1112 It stated that the British press saw the whole affair 
as "none other than anti-British politics" and it quoted the 
Manchester Guardian as saying that British immigrants "would 
obviously vote against the Nationalist Government" and that this 
was why the immigration restrictions were introduced. 13 Die Burger 
denied that this was the case and pointed to similar restrictions 
introduced in the British colony of Southern Rhodesia which, as in 
South Africa, "had nothing to do with anti-British politics". 
By September 1948, however, moves towards further restrictions on 
immigration from Britain were indicated in the guidelines for 
screening procedures which had been drawn up in respect of the 
London Immigration Committee. These guidelines included one 
ostensibly political motive, namely: "(b) more careful security 
enquiries ... it is felt that the authorities should be better 
informed as to the leanings of immigrants in regard to Communism" . 14 
It also stated that the London Immigration Committee would now have 
to liaise more carefully with the South African-based Immigration 
Advisory Committee regarding block recruitment schemes and would 
have to re-screen those who had recently been granted priority 
immigrant status. The Immigration Advisory Committee would be under 
the chairmanship of the minister of the interior and all enquiries 
in relation to immigration policy were now to be addressed to this 
committee. 15 
It is significant that the high commissioner's office in London had 
been complaining that it was proving difficult to ensure that all 
12 Die Burger, 20 August 1948. 
13 Ibid. 
14 TA,A78 (Te Water), Vol. 5, File A2/l/2 (Immigration: 1948 
August 9 to 1949 September 15) , Aide Memoire: Discussion on 
Immigration Policy in Ambassador's Office, South Africa House, 
London, 9 September 1948. 
15 Ibid., p.4. 
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the prospective immigrants to South Africa were being screened·16 The 
reason given was that the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 was 
"fairly widely known" in Britain and that it excluded natural born 
British subjects from its ambit. Furthermore, although shipping 
companies and airlines had been asked to issue "D.1.317" forms to 
potential permanent residents, '' these had not been given to all 
prospective passengers,· especially not those of the Union Castle 
line which, for the case of first class passengers, very rarely sent 
in forms to the high commission because they are adjudged to be able 
to comply with the Union's Immigration requirements". 
These complaints from the high commission in London could have been, 
it seems, another motivation for the termination of the Union Castle 
line agreement, a motivation not mentioned by the minister in 
parliament. It is also significant in that they seemed to point to 
the need (from the Nationalist point of view) for a change in the 
law concerning citizenship. In other words, what was implied was 
that the process of acquiring South African citizenship by "natural 
born British subjects" should be made more difficult so as to put 
them on the same footing as "foreigners" concerning immigration. 
What all these policy documents indicate is an increasingly 
restrictive immigration policy adopted by the Malan government which 
partially aimed at a reduction of the British element among 
potential migrants to South Africa. That it succeeded was soon 
evidenced by the statistics. As Brownell notes, within one year 
South Africa dropped to the bottom of the list of countries to which 
British citizens traditionally migrated. 17 {In 1948 South Africa had 
been on a par with the USA and Australia in terms of numbers of 
British immigrants) . 
The Star reported in 1949 that Dr Donges' "Immigration Sieve" had 
cut the numbers of British and other immigrants to 6188 from January 
16 A78 (Te Water) , Vol. 5, File A2/1/2,, Aide Memoire: Office 
of the High Commission, London, n.d. 
17 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.33. 
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to April 1949 as compared to 12521 
The official figures reveal that 
residence had numbered 28839 in 1947 
in the first quarter of 1948. 18 
immigrants granted permanent 
and 35631 in 1948 but that the 
numbers had dropped to 14780 in 1949. 19 Of these, in 1949 the 
proportion from Britain and the Commonwealth dropped to 9197 out of 
14780, or less than 63% compared to a proportion of 76% in 1947 and 
77% in 1948. The proportion from Holland had risen to 11.7% in 1949 
compared to only 5.7% in 1948 and those from Germany had risen to 
4.2% compared to only 1.2% the previous year. 20 
During the next three years the drop in the proportion from Britain 
and Commonwealth was even more marked: 39% in 1950, 38% in 1951 and 
38% again in 1952. If one looks at the period 1948-1956 compared to 
that of 1940-1947, the proportion of immigrants from British 
Commonwealth sources dropped from 72% to 47%. 21 A press statement 
which gave similar figures from South Africa House in London noted 
with satisfaction that there had been a fairly constant flow of 
immigrants to the Union from 1949 to 1954 and that the composition 
was now "more balanced in the sense that in regard to the countries 
of origin - England, Holland, Germany and France - the people who 
emigrated to South Africa in recent years were a much more balanced 
ratio between those various countries". 22 
Brownell points out the dilemma in which the Nationalists found 
themselves concerning immigration policy. They needed white 
18 The Star, 23 June 1949. 
19 Official Year Book of the Union of South Africa and of 
Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, No.25, 1949, p.1117. 
20 Ibid. 
21 My information for these figures comes from the Official 
Year Books for 1949 and for the years 1952-1953. My comparison 
with the Smuts period comes from the Statistical Year Book 
(1964), B-10, Migration Statistics for the period 1924-1963, 
Central Statistical Services, Dept. of Statistics, Pretoria. 
n CA, A1646 (Donges Collection), Vol.214 (Immigrasie 
Voorleggings 1948 June - 1958 Sept.), Press Statement Issued by 
the Director of Information, South Africa House, London - "Facts 
and Figures about Immigration to South Africa", n.d. 
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immigration for economic reasons and in order to increase the 
European element vis-a-vis the black population, but at the same 
time wanted the Afrikaner element to predominate in the white 
population. 23 This meant restricting immigration in general and 
British immigration in particular. Thus in the 1950's there was a 
sharp downward trend in immigration from British and Commonwealth 
sources that was related to the "essentially negative" immigration 
policies of the Nationalists. Ideological considerations took 
precedence and it was only when the NP felt it had successfully 
settled its political future that it felt confident enough to 
encourage (European) immigration again. This occurred once Verwoerd 
had introduced the republic and had left the Commonwealth. As 
Brownell notes, Verwoerd saw the need for the undivided loyalty of 
both white sections as necessary before a resumption of large-scale 
immigration could begin. 24 
As we have seen, immigration policy in South Africa referred only to 
whites because of statutory definition (the 1913 Act which gave the 
minister the discretionary power to deny entry to a "class" of 
persons deemed "unsuitable") 25 During the Malan period the only 
reference to non-Europeans in immigration matters was to the 
question of closing the "loophole" left by Smuts concerning the 
immigration of Indian wives and children. Malan's amended Immigrants 
Regulation bill which finally closed this loophole was passed with 
United Party support in September 1953. (One UP member stated in the 
second reading debate that it was essential to get "unanimity of 
outlook" by the European population on the "Indian Question") . 26 
However, from the Indian point of view it was seen as a policy of 
"malice and prejudice". 27 The editor of Indian Opinion asked why, 
since an average of only 320 wives and 360 children had come into 
23 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.33. 
24 Ibid., pp.49-50. 
25 See Brownell, "British Immigration", p.8 and pp.16-17. 
26 Rand Daily Mail, 25 September 1953. 
27 Indian Opinion, 18 September 1953. 
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South Africa annually since 1927, it was really necessary to proceed 
with what would look to the rest of the world like a "spiteful 
pinprick? 1128 
In the event, the bill contributed to the deteriorating relations 
between India and South.Africa which resulted in the closing of the 
Indian high commission in Durban the following year. It also did not 
escape the attention of Commonwealth delegates to the fifth 
Commonwealth unofficial relations conference at Lahore in Pakistan 
in 1954. There South Africa's racially ?iscriminatory immigration 
system was referred to by various speakers and was even acknowledged 
by one South African delegate who said that South Africa unashamedly 
discriminated in its immigration against those it felt could 
"never ... be absorbed in the political and economic life of the 
nation". 29 Speakers from India and Pakistan, on the other hand, 
urged South Africa and other white dominions to be more aware of the 
population pressures in the Asian dominions and therefore to be more 
amenable in their immigration policies. They did, however, recognise 
the right of each Commonwealth country to preserve "its own way of 
life" by determining for itself the number and type of immigrants. 30 
(c) Citizenship 
Before 1961 citizenship and immigration policies and the 
Commonwealth connection were intimately linked because the process 
of acquiring citizenship by an immigrant to South Africa depended on 
that person's status as a (white) British subject (Commonwealth 
citizen) or his/her status as an "Alien" (non-British or 
non-Commonwealth citizen). For the latter class of persons the 
process of acquiring citizenship took up to five years or more of 
permanent residence in the Union whereas for the former (before 
28 Ibid. 
29 N. Mansergh, The Fifth Commonwealth Unofficial Relations 
Conference. Lahore, Pakistan, p.99. 
30 Ibid., p. 98. 
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1949) it took only two years of residence. 31 The Nationalists, 
however, wished to abolish altogether the distinction in law between 
British subject and non-British subject concerning immigration and 
citizenship and Hertzog had only been prevented from doing so before 
the war because of the outcry from supporters of the British 
connection. 32 After the war, however, the situation changed to the 
Nationalist's advantage in a number of ways. 
The trend after the war, initiated by Canada and then gradually 
followed by the other dominions, was towards a situation whereby the 
separate citizenship of each country became paramount and the common 
status of British subject was to become of secondary importance. 
Canada's Citizenship Act of 1946 initiated the newly-defined status 
of Canadian citizen vis-a-vis the status of British subject (which 
remained intact but diminished in importance) . 33 The latter was 
secondary in that it now no longer had any legal content or effect 
and was retained only as a symbol of the political unity of the 
Commonwealth. 
After inter-Commonwealth consultations and the "nationality" 
conference of February 1947 in London it was agreed that, in order 
to preserve at least something of the common status, albeit on a new 
basis, all members of the Commonwealth should make a similar 
change. 34 The change was made in the British Nationality Act of 1948 
and in later legislation by other members of the Commonwealth. The 
essence of it was given in an official summary of the British Act 
which stated that each country should "legislate" to "determine who 
are its citizens" and "shall declare those citizens to be British 
subjects" and "shall recognise as British subjects the citizens of 
31 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.36. 
32 E.A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa (London, 
Longmans, 1972), p.675. 
33 
"Nationality and Citizenship", Round Table, No.281, 
January 1981, pp.9-10. 
34 Duncan Hall, Commonwealth, p.708. 
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the other countries". 35 The expressions "British Subject" and 
"Commonwealth Citizen" were declared to be of the same meaning and 
the British Nationality Act went on to define a new and separate 
citizenship for the United Kingdom and colonies (in keeping with 
the Canadian precedent). 
In 1949 Malan's attendance at the London conference and the decision 
to accept India as a republic had given the NP the confidence to 
introduce South Africa's new citizenship laws. Only a month after 
his return they were introduced in parliament, without notice and 
towards the end of the session (and also to the surprise and anger 
of the official opposition) . 36 
South Africa's citizenship laws were, according to Dr T.E. Donges, 
Malan• s minister of the interior in 194 9, "sixth in the race for the 
Nationality stakes 1137 and this was for him sufficient reason why 
South Africa's laws should also change. In the second reading debate 
on the government's draft Citizenship bill in June 1949 he outlined 
four ways of acquiring the newly-defined South African citizenship: 
by birth, descent, registration (for Commonwealth and Irish 
citizens) and by naturalisation (for aliens). He claimed this was in 
accordance with the procedure adopted by other Commonwealth 
countries and that there was no principle "of substance" that 
differed from other Commonwealth countries "who have outstripped 
South Africa in the race to put this legislation on their statute 
books" . 38 
Only two exceptions, he said, had been introduced. Firstly, there 
was recognition in the bill of the "constitutional changes" in the 
Commonwealth as a result of the prime ministers conference in London 
of that year (the Declaration of London) but the "practical effect" 
35 Ibid. 
36 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.37. 
37 House of Assembly Debates, col.7574, 10 June 1949. 
38 Ibid., col. 7587,. 10 June 1949. 
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of that as far as the Citizenship bill was concerned was •nil''· This 
was because 
Commonwealth 
the "practical advantage• 
country rather than an 
of being a citizen of a 
alien had been retained. 
Secondly, there was a link between the right to vote and citizenship 
that had "in any case merely formalised the position brought about 
by prior legislation''. 
As far as recognition of the new constitutional status of the 
Commonwealth was concerned, Donges had earlier explained that "since 
there was no longer any common status there could not be a common 
citizenship"39 However, there would still be preferential treatment 
accorded to citizens of other Commonwealth states (now five years 
permanent residence instead of two whereas aliens had to wait six 
years) . The only difference was that they would no longer be known 
by the term "British subject" or "Commonwealth citizen" and this was 
the only way in which the South African Act differed from the 
recommendations of Commonwealth conferences.~ 
The parliamentary opposition saw it all very differently. The acting 
leader of the United Party, J.G.N. Strauss, replied to Donges by 
announcing that he and the opposition in general had received a 
"rude awakening" after Donges' s initial statements in support of the 
Commonwealth connection. 41 The rude awakening related to the 
abolition of the common citizenship and other measures that weakened 
the commonwealth connection in the bill. He criticised the way in 
which it was being "forced through" the House at the end of the 
session 11 wi th only three weeks left" to decide it. 42 The bill failed 
to provide for the "Common Clause", the key clause which was agreed 
upon at the conference of experts and which appeared in all the Acts 
of member countries of the Commonwealth. Even Canada's 1946 
legislation referred to Canadian citizens as British subjects, he 
39 Ibid., col.7579, 10 June 1949. 
~ Ibid. 
41 Ibid., col.7590, 10 June 1949. 
42 Ibid., col.7591, 10 June 1949. 
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noted, and in Australia a British subject who was not Australian-
born would be able to become an Australian citizen by a simple act 
of registration. 
The bill did not make sufficient distinction, Strauss noted, between 
the citizens of the Commonwealth who applied for registration and 
aliens who applied for naturalisation. 43 It made the position of a 
British immigrant almost 
and seemed to be "a 
indistinguishable from that of an alien 
cold and very meaningful step by the 
Minister 11 «This, he said, was especially relevant if the situation 
was compared to that of Australia where a British immigrant could 
vote after one year's residence whereas South Africa required five 
years residence and only after the minister had decided whether the 
immigrant was fit to become a South African citizen or not. Here he 
was referring to the new test of knowledge of the "responsibilities" 
of citizenship required by the bill, a test which Strauss described 
as "political indoctrination cleverly disguised as courses in 
ci vies, history and so forth" . 45 
Furthermore, sub-clause (3) which provided for deprivation of 
citizenship at the minister's discretion could be used "to deprive 
a member of this House of his citizenship and of his seat in this 
House and so secure a precarious majority of his party". 46 In fact 
a test case of exactly this possibility was provided by W.G. 
Ballinger whose position in the Senate was immediately challenged by 
the Nationalists on the grounds that his British nationality would 
not any longer qualify him for South African citizenship. As his 
wife Margaret Ballinger pointed out, Ballinger held the balance in 
the Senate and thus the Nationalists challenged his citizenship and, 
through his, her own position in the House of Assembly. 47 
43 Ibid., col.7597, 10 June 1949. 
« Ibid., col.7598, ·10 June 1949. 
45 Ibid., col.7600, 10 June 1949. 
46 Ibid., col.7603, 10 June 1949. 
47 Ibid., col.7870, 14 June 1949. 
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As the debate on the bill proceeded, the opposition comments became 
considerably more heated with at least one UP member (A.E.Trollip, 
Brakpan) reminding Donges that the question of citizenship had in 
the past led to war - the Anglo-Boer War. 48 Mrs Ballinger continued 
the opposition attack by describing the Nationalists' talk of 
citizenship being a privilege not a right as "so much nonsense" 
because, she argued, citizenship was the right of anybody who was 
prepared to subscribe to the "fundamental principles of the type of 
State to which we belong" and not to what she called "some old 
beastly Nazi methods". 49 She claimed that the government had already 
cancelled the Commonwealth bond "to the extent that it was able" and 
that it was forcing English-speakers back on the "hospitality that 
Britain will undoubtedly offer them when this country treats them 
like Uitlanders". She went on to say that South Africa had not yet 
solved the problem of relations between white and black "let alone 
the problem of relations between Afrikaners and Englishmen" but that 
the government was going out of its way to "drive us apart". 50 
As opposition to the bill mounted in parliament so it did in the 
country at large. On 20 June the South African Legion, representing 
thousands of returned servicemen, complained to Donges that 
thousands of these soldiers who were expecting to receive South 
African citizenship on completion of the two-year residence 
qualification introduced by Smuts in 1948 would now find that they 
had to wait five years instead. 51 0n 23 June the Worcester branch of 
the United Party conveyed a unanimous resolution objecting in "the 
strongest possible terms" to the Citizenship bill especially because 
"it failed to recognise the principle of Commonwealth Status", it 
unduly extended "the arbitrary and autocratic powers of the Minister 
48 Ibid., col.7604, 10 June 1949. 
49 Ibid., col.7873, 14 June 1949. 
~Ibid., col.7875, 14 June 1949. 
51 CA, Al646 (Donges Collection), Vol.113 (State Activities 
Parliament Minister of Internal Affairs Immigration 
Arrangements) , Letter from the National Secretary of the SA 
Legion to the Private Secretary for the Minister of the Interior, 
20 June 1949. 
184 
of the Interior" and it deprived Commonwealth subjects who had 
already immigrated to the country of their conferred right to 
citizenship after two years. 52 
Brownell notes that some 55000 British immigrants since World War II 
would have qualified for the vote by the time of the 1953 elections 
had the previous two-year qualification remained in force. 53 This 
was therefore an obvious political consideration for the 
Nationalists in introducing the Citizenship bill. As the Rand Daily 
Mail noted on 12 March 1949, the Nationalists were "naturally 
concerned about their political future". 54 Dr A.J.R. van Rhijn, the 
future high commissioner in London, noted in the Assembly that if 
large numbers of British migrants were allowed to vote "they might 
as well determine which government is going to govern the 
country" .55 
The Star had reported on 14 June that 4000 people joined a lunch-
time protest in Johannesburg against the bill and that a telegram 
had been sent to the minister expressing the opposition of the 
"citizens of Johannesburg" to the discretionary powers granted to 
him and demanding that British immigrants already in the country 
receive their citizenship after two years as originally promised to 
them by the previous government. 56 
The Star, however, did not condemn the bill outright. In an 
editorial of 11 June it recognised that the old common nationality 
for the whole Commonwealth "was not achievable" . 57 It also 
52 Ibid. , Telegram from the Worcester Branch of the United 
Party to Minister T.E. Donges, House of Assembly, Cape Town, 23 
June 1949. 
53 Brownell, "British Immigration", p.38. 
54 Quoted in Brownell, "British Immigration", p. 38. 
55 House of Assembly Debates, Col. 7709, 13 June 1949. 
56 The star, 14 June 1949. 
57 The Star, 11June1949. 
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recognised the racial nature of the whole debate by saying: 
The plain English of the matter is that white British 
subjects are admitted to the white Dominions because they 
are white and not because they are citizens of a sister 
state. Citizens of the Republic of Ireland rank as white 
British subjects, a circumstance that reveals the failure 
of the law to conceal an inner reality of Dominion 
nationality laws, namely, that they are colour bars.~ 
All that the editor objected to was the length of time that British 
subjects now had to wait to gain citizenship, the powers of the 
minister and the temptation to use those powers against a number of 
opposition MPs who had not been born in South Africa. The Star also 
criticised the "steamrollering" of the bill through parliament in 
the last days of the session in order to "prevent thousands of 
British immigrants who could otherwise qualify for the vote in the 
next few months from doing so for several years" . 59 
Die Transvaler, on the other hand, accused the opposition of 
starting a "poisonous" campaign against the bill in order to 
discredit the government with English-speakers by suggesting that it 
wished to suppress everything British. 00 It also asked what the fuss 
was all about since other Commonwealth countries already had similar 
provisions. Similarly, Die Burger noted that the five-year clause 
relating to residence was the same as that for Canada and that the 
only difference was the use of the minister's discretion which had 
existed in any case in South Africa since 1926 in relation to 
"foreigners". The UP had never complained about that, it noted. 61 
To the outraged protests of the UP the government applied the 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
00 Die Transvaler, 10 June 1949. 
61 Die Burger, 10 June 1949. 
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guillotine to any further debate on 16 June and the bill passed the 
second reading stage by 77 votes to 68. The bill became law on 23 
June and what had been one of the most "disharmonious and 
cacophonous" parliamentary sessions 62 passed into history. In the 
Senate, Heaton-Nicholls spoke of a "breach of faith" with the 
Commonwealth, described the bill as "sheer republicanism" and noted 
that it "could destroy the Club itself" . 63 In Britain The Economist 
gave what the South African high commissioner in London described as 
"perhaps the most sweeping and certainly the longest criticism 
against South African policy in recent months 11 • 64 It claimed that the 
Nationalists were intending to ride roughshod over the interests of 
all other groups and that they "had taken the Union back in one 
stride to the days of Paul Kruger 11 • 65 However, "the English section 
of the Europeans must accept some of the blame, as they are now 
experiencing some of the results of allowing intolerance to reach 
its present pitch''.M 
62 The South African Weekly, 24 June 1949. 
~The Star, 24 June 1949. 
64 TA, A78 (Te Water), Vol.5, File AE 2/1/2 (Immigration: 
1948 Aug.9 - 1949 Sept.15), Weekly Summary of British Press 
Comment from June 24th to July 1st 1949, No.39., from the SA High 
Commissioner, London. 
65 Ibid. 
M Ibid. 
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Chapter 9: Defence and Economic Issues 
(a) Introduction 
White ethnic passions in South Africa were not aroused to such an 
extent when it came to questions of Commonwealth co-operation in the 
fields of defence, trade, and finance as they had been during the 
row over citizenship. With a few exceptions in the parliamentary 
ranks, opposition and government were at one in their desire for 
continued Commonwealth defence and economic links, for ideological 
as well as practical reasons. After all, this was the period of 
heightened Cold War tensions following the Berlin Crisis and 
outbreak of the Korean War and both the main white parties were 
united in their opposition to Communism. As the key member of the 
Western alliance in Europe and the Middle East, Britain could not be 
ignored even by the most anti-British Nationalist. There was, in 
general, little alternative to the "Commonwealth nexus" because 
there was "simply no other international group into which South 
Africa could be accommodated".' The Te Water mission had shown that 
there was little indication of success for South African attempts 
to form her own regional organisation in Africa and certainly not 
for any which did not have the support and co-operation of the main 
colonial power, Britain. 
However, during the Malan years there were, from the point of view 
of both the UP and the government, worrisome signs of Britain's 
inability to maintain her global defence and economic commitments. 
In the early fifties the withdrawal from India and Pakistan and 
outbreaks of agitation in Egypt over Suez threatened to undermine 
the strategic unity of the Commonwealth. This weakness had already 
been demonstrated during World War II and was now for a time masked 
by the growing British partnership with the USA in alliances such as 
CENTO and SEAT0. 2 It was the Suez crisis of 1956 which marked the 
end of the Commonwealth as an independent defence system and which, 
1 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.393. 
2 Ibid., p.394. 
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together with British withdrawal from most of Africa, left South 
Africa realising how "naked" she was in defence terms. 3 In Malan's 
period this was already becoming apparent and the securing of a 
defence agreement with Britain, particularly in Africa, remained the 
most-sought after prize. 
Similarly, in economic matters, co-operation with Britain and the 
sterling Commonwealth remained a priority during Malan's period 
despite signs of the Commonwealth's economic unity coming under 
pressure. Britain's ability to provide all the investment needs of 
the sterling area had long since broken down and in the fifties the 
growth of GATT-sponsored multi-lateralism meant a decline in the 
relative value of Commonwealth preferences for South Africa and the 
other dominions. However, Britain remained South Africa's chief 
source of imports and investment capital as well as her most 
important export market until well into the 1960's and the benefits 
of remaining in the sterling area became apparent to most 
Nationalists despite their earlier ideological opposition to the 
"Imperial" trading system. 
It was left, once again, to a dwindling handful of liberal and 
left-wing voices in the white parliament to articulate the fears and 
protests of the black majority concerning the racially exclusive 
debate over defence and economic policy during the first five years 
of Nationalist rule. It was this group, whose numbers had diminished 
considerably following the expulsion of the communists from the 
Assembly in 1952, who consistently put forward the view that any 
regional defence alliance for Africa was doomed to fail because of 
the government's refusal to arm blacks and because of its race 
policies in general. Similarly, the extra-parliamentary opposition, 
in various statements on foreign policy, condemned what were seen as 
attempts by South Africa and the colonial powers in conjunction with 
the United States to impose a new "imperialist hegemony" in Africa. 4 
3 Ibid., p.395. 
4 See for example the Presidential Address by the Transvaal 
leader of the ANC, J.B. Marks, at the opening of the regional 
congress 30 Sept.-1 Oct.1951, AD 2186 (ANC Collection), B 
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(b) Military co-operation 
From 
more 
the British point of 
willing than the 
view, Malan's government seemed to be even 
previous pro-Commonwealth government of 
General Smuts to co-operate on defence measures. For example, Gordon 
Walker's memorandum of 1950 on relations with South Africa noted 
that the Nationalists were "staunchly anti-Communist" and that Malan 
had more than once pledged South Africa's support in any war 
resulting from "Russian aggression" as well as having provided air-
crews in the Berlin airlift and having agreed to send a squadron to 
Korea. 5 The Labour cabinet which met to discuss Gordon Walker's 
memorandum in 1950 noted that "good progress" was being made in the 
defence discussions with the South African minister of defence, F.C. 
Erasmus, and that the latter seemed more ready to enter into defence 
commitments "than any of his predecessors had been" . 6 The Tories 
after 1952 also stressed the value of South Africa's willingness to 
co-operate in defence matters, even going so far as to reassure 
Malan that on defence matters there would always be a difference "in 
fact if not in status" between old and new Commonwealth members. 7 0n 
some matters, Lord Swinton said to Malan, the old dominions were 
given "full information" and were taken into full consultation" 
while there was a "more limited" exchange with the Asiatic 
countries. 8 
Jack Spence explained the changed Nationalist attitude to co-
operation with Britain and the Commonwealth in the early fifties as 
a.2. (3), Presidential Address, p.l. 
5 PRO, CAB 129/42, C.P. (50)214, "Relations with South 
Africa", Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 25 September 1950. 
6 PRO, CAB 128/18, C.M.62(50)4, "Relations with South 
Africa", 28 September 1950. 
7 PRO, CAB 129/61, 
Africa", Memorandum by the 
Relations, 5 June 1953. 
8 Ibid. 
C. (53) .165, "Relations with South 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
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being the result of the Nationalists seeing the Commonwealth as a 
"buffer against external hostility" . 9 Apartheid had become the symbol 
of South Africa's domestic policy to the outside world and the 
hostility that this new policy engendered put South Africa into a 
"Cold War" situation. The militant anti-Communism of the 
Nationalists in the Cold War between East and West then made it even 
more urgent for their leaders to search for alliances. However, as 
Spence points out, the very foundations of the Nationalists' 
domestic policy made this search for allies extremely difficult.IO 
The Commonweal th remained South Africa's only "natural ally" but 
unlike the other white dominions and because of her domestic 
policies, South Africa had no regional defence pact to fall back on. 
The closest she ever came to such a pact was the Nairobi conference 
of 1951 with the colonial powers in Africa and the Dakar conference 
of 1954. But the discussions broke down when, as Spence notes, it 
became clear that the South African government would not be a party 
to any military arrangements entailing the use of arms by 
Africans. 11 
Berridge has pointed out that the relationship between South Africa 
and Britain (and other colonial powers in Africa) during Malan's 
period and up until 1960 amounted tq an "entente". 12 An "entente" 
he defines as more of an "informal" military relationship than an 
alliance, based on "shared political and strategic assumptions" and 
on collaboration in areas such as staff talks, arms sales, use of 
military bases and manoeuvres. 13 Despite South Africa's attempts to 
turn the entente into an alliance towards the end of the 1950's the 
arrangement suited both sides because of the political difficulties 
9 J. Spence, "South Africa and the Modern World", in 
and Thompson (eds. ) , Oxford History of South Africa, 
p.487. 
IO Ibid., p.479. 
11 Ibid. 
Wilson 
Vol.2, 
12 Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 
Introduction, XI. 
13 Ibid., Introduction, Xl. 
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in the way of a more formal commitment. In South Africa the new 
National Party government did not share the "kindred ideals" and the 
"community of outlook" of the Commonwealth and so the idea of an 
entente with Britain was "one thing", "an entente with all of the 
colonial powers in Africa was something else - and an alliance with 
them all was something else again" . 14 
South Africa preferred an alliance with all the Western powers and 
one which would be directed against soviet and African-supported 
black nationalists. Britain, on the other hand, preferred a South 
African commitment concerning reinforcements for the Middle East and 
was re1uctant to support South Africa's idea of African defence 
(expressed in Malan's African Charter). The African pact proposed by 
Malan was seen as a "dangerous political liability" in London 
because the Nationalists would see it as a substitute for the 
Commonwealth and because it would cause hostility in colonial West 
Africa, the Middle East and India. 15 
At Dakar in 1954 there was still evidence of European interest in 
joint arrangements with South Africa for the movement of troops and 
supplies and the USA sent an observer to both the Nairobi and Dakar 
conferences, a move which seemed to indicate some sort of role for 
NATO. All of these plans eventually came to nought because of South 
Africa's racial policies, the collapse of the Central African 
Federation and the withdrawal of South Africa from the Commonwealth 
in 1961. 
During the early fifties South Africa's main interest, however, was 
to obtain some sort of European security body for the defence of 
Africa while for Britain the chief priority was to involve South 
Africa in defence of the Middle East. In the end South Africa made 
a commitment to supply one division of troops and an air squadron to 
the Middle East in the event of war while the Simonstown Agreement 
which was eventually concluded in 1955 gave to South Africa 
14 Ibid. , Xlll. 
15 Ibid., p.13. 
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Britain's vague assurance of troops for the defence of AfricaM -
commitments which proved to be so vague and open-ended that they 
were never implemented by either side even during crises such as 
Suez in 1956. 
What then, in concrete terms, did co-operation between South Africa 
and Britain amount to during Malan's period of rule? Besides some 
combined naval and air exercises and some sharing of technical 
information the only really significant military commitment agreed 
to during the Malan period seems to have been what Gordon Walker 
described in his 1950 memorandum as South Africa's "firm commitment" 
[in the event of war] to the Middle East of one armoured division 
plus aircraft and naval forces. 17 This was first confirmed in the 
South African parliament in 1951 and was debated regularly in 
subsequent years. In 1954 the British defence minister, Earl 
Alexander, mentioned in cabinet that the agreement still existed and 
used it as an argument in favour of giving sovereignty over the 
Simonstown base back to South Africa. 18 
In the South African parliament the UP leader, J.G.N. Strauss, 
criticized the government for making such a commitment without 
consulting parliament especially in view of what he saw as 
"inevitably heavy sacrifices" that South Africans would have to bear 
in the event of war breaking out in the "seething cauldron" which 
was the Middle East . 19 Malan, in reply, said that South Africa would 
co-operate with NATO and the "Middle Eastern Countries themselves" 
as well as with the Commonwealth in preventing an "enemy invasion" 
from the Middle East. 20 It would only involve an air squadron and an 
16 Barber and Barratt, south Africa's Foreign Policy, p.59. 
17 PRO, CAB 129/42, C.P. (50)214, "Relations with South 
Africa", Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth 
Relations, 25 September 1950. 
18 PRO, CAB 128/27, C.C. 59(54)11, "South Africa: Simonstown 
Base", 8 September 1954. 
19 House of Assembly Debates, col. 4306, 24 April 1952. 
20 Ibid., col.4324, ·24 April 1952. 
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army division "in war time not peace time" . 21 
Malan also referred in the same speech to discussions with the 
colonial powers at Nairobi in 1951 "concerning the sending of 
troops north, transport, etc". 22 but without mentioning the problem 
of South Africa's opposition to Africans carrying arms. It was 
Margaret Ballinger who had to point out that there was little chance 
of finding common ground with "northern neighbours" so long as South 
Africa's "Native" policy was "so different to that in the North". 23 
By 1954 Strauss had forgotten his earlier concerns about South 
African commitments in the Middle East and was more interested in 
urging the government to form a common front with the colonial 
powers 
noted 
against Communism and "Moscow's interference in Africa". 24 He 
the American president Eisenhower's statement that the 
communists were trying to "arouse the Native people" into revolt 
against Europeans in Africa and asked Malan to provide further 
information on what steps he was taking to form a "Pan-African 
Organisation". Malan agreed with Strauss about the "danger of 
Communism" and the need for a defence pact for Africa and blamed 
communist agitators and the UNO for saying to Africans: "You are 
being oppressed". 25 
Nationalist and UP speakers generally rejected the argument of 
Margaret Ballinger that a defence pact would only succeed if 
Africans were allowed to be armed. It would mean, argued one 
Nationalist MP, "the end of western civilisation in Africa". 26 "One 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid. 
n Ibid., col.4347, 24 April 1952. 
24 House of Assembly Debates, col. 4386, 3 May 1954. 
li Ibid., cols 4415-19, 3 May 1954. 
26 Ibid., col. 4427, 3 May 1954. 
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does not hand a rifle to a child", said Malan. 27 Britain, he said, 
should take the lead in forming a defence pact, not South Africa, 
because Britain had "more influence in Africa as a whole" . 28 
Ballinger argued in the 1954 debate that if a "Third World War" were 
to break out between East and West it would be necessary to ensure 
that trained African troops were ready to help defend their homeland 
and to ensure that they did not "go over to the enemy" because of 
South Africa's race policies. 29 She was supported by the UP member 
for Hillbrow, Dr B. Friedman, who criticised Malan's statements on 
the arming of Africans and who asked if the government would be 
prepared to hold conferences to which South Africa's northern 
neighbours could send their delegates "irrespective of race or 
colour" . 30 (He was met with a resounding "No! " from the assembled 
parliament) . Unless the latter were possible, he continued, it was 
useless to talk of initiating a Pan-African movement in any case. 
The Star in its report on the 1954 debate in parliament noted that 
there had been "hardly any room for disagreement" between government 
and opposition concerning the question of co-operation between South 
Africa and the Commonwea_lth in defence matters and praised Malan for 
being the "last of the Imperialists". 31 However, in November The 
Star noted in the context of discussions with Britain over 
Simonstown that South Africa's opposition to the arming of "Natives" 
might well become "one of the big stumbling blocks in the way of 
unqualified South African participation in an African Defence 
Force" . 32 It reported that the British defence minister, Harold 
MacMillan, was considering a suggestion by his South African 
counterpart, Erasmus, for the establishment of an African defence 
27 Ibid., col. 4496, 4 May 1954. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid., cols 4503-4, 4 May 1954. 
30 Ibid. , col. 4530, 4 May 1954. 
31 The Star, 4 May 1954. 
32 The Star, 2 November 1954. 
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organisation but stated: 
We must recognise, however, that we cannot escape isolation 
in Africa or expect the utmost possible security unless we 
are prepared to co-operate with other African populations, 
White or Black, on terms acceptable to them as well as to 
ourselves. 33 
Ultimately, of course, this editorial was correct in its analysis. 
The British would prove reluctant to be drawn into any South African 
scheme for the defence of Africa because of the perceived 
unpopularity of apartheid and the resentment it created in the rest 
of Britain's colonial empire. 34 But, in order to appease the South 
African demand for an African military treaty and in the hope of 
securing forces for the Middle East, the Commonweal th relations 
office on the advice of the high commissioner in South Africa, 
Liesching, tried to buy off Erasmus and Eric Louw (the most 
persistent Nationalist ministers) with the promise of 
over Simonstown. 35 In the British cabinet the 
an agreement 
Commonwealth 
secretary's arguments in favour of an agreement over Simons town 
centred on "encouraging South Africa to take a broader view" of its 
responsibilities in Commonweal th defence. 36 This argument eventually 
outweighed Churchill's own fears about the wisdom of handing over 
the sovereignty of such an important British naval base to an 
uncertain ally like South Africa. 
(c) Trade and the sterling area, 1948-54 
We saw in Chapter 3 how the Nationalists, in various policy 
statements before 1948, had criticised the imperial trading system 
and had promised to put South Africa's foreign trade on a "business 11 
33 Ibid. 
34 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp. 324-326. 
35 Ibid., p.324. 
36 PRO, CAB 128/27, .C.C. (54)57,4, "South Africa: Simonstown 
Naval Base", 27 August 1954. 
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footing by ending Commonwealth preference and by treating Britain 
and the Commonweal th as "foreign" countries for trade purposes. 37 
After 1948, however, the National Party did not do much to put such 
policies into effect other than by encouraging import substitution 
and a diversification from British sources in the buying of 
equipment for state-controlled enterprises such as the South African 
Railways. 38 Voices were occasionally raised in parliament against 
the imperial preference system, for example that of J.C. Brill 
(Mayfair) who complained in 1948 that it was very "dangerous" to 
give preference to one nation because differentiation by means of 
preferential tariffs made it difficult for the National Party to 
"make friends" with other nations 39 and that taxpayers' money had 
in the past been "wasted" by not buying "better quality" American 
equipment because of preference. 
Such protests were not as significant, however, as the ministerial 
pronouncements in favou~ of continued association with the sterling 
area and the Commonwealth preferential system. For example, the 
minister of finance, N.C. Havenga, stated in parliament in January 
1952 that there were many benefits for South Africa in being part of 
the sterling area, including the lack of restrictions on the flow of 
capital from Britain, the ease with which international payments 
could be made from London and the fact that it would have been 
difficult to find "alternative export markets for our fruit and 
37 See chapter 3, pp.45-47. 
38 It is difficult to distinguish between political motives 
and purely economic factors such as price competitiveness and 
delivery time when looking at government department buying 
policies. In the case of SAR railway locomotives it seems that 
British firms had difficulty meeting delivery times in the early 
1950's but this does not altogether explain the vociferousness 
of the threats in parliament to buy elsewhere. In 1953 the 
minister of transport said in parliament that he had warned 
Britain about the late deliveries of locomotives which had been 
ordered in 1949 but which were only coming in now and that such 
late deliveries might force South Africa to stop buying British 
equipment (Rand Daily Mail, 4 August 1953). 
39 House of Assembly Debates, col.1375, 1 September 1948. 
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wines" 40 Speaking at a time when the sterling area was going through 
one of its periodic balance of payments crises, Havenga noted that 
South Africa had much to lose from the disintegration of the 
sterling area and the collapse of sterling as an international 
currency. In much the same way as Jan Smuts had acted during the 
1947 sterling crisis, he now suggested that South Africa make 
another "sacrifice" in order to assist the sterling area through yet 
another "critical period" by drawing upon South Africa's gold 
reserves. 41 
The conversion of the National Party government to a 
pro-Commonwealth policy in economic matters can be explained mainly 
by economic imperatives - in particular, the realisation that it 
would be well-nigh impossible to break away from the sterling area 
given South Africa's position in the then current international 
trading conditions. Heavily reliant on the sale of gold in London in 
order to overcome persistent current account deficits and still 
dependent on the British market for certain key agricultural 
exports, it would have been economically and politically disruptive 
to cause a sudden break at a time when the Nationalists were not 
even sure of a continued parliamentary majority. Although it may 
have seemed to contemporary observers that Britain was more 
dependent upon South Africa economically than the reverse (for 
example, the gold loan of 1947) the truth is that both economies 
were heavily reliant upon each other and the inheritance of 150 
years of trading and financial interconnections could not be 
abolished overnight. 
The precarious nature of South Africa's financial situation and the 
importance of sterling area support was made apparent to Malan's 
government soon after the elections in 1948. A Balance of Payments 
crisis which had been developing for some time as a result of 
excessive dollar expenditures. (In May, Smuts's treasury officials 
40 Quoted 
Finance) (9), 
pp.15-16. 
in Commonwealth Survey, 1952, 1 h (Trade and 
"South Africa and Sterling", 1 February 1952, 
198 
had noted that the reserves had reached a critical point towards the 
end of August, were being depleted at the rate of £3.Sm p.m and that 
they could not "continue this strain very much longer") . 42 In that 
month The Star. claimed that the minister of finance, Havenga' s 
"disinclination" to impose any sort of import control from dollar 
countries might "imperil the Union's currency resources" and 
reported the governor of the Reserve Bank as saying that South 
Africa's gold reserves and sterling balances would run out by the 
beginning of 1950, if not earlier.~ 
In August, Malan's roving ambassador, Charles te Water, was sent on 
a mission to Britain, the United States and Europe in order to 
investigate the possibility of a loan for South Africa and also to 
calm the fears of foreign investors who felt that the new 
Nationalist government heralded a period of instability in South 
Africa. Although Te Water denied that these were the aims of his 
mission he did admit that the Union's dollar position was 
"unsatisfactory" and that the Union might have to institute import 
control.~ An alternative, he said, might be an American loan or the 
possibility of persuading the Americans to agree to a higher price 
for gold. 
By October the balance of payments situation had worsened and 
Forsyth, secretary of external affairs, cabled Te Water to say that 
the government had decided on action early in November to reduce the 
Union's non-sterling expenditure on consumer goods by at least SO 
per cent. 45 He noted, however, that the Union's sterling reserves 
were sufficient to cover the country's requirements for at least two 
42 TA, Al (Smuts Collection), B (Union of south Africa Papers 
1945 -48), Vol.173 (March -May 1948), No.52 A, Letter from F.C. 
Sturrock (Treasury, Pretoria), to Prime Minister, J.C. Smuts, 17 
May 1948. 
43 The Star, 10 August 1948. 
~Die Burger, 20 August 1948. 
45 TA, A78 (Te Water Collection), Vol.9, File AE 3/1 
(Economic Development in South Africa: General), Forsyth- Te 
Water, 27 October 1948. 
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years and that therefore it was not envisaged that there would be 
any restrictions on purchases on countries in the sterling area. If 
import control measures on dollar goods did not suffice, he wrote, 
it might be necessary to look into the possibility of an American 
loan. 46 Te Water, who had been encountering a flood of bad publicity 
in the USA, wrote back to say that it might be necessary for the 
government 
enclosed an 
to take steps at home "to combat criticisms". 47 He 
article from the Wall Street Journal of 19 October which 
called Malan' s government "among other things, anti-negro, 
anti-Jewish, anti-Indian, anti-Mulatto and anti-British" and which 
claimed there was a "marked lack of confidence" on the part of Wall 
Street and Throgmorton Street and there had been a greater flow of 
British capital away from the Union than towards it in the "past few 
months". 48 On 3 November Te Water wrote to Lord Cato, governor of 
the Bank of England, for assistance in arranging interviews with US 
treasury officials "to inform them of the purpose of my visit", as 
he put it. 49 
On 5 November Havenga had to announce to the House of Assembly wide-
ranging restrictions on dollar imports and stated that if the 
measures were not sufficient to improve South Africa's reserves, a 
loan would be sought. 50 Te Water's "informal" approaches to the US 
government meanwhile proved fruitless and were not helped along by 
Havenga's "bait" in the form of a promise to give priority to 
relaxation of restrictions on dollar countries as soon as there was 
an improvement in the reserve position. 51 
All that Te Water was able to achieve in the USA was that a 
~Ibid., Forsyth - Te Water, 1 November 1948. 
47 Ibid., Te Water - Forsyth, 29 October 1948. 
48 Wall Street Journal, 19 October 1948. 
49 A78 (Te Water) , Vol. 9, AE 3/1, Te Water - Lord Cato, 3 
November 1948. 
50 The Times (London) , 5 November 1948. 
51 The Economist, 13 November 1948. 
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reportedly favourable attitude was taken by the semi-private US 
Import-Export Bank for a possible loan in return for a contract by 
South Africa to supply "agreed quantities" of base minerals to the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation or the Federal Supplies 
Organisation. 52 Forsyth advised the SA Legation in Washington that 
it was not proposed that the World Bank be approached for a loan 
"because it would suggest to other countries that we are in 
financial distress" whereas the "real position" was that South 
Africa "had to pass 'by valuable opportunities "for lack of 
sufficient capital". 53 On 7 February Havenga announced that the 
government had made arrangements to sell a small part of the Union's 
gold output to a London bullion trading firm at a price which was 20 
per cent above the official world price. This measure was greeted 
with scepticism by financial circles in London.M 
In contrast, with the coolness and disinterest that was displayed by 
the Americans, it was reported on 18 January 1949 that the British 
government was taking a "favourable view" of the prospects of a 
Union loan in London and that the approval of the Capital Issues 
Committee would be a "mere formality" . 55 On 10 February the South 
African high commissioner in London, Lief Egeland, was asked to 
approach the British chancellor of the exchequer directly about a 
loan because Havenga was being "pressed" in parliament with 
suggestions of a London loan so as not to "curtail [future] capital 
developments" and so as to avoid possibly imposing "restrictions" on 
sterling area imports. 56 
52 A78 (Te Water), Vol.9, AE 3/1, Memorandum for the Union 
Minister in Washington, 21 December 1948 
53 Ibid., Forsyth - SA Legation, Washington, 4 January 1949. 
54 The Financial 
Relief" to South 
difficulties" and The 
be negligible. 
Times described the measure as "No Great 
Africa's "pressing foreign exchange 
Times said the effect on the reserves would 
55 A78, Vol.9, AE 3/2/1 (United Kingdom Loan Negotiations: 
1949 Jan Feb.) Secretary of SA Treasury, J.Holloway to 
L.Egeland, High Commissioner, London, 18 January 1949. 
56 Ibid., Holloway - Egeland, 10 February 1949. 
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Te Water then informed Havenga on the 15th that he had spoken to 
Stafford Cripps, the British chancellor of the exchequer, who had 
expressed "dislike" of the idea because a South African loan might 
"induce" a "run on the London capital market" . 57 However, he did 
suggest that the British government would "be agreeable" to South 
Africa taking sterling in lieu of the gold loan of 1948 thus 
enabling South Africa to obtain the currency needed to finance 
capital development programmes from sterling sources. 
Later in the same year Havenga was obliged to do exactly that - to 
recall the balance of the gold loan and to promise that imports from 
the sterling area would be paid for in gold. 58 He was also obliged 
to follow the United Kingdom's lead and to devalue the South African 
pound from 4.03 to 2.80 dollars, a move that helped to make possible 
the reduction of import controls by the beginning of 1950. 59 
All of this reveals how dependent South Africa still was on the 
sterling area financial system in the early post-war period. South 
Africa (and the other dominions) could only protest at the way in 
which the British had taken the decision to devalue sterling 
unilaterally without consulting their Commonwealth partners in 
advance60 but their economies were still inextricably linked to 
sterling. However, Malan's government did not altogether abandon 
plans for a loosening of the financial and trading ties with Britain 
and the Commonwealth, despite or perhaps because of the realisation 
of such dependency. A programme of industrial diversification and 
economic self-sufficiency had long been part of National Party 
policy as had been evidenced during the period of Hertzog's Pact 
government in the 1920's. This was now accelerated in the 1950's as 
South Africa's apartheid-induced isolation became increasingly 
57 Ibid., Te Water - Havenga, 15 February 194 9. 
58 E.A. Walker, A Historv of Southern Africa. p.789. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Brindley Thomas, -"The Evolution of the Sterling Area" in 
N. Mansergh and R. Wilson et al, Commonwealth Perspectives, 
pp.188-9. 
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apparent. 
Eric Louw, minister of economic affairs, explained his government's 
industrial policy in an.article for publication in London in 1953. 61 
He outlined the growth of new industries in South Africa which 
included uranium extraction and oil from coal and went on to praise 
the "diversification" of the South African economy since the war. 62 
He claimed that import restrictions on trade were "temporary 
expedients". In a further article of the same year he stated that 
the import controls (introduced in 1952) were "non-discriminatory" 
and allowed importers the "widest possible choice between 
alternative sources of supply". 63 "Soft-currency" countries 
[non-dollar] such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and other 
West European countries, he said, could compete on a "completely 
non-discriminatory basis", although dollar goods still fell into the 
"restricted" category .. He went on to affirm South Africa's 
"adherence to the basic principle of multi-lateralism in the conduct 
of its international trade" and also to defend the policy of 
protectionism for secondary industries which were making "valuable 
contributions" to South Africa's "economic stability". 
South Africa's moves towards "non-discrimination" in its 
international trading relations dovetailed neatly with the wider 
context of a gradual post-war development of world trade towards 
multi-lateralism and the reduction of tariffs. By acceding to the 
General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in 194 7 Smuts's 
government had already committed itself together with the other 
dominions to a modification of Commonwealth preferences. 
In 1952 a "standstill" agreement was negotiated with the USA whereby 
Britain and the Commonwealth agreed not to introduce new preferences 
61 INCH, PV 4 (Eric Louw Collection), 
and Manuscripts) , No. 5. , "Government 
Development in South Africa", 1953. 
62 Ibid. , p. 3 . 
File No. 72 (Articles 
Policy and Economic 
63 Ibid., No.6, "The SA Economy and Some Aspects of the South 
African Economic Policy", August 1953, pp.3-4. 
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but would continue to retain the old ones.M This, as Miller points 
out, was "most convenient for all concerned" because "new 
preferences may have prejudiced advantages elsewhere but old 
preferences needed to be retained because there was not enough 
prospect of alternative markets". 65 For South Africa the guaranteed 
market provided by Britain for wines and fruit was politically 
important as it represented rural interests with much say in the 
government of the country (as was the case in Australia and New 
Zealand) but the extension of preferences could have prejudiced the 
ability of South Africa, Australia and to a lesser extent, New 
Zealand, to sell more freely in world markets such as the USA, Japan 
and Germany. 66 
In any case, as Miller points out, the Commonwealth was 
increasingly unable to maintain itself as a "closed system" for 
economic purposes and by the mid-1950 's "no future efforts were 
planned to confine Commonwealth resources to Commonwealth needs" . 67 
1952 was, according to him, the turning point, when the Commonwealth 
finance minister's conference in London announced that it was in 
favour of multi-lateralism. This coincided with the steadily 
increasing convertibility of sterling as a result of increased US 
spending on imports, a relaxation of tariffs world-wide, a revival 
of the European and Japanese economies and the diversification of 
trade. 
An indication of the British view of South Africa's role in the 
sterling area during Malan's period is given in some of the cabinet 
memoranda and discussions of economic policy in those years. In 
1949, for example, a British cabinet memorandum on the meeting of 
Commonwealth finance ministers in July commented on the "identity of 
views" which was eventually reached even on matters regarded as 
M Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, pp.218-219. 
65 Ibid. , p. 219 . 
66 Ibid., p.218. 
67 Ib'd 222 __ l._.' p. . 
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necessary for "immediate action" such as cuts in dollar imports. 68 
It was noted that the Canadians had "naturally" dissociated 
themselves from the recommendations regarding dollar import cuts and 
that the South Africans, not being members of the sterling area 
dollar pool, "were in a different position from the rest". All the 
dominions had, however, appreciated the need for "drastic action 
immediately" and for a "constructive approach" to the long-term 
problem. "There was a unanimous determination to do whatever was 
possible to maintain the strength of the sterling area". 69 
In 1952 a report by the Commonwealth relations office to all British 
high commissioners in the dominions on the London finance ministers' 
conference noted ~hat South Africa undertook to do everything to 
"hit her target" of a balance of payments surplus with the 
non-sterling world and that she had made "very forthcoming" 
proposals concerning gold which represented "a major contribution on 
her part to strer.?then the central reserves". 70 It also noted that 
the South Africar finance minister, Havenga, had made "helpful 
speeches" on the conference after his return. On the question of the 
development of Commonwealth resources, the South African delegate 
was "at pains" to oppose restraints on the movement of private 
capital from Brita~n to South Africa and had given "useful accounts" 
of South Africa's success in obtaining overseas capital. 71 
Liesching, at the CRO, noted in a separate letter to the British 
high commissioner in Cape Town, Sir John Le Rougetel, that South 
Africa was repres·~nted at the finance ministers' conference by the 
68 PRO, CAB 129/36, C.P. (49)160, "Meeting of Commonwealth 
Finance Ministers", Memorandum by the President of the Board of 
Trade, Mr Harold \hlson, 21 July 1949. 
69 Ibid. 
70 PRO , DO 3 5 , 
Conference January 
Commissioners, No.8, 
71 Ibid. 
File 2668 (Commonwealth Finance Ministers 
1952) , Report to United Kingdom High 
Results of Commonwealth Conference. 
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"wise and experi=nced Mr Havenga". 72 He commented further that as 
a non-sterling pool member South Africa could easily have taken the 
Canadian line that "others must make the sacrifices". Yet in the 
end, Havenga, together with the Indians, "proved to be the most 
willing of all the other Commonwealth Ministers to help weather the 
immediate crisis·· . 
In parliament, the government was attacked for not doing enough to 
help the sterling area through its crisis of 1952 and for a 
statement by Havc:1ga that South Africa was "not irrevocably tied to 
sterling". 73 The LP Member for Vasco claimed that Havenga had "lost 
the big chance" to help the sterling area and did not have the 
"vision" with reg:ird to the future role which sterling would play in 
the "development of the country". 74 
A National Par\ y spokesman (Dr N. Diederichs) answered this 
criticism by saying that South Africa was "doing all it could" to 
aid sterling but that "help must not come from one side only". 75 He 
claimed that "Britain was not delivering the good business" needed 
in South Africa "fast enough" nor "at a competitive price compared 
to elsewhere" . 76 ·'owever, Britain was herself expressing gratitude 
for what was don•o in the latest budget, he said (referring to the 
advance sale of £~Om of gold from the reserves, cuts in imports from 
Europe and greater opportunities for British exporters in terms of 
South African imrort licences) . 77 Havenga then joined in the debate 
and added that he was doing even more for sterling than was 
indicated in the budget but that "sooner or later the question will 
be put whether i ·: is in the interests of South Africa to make those 
72 Ibid., No .10, Liesching - Le Rougetel, 27 February 1952. 
73 House of Assembly Debates, col.8156, 14 June 1952. 
74 Ibid. , co~.8311, 17 June 1952. 
75 Ibid., co . . 8324, 17 June 1952. 
76 Ibid., co_.8325, 17 June 1952. 
77 Ibid., col.8326, 17 June 1952. 
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sacrifices which we are making". 78 
Clearly, however, the bickering between government and opposition 
over the degree of help given to sterling in 1952 was overshadowed 
by the amount of agreement between them on the question of 
Commonwealth co operation in the economic field. As had been the 
case in questions of a military nature the realities of the post 
-war internatio'.lal order intruded into the party-political debate 
and forced both sides to modify their ideological stand-points on 
economic matters. 
78 Ibid., cols 8372-3, 17 June 1952. 
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PART THREE: THE STRIJDOM YEARS 1954-
1958 
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Introduction 
Strijdom's premiership was not marked by any dramatic moves to break 
ties with the Commonwealth. This was partly because of the 1951 
compromise over Commonwealth membership, which Strijdom had agreed 
to and which separated the republican issue from the Commonwealth 
issue, at least temporarily. But it also reflected the fact that 
overwhelming economic, strategic and political considerations made 
the necessity apparent to Strijdom, as it had to Malan, of retaining 
Commonwealth ties in a period of international uncertainty and 
increasing South African isolation. 
There was also the need to retain some degree of English-speaking 
support and a display of white unity in the face of local and 
foreign hostility to apartheid. Thus there would have been no point 
to a policy of deliberately antagonising English-speakers by 
breaking Commonwealth ties at such an early period in the 
Nationalist programme. Instead, to assuage feelings that not enough 
was being done, there was a continuation of the campaign by the 
Nationalist Party to whittle away at the symbols of the British 
connection (such as the flag and anthem) and to prepare the public 
for what was seen as the inevitability of the republic. 
Other major developments in South Africa's foreign policy in general 
or in Commonwealth policy in particular during Strijdom's period 
were few. 1 Nevertheless, the effects of South Africa's domestic 
policies on her international relations in general and her 
Commonwealth relations in particular continued to be felt in terms 
of differing black and white perceptions of the Commonwealth and the 
British connection during Strijdom's period. Furthermore, certain 
events or policy initiatives had some dramatic reverberations on 
public opinion. The Suez crisis was particularly important in this 
regard, as was the changing official attitude to decolonisation. 
The Suez crisis of November 1956 was an earthshaking event for 
1 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.21. 
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Britain and the Commonwealth with major implications for the future 
course of Commonwealth relations. It left a trail of distrust and 
uncertainty in many countries, including South Africa, about British 
commitment to the Commonwealth. In practice, it did not mark a 
departure for Strijdom's government from the already guarded and 
cautiously non-committal approach to Commonwealth relations adopted 
previously by Malan. 2 
Nevertheless, the disastrous consequences of the Suez debacle in 
Nationalist eyes seemed to vindicate this "hands-off" policy and 
appeared to demonstrate the folly of becoming involved in Britain's 
wars. By keeping his head "out of the beehive" as he called it, 
Strijdom limited the "fall-out" for South Africa (which in any case 
benefited economically, both in the short-term and the long-term, 
from the temporary closure of the Suez Canal which had caused 
insecurity in Europe about its future use). Officially, relations 
with Britain were not adversely affected to any degree beyond an 
initially angry exchange betweer, Eric Louw and the British high 
commissioner, Sir Percival Liesching, over the lack of Commonwealth 
consultation by the British government. 3 Unofficially, however, it 
marked a sea-change in public attitudes in South Africa towards 
Britain and the Commonwealth that had the effect of weakening the 
Commonwealth connection. 
Other than Suez the only important development, which related more 
to British-South African relations than the Commonwealth in general, 
was the Simonstown Agreement of July 1955. 4 This was significant in 
that it marked the culmination of South African attempts to involve 
a major power in defence of the southern African region and 
indicated that south Africa's racial policies were not yet an 
overwhelming consideration in British strategic planning. As a 
2 The Suez crisis and its implications for South Africa's 
Commonwealth relations is discussed more fully in Chapter 13. 
3 James Eayrs (ed.), The Commonwealth and Suez. A 
Documentary Survey (London, OUP, 1964), p.190. 
4 See chapter 11, pp.234-248. 
210 
demonstration of Nationalist commitment to the Commonwealth it was 
not significant to any extent. It was, rather, an assertion of South 
African nationalism against one of the last remaining symbols of 
British sovereignty, the Simonstown naval base. As such it 
represented the ongoing Nationalist campaign against British symbols 
in South Africa such as the national anthem, the flag and also 
British contrcl of the high commission territories. In all these 
matters Strijdom's government was following a path already laid out 
for it by Malan. 
The relationship between Britain and South Africa during Strijdom's 
premiership continued to be marked, as we shall see, by a degree of 
distance and formality. However, economic, strategic and political 
necessities dictated a close working relationship between the two 
countries. This relationship continued to be characterised more by 
British appeasement of South Africa than the reverse, as the chapter 
on the Simonstown Agreement should indicate. On issues such as the 
transfer of the high commission territories and South African 
access to them for defence purposes, the governments of Churchill 
(despite some reluctance expressed by the prime minister himself 
over Simonstown) , Eden and Macmillan continued to adopt a mollifying 
attitude which aimed at ensuring South African co-operation in key 
areas of Comm:mwealth -concern. One of these areas was British 
decolonisation policy. The shift in the Nationalist attitude to 
independent African states during Strijdom's premiership came as a 
pleasant surprise to the British who continued, however, to show 
their eagerness to consult South Africa before embarking on major 
policy initiatives concerning decolonisation in Africa. 
Strijdom's inexperience in foreign affairs, his ill-health and the 
lack of any new major developments in South Africa's foreign 
relations meant that he of all Nationalist prime ministers up to 
1961 "left the smallest imprint on foreign policy". 5 He did not 
engage much in personal diplomacy, unlike his predecessors, and was 
content to leave much -of the business to Eric Louw, who shared 
5 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.21. 
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Strijdom's views on republicanism, the Commonwealth and UNO. The 
demands of premiership, Strijdom said, made it "impractical" for him 
to do justice :o any other cabinet portfolio. 6 Thus, the prickly and 
often tactless Eric Louw was given more or less of a free hand, much 
to the dismay of the parliamentary opposition and British policy-
makers who had to deal with him. (Even some in his own party were 
not happy wi~h his strident style, as was evident in the 
occasionally critical columns in Die Burger) 
Strijdom's on2.y official visit abroad was to attend the 1956 
Commonwealth prime ministers' conference in London, where his public 
defence of ap<crtheid and his half-hearted attempt to pursue the 
issue of incorooration of the high commission territories with his 
British counterparts left him with few admirers. In a period of 
growing hostility to South Africa in the UNO and with increasing 
preoccupations at home Strijdom (and to an extent, his successor, 
Verwoerd) couli not engage in the sort of high profile diplomacy of 
a Smuts or ev 0 n of a Malan. The Simonstown negotiations were left 
largely to the defence minister, F. C. Erasmus, and the 
implementation of the changing Africa policy, to Eric Louw. 7 
Eric Louw, whc) as minister of external affairs embarked upon a 
reorganisatio:: of the Africa section in 1955 in order to improve 
contacts with ~ther African territories, began a process of policy 
formation in regard to Africa that had important consequences for 
South Africa's external relations in the long term. Abandoning 
Malan' s reluctance to ·accept independent African states in the 
Commonwealth -er out of it, he redefined policy in such a way as to 
accept the ine·ritability of the decline of colonialism and the need 
to deal with independent African states on equal terms. 
The implicatio'1s of this change in policy were numerous. In domestic 
terms it den~nstrated a convergence of policy concerning the 
"homelands" c.:lminating in the Promotion of Bantu Self-government 
6 Ibid. 
7 See cha;.ters 11 and 12. 
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Act of 1959. In wider terms it removed a potential source of tension 
between Britain and South Africa over the admission of African 
colonies to full membership of the "club" and was dramatically 
evidenced by the cordial exchanges between Lauw and Nkrumah on the 
eve of Ghana's independence. However, the implications of diplomatic 
recognition in terms of practical arrangements at home for the 
hosting of black diplomats soon proved to be source of embarrassment 
for Strijdom's government and the problem was not resolved during 
his premiership. 
Developments in black politics during the mid-fifties left their 
imprint on attitudes to the Commonwealth and the British connection. 
The tensions within the main African political movement, the ANC, in 
these years were not often reflected in its resolutions on foreign 
affairs. These 
and continued 
retained a uniformly 
to be influenced 
anti-imperialist tone 
by the rhetoric of 
in general 
left-wing 
politics. 8 In 1955 the ANC supported the Bandung Conference and the 
adoption of a non-aligned stance in world affairs. This attitude 
was, however, quite consistent with the pro-Soviet stance of the 
South African Communist Party, one of the Congress Alliance members. 
By the mid 1950s it had become apparent to the Soviet Union that the 
rigid classification of the world into two implacably antagonistic 
camps, the "anti-imperialist democratic" and the "imperialist anti-
democratic" camps (the so-called Zhdanovite perspective adopted 
during Cold-war tensions of 1947), had not resulted in an increase 
in communist influence in the colonial, semi-colonial and dependent 
countries. 9 Accordingly, a new strategy towards socialist 
transformation in the colonies and ex-colonies (South Africa being 
seen as a colonial country of a "special type"), was adopted based 
on the concept of "national democracy". 10 
8 G.M. Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa. The Evolution 
of an Ideology (UCLA Press, Los Angeles, 1979), p.119. 
9 Peter Hudson, "The Freedom Charter and the theory of 
National Democratic Revolution", Transformation (1), 1986, pp. 
13-14. 
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This concept involved the legitimisation of an independence struggle 
by means of a "national-democratic" revolution in which the 
bourgeois would be in alliance with the proletariat and peasantry 
against the forces of imperialism. Experience had demonstrated that 
newly independent countries were often dominated by national 
bourgeoises and that their quest for independence and non-alignment 
was more than just rhetoric. Many of them adopted far-reaching 
social and economic reforms. The theory of the "Two Camps" was 
therefore seen as inconsistent with developments in the under-
developed world and also as "unfruitful both for the Soviet Union 
and for numerous communist parties in underdeveloped countries." 11 
The adoption of the Freedom Charter in Kliptown by the Congress of 
the People in 1955 and later endorsed by the ANC was interpreted in 
marxist circles as being in conformity with the concept of national-
democratic revolution . 12 But it is doubtful whether the Charter had 
revolutionary 
at the time) 
implications (as the South African government assumed 
and even whether the ANC could be described as a 
revolutionary movement in the mid 1950s. 13 
The divisions between Charterist, Workerist and Africanist 
viewpoints within the ANC became increasingly apparent during and 
after the adoption of the Freedom Charter in 1955 and culminated in 
the establishment of an openly Africanist group that eventually 
split from the ANC to form the Pan-Africanist Congress in 1959. 
While Africanist and Charterists were united in their desire to see 
a free Africa emerge from colonial rule they were not at one in 
their views of the roles of whites, coloureds and Asians in a future 
people's republic nor in their attitude to Strijdom's diplomatic 
manoeuvres concerning independent African states. This reflected, 
partly, the division between the older and younger generations in 
African politics, the latter fired with impatient enthusiasm for the 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Hudson, pp.6-10 and Lodge, Black Politics in South 
Africa, pp. 70-74. 
13 Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, p.73. 
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slogan of "Africa for the Africans" and scornful of the leadership's 
cautious and moderate acceptance of white liberals and other 
political allies. 14 
At the 1954 ANC annual congress in Durban the Natal Indian Congress 
president, G.M Naicker, referred obliquely to the Africanist agenda 
when he congratulated the leadership of the ANC for "choosing the 
path of democracy" and not allowing the movement for national 
liberation to become "reactionary in character .... as was the case 
with Afrikaner Nationalism". 15 The slogan of the ANC, he said, was 
not "South Africa for the Africans", but "South Africa for all her 
peoples 
of the 
of all creeds and nationalities". Chief Luthuli, president 
ANC, had stressed also in his opening address to the 
conference "that while the African National Congress must naturally 
work for its own growth it is equally committed to the policy of 
forming a multi-racial united Democratic front to challenge the 
forces of reaction in this country". 16 
However, the uncompromisingly strong rejection of colonialism 
continued to be seen in Congress resolutions and reports. At the 
national conference of 1957, for example, the report of the National 
Executive Committee noted how the rise of independent states in Asia 
and Africa "had inspired the struggling peoples of Africa and Asia 
and .... shattered ... the myth of the inherent inferiority of the 
colonial peoples and their helpless dependence on the colonisers". 17 
The year 1957 had seen ~the birth of the first independent African 
state freed directly from British imperialism," the emergence of 
Ghana which "had a profound effect on the racist theories of our 
Nationalist government". 
14 Gerhart, Black Power in South Africa, p. 168. 
15 AD 2186 (ANC Collection), B (a) 3, Annual Report of the 
National Executive Committee to the 42nd Annual Congress, Durban 
16-19 December 1954, Address by G.M. Naicker, p.4. 
16 Ibid., Presidential Address by Chief Albert Luthuli, pp. 3-
4. 
17 AD 2186, Ba 4. 
Report of the National 
(45th Annual Conference , Orlando 
Executive Committee, pp.1-5. 
1957)' 
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The 1957 report went on to condemn what it called the "disgraceful 
act of aggression" by Britain and France in Suez the previous year 
and also American interference in the Middle East under the cloak of 
the Eisenhower Doctrine. 18 In the light of Soviet foreign policy at 
the time, which supported and encouraged non-alignment in the newly 
independent countries, 19 and in the light of the South African 
Communist Party's influence on the Congress Alliance's policy 
formation at that time,w it is not surprising that the ANC 
demonstrated such support for Egypt. 
In fact, as we shall see in a later chapter, the Suez crisis had 
marked something of a watershed in South African black attitudes to 
Britain and the Commonwealth. It revealed a disillusionment that 
went beyond mere verbal condemnations of the British and French 
actions. The Suez invasion was seen as another example of how 
Britain was breaking faith with the Commonwealth ideal of peaceful 
co-operation and non-racialism. 21 
18 Ibid. 
19 Hudson, "The Freedom Charter and the Theory of National 
Democratic Revolution", p.14. 
w Lodge, Black Politics in South Africa, p.28. 
21 See for example the editorial in the World (formerly Bantu 
World) of 17 November 1956 which stated that "In the minds of 
Africans ... Britain had done herself irreparable harm. She has 
lost her prestige among Afro-Asian people and nations ... they no 
longer are for Britain". 
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Chapter 10: Strijdom and the Republican Ideal 1954-58 
(a) Strijdom's early and later republican strategies 
It is a little ironic that J.G. Strijdom, the arch-republican and 
open advocate of secession from the Commonwealth, should have been 
in London on a private visit during the crisis in Nationalist ranks 
that occurred after D.F. Malan's announcement of imminent retirement 
in October 1954. From a hotel in Marble Arch, close to the centre of 
the empire he detested so much, he wrote to his closest cabinet 
colleague and confidant, H.F. Verwoerd, minister of native affairs, 
and plotted a minor "palace coup" against his rivals for the 
premiership within the ranks of the Nationalist caucus. 1 
Foremost amongst the contenders for the position was N.C. Havenga, 
Malan's own choice as his successor, the minister of finance and 
one-time leader of the Afrikaner Party who had helped the 
Nationalists gain power in 1948. But Havenga had compromised himself 
and the party in the eyes of Strijdom supporters because of his 
relatively moderate stance on the question of tactics in relation to 
the abolition of the coloured vote. As Strijdom put it, he could 
have voted for Havenga as Malan's successor "up to two years ago" 
because of all he had done for "our cause" ("ons saak") up to that 
point. 2 But since the "difference of opinion" ( "meningsverskil") 
between himself and Malan/Havenga on the coloured vote and 
sovereignty of parliament issues, his ideas had changed. 
He believed Malan and Havenga should have stuck by the 1952 caucus 
decision to affirm parliamentary sovereignty over the law courts in 
the coloured franchise issue and instead felt they had greatly 
damaged the party by trying the constitutional method of achieving 
a two-thirds majority in parliament. But this was not all they 
disagreed upon because the sovereignty of parliament principle had 
1 INCH, PV93 (Verwoerd Collection), Vol. 1. (Onderwerpsleers), 
File 1/11/1 ( 1954 Oct-Nov: Eerste Minister se verkiesing) , 
Strijdom - Verwoerd 17, October 1954. 
2 Ibid. 
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a bearing on the republican issue and thus on the question of South 
Africa's continued adherence to the Commonwealth. 
It was Havenga who had insisted that any decision on a republic 
should not be adopted by a bare parliamentary majority but rather by 
an expression of the people's will through a referendum. While 
Strijdom had accepted this for tactical reasons he had always argued 
that Nationalist policy was to institute a republic and leave the 
Commonwealth at the same time. Malan and Havenga, however, insisted 
that the two issues be treated separately and at the 1951 caucus 
meeting Malan had warned the party about a split on this issue by 
arguing that it could give the United Party opposition the 
opportunity to "drive a wedge between us" ("'n wig tussen ons in te 
drywe") . 3 He rebutted Strijdom's attack on him and his demand for 
immediate withdrawal from the Commonwealth with the words: 
My standpoint is that if we do not want to be 
isolated we should choose co-operation with the 
Commonwealth. If we do not have a good reason to 
get out of the Commonwealth then we must stay 
in .. 4 
He went on to say in a more placatory manner that the coloured vote 
issue was pertinent to the republican issue in that it was based on 
the staridpoint that the Union was a "sovereign and independent state" 
and could change her constitution "as she liked". Staying in the 
Commonwealth "made no difference in the slightest to this position 
of independence". 
Strijdom, who reluctantly accepted the compromise caucus decision of 
1951 to treat the republican and Commonwealth issues separately, 
continued in private to.berate Malan for his stance on Commonwealth 
3 INCH, PV4 (Eric Louw Collection) , File No. 93 ( 1951: 
Republikeinse Beleid, Koukus Besprekings) , Dept. Commerce and 
Industry, "Subject: Private, Republican Policy, Caucus Meeting 13 
March 1951", pp.1-4. 
4 Ibid., Caucus Meeting 20 March 1951, p.l. 
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membership. In January 1952 he wrote to Malan saying he was 
surprised to see (in a recent Foreign Affairs department publication) 
that Malan was satisfied with the 1949 position on Commonwealth 
membership "despite our important principles" and "your promises" in 
parliament. 5 He appealed to Malan to change his attitude, saying the 
NP could not afford a split on this "after all we have been through". 
The caucus decision of April 1951, he said, had stated the NP should 
accept that South Africa was now free to break away from the 
Commonwealth "and have freedom" and that the republic and 
Commonwealth membership were separate issues to be decided 
separately. 
In the same letter Strijdom complained that he had just learnt in the 
newspapers about the Commonwealth finance ministers conference "and 
the attendance of Paul Sauer [minister of transport) at the 
meeting". 6 This was "obviously an important conference" but he did 
not know what Sauer would "bind us to accept there". Thus he found 
himself in an "unpleasant situation" as leader of the Party in 
Transvaal and as a government member. He had also learnt in 
newspapers that South Africa was "satisfied" with the title of "High 
Commissioner" instead of "ambassador" for South African 
representatives in Commonwealth countries. His feeling was "we should 
have ordinary titles for them because the British want to maintain 
'High Commissioner' so as not to admit the divisibility of the 
Crown". 7 That, he continued, was another example of how he had 
learnt in newspapers about such decisions. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that 
should have been anxious to secure 
Strijdom and his 
the premiership 
supporters 
when the 
opportunity arose with Malan's resignation announcement in October 
1954. Malan had warned the party soon after his announced retirement 
not to form groups or to listen to those who would try to exclude the 
5 TA, A2 (Strijdom Collection), Vol.2 (Correspondence: Party 
Political), File No.40 ·(Federal Council of Nationalist Party: 
1935 July 5 - 1958 May 2), Strijdom - Malan, 10 January 1952. 
p. 62. 
6 Ibid., p.56. 
7 Ibid. , p . 5 9 . 
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English-speaking South Africans by setting up a purely Afrikaans 
republic. 8 This veiled reference to the Strijdom faction indicated 
his fears of a forthcoming leadership struggle. The caucus met on 30 
November and nominated both Havenga and Strijdom, the latter in 
absentia and on his way back from Europe. It soon became clear, 
however, that Verwoerd and Strijdom had outmanoeuvred the Havenga 
group and when Havenga realised that his chances of election were 
slim, he stood down. Strijdom was elected unanimously in absentia. 
As Walker described it, this "symbolic victory of the North over the 
South" (Transvaal vs. Cape) in South African Nationalist politics was 
attended by crowds brandishing the Vierkleur and singing the 
republican Volkslied around Kruger's statue in Church Square. 9 The 
historian, D.W. Kruger, noted that in English opposition circles 
fears arose that "things were going to happen now and that moderation 
and caution in politics would be thrown overboard". 10 
Seeming to confirm this Strijdom immediately reshuffled his cabinet 
in a way which resulted in a strengthening of the republican element 
and the "no compromise" group on racial policy. 11 For the first time 
since Union the prime minister took no portfolio for himself and 
instead gave external affairs (traditionally linked to the prime 
minister's office) to Eric Louw. As a strong supporter of Strijdom, 
Louw was also rewarded with the finance post which he inherited from 
Havenga. Paul Sauer, a Havenga man, was demoted from transport to 
lands. Verwoerd kept native affairs and "was henceforth very much in 
the forefront of the Party's councils", 12 becoming Strijdom's right-
hand man in cabinet. Jan de Klerk, Transvaal secretary of the party 
and one of Strijdom's brothers-in-law, replaced B.J. Schoeman as 
Labour minister and received senatorial rank. 
8 Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p.922. 
10 Kruger, The Making of a Nation, p.288. 
11 Ibid., p.289. 
12 Ibid 
--· 
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This transfer of the balance of power in government to the 
"extremists" was not, however, immediately apparent in the field of 
foreign relations policy and Commonwealth relations in particular. 
As Kruger puts it, the new prime minister "was careful to strike the 
right moderate note" 13 from the beginning. He promised there would 
be no immediate move towards the creation of a republic, at least 
during the lifetime of the present parliament and that when the 
change was made it would only be after a plebiscite or special 
general election. Only then would the party decide whether or not the 
republic should remain within the Commonwealth. Other "assurances" 
were that there would be no anti-British immigration policies, that 
equal language rights would continue and a promise to the whites that 
no Indian or "Bantu" need look to him for votes . 14 The policy of 
apartheid would be followed to the end. 
Soon after coming to power Strijdom assured his party supporters in 
a speech at Bloemhof that "when an adequate majority wants a Republic 
it must come to pass" . 15 However, he had promised English supporters 
earlier that such a republic would not be introduced during the 
lifetime of the present parliament. Thus it was hardly surprising 
that a measure of impatience in Nationalist circles with the lack of 
movement towards a republic came to the fore by the time of the third 
Nationalist election victory of 1958. Correspondence between the 
young P.W. Botha and Strijdom in May of that year revealed how the 
demands of leadership had toned down Strijdom's republican rhetoric. 
Impatient at the lack of progress towards the republic, Botha wrote 
to Strijdom indicating his intention to ask a question in parliament 
about when and how the republic would be introduced. 16 He asked 
Strijdom to have a thorough discussion at the beginning of the new 
14 Walker, A History of Southern Africa, p. 924. 
15 Commonwealth Survey , (1954), 1 (a) Constitutional and 
Political, "South Africa: Policy of new Strijdom Government", 22 
December 1954. 
16 TA, A2 (Strijdom), 1 (Correspondence) , Vol. 54 (Republican 
Struggle 4 Sept.1952 - 17 June 1958), P.W. Botha - J.G. Strijdom, 
29 May 1958, p.119. 
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parliamentary sitting concerning the republic and suggested putting 
forward a motion to the effect that: 
The Council brings to the attention of the 
Government the growing feeling ["groeiende 
gevoel") of the South African electorate in 
favour of a Republican state. Furthermore the 
Council requests the Government to turn its 
attention ["om sy aandag ... te skenk" J towards 
creating a Republic in South Africa. 17 
Strijdom' s reply indicated the extent to which the realities of 
premiership had modified his earlier ardour about such things. He 
said to Botha that the republic was in the party's programme of 
principles and that he had emphasized it many times. 18 "No 
Nationalist could doubt our determination over a republic", he said, 
but if the sort of motion proposed by Botha were to be introduced it 
would give the opposition "a huge weapon". It would show that "we the 
government are not aware of the growing republican feeling and that 
we were not serious about it". He had discussed it with the cabinet 
who agreed with him and he hoped Botha would not take the matter 
further. 
That, however, was not the end of the matter, for Botha replied on 
11 June to the effect that he appreciated Strijdom's reservations but 
was himself not tied to the wording of such a motion. 19 He claimed 
the time was now ripe for a republic and exactly how it was to be 
introduced and whether it was to be in the Commonwealth or not should 
be stated. Would the decision on Commonwealth membership, he asked, 
be given to a vote in parliament or only the cabinet? He would 
consider a new motion to thank the government for the steps it had 
taken on the way to a republic and would ask the government to take 
practical steps to prepare the white voters for a republic. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid., Strijdom - Botha, 5 June 1958, p.121. 
19 Ibid. , Botha - Strij dom, 11 June 1958, p .129. 
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Again Strijdom replied, this time on 17 June, to the effect that the 
time was still not ripe for such a government declaration and that 
other steps had to be announced first. 20 It could not happen yet 
because "it could do damage" and a declaration now over the 1949 
question of whether it should be a republic in or out of the 
Commonwealth "would reopen old wounds and splits in the party". 
Strijdom's reluctance to move quickly on these issues was also, of 
course, conditioned by the fact that in the general elections of 
April 1958 the Nationalists had still not achieved an overall 
majority of votes cast. Round Table commented at the time that it was 
only because of "emigration, ... the removal of 50, 000 coloured voters 
from the roll in 1956 ... and the overloading of constituencies" that 
the April election victory of 103 seats to 53 had been achieved. 21 
Support for the Nationalists was growing, however, and the electoral 
system continued to favour them as it had in 1953 and 1948. What was 
still uncertain was whether the republicans would win a referendum 
vote. Even with the passing of Act 30 of 1958 which enfranchised 18-
year-olds, Strijdom could not risk a hasty decision. It would be left 
to his successor, H.F. Verwoerd, to plan for a republican victory in 
circumstances very different to those in 1958. 
In London in 1956 Strijdom had raised the question of a republic in 
the course of a speech at the South African Club. He had claimed that 
under a republican form of government "the majority of our people, 
namely the Afrikaans-speaking section" would be "infinitely more 
willing to co-operate with Great Britain and other Commonwealth 
countries than they would be under present circumstances".n He was 
also reported to have said that South Africa and other countries only 
remained in the Commonwealth "as long as it is in their interests to 
remain". 
These statements, claimed one opposition newspaper, the Eastern 
20 Ibid., Strijdom - Botha, 17 June 1958, p.132. 
21 
"South Africa: General Election", Round Table, Vol. 48 
(1957-58)' pp.297-299. 
n Eastern Province Herald, 27 June 1956. 
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Province Herald, were "cynical" and "not calculated to win friends 
at the Prime Ministers Conference". Strijdom had ignored the fact 
that the "real majority in the country were non-Europeans" and that 
such a statement would not go down well in a "multi-racial 
Commonwealth". However, The Star and Rand Daily Mail were more 
favourable in their reactions to Strijdom's speech and his actions 
at the conference. The former congratulated him for showing a 
"straightforward and uncomplaining approach that was calculated to 
touch the cricketer in every Englishman" . 23 The latter wondered how 
long South Africa could.remain a member of the Club in the face of 
criticism by other Commonweal th members. 24 Strijdom's "probable 
dilemma" (of racism,) was that "the Commonwealth asks him to practise 
what he dare not preach". 
In October 1956, after a heated parliamentary debate on the question 
of Natal's position in a future republic (Heaton-Nicholls had argued 
for a separate referendum in Natal to determine whether it should 
secede or not), Ilanga Lase Natal expressed the views of the excluded 
majority in the debate. Under the heading "Natal and Africans" it 
said that Africans were asking, "what do the Nationalists lack today 
which they can only obtain through a republic? "25 South Africa was 
a "powerful independent state", it argued, with its own legislature. 
No other country, including Britain, could dictate to South Africa 
what course to follow. But what Africans were asking was, would the 
republic "bring us the freedom and independence which the 
Nationalists already enjoy", or would it "enslave us still more?" 
Africans were "puzzled and concerned" over the cry for a republic and 
"present political trends" afforded little hope of improved 
conditions for them. 
(b) British -South African relations 
At the 1956 prime 
opinion had been 
ministers conference white South African public 
shocked at pictures of demonstrators dogging 
D The Star, 26 July 1956. 
N Rand Daily Mail, 3 July 1956. 
~ Ilanga Lase Natal, 13 October 1956. 
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Strijdom's footsteps. This was the first time such anti-apartheid 
demonstrations had been seen at a prime minister's conference. 
Prominent Labour Party politicians like Fenner Brockway and Anthony 
Wedgewood Benn made speeches denouncing apartheid and prompted angry 
retorts about Labour Party interference in South African affairs. 26 
Dr J.H.O. du Plessis (NP Stellenbosch) noted in the 1957 
parliamentary session that these demonstrations and other statements 
by Labour politicians such as Aneurin Bevan (who had remarked that 
he "would enjoy seeing Strijdom sit next to Nkrumah at a Commonwealth 
Conference"), were to the "detriment of British relations with South 
Africa" . 27 
Eric Louw wrote a prickly letter to the London Times in January 1957 
objecting to a proposed visit by British jurors to the Treason Trial. 
He threatened that South Africa could withdraw from the Commonwealth 
if such interference in South Africa's affairs were to become 
endemic. 28 This letter caused a minor political storm in South Africa 
with the opposition United Party criticising Louw for a "thoroughly 
badly-drafted, irresponsible and clumsy document ... calculated to do 
far more harm than good to our foreign relations" . 29 He was accused 
of being a disciple of "knobkerrie [sic] diplomacy", for antagonising 
Britain unnecessarily and for being ham-handed in his attempts to 
retaliate against Indian trade sanctions after the closure of the 
Suez Canal . 30 
British official views of Strijdom's govermnent were hesitant and 
reactive. An indication of contemporary British thinking about 
Strijdom and the relationship with Britain after his accession to 
power in 1954 is given in some of the dominions off ice files for the 
period. It has been noted in previous chapters that in Malan' s 
period, British officials such as the high commissioner, Evelyn 
26 Die Vader land, 3 July 1956. 
27 House of Assembly Debates, cols 7626-7, 10 June 1957. 
28 The Times , 7 January 1957. 
29 House of Assembly Debates, col.568, 4 February 1957. 
30 Ibid., col. 571, 4 February 1957. 
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Baring, had expressed alarm at the possibility of an "extremist" like 
Strijdom coming to power in South Africa: that unless Britain made 
concessions on issues such as the Seretse Affair and the high 
commission territories the moderates would be swept from power and 
the extreme republicans would declare a republic and secede from the 
Commonwealth. 31 But as these fears receded and it became clear that 
no hasty moves in that direction were planned the Conservative 
governments of Churchill, Eden and Macmillan settled into an uneasy 
working relationship with Strijdom. 
Issues such as the incorporation of the high commission territories, 
the Simonstown agreement, the status of high commissioners and 
economic co-operation were matters of negotiation between the two 
governments conducted in a formal and rather less than friendly 
manner but which the British were already accustomed to from Malan's 
period. At the UNO Britain and the other "white" Commonwealth 
countries continued to shield South Africa from anti-apartheid 
criticism as the price demanded for South Africa's continued co-
operation in the Commonwealth. But on the surface, there was little 
in the mid- 1950's to disturb the relationship between South Africa 
and Britain besides occasional pinpricks such as anti-apartheid 
demonstrations and Eric Louw's public indiscretions. 
In 1955 a report was sent by the Commonwealth relations office (CRO) 
to the British high commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Percival 
Liesching, about talks which took place between CRO officials in 
London and South Africa's high commissioner, G.H. Jooste. Jooste had 
reportedly expressed "regret" that Strij dom had not met anyone in the 
British government or in the CRO before taking office in November 
1954.n That, said Jooste, had been for health reasons and because 
of a desire to avoid publicity when he was then in London. However, 
Jooste expressed the hope that British ministers would take the 
initiative themselves to visit South Africa and not wait for 
invitations. He said he was satisfied with the Simonstown 
31 See for example chapter 5, pp.99-104. 
32 PRO, DO 119, File 1177 (Union 
Kingdom Relations,1955), G. Laithwaite 
High Commissioner, Cape Town, 11 August 
of South Africa/United 
( CRO) to P. Liesching, 
1955. 
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negotiations but felt that both sides should "avoid commitments" at 
first and build up trust. He also stated that even though the 
majority of whites were Afrikaners of German or Dutch descent South 
Africa would be more likely to turn to Britain if she left the 
Commonwealth, rather than stand alone. 
Behind the scenes he was doing his best, Jooste said, to bring about 
a "better understanding'.' between the two countries and he accepted 
the importance of not antagonizing public opinion and the press. He 
claimed that many South Africans were shifting money from the UK to 
the USA or Switzerland because of "bad feelings in the UK towards 
South Africa". But he was telling people not to be foolish and not 
to allow their conduct to be ruled by "uninformed press reactions" 
in Britain. He denied there was any hostility on the part of the 
South African government to "British South Africans". 
Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the secretary of state for Commonwealth 
relations (also referred to as Lord Home), in a separate meeting with 
Jooste on 26 July had made certain remarks in relation to British-
South African relations. that reportedly "made an impact" on Eric 
Louw.n Home had insisted that better relations between South Africa 
and the UK could only come about by "going carefully and slowly" -
remarks clearly aimed at Louw's brand of diplomacy. Jooste had then 
asked Home whether the people of the UK really wanted to be friendly 
and to co-operate with South Africa and if so, would the "Native 
Policy" in South Africa bring about a change. Home had answered "yes" 
to both questions but had added that "we must all try to see that it 
did not happen" . 
It was of course in the interests of both sides not to disturb the 
relationship too much. Britain needed South Africa as much as South 
Africa needed Britain .. Britain's share of South Africa's trade 
remained as important as before34 and there were too many mutual 
economic, strategic and social bonds between them to allow either 
side to make a radical break with the past. The republican issue and 
33 Ibid. 
M See chapter 13, pp.300-308. 
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the possibility of secession from the Commonwealth, while still 
matters for concern, had diminished in urgency given the reassuring 
noises from Strijdom's government. 
The Commonwealth was, as one writer has noted, "a congenial place" 
for South Africa in the mid-fifties . 35 It did not bar republics but 
was still associated with the monarchical symbols which the English 
South Africans valued. It was a "possible way in to the Western 
defence system and the economic preferences still remained important 
for certain industries. India's criticisms were still voiced outside 
official Commonwealth forums and the fears about admitting 
independent African states had temporarily subsided with the 
implementation of the new Africa policy. In all it remained a far 
better bet in Nationalist eyes than the UNO, where, as Miller notes, 
South Africa retained, in protest, only a token membership after 
195636 (South African officials refused to take up their official 
seat in the General Assembly except in exceptional circumstance such 
as when Article 2 (7) was at issue) . 37 
As has been noted, Eric Louw occasionally ruffled feathers at the 
Commonwealth relations office. This was evidenced, for example, by 
his statements in 1956 concerning the title of "minister of external 
affairs". An article in the Cape Times had prompted Louw to bring up 
the subject. The article, written in a conciliatory, if not quite 
appeasing tone, suggested that now Louw had taken over as minister 
of external affairs with "whole-time responsibility" the time was 
ripe to consider the change from minister of "External Affairs" to 
minister of "Foreign Affairs" . 38 South Africa, said the editor, was 
"one of the few nations of the world" which referred to the political 
head of the department as the "Minister of External Affairs". 
Liesching, the British high commissioner, then learnt from the ex-
secretary of external affairs, D.D. Forsyth, that Louw had 
35 Miller, Survey, p.132. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.52. 
38 Cape Times, 16 August 1956. 
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immediately seen the advantage in this article for the republican 
This cause and had contacted him about it. 
gave fresh evidence 
trying to get rid 
of the way Lauw' s mind worked in 
of the nomenclature marking the 
distinction which should be drawn between the relations 
between members of the Commonwealth and those that exist 
between any of them and a foreign country, or between 
foreign countries themselves. 39 
It reminded Liesching of Lauw' s "suppressed desire" at a recent prime 
minister's meeting to change the title of high commissioner to 
ambassador. Other evidence was the change in the position of deputy 
high commissioner to "Minister Counsellor". 40 
Now Lauw had wanted to get Forsyth's support "as an ex-civil servant 
of great standing, authority and impartiality", to pave the way for 
the change in the title of minister of external affairs. He wanted 
Forsyth to write to the Cape Times or any other newspaper in support 
of the change. Clearly Forsyth had disliked both the proposed method 
and the change and had asked Liesching's opinion about it. Liesching 
had told Forsyth that he considered Commonwealth relations to be 
different in kind from relations between a Commonwealth member and 
a foreign country and that "this to me was a principle that should 
at all costs be sustained. Anything which whittled it away by change 
in nomenclature should be resisted''· The term minister of foreign 
affairs was also not in use in any Commonwealth country except 
Pakistan where it was coupled with Commonwealth relations. In the 
United Kingdom there was separation of the portfolios and the UK 
still referred to Ireland as "non-foreign" in parliament. 
Forsyth "had agreed with all this" and had said to Liesching that 
he would refuse to support the Cape Times article. In conclusion 
Liesching indicated his irritation with the editor of the above-
39 PRO, DO 119, File 1185 (1956: Proposal to alter title of 
Minister of External Affairs), Liesching (Cape Town) - Laithwaite 
(CRO) 25 August 1956. 
40 Ibid. 
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mentioned paper by saying: 
I cannot think why the editor of the Cape Times, 
Victor Norton, ... can have lent himself to this 
idea. He has, of course, got a very immature 
mind. I only wish he was within reach so that I 
could have a talk to him myself.M 
The matter rested there until it was brought up again in June 1957 
by Dr J.H.O. du Plessis in parliament. During the external affairs 
vote in parliament, Du Plessis, a former editor of Die Oosterlig and 
strong National Socialist sympathiser in the 1940's, mentioned the 
Cape Times article in support of his argument that there should be 
a change in nomenclature for the minister of external affairs. 42 
"That'', he said, "is the attitude of the Cape Times. I think it is 
an attitude all of us in this House can subscribe to.• He then went 
on to suggest a change in the title of high commissioner to that of 
"Ambassador", a change which Eric Louw had been working towards for 
years. Du Plessis's argument was that South Africa had reached the 
stage of development as "a sovereign independent state" where such 
a change was necessary. 43 
The Commonwealth relations office decided, in 
matters as they stood. Describing Louw's 
the end, to leave 
machinations as 
"troublesome", it was thought best not to bring up the issue of 
nomenclature in discussions with Jooste because "it might have raised 
discussion about changing the title of High Commissioner to 
Ambassador which would have been a much more serious matter". 44 
Clearly, what was feared most, from the British side, was the 
creation of a precedent by South Africa that could then be followed 
by the newer Commonwealth states and that could weaken the bonds 
between member states even further. In the event, however, the titles 
41 Ibid. 
42 House of Assembly Debates, col. 7623, 10 June 1956. 
43 Ibid. , col. 7624, 10 June 1957. 
44 DO 119, File 1185, A.W. Snelling (CRO) - R.H. Belcher 
(Cape Town), 9 July 1957. 
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of both high commissioner and department of external affairs were 
retained by South Africa until she left the Commonwealth in 1961. 
(cl The Flag and Anthem 
Other measures taken by Strijdom's government against the symbolism 
of the British connection were the abolition of "God Save the Queen" 
as one of the national anthems and the Union Jack as one of the 
national flags. The move had been foreshadowed in Malan's period in 
the form of a private member's motion by the Nationalist MP for 
Namib, J. Bas son in 195'4. 45 Bas son, supported by Malan, had argued 
that the country was ready for only one anthem and one flag and that 
the national symbols should be those which were purely South African 
in origin not imported from Britain or elsewhere. The 1928 Flag Act 
compromise in the form of two flags and anthems was unusual and 
reflected the strong ethnic sentiments of the time, argued the 
Nationalists. Now that the two main streams of the white population 
had grown together and had developed a purely South African 
nationalism the 1928 compromise was no longer necessary. 
The United Party had remained committed to the 1928 act, however, and 
refused to accept the Nationalist line of argument, notwithstanding 
some conciliatory statements in the English press of the time. 46 As 
for extra-parliamentary opinion, as represented indirectly by the 
natives representatives, the attitude to such changes was clear: in 
1955 when the Senate debated the question of prayer which excluded 
reference to the queen and Commonwealth Senator Cowley reminded the 
House of the African• s respect for Queen Victoria. 47 Senator 
Ballinger added that those he represented were with him in his 
objection to the omission of the queen and the Commonwealth from the 
prayer under discussion. 
In 1954 the Nationalists had not taken any action on the flag and 
tj See chapter 7, p:l60. 
40 See, for example, The Star, 24 February 1954 and its 
report of Malan's statements on the issue in parliament in that 
year. 
47 World, 7 May 1955. 
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anthem issues, but in 1956 a surprise move by the UP member for 
Hospital Hill, Arthur Barlow, reopened the question. On 23 March 1956 
Barlow introduced a private member's motion stating that 
this House is of the opinion that in view of the 
necessity for promoting a sound South African 
national unity and in accord with the national 
aspirations of our people, the time has arrived 
for recognising the National Flag of the Union 
as the only official Flag and 'Die Stem van Suid 
Afrika in both Afrikaans and English as our 
South African Anthem. 48 
Barlow, who claimed not to have discussed this motion with "any 
member of the government", then explained his conversion to the 
Nationalist point of view in a rambling and colloquial speech. He 
claimed that the passions of twenty years before would not be 
rekindled again and that the English South Africans could not "come 
to any harm" because "Die Stem" was already being sung in their 
schools. 49 He had been congratulated by D. F. Malan for introducing 
this motion, he said, and he invited colleagues to "cross the floor" 
and vote for one flag and anthem. It would "kill" much of the present 
animosity between the two language groups, he argued. 
Barlow was supported by one other UP member, Frank Waring (Orange 
Grove), who later left the UP and became a Nationalist cabinet 
minister. The two were congratulated by Donges, the home affairs 
minister, "for pleading in such an effective way, the cause of one 
flag and one anthem for South Africa" and for making Bas son's earlier 
motion unnecessary. 50 The government then gave notice of its 
intention to introduce the legislation giving effect to the changes. 
These were duly brought about in the next parliamentary session. 51 
The embarrassed opposition, facing further divisions and defections 
48 House of Assembly Debates, col. 3 080, 23 March 1956. 
49 Ibid., col.3085, 23 March 1956. 
50 Ibid., col. 3093, · 23 March 1956. 
51 Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.224. 
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and having just experienced a leadership crisis (Sir de Villiers 
Graaff replaced the weary Strauss in November 1956), could not put 
up much of a fight and the measure was passed with the usual huge 
majority. 
Indian Opinion had expressed the feelings of those who were left out 
of the debate because of their race by stating that "sight should not 
be lost of what would go with the Union Jack if it went" . 52 While the 
Union Jack was certainly not a "guarantee" to the people of South 
Africa that their rights would be protected, to remove it was 
to blow out one more light which flickered, 
perhaps dimly amidst the deepening darkness and 
tyranny of the present ... Against this background 
the European who genuinely seeks to defend the 
Union Jack and the values it symbolises will 
realise that the only real guarantee of survival 
for the things he considers precious is to give 
the non-European a vested interest in their 
defence. 
In Britain the Daily Mirror correspondent, William Connor, stated 
that he was for once in agreement with Strijdom for his desire to 
remove the Union Jack. "Nothing", he said, "could be better in my 
view. Great Britain and the Crown cannot afford to be linked up with 
this racist madness".~ 
In May, after the passing of the act abolishing the Union Jack and 
"God Save the Queen", Indian Opinion criticised English speakers for 
being in a mood to "surrender to apartheid" rather than "joining 
forces with the non-Europeans in the fight against race 
oppression". 54 The flag and anthem issues were raised by the 
government to "divert attention" from drastic measures such as the 
Native Laws Amendment Act forbidding race contacts even in the 
52 Indian Opinion, 15 February 1957. 
53 Quoted in Indian Opinion, 15 February 1957. 
54 Indian Opinion, 10 May 1957. 
233 
Church. 55 Now the government had shown its disregard for English-
speakers by abolishing "without notice" their flag and anthem and by 
riding roughshod over parliamentary traditions in order to get rid 
of the coloured vote. 
What seems clear, however, is that the passions relating to national 
symbols had faded as far as English speakers were concerned. What had 
once almost brought the country to the brink of civil war now only 
prompted an attitude of weary resignation. In view of their muted 
response to such issues, it could be surmised that by the late 
1950 's, English speakers were more preoccupied with the perceived 
threats of African nationalism and communism than with the loss of 
their own national identity (demonstrating what Miller described as 
the "melancholy movement of South African politics towards a white 
consensus on Apartheid") . 56 This attitude was to persist and to 
deepen in the turbulent years ahead as Nationalist race policy drove 
South Africa into further isolation and international ostracism. 
55 Indian Opinion, 19 May 1957 
•Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.101. 
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Chapter 11: Simons town, the High Commission Terri tori es and 
Defence Issues 
(a) Introduction 
It has been noted that, once the British realised that their 
worst fears in relation to South Africa's position in the 
Commonwealth had not materialised, they settled into an uneasy 
working relationship with Strijdom's government. Issues such as 
Simonstown, the high commission territories and defence 
obligations became the stuff of formal negotiation and diplomacy 
which reflected the degree to which relations had become less and 
less of a "family" nature but which also demonstrated a certain 
continuity and stability. 
The Simons town negqtiations had begun in Malan' s period and 
indicated how the British were prepared to concede sovereignty 
in return for hopes of South Africa's continued co-operation on 
a whole range of issues including the high commission 
territories. On the latter issue the British were not prepared 
still to consider transfer, but negotiations over the 
protectorates continued to be conducted in a manner which 
reflected more of a concern (by both governments) with public 
opinion at home than with the issues at stake. Neither side was 
willing to risk a break by taking precipitous action. 
Defence issues and the protectorates question were linked to some 
extent in that South Africa demanded certain air and land access 
rights for defence purposes in those territories. These demands 
were useful for propaganda purposes and as bargaining points in 
negotiations over the incorporation issue. They also had the 
effect of keeping public opinion on the boil and provoked 
concerned reactions in Britain and the Commonwealth. 
However, white and black opinions remained poles apart on these 
issues. Black nationalist opinion without exception criticised 
the NP's continued attempts to assert South African sovereignty 
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over the territories and also remained suspicious of British 
intentions. The two main white parties supported incorporation 
but only argued about the method of achieving it. Only a handful 
of liberal natives' representatives questioned the whole 
motivation behind the incorporation demand. By the time Dr 
Verwoerd had come to power in 1958 the issue remained unresolved 
although the Tomlinson commission report had suggested a possible 
change of tactics through its implication that the territories 
should be treated as if they were self-governing homelands. 1 
(bl The Simonstown Agreement 
It has been noted how during Malan's premiership the National 
Party lost its reluctance to join alliances, particularly 
alliances with Britain and the Commonwealth. In the context of 
the Cold War the South African government saw itself as the 
leading Western state in Africa and identified communism as the 
biggest enemy. Thus a strategy evolved of trying to gain a place 
in an alliance and of trying to commit the West to defend Africa. 
As the leading colonial power in Africa, Britain was of 
necessity the key to such a strategy. During Malan' s period 
regular defence consultations between Britain and South Africa 
took place, there were exchanges of personnel, and Britain 
remained South Africa's main supplier of equipment. 2 
There were, however, different perceptions about what each side 
wanted out of negotiations for defence agreements. South Africa 
wanted an extension of NATO to the southern African continent and 
an African alliance while Britain was more concerned with 
obtaining a commitment from South Africa to defend the Middle 
East. These differing perceptions continued into the period of 
negotiations over Simonstown during Strijdom's premiership. 
The differences had also emerged, briefly, during discussions at 
1 Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, p.193. 
2 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.56. 
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the unofficial 1954 Commonwealth relations conference in Lahore, 
indicating how defence matters as well as political issues were 
beginning to complicate South Africa's Commonwealth relations in 
the 1950 's. 3 A South African delegate there had claimed that 
Malan was ambivalent about closer defence ties with Britain and 
the Commonwealth but had "no reservations" about binding 
commitments outside the Commonwealth - such as joining NATO. 
These comments then initiated a "vigorous controversy" about the 
desirability of South Africa joining NATO, with British delegates 
reportedly "divided" on the issue. One noted that NATO was both 
a military and an ideological alliance and would be better on 
balance without South Africa's membership. This indirect comment 
on South Africa's race policies was then "repudiated" by the 
other British and South African delegates. 
Underlying the negotiations between Britain and South Africa over 
Simonstown were broadly different strategic policy aims. What 
resulted was a form of compromise that only partly satisfied both 
parties. South Africa achieved sovereignty over the naval base 
and a vague commitment by Britain to help defend southern Africa 
from external attack while Britain received unconditional use of 
the base in peace and war and the promise of South African help 
in keeping the Cape sea lanes open in the event of a war in which 
both Britain and South Africa were involved. 4 South Africa 
undertook to purchase six frigates and other naval craft from 
Britain and also promised not to discriminate against non-
Europeans in the employment conditions at the Simonstown base. 
The latter condition was the only reference to racial matters but 
it had caused some concern in British cabinet discussions. 
3 Mansergh, The Fifth Unofficial Commonwealth Relations 
Conference, p.128. 
4 The full terms of the Simonstown Agreement are set out in 
the "Exchanges of Letters on Defence Matters between the 
Governments of the United Kingdom and the Union of South Africa", 
Cmd. 9520, HMSO, June 1955. I have relied on the summary in 
Commonwealth Survey, Vol.l, No. 14, 12 July 1955 ("United 
Kingdom/South Africa Defence Agreements"), pp.583-584. 
237 
During the last year of Malan's premiership, negotiations over 
Simonstown were at an advanced stage while Churchill was still 
prime minister in Britain. Differences of opinion emerged between 
Churchill and his ministers over certain aspects of the proposed 
treaty. 5 On 27 August 1954 Churchill noted how strategically 
important Simonstown was to Britain "in the light of the reduced 
importance of the Suez Canal and the greater uncertainty about 
the degree of co-operation in defence matters which was to be 
expected of the South African government in the future" . 6 He 
felt doubtful whether in any circumstances Britain should 
consider abandoning her legal right to perpetual use of the 
Simonstown base. 
The Commonwealth secretary, Lord Swinton, had argued that the 
object of discussion was to encourage South Africa to take a 
"broader view of their responsibilities in Commonwealth defence". 
The defence minister, Earl Alexander, pointed out that even from 
the point of view of Britain's use of Simonstown it was important 
to ensure the fullest possible co-operation of the South African 
government in order to safeguard continued supplies of labour, 
electricity and power to the base. 
When the issue was discussed again on 1 September 1954 Alexander 
reported that he had told Erasmus that other Commonwealth 
governments would have to be consulted in view of the base's 
strategic importance to them. 7 He had also told Erasmus that it 
was imperative for Britain to have the base freely available in 
peace and in war (even if South Africa were not allied to Britain 
in such a war) and that the base should be "efficiently organised 
and maintained". Erasmus had agreed to these conditions. 
5 See Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, 
pp.100-106, for a fuller discussion of these differences. 
6 PRO, 
C.C.(54)57,4. 
1954. 
CAB 128/27, Part 2 (29 June Dec. 1954), 
"South Africa: Simonstown Naval Base", 27 August 
7 C.C. (54)52,2. "South Africa: Simonstown Naval Base", 1 
September 1954. 
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Churchill again indicated his reservations and said he was 
"reluctant to contemplate any transaction which would be 
presented as yet another surrender of the rights and 
responsibilities of the United Kingdom". With somewhat prophetic 
words8 he pointed out that 
the political pressure engendered by the 
colour problem might lead South Africa at 
some time to sever her ties with the United 
Kingdom and the rest of the Commonwealth. 
Indeed, this consideration might underlie 
the Union's desire to have the base handed 
over to her. 9 
Swinton then argued that the base was of "little value" without 
South Africa's co-operation anyway and that the repair facilities 
at Simonstown were "very limited". In war the UK would always 
need the additional facilities of Durban and Cape Town. So an 
agreement which safeguarded Britain's requirements, he said, 
would be "preferable to having no agreement and being unable to 
use Simonstown in practice because of South African hostility". 10 
It was reported on 15 September" that Erasmus had been told 
that Britain would look at his plan for an African regional 
organisation but only if it was "clearly complementary to sound 
arrangements in the Middle East". The CRO had been in favour of 
some measure of support for Erasmus's plan on the grounds that 
it would take South Africa out of her neutral stance and would 
8 Ingham, "The British Government and Apartheid", pp.8-9. 
9 PRO, CAB 128/27, C.C. (54)52,2. 1 September 1954. 
10 Ibid. 
" CAB 129/70 (23 July -28 Sept .1954), C. (54) 291, "South 
Africa Defence Talks: Memorandum by the Minister of Defence and 
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations", 15 September 
1954. 
239 
help against "communist subversion". 12 The foreign office, on the 
other hand, had rejected the idea and Eden had reminded cabinet 
of the disadvantages: Belgium and Portugal would not join it and 
there was opposition in the African colonies to the presence of 
South African forces. 
Eden had stated on 8 September that undue importance should not 
be attached to Malan's African Pact which other powers would be 
reluctant to join. An inter-departmental meeting also opposed the 
idea on the grounds of hostilities that it would provoke in other 
colonies . 13 All that was favoured was the establishment of a 
supporting organisation 
the Nairobi and Dakar 
drawback of a South 
alliance. 
for logistics as a possible corollary to 
arrangements. It would not have the 
African-led, anti-communist, military 
So, as Berridge points out, Swinton and the CRO had been 
"outgunned" and he had to give Erasmus the further "bad news" 
that there would be no African Pact unless it were clearly 
complementary to Middle East plans. 14 It was therefore "not 
surprising" that South Africa's commitment to the Middle East was 
"in no way strengthened" by these negotiations. 
On 15 September Swinton had told the British cabinet that if 
further negotiations resulted in a sound and comprehensive plan 
guaranteeing all Britain needed it would be clearly to Britain's 
advantage: but rejection of it "would jeopardise the whole range 
of South African co-operation with us" . 15 
To assuage South African disappointment it was decided to move 
swiftly on working out the terms of reference of a joint working 
108. 
12 Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, pp.107-
13 Ibid., p.108. 
14 Ibid., p.109. 
15 PRO, CAB 129/70, C. (54)291, 15 September 1954. 
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committee which would be sent to South Africa to discuss 
Simonstown. When the committee reported back in December it noted 
South African willingness to buy naval equipment in Britain but 
also stated doubts about the National Party's commitment to an 
agreement once the base was in South African hands. 16 Their 
ability to run it efficiently was also in doubt. Churchill was 
persuaded in December to allow discussions to go forward after 
the February Commonwealth conference and the South Africans 
agreed to avoid advance publicity about any agreement so as to 
increase the British Conservative Party's chances at the 
forthcoming general election. 17 Strij dom, who replaced Malan in 
December, suggested an appropriate "cover" in the form of a pre-
election trip to London by Erasmus. 
Between December 1954 and June of 1955 the two governments 
finalised details of the agreement in an exchange of letters. In 
the meantime Strijdom had become prime minister in South Africa 
and in Britain Churchill had retired, with the foreign 
secretary, Anthony Eden, taking his place. The May general 
election had given the Tories a bigger majority and so the 
worries concerning the domestic effects of any agreement on 
defence with South Africa had receded. Eden was anxious to 
conclude an agreement quickly that would satisfy Britain's 
strategic concerns in the South Atlantic and Middle East. On 
South Africa's side Erasmus and Louw were pursuing their own 
versions of an African regional defence system which the British 
were trying to stall having realised that such schemes were bound 
to fail if they included South African participation. 18 
In South Africa disquiet had arisen in the ranks of the official 
opposition about the secret nature of the Simonstown talks and 
the lack of information coming from the government. In the 
16 Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, pp.110-
111. 
17 Ibid. , p . 112 . 
18 Ibid., pp.118-120. 
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Assembly in February 1955 Erasmus refused to divulge details of 
what had been discussed at the 1954 prime ministers' conference, 
especially on defence matters. Nothing had been said there about 
Simonstown, he said in reply to opposition demands for 
information, because "that was a matter entirely between the 
Government of the United Kingdom and our Government". 19 He would 
have refused to discuss it if it were brought up as it would 
"show the old idea that the Commonwealth is a kind of super-
Parliament". All he would reveal is that discussions with Britain 
had reached "an advanced stage" and that he discussed with the 
British the necessity of establishing an African Defence 
Organisation of "anti-communist countries south of the Sahara" . 20 
In May the UP again asked for more information on Simonstown from 
Erasmus. Their defence affairs spokesman outlined the UP 
opposition stance on transfer of the base and noted that "this 
was a matter in which we have to walk very slowly". 21 The UP, he 
said, would support the establishment of a South African naval 
base provided "we are in a position to accept the 
responsibility" . 22 He asked for a secret bipartisan defence 
committee to be set up in order to "put the House more in touch 
with the position as it stands". 
Erasmus rejected the latter proposal and accused the UP of 
sabotaging the defence discussions with Britain by suggesting 
that South Africa's military preparedness left much to be 
desired. 23 Referring to an article in the Cape Times of 11 May 
entitled "Disquiet on Defence Preparedness", he claimed such 
reports did "incalculable harm" at a time when he was busy with 
19 House of Assembly Debates, col .1256, 17 February 1955. 
20 Ibid., col.1261, 17 February 1955. 
21 Ibid., col. 54 70, 11 May 1955. 
22 Ibid., cols 5470-5471, 11 May 1955. 
23 Ibid., col. 54 72, 11 May and cols 54 98-5500 , 12 May 1955. 
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important negotiations. 
The British had been aware of the state of South Africa's 
defences since the ''purge'' of the 
Erasmus in the years after 1948. 
top 
It 
command conducted by 
had resulted in the 
resignation or dismissal of battle-hardened English officers such 
as General Evered Poole, Smuts's former army chief. This factor, 
together with what was perceived to be an inadequate level of 
expenditure on modern equipment, was according to some 
commentators an important reason why the British were tending to 
discount South Africa's value as an ally in the 1950's. 24 In the 
1955 parliamentary session various UP speakers brought up this 
concern and continued to raise the implications again of not 
allowing the arming of blacks. Colonel Stanford (natives 
representative Eastern Cape) argued that it was ridiculous to 
expect "a small white population" to defend a country of South 
Africa's size and foresaw difficulties in co-operation with the 
USA and other countries if the "exclusive policy towards our 
Africans" continued. 25 He referred to the difficulties 
experienced earlier that year when a US aircraft carrier visited 
Cape Town with some black crew members. 
On 23 June the British cabinet discussed a memorandum by the 
minister of defence and .the first sea lord on the last stages of 
consultations with Erasmus on defence matters. They reported that 
it seemed likely they could obtain a satisfactory agreement on 
Simonstown and on naval co-operation generally, but that there 
was "little prospect of obtaining a firm promise of South African 
co-operation in the Middle East or of persuading them to abandon 
their project of an African Defence Organisation" . 26 The defence 
minister, Selwyn Lloyd, asked cabinet whether in future 
24 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, pp.58-
59. 
25 House of Assembly Debates, cols 5552 -5553, 12 May 1955. 
26 CAB 128/29 (April Dec. 1955), C.M. (55)17,8, "South 
Africa: Defence Co-operation", 23 June 1955. 
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negotiations he should aim at agreement on Simonstown and naval 
co-operation together with a promise of military staff talks on 
the Middle East or whether "in default of a firm promise 
regarding the Middle East, the whole discussion should be 
adjourned". 
Eden replied that he "would not put too high a value on a South 
African undertaking to contribute towards the defence of the 
Middle East". The Union government of the day, he said, would 
take the decision to go to war or not "in the light of prevailing 
circumstances". Secret staff talks "to which Erasmus might agree" 
would give Britain almost as much assurance of South African 
support in this area "as any formal commitment by the present 
government" . He preferred to concentrate on securing the most 
satisfactory agreement that Britain could obtain on the 
Simonstown base and on naval co-operation in general. Erasmus was 
prepared to sign an agreement which met all Britain's 
requirements. South Africa was prepared to spend £18m on naval 
vessels and this would have the effect of "linking the Royal Navy 
to the South African Navy for some years to come". 
Turning to the question of coloured labour at the base Eden 
stated his concern that while the agreement was defensible on 
strategic grounds it could still be criticised on the grounds of 
"discrimination against Coloured workers". He suggested that 
Britain should try to improve the safeguards which the agreement 
provided them. 27 Discussion ensued on Clause 9 (a) in which South 
Africa agreed to provide Non-European labour in the dockyard on 
the "basis of merit" if a deficiency of qualified European labour 
occurred. 
It was agreed that in further discussions every effort should be 
made to persuade Erasmus to give a firmer assurance that racial 
discrimination would be avoided in the recruitment of new labour 
27 Ibid. 
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for the dockyard. 28 It was also decided that the "primary 
objective" was to get a satisfactory agreement on Simonstown and 
on naval co-operation in general. This should not be "prejudiced" 
by insistence on a firm South African promise of co-operation in 
the defence of the Middle East. 
By 28 June the British cabinet had accepted "improved safeguards" 
for the future recruitment of coloured labour at the dockyards 
and it was decided to make these safeguards public despite the 
possibility that "·.it might provoke demands for similar 
conditions at other Admiralty establishments overseas" . 29 It was 
agreed that this was a "risk which had to be taken in the 
interests of securing full public support in this country for the 
transfer of the Simonstown base to South Africa". It was also 
pointed out that a certain paragraph of the relevant clause 
"might seem to imply" that the Admiralty already discriminated 
extensively on the grounds of race or colour between different 
classes of their employees at Simonstown. The wording should be 
adjusted, it was argued,· "to give less prominence to this point". 
It was agreed that publication would not take place before 4 July 
and that other "interested foreign governments" in Africa and the 
Middle East as well as colonial governments in Africa would be 
informed in advance but only at "the last moment" in order to 
avoid premature disclosures. 30 (The latter indicated a certain 
nervousness about the effect on public opinion in the colonies). 
Berridge notes that the foreign office was not happy with the 
clause relating to British commitments to defend southern Africa 
in the event of a war in which both countries were involved. 31 
The area might be "impossible to defend" in the event of a global 
war. Furthermore, the commitment to staff talks on the Middle 
28 Ibid. 
29 CAB 128/29, C.M. (55)18, 3, "South Africa: Defence Co-
operation", 28 June 1955. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, p.128. 
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East was not a weighty enough "quid pro quo" by the South 
Africans. Nevertheless the cabinet authorised all four drafts of 
the agreement (an agreement for joint defence of the Cape sea 
route with the possibility of other maritime powers joining, the 
Simonstown base, the regional defence commitments and staff talks 
on the Middle East) . 
On 30 June the British cabinet was told by the minister of 
defence, Selwyn Lloyd, that the discussions had been 
"satisfactorily concluded" . 32 The agreement would also be 
registered with UNO despite Erasmus's initial disagreement. 33 The 
results would be announced simultaneously in both countries on 
4 July with the text to be published that afternoon in the form 
of a White Paper. The Labour opposition leader, Hugh Gaitskell, 
would be given an advance copy "shortly before announcements were 
to be made in the House of Commons on 4 July". Earlier, Labour's 
defence spokesman, James Callaghan, had expressed his concern 
about the agreement's possible effect on Britain's purely 
strategic position without mentioning its implications in terms 
of Britain's international relations.~ The latter only became 
a Labour Party concern in the 1960's and led eventually to public 
opinion in the Commonwealth and Britain forcing the Labour 
government to cancel the Simonstown Agreement. 
Berridge notes that the "public version and the reality" of the 
Simonstown Agreement were very different. 35 The assurance from 
South Africa over the "unqualified" use of the base in future did 
not mean much because South Africa viewed British collaboration 
in the Cold War as "axiomatic". The expansion of the South 
African navy was unlikely to be carried through (as events later 
demonstrated) . So the main reason for the whole agreement in 
32 CAB 
Cooperation", 
128/29, C.M. (55) 19,4, 
30 June 1955. 
"South Africa: Defence 
33 Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, p.131. 
34 Ingham, "The British Government and Apartheid", p. 8 
35 Berridge, The Rise and Fall of the White Entente, p. 131. 
246 
British eyes was the need to "spend money on other things" in a 
time of reassessment of defence priorities. It was also because 
the 
symbolic cost of the agreement to the Empire and to 
the relative strength of the English-speakers in the 
Union which the sacrifice of sovereignty over the base 
would entail, and which in the event Churchill alone 
had not been prepared to incur, was now believed to be 
less important. 36 
Out-weighing this cost was the wish to avoid putting "needless 
strain" on the friendship with South Africa in future and that 
is why the "entente" was· more in favour of Pretoria than London, 
concludes Berridge. The broader picture was provided by South 
Africa's gold and uranium supplies and by the high commission 
territories as well as South African opposition to the inclusion 
of independent states in the Commonwealth (still a factor in 
Strijdom's first year of power). The "slender" concession by 
South Africa on staff talks on the Middle East, together with the 
concessions concerning exemption from apartheid for coloured 
workers at the base 
gives the lie to the orthodox view - cleverly inspired 
by the British government that even in its formal 
terms the Simonstown Agreements were very favourable 
to Britain. 37 
South Africa's high commissioner in Britain at the time, Gerhardt 
Jooste, felt that South Africa had made significant concessions 
by allowing the base to be available to Britain in time of war 
and by agreeing to what he considered to be "interference in our 
domestic affairs" ( "inmenging in ans huishuidelike sake") 
36 Ibid. 
37 b' d I i . , p.132. 
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concerning the issue of coloured workers at the naval base. 38 
Jooste noted with satisfaction in his memoirs, however, that the 
South African flag now flew over the base and that when the 
Labour government cancelled the deal in 1975 the base came "for 
once and for all, unconditionally under the control and 
sovereignty of the Republic of South Africa". 39 
A postscript to the whole affair was written in November when the 
cabinet was informed of South Africa's decision to cancel two of 
the six frigates she was supposed to have ordered from Britain 
according to the July agreement. An aggrieved memorandum by the 
British defence minister, Lloyd, noted that the order for six 
frigates had been "a considerable justification in our eyes" for 
Africa. 40 Erasmus had told him transferring Simonstown to 
that he was limited to an 
South 
expenditure of £18m and that rising 
costs and the need for adequate stores and provisions made it 
impossible for him to order all the frigates, but that this would 
be reconsidered "in a year's time". 
Lloyd also reported that Erasmus had suggested during talks in 
October that the Simonstown Agreement should be extended to 
include other countries such as France, Belgium and Portugal. 41 
The British had "persuaded" him it was wiser to have the broad 
shape of the agreement for maritime co-operation settled first 
between the two founder members (Britain and South Africa). Then 
if other countries later agreed, a conference could be held in 
Cape Town. This aspect of the agreement turned out to be a dead 
letter, however, for no other country was prepared to be involved 
with South Africa in such an organisation. The conference on 
38 Gerhardt Jooste, 
Perskor, 1977), p.174. 
39 Ibid. 
Diensherinneringe, (Johannesburg, 
40 PRO, CAB 129/78 (14 Oct. - 31 Dec. 1955), C.P.(55)170, 
"Defence Talks with South Africa: Memorandum by the Minister of 
Defence", 3 November 1955. 
41 Ibid. 
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maritime co-operation never took place, neither did the agreed 
international consultations on the defence of southern Africa 
which lapsed as a result of lack of interest from other powers, 
notably the United States. 
The British-South African staff talks on the Middle East became 
similarly redundant. In the October 1955 discussions Erasmus had 
expressed his fears that the British agenda for such talks might 
imply the commitment of South African forces to the Middle 
East. 42 He had insisted on the talks being 11 informal" with no set 
agenda. British efforts to obtain a Middle Eastern Defence 
Organisation (MEDO) had in any case collapsed and South Africa's 
reluctance to take part was but one facet of this failure. 
The Cape Argus, in June 1956, summarised the situation 
concerning South Africa's failure to obtain any defence 
agreements (other than Simonstown) . Noting that the Commonwealth 
prime ministers' conference in London would be discussing the new 
Soviet competitive co-existence policy, the editor stated "the 
time was ripe" to discuss South Africa's defence as well, 
especially in the light of South Africa's withdrawal from 
commitments to the Middle East. 43 The Commonwealth had a system 
pact for of regional alliances, but 
Africa, the Middle East or 
South Africa had pressed 
South Africa still had no 
the South Atlantic for her to join. 
for the defence of Africa without 
success and there was no defence agreement for the Middle East. 
Instead she was criticised from all sides for her racial policies 
and effectively shunned, so that "she was not in a position to 
undertake commitments in the rest of the world". 
The Simonstown Agreement, it could be argued, thus represented 
both the high and low points of South Africa's attempts to find 
alliances in the western world. Even if, as Berridge points out, 
it favoured South Africa more than Britain, it nevertheless 
42 Ibid. 
43 Cape Argus, 28 June 1956. 
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turned out to be a failure for South Africa in terms of the wider 
strategy of involving major powers in the defence of southern 
Africa. The increasing isolation which South Africa found herself 
in because of her racial policies was both the context and the 
major constraining factor in her foreign relations. The agreement 
might therefore have only provided temporary satisfaction at home 
as a symbolic display of assertive nationalism by South Africa 
and as an assurance to white voters that at least one major power 
remained on her side. 
(c) The High Commission Territories 1954-1958 
Strijdom, like Malan before him, continued to try to persuade 
Britain to hand over the protectorates but, as one author has 
pointed out, these efforts lacked the force and conviction of 
Malan's previous attempts.« Strijdom raised the issue personally 
at the 1956 Commonwealth prime ministers' conference but 
experienced the usual polite British refusal to entertain the 
thought of transfer "at the present time" and until the 
inhabitants had been consulted.~ 
English-language newspapers such as The Star and the Rand Daily 
Mail adopted a resigned attitude to Strijdom's failure noting 
that he was not personally to blame and that the United Party 
would have received the same British response.% British policy 
towards the inhabitants of the territories and South Africa's 
policies towards its own black population had diverged to the 
point where it was politically impossible for Britain to allow 
transfer. As The Star put it, "Britain must dig its heels in 
until and unless more tolerant policies are followed in Cape 
Town" . 47 Or, as the Rand Daily Mail editor more cynically noted: 
« Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.21. 
45 Rand Daily Mail, 6 July 1956. 
46 Ibid. 
47 The Star, 26 July 1956. 
250 
If the apartheid state is all that its 
founders believe it to be the time must come 
when the people of the protectorates clamour 
to be incorporated. We have only to wait 
patiently until they see the advantages of 
our system and petition the British 
Government to be handed over. 48 
Public opinion was a key factor, at least for the British 
government. No British government could have afforded the storm 
of protest that would have arisen in Britain and in the 
Commonwealth if moves had been made to hand the territories over 
to South Africa's apartheid government. For Strijdom, on the 
other hand, it was a matter of prestige to continue the 
Nationalist campaign to incorporate the territories but, being 
an astute politician, he probably realised that it was not enough 
of an election issue to warrant pressing too hard for it. 
Furthermore, as Geldenhuys noted, he was probably aware that any 
attempt to get the territories would be fruitless. 49 Yet, he had 
to make an attempt for the sake of Nationalist opinion. 
He also probably knew that by keeping up the pressure on Britain 
to hand them over valuable concessions could be extracted in 
other areas, notably defence. The Simonstown negotiations and 
negotiations on defence co-operation in general were influenced 
by these considerations. The cabinet memorandum by Swinton and 
Alexander in 1954 had referred to the "whole range of co-
operation" with South Africa in southern Africa that would be 
"jeopardised" if no agreement was reached on Simonstown. 50 
Furthermore, if pressure was kept up, concessions on certain 
48 Rand Daily Mail, 6 July 1956. 
49 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.21 
50 PRO, CAB 129/70, C. (54) 291, "South Africa Defence Talks", 
15 September, 1954. 
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aspects of the administration of the protectorates could be 
obtained, such as strategic military access for South Africa and 
the return of political refugees. This was aided by the awareness 
on the part of the British of the weakness of their position in 
southern Africa, first revealed during the Seretse affair. A 
brief look at some of the correspondence in the dominions off ice 
files for the period reveals this factor as well as considerable 
awareness by the British of the motivations behind South African 
policy towards the protectorates. 
In February 1955 the high commissioner, commenting on a remark 
by Verwoerd in the House of Assembly to the effect that it was 
necessary to arrest the progress of British policy in the 
territories because they differed from South African policies, 
said in a note to the CRO that most of the South African 
arguments for annexation had been from F.C. Erasmus for "defence 
reasons". 51 Now, however, "inevitably there were more statements 
in Parliament". The CRO noted that there were "contradictions" 
in Nationalist policy towards the territories. 52 On the one hand 
they needed to have "slogans arousing racial fears in order to 
win votes at home" and on the other hand, they had to try to 
"minimise" racial slogans in order to show that South African 
racial policy was the same as that in the high commission 
territories. 
On 2 March the Rand Daily Mail reported Strijdom's remarks in 
parliament concerning the protectorates. He had said that he was 
just as concerned as Malan had been about transfer and that it 
was "intolerable in a dangerous world" to have a breach between 
Britain and South Africa over native policy in Africa. 53 
51 PRO, DO 119, File 1181 (1955: Administration of the High 
Commission Territories, Future of), No. 15, High Commissioner 
Cape Town to CRO London, 4 February 1955. 
52 Ibid., No. 65, T.V. Scrivenor (CRO) to High Commissioner, 
24 August 1955. 
53 Rand Daily Mail, 2 March 1955. 
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Liesching, a few weeks later, seemed to think the question of 
transfer was "quiescent at this time" and that nobody in the 
Union had mentioned it to him. 54 He wondered whether Strijdom 
before he took office knew of the "firm but friendly" warnings 
given from London about the "head-on collision and deadlock" 
which would ensue if the Union claims were pressed. He referred 
to documents like Attlee's message to Malan on 2 November 1949 
and Lord Swinton's personal letter to Malan on 1 April 1954. 
He had asked Forsyth, secretary of external affairs, to mention 
it to Strijdom and after some hesitation Forsyth had said he 
would mention it to Visser (in charge of the prime minister's 
department) and if Strijdom started to talk of transfer he would 
remind him of the UK position. He also promised not to reveal 
this "personal initiative" and said he now had confirmation about 
the "unchanged position" of the British concerning transfer. 
Liesching ended this report by noting that there was a 
possibility that Strijdom's closest official advisers were 
ignorant of the secret exchanges with Malan in April of the 
previous year. This was because of the separation of the prime 
minister's department from the department of external affairs 
announced by Strijdom when he came to power. 
In April Strijdom made some more statements in the Assembly 
concerning both the protectorates and the republican issue which 
were interpreted as "bellicose" by the CR0. 55 Strijdom had said 
he was reasserting his government's policies concerning the 
protectorates, would not "leave it where it was" and would 
proceed with a republic when there was adequate voter support. 
Did this presage a reopening of the transfer question in the near 
future and a "stiffening" of the Union's position, asked the CRO? 
A.W. Snelling, for the high commissioner's office in Cape Town, 
54 PRO, DO 119, File 1181, No. 25, H.C. (Liesching) to G. 
Laithwaite CRO, 7 April 1955. 
55 Ibid., No.32, CRO to Snelling, Cape Town, 22 April 1955. 
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replied that while this interpretation was substantially correct 
Strijdom's statements were made at the end of a "long and 
vigorous" debate on the prime minister's vote and that three 
other speakers had raised the issue of transfer. 56 One of them, 
G.F.H. Becker (NP Cradock), had made an "unfriendly reference" 
to the UK and the proposed hydro-electric scheme in Basutoland. 
A. Barlow, the UP "rebel" for Hospital Hill, had declared the 
time was ripe for the Union to carry out the contract made before 
Union and J.H. Fouche' (NP Rustenburg) had declared the "danger" 
of the territories for the Union. 
As Snelling put it, Strijdom "could hardly fail to reply and 
under the circumstances what he said was not immoderate". There 
were doubts whether the· question would come to the fore again 
until the October or November conferences because "the NP pack" 
was then in full cry after its "constitutional quarry" (the 
removal of the coloured vote) and had its hands full. 
Furthermore, it was "not in character" for South Africa's 
government to "shout loudly about the Protectorates when they are 
hopeful that if they are nice to us for a little while Simonstown 
will fall into their lap". 
In June, 1955 the Commonwealth 
Liesching saying he was glad 
secretary, Lord Home, wrote to 
Strijdom' s statements did not 
presage immediate future requests for transfer but that he was 
also concerned about possible actions and practical measures in 
the future when he did. 57 He asked for Liesching' s views on such 
measures and on various preparatory measures such as the removal 
of Bechuanaland HQ from Mafeking. He expected a "gradual 
tightening of the screw" by South Africa in the form of a 
"withdrawal of one facility after another" rather than a "total 
blockade" . The example of South Africa's earlier refusal to allow 
students from the protectorates at universities and schools in 
the Union was the first such action. Now, perhaps, embargoes on 
56 Ibid., No.33, A.W. Snelling to CRO, 10 May 1955. 
57 Ibid., No. 3 5, Home to Liesching, 11 June 1955. 
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medical specialists, vaccines, research facilities, transport to 
Swaziland, exports or blockades of maize sales or a demand for 
the revision of the customs treaty could come from the Union. It 
was necessary, he said, to see which measures could be countered 
"without too much expense" and which could not. There was a need 
for the early appreciation of South Africa's intentions and plans 
in advance, especially concerning "unfriendly acts". 58 
Enclosed with Home's letter to Liesching was a highly significant 
memorandum, undated and unsigned but presumably drawn up for the 
Commonwealth secretary by officials of the department, outlining 
alternatives facing the British and possible "counter-actions" 
in the event of South African hostility to the protectorates.• 
It can be regarded as one of the first official British 
initiatives concerning the drawing up of contingency plans for 
the worst-case scenario of a major deterioration of relations 
with South Africa. Although confined to the protectorates issue, 
it entertained the possibility of economic and other sanctions 
and their repercussions for both sides. 
The memorandum began by ruling out the weapon of withdrawal of 
labour supplies to the Union "as Basutoland depended too much on 
it". It went on to suggest that international sanctions or the 
withdrawal of defence co-operation could be a "two-edged sword". 
It outlined all the areas of co-operation between the British and 
South Africa that could be affected by hostility. They included 
the "Memorandum of Understanding" concerning South African gold 
supplies and South Africa's access to the London market for loans 
(but it was noted that the former agreement had lapsed in 1954 
and the latter had not been used by South Africa since 1947 
although many private investors "might back off"). The CDFC 
(Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation) , which worked 
closely with the UK government could, it suggested, be "induced" 
to alter its lending policy to South Africa although it had 
58 Ibid. 
59 File 1181, No.35, "Memorandum", n.d. 
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recently lent money to ESCOM and the South African Industrial 
Cellulose Corporation (SAICC) . 
As for South Africa's gold, which South Africa had sold 
exclusively in London since the reopening of the gold market in 
1954, they could •easily be sold via the Swiss if Britain blocked 
them•. If South Africa then blocked British imports in return it 
could •affect our gold earnings", the memo warned. 
By and large, the Union co-operates extremely well in 
the Sterling Area matters, and any diminution in 
their co-operation might prejudice the success of our 
policies, eg: in respect of convertibility [of 
sterling] 
On uranium it said the UK was committed via the CDA (Combined 
Development Agency) to a large loan programme to South Africa for 
the uranium mines and "would rely almost wholly on South African 
supplies until 1962, with minor exceptions••. 00 
On Simonstown the memorandum noted that the case for handing 
Simonstown to South Africa rested on the premise that "it would 
be better, given certain safeguards, to have Simonstown in the 
hands of a co-operative South African government than to try to 
operate it ourselves in the face of a bitterly opposed South 
Africa ... It would not therefore be in the UK's interest to use 
delaying tactics on Simonstown as a means of retaliation quite 
apart from the obvious difficulties of doing so" . 61 
On defence planning and equipment the memo said the South African 
approach concerning firm commitments in peace and war was "slow, 
leisurely" and •unrealistic•, but the UK position was that of a 
"suitor" and was "weak•, so it could not do anything until SA had 
a "more realistic approach". 
00 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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The report concluded that all the above-mentioned measures that 
could be taken by Britain were "too costly" and the provision of 
alternative transport systems for the protectorates would be 
equally so. However, "any measures to develop the territories 
towards self-sufficiency would help, as was going on at present 
in education and medicine". The territories would never be 
completely independent of South Africa and were "vulnerable to 
pressure". Only Bechuanaland could withstand a blockade with 
increased UK aid. 
A later note from the deputy high commissioner in reply adopted 
a more sanguine view of the Union's intentions than those mooted 
above. It criticised the suggestion that South Africa's acts 
against the territories would "necessarily be hostile in nature" 
and said instead that "I think we are treated better by the Union 
that we would be treated financially and otherwise by any British 
territory". 62 The real problem was finding ways to make the 
territories self-sufficient in economic and social services, 
internal security, communications and the ability to absorb 
labour. 
In July Strijdom was reported to have said after a Senate debate 
on the prime minister's vote that the time was not right to 
press the incorporation ·issue again. 63 He said that a request for 
a conference of the UK and SA over the protectorates had been 
refused by the UK on the grounds that the time was not suitable. 
But he reiterated the call for transfer and gave all the South 
African reasons again. 
This time his call received unexpected support in the British 
House of Lords where the former governor-general of Nigeria, Lord 
62 DO 119, File 1204 (1956-60: Administration, High 
Commission Territories. Notes on aspects likely to arise in 
connection with transfer), Note by Deputy High Commissioner on 
possible Union withdrawal of facilities, 1955. 
63 File 1181, 
representative, Cape 
18 June 1955. 
No. 37, Presse Telegram from the UK 
Town, to the High Commissioner, Pretoria, 
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Milverton, argued for incorporation. On 27 July the Commonwealth 
secretary, Lord Home, wrote to Liesching saying that he had had 
to rebut Milverton' s speech and had to reiterate again the 
British policy statement to the effect that the time was not ripe 
"according to conditions that exist at the present time" and had 
again expressed the hope that co-operation with South Africa 
"over a wide range of practical issues would continue". 64 
A leader article in Die Transvaler of 28 July then claimed that 
"the weary old British formula "of time not ripe under present 
conditions" was "trotted out again". 65 This, the article claimed, 
"was a case of internal British politics and not being able to 
lose the support of radicals in the UK". Time would eventually 
mean a "process of wearing away" and would "eventually bring the 
Protectorates to their intended destination'', the article 
claimed. Lord Milverton's speech "would help". A few weeks 
later, Dagbreek en Sondagnuus also referred to the British 
response to the question of incorporation.~ In an article 
entitled "This Week in Politics" by W. van Heerden, it was 
stated: 
We might as well cease bluffing ourselves 
with the idea that we will achieve transfer 
of the Protectorates in the present 
circumstances in the sense in which it was 
intended in 1910. 
This was all because of British political reasons, the article 
went on to say, but it was hoped the UK would recognise the 
"importance of the Protectorates for South Africa's apartheid 
programme". A common British, South African and Central African 
Federation policy would be best for the territories, and would 
be "a boost for separate development" in southern Africa. 
64 Ibid., No.46, Home - Liesching, 27 July 1955. 
65 Ibid., No.48, Die Transvaler, 28 July 1955. 
~File 1181, No.56, Dagbreek en Sondagnuus, 14 August 1955 
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Lord Home wrote to Liesching in comment upon the Dagbreek article 
and asked whether he thought it meant a new attempt by Strijdom 
to try out unofficially a new approach to 
A draft reply from Liesching claimed the 
the protectorates.fil 
article 
"typical Nationalist Party double think" concerning 
was needed to justify apartheid on occasions when NP 
would try to "minimise differences" over policy. 68 A 
represented 
slogans but 
politicians 
full reply 
to Home from G.H. Baxter for 
then also pointed out that 
independent" and 
Strijdom, Naude', 
"moderate" 
the high commissioner on 18 July 
the Dagbreek was a "nominally 
Nationalist paper with Verwoerd, 
etc. on its Board of Trustees. 69 Van Heerden' s 
article was his own and it was unlikely that the South African 
government would agree to co-operate with Britain and the CAF 
concerning the territories nor was it likely "that Apartheid 
would be dropped yet as a slogan". 
Towards the end of 1955 , during general defence discussions with 
the British in October, South Africa's defence minister, F.C. 
Erasmus, indicated that South Africa wanted discussions 
concerning the surveying of possible radar sites in the 
protectorates. This was to be the first of several defence-
related demands made in the following years. In 1957 it was 
overflying rights, in 1958 and 1959 it was right of access to 
South African troops through Bechuanaland. 70 The British proved 
amenable concerning radar sites and overflying rights but balked 
at allowing physical access to the Caprivi 
Drift in Bechuanaland. 71 While it was felt 
Strip via Martins 
that South Africa 
67 DO 119, File 1181, No. 56, Home - Liesching, 15 August 
1955. 
68 Ibid., No. 58, Liesching - Home, n.d. 
69 Ibid., No. 61, G.H. Baxter - Home, 18 August 1955. 
70 DO 119, File 1193 (1958: Defence. Transit of UDF Vehicles 
and Personnel through High Commission Territories) and File 1205 
(Defence: High Commission Territories, General). 
71 File 1205, No. 2, Secretary of State Commonwealth Relations 
- High Commissioner, Cape Town, 27 January 1959. 
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may have had genuine defence reasons for such requests, in 
particular the first, concerning the last it was also felt that 
there was an element of political manoeuvre and perhaps a desire 
to "embarrass" the British government. 
In November 1956 the British minister of defence, Selwyn Lloyd, 
reported favourably on the radar site request to his cabinet 
colleagues in London. He reported that he had asked Erasmus not 
to ignore British industry when purchasing radar equipment but 
that Erasmus had replied that price would be the "governing 
factor". 72 However, the talks had been "friendly" and Erasmus 
appeared "well-satisfied". Britain had agreed to allow such radar 
sites (according to an undertaking made by Swinton in June) 
subject to joint surveying and certain technical safeguards 
concerning the building and control of such sites. Lloyd wrote: 
I think he [Erasmus] genuinely tried to meet 
our wishes [and] we felt it advantageous to 
be as helpful to him as possible ... The 
fields in which we can be co-operative with 
South Africa are limited .... it may help over 
more difficul.t issues (such as the Gold 
Coast in the Commonwealth) if we can 
accumulate what goodwill we can over less 
controversial issues now. 
By this time the South Africans were seriously considering a 
change of emphasis in their approach to the territories. The 
Tomlinson commission report of 1954 (the complete summary of its 
findings were only released in March 1956) recommended treating 
the territories as potential homelands which would add 45% to the 
72 PRO, CAB129/78 (14 October 31 December1955), 
C. P. (55) 170, Memorandum by the Minister of Defence: Defence Talks 
with South Africa, No.5. Radar Early Warning System, 3 November 
1955. 
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area of the native trust areas envisaged in 1936. 73 In February 
1956 Verwoerd indicated the direction in which the government was 
moving when he replied to one of the natives representatives who 
had claimed that the removal of the coloured franchise made 
transfer of the protectorates impossible. He said that even if 
the coloureds were on a common roll the inhabitants of the 
protectorates 
"value their 
would still reject incorporation because they 
independent existence" and did not want to be 
swallowed by the Union. 74 Only South Africa's apartheid policy, 
said Verwoerd, guaranteed their independence. British policy, on 
the other hand, meant more white colonisation and the loss of 
economic control. South Africa would give the inhabitants the 
chance to join their ''blood brothers'' in the native areas of 
South Africa. 75 
The high commissioner's office had interpreted an earlier speech 
by Verwoerd on the same topic (during the no confidence debate) 
as meaning "transfer was necessary to save the Protectorates from 
British colonial policy". 76 Officials expected that the question 
of transfer would be reopened by South Africa based on a "six-
point claim" and that therefore there was a need to counter it 
with detailed reasons why there would be no transfer, being 
careful "not to make an indictment of South Africa's policy on 
apartheid" since "most South Africans agree with it" and "an 
indictment would not be helpful". 
The language of this particular British assessment of South 
Africa's motives is significant. Not only did it, by omission, 
73 Wilson and Thompson, (eds), The Oxford History of South 
Africa, Vol.2, South Africa 1860 -1966, p.500. 
74 DO 119, File 1182 ( 1955: Administration of the High 
Commission Territories), No.43, Extract from the Speech by the 
Minister of Native Affairs on the South African Constitutional 
Amendment Bill, 1956 Joint Sitting, 23 February 1956. 
75 Ibid. 
76 File 1182, No. 41, Office of the High Commissioner, Cape 
Town - R.W.D. Fowler, CRO, 11 February 1956. 
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assume that "South African" was synonymous with "white South 
African" and thus failed entirely to take account of black South 
African hostility both to apartheid and the issue of transfer, 
but it revealed clearly the underlying policy on which the whole 
British approach to South Africa had been based since 1948 or 
earlier: namely, that of not antagonising the white government 
too much by criticising its race policies. This time the context 
was the protectorates issue. At other times, as we have seen, it 
was defence or economics or Commonwealth co-operation in general. 
But the seemingly firm British refusal to give way "at the 
present time" on transfer masked an even firmer determination not 
to allow this issue or any other to impair relations with the 
South Africans to the point of risking a complete break. This had 
been made clear during the Seretse crisis by the Labour 
government of the time. The Conservatives were just as 
determined. As Liesching put it to a meeting of CRO officials in 
January 1956, "We should never reject a request from the Union 
to discuss the problems of the Territories but we should, as in 
the past, do our best to avoid a head-on collision". 77 
At that same meeting in January 1956 Lord Home had wondered how 
long Britain would be able to maintain its "apparently negative 
attitude" in the face of South African demands for transfer. He 
was answered by one official who thought the "governing factors" 
were "the British provision of capital for the Union and British 
defence assistance". Transfer, al though not practicable for South 
Africa, was "a permanent plank in the Government's platform for 
prestige reasons". 78 Liesching then predicted (correctly as it 
turned out) that Strijdom would raise the issue at the next prime 
ministers' meeting or before the next general election. However, 
he felt that Strijdom was "astute" enough to realise that Britain 
would not agree and that he would not pursue the matter to the 
point of a "real clash". The agreement over Simonstown and the 
77 Ibid., No. 38A, Minutes of Meeting at CRO, 26 January 
1956. 
78 Ibid. 
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support given by Britain at UNO to South Africa had "helped 
greatly to ease relations between the Union and the United 
Kingdom". It was clear therefore, added Lord Home, that Britain 
should continue with its "rather negative attitude" and that no 
initiatives concerning transfer could take place until the 
Union's policies "were such as to persuade the African 
inhabitants that transfer was desirable". 
In May 1956, before the prime ministers' meeting, the high 
commissioner's office in Cape Town had telegrammed the CRO with 
some surprisingly defeatist thoughts concerning the future of the 
territories. 79 It was felt that preparing counter-measures to 
sanctions by South Africa would be "unrealistic". Such measures 
would primarily be directed against "HMG" (Her Majesty's 
Government) and if "HMG" were not in a position to bring "massive 
pressure" to bear on the Union government it would have to 
recognise "frankly" that "in certain circumstances the 
Territories will be unable to resist Union pressure and will have 
to be abandoned". Again, the advice was tendered to the effect 
that, instead of counter-measures, moves towards greater self-
sufficiency should be adopted or, alternatively, if South Africa 
were to impose sanctions "the situation could only be restored 
by such counter-pressure by the UK government as would be strong 
enough and well-enough directed to make the Union abandon their 
measures". 
At the June prime ministers' meeting, Strij dom, as was noted 
earlier in this section, did raise the question of transfer and 
was duly rebuffed (if somewhat politely) by the British. The 
official statement mentioned that the position of the British 
government was restated "and agreement was not reached" . 80 Die 
Burger then reported that although there was disappointment in 
political circles ( "teleurstelling in politieke kringe") over the 
79 File 1204, No. 21, T.V. Scrivenor, Cape Town - R.W.D. 
Fowler, CRO, 23 May 1956. 
80 The Star, 5 July 1956. 
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failed negotiations there was no "despair". 81 "We will try and 
try again", and the government "would not let the matter rest". 
The public were reminded that the British had earlier conceded 
to General Hertzog that "thorough consultation" with the 
inhabitants did not necessarily mean that their "permission" had 
to be given before transfer took place. This concession provided 
"hope" for the future. 
The World, however, in commenting later in the year on the 
territories, expressed the gratitude of black South Africans to 
the British government for promising at "just 
that Basutoland and the other protectorates 
incorporated in South Africa if the people of 
the right time" 
would only be 
the territories 
"gave their consent 11 • 82 The promise would "serve to allay any 
fears that earlier discussions might have aroused". 
There was, however, not much more that the British would hear of 
transfer from Strijdom's side officially. In May 1957 Strijdom 
was asked in parliament what the reaction of the government was 
to the fact that at the prime ministers• conference in the 
previous year it had emerged that South Africa and Britain were 
applying very different policies when it came to the high 
commission territories and the native reserves. The one was 
allowing white capital and expertise to develop the high 
commission territories while the other was refusing white capital 
and investment in the reserves. South Africa, it was pointed out, 
would have to spend at least as much on the reserves as Britain 
had on the high commission territories in order to justify their 
incorporation. 83 
Strijdom, in one of his last statements on the protectorates 
issue, replied that the matter was of "great importance" to South 
Africa in terms of relations between South Africa and Britain 
81 Die Burger, 9 July 1956. 
82 The World, 13 October 1956. 
83 House of Assembly Debates, col. 5620, 2 May 1957. 
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and in terms of "relations with the non-white races in southern 
Africa". 84 It was, he said, "a tragedy" that no South African 
prime minister had succeeded over the previous 48 years in 
getting transfer of the territories. He had raised the matter as 
had his predecessors and he had "put our case strongly but in a 
friendly way, without success". While he was alive he would 
tackle the case again "when the opportunity presented itself" and 
South Africa could "never abandon her attitude in this 
connection". 
But, he continued, these were not matters to be discussed at a 
Commonwealth conference, rather a "matter of inter-governmental 
negotiation". It had nothing to do with the other Commonwealth 
countries. 85 He felt it was wrong of the British to apply 
different policies to those of South Africa in the territories 
in view of their possible future incorporation into South Africa 
and it was wrong of the British to say South Africa should not 
interfere. South Africa would treat the protectorates like her 
own "native" territories and would not allow "white" capital 
in. 86 
In London discussion continued concerning the possible future 
motives and implications of South African policy towards the 
territories. In January 1958, for example, 
at the prospect of the issue being raised 
alarm bells were rung 
again just before the 
imminent South African general election. A cabinet memorandum 
stated that the forthcoming general election in South Africa in 
late April "may create new tensions" in relations between the 
National Party government and the United Kingdom. 87 Among the 
84 House of Assembly Debates, col.5272, 2 May 1957. 
85 Ibid., cols.5272-3, 2 May 1957. 
86 Ibid., col. 5273, 2 May 1957. 
87 PRO, CAB 129/91 (2 January - 25 February 1958), C. (58) 12, 
"The High Commission Territories in South Africa", Memorandum by 
the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 20 January 
1958. 
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issues expected to provide Nationalist leaders with the raw 
material for "extreme statements" was the future of the high 
commission territories. 
Two matters could be "blown up" for election purposes to 
proportions which, however unjustifiable, "might cause us a great 
deal of trouble". These were the development of minerals and 
railway communications in Swaziland, or defence facilities for 
Union forces in Bechuanaland and Basutoland. Regarding the 
former, it was suggested that a contracting bid by a South 
African firm (Anglo-American) together with a British consortium 
(led by Guest, Keen and Nettlefolds) be accepted despite the 
possibility it "may cause some controversy with a section of the 
Conservative Party in the House of Commons" and despite possible 
criticism that it would be "the thin [end of the] wedge to extend 
South African influence in Swaziland" . 88 
Similarly on the question of defence facilities in the high 
commission territories it was suggested that the cabinet should 
accept certain South African overflying rights and right of 
access to radar sites in Basutoland but that the emergency route 
requested for South Africa through Bechuanaland should be 
rejected. The latter would be "politically dangerous" since it 
went through Bamangwato territory. The memorandum warned, 
however, of a tough Union response to such a refusal. It could 
mean a possible "renunciation by the Union of the 1910 Customs 
Agreeme11t 11 • The territories "would not be able to retaliate". The 
Commonwealth secretary did not know if the warning was "too 
pessimistic", nor did he wish to suggest that Britain 
"should ... be swayed by fears of possible Union action" but that 
it was "right to reckon with the possible consequences". 
Negotiations were to be kept going, however, "until the elections 
were over". 
A year later, when Strijdom had died and had been succeeded by 
88 Ibid. 
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Verwoerd, the decision to reject the original South African 
request was communicated by the Commonwealth secretary to the 
high commissioner in Cape Town. He wrote: 
The attention which the 1958 arrangements 
has aroused in Parliament here has confirmed 
our view that it would be politically unwise 
for you to accede to Mr Erasmus's request 
[to reconnoitre a new route via Martins 
Drift to Caprivi instead of the South West 
corner of the territory via Ghanzi and 
Gobabis) . 89 
South African protests that the British were being "unco-
operative" were to be rejected. Their attempts to gain physical 
access to the territory were described as a "political manoeuvre 
designed either to obtain a footing in the territory or to 
embarrass us". But another less politically dangerous route 
through Bechuanaland could be approved , preferably the one via 
Ghanzi and Gobabis. 
The background to this relatively strong rejection of South 
African interference in the territories was provided by the 
changes in policy towards them both in Britain and in South 
Africa at the end of the decade. In line with moves towards 
faster decolonisation in the rest of Africa, in 1958 the British 
had decided to grant Basutoland a fully elected legislative 
council, a move which heralded a new move to self-government for 
the territories. It also prompted one of the last angry reactions 
from the Strijdom government which had struggled to accept 
independent African colonies to the far north but which now felt 
threatened by such moves closer to home. Indian Opinion commented 
that their anger exposed "one more weakness of apartheid". It was 
not the friendship of the Africans that they [the Nationalists) 
wanted, claimed Indian Opinion; they were instead trying to 
89 DO 119, File 1205, No. 2, Secretary of State, CRO - High 
Commissioner, Cape Town, 27 January 1959. 
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"neutralise the movement of a united front against apartheid 
throughout Africa". 90 Strijdom' s earlier attempts to convince 
emergent Africa that he sincerely welcomed independence were now, 
it was claimed, proved to be false. 
By that time, however, the question of transfer had become 
subsumed by the rapid decolonisation policy of the British 
government in Africa, which had, in turn, implications for the 
future independence of the high commission territories. This was 
also accompanied by a decisive change in policy from Verwoerd's 
side once he had succeeded Strijdom as prime minister. By 1959 
Verwoerd had begun to recognise that the destiny of the 
territories did not lie in their transfer to the Union. 
Inevitably it marked the abandonment by South Africa of any 
further attempts to obtain the territories and instead a shift 
of emphasis towards the 
homelands and states, 
economically dependent 
future. 91 
idea of a "constellation" of independent 
all of which would be politically and 
on South Africa for the indefinite 
90 Indian Opinion, 1 August 1958. 
91 See Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, pp.194-
198 and T.M. Shaw, "Southern Africa: Co-operation and Conflict 
in an International Sub-System", Journal of Modern African 
Studies (JMAS), Vol.12, -No.4, 1974, pp.633-655. 
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Chapter 12: Strijdom and Independent Africa 
(a) The changing Nationalist attitude to decolonisation 
Closely linked to the i.ssue of the high commission territories 
was the Nationalist attitude to British decolonisation policies 
in Africa. Britain's moves towards granting independence to 
territories in West and East Africa were not as close to home as 
the later moves towards self-government in high commission 
territories such as Basutoland, moves which, as we have seen, 
occasioned considerable unease in South Africa. Nevertheless, it 
was during Strijdom's premiership that the significant change in 
emphasis occurred concerning South Africa's attitude to 
independent black states to the north. It did not happen at once 
and the moves to welcome such states within the Commonwealth were 
somewhat hesitant and grudging at first. Eric Louw's ground-
breaking speech at Pretoria University in 1957 (in which he 
welcomed independent Africa in return for non-interference in 
each other's internal affairs)' took place some three years after 
Strijdom's accession to power. 
Even after the recognition of Ghana and its acceptance by South 
Africa into the Commonwealth, National Party voices continued to 
criticise the speed and manner in which Britain was proceeding 
with its decolonisation policy and continued to predict dire 
consequences for South Africa from such a policy. There were 
indications, also, of much soul-searching over the question of 
diplomatic exchanges and the possible establishment of a "guest-
house" for foreign black diplomats in Pretoria. Louw advocated 
a policy of "festina lente" ("make haste slowly") and admitted 
that white opinion would have to be prepared for such changes. 2 
Essentially the Nationalist change in attitude to independent 
African states could be explained as tactical rather than 
1 Miller, Survey of Commonwealth Affairs, p.133. 
2 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.13. 
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ideological. As Seiler points out, it was only during the late 
195 O's, in reaction to heightened attacks on South Africa's 
domestic policies, that the South African government began to 
elaborate a coherent foreign, defence and development policy. 3 Up 
until then the basic preoccupation of the Nationalists was with 
what Seiler terms "a continuing, inward preoccupation with the 
achievement and consolidation of power''. 4 
Louw's new Africa policy can thus be placed in the context of 
what Seiler calls a need to "redefine the situation" facing South 
Africa. A redefinition was a necessary response to "external 
stimuli" which were the "threats and opportunities" existing in 
the external environment confronting South Africa. One such 
threat was the existence of potentially hostile black states 
which would join an already existing alliance of anti-apartheid 
and anti-colonial countries headed by India. On the other hand, 
the "opportunity" was provided by indications that such states 
could be induced to modify or lessen their hostility towards 
South Africa if South Africa were to profess a genuine desire to 
be friendly and to promise rewards in terms of trade and 
technical co-operation. 
This approach could be tested first with Ghana whose relatively 
slow movement towards independence, as Miller points out, 5 
''allowed for considerable speculation about what attitude South 
Africa would take". As we have seen, Malan had expressed his 
displeasure as early as 1951 about the possibility of 
Commonwealth membership for Britain's ex-colonies and Britain had 
assured him that there would not be any admittance of new members 
without full consultation. 6 The British approach had been to a 
3 J. Seiler, ''South African Perspectives and Responses to 
External Pressures", Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 13, 
No.3, 1975, pp. 448-9. 
4 Ibid., p.448. 
5 Miller, Survey, p.133. 
6 See chapter 6, p.137. 
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large extent conditioned by South Africa's attitude although it 
had been made clear to Strijdom and Louw in 1955 that Britain 
would go ahead with or without South Africa's agreement to bring 
her colonies to independence. 7 Even so, there continued to be 
considerable hesitation and speculation on the part of Britain 
about the South African attitude. 
In September and December of 1955 the first public indications 
of a more congenial South African attitude to the possibility of 
independent black African states emerged during speeches made by 
Strijdom and Louw. In 1956, during the prime minister's vote, the 
opposition leader, Strauss, quoted Strijdom's and Louw's remarks 
in the course of a speech which essentially outlined the identity 
of views held by the UP and the NP on foreign policy. 8 Strauss 
criticised Strijdom 
( 1955) that whites 
for having said in the previous session 
should take joint action with their 
counterparts to the north to "protect the white heritage"; but 
then praised him for saying on 22 September 1955 that South 
Africa should not act towards the non-white countries as if they 
were enemies but should instead co-operate, consult and express 
friendship towards them. He also praised Eric Louw for saying the 
same on 31 December 1955, in the course of an announcement of 
changes in the organisation of the department of external 
affairs. He now asked Strijdom to make a more comprehensive 
policy statement on the issue in the light of these indications 
of a policy change. 
Strijdom' s reply expressed gratification for Strauss' s desire for 
"one voice" on foreign affairs and also claimed that "any 
sensible person" would see the need for the white communities of 
Africa to "stand together" . 9 At the same time, however, it stood 
to reason that South Africa "should not make enemies of black 
7 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp.326-328 
and p.400. 
8 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 4097-8, 23 April, 1956. 
9 Ibid., col.4104, 23 April 1956. 
271 
states to the north" and that his aim, as he had said the 
previous year, was, "nations and governments acknowledging and 
respecting each other's right to exist .... There is a place in 
Africa for White states and there is a place for non-White 
states." 
These statements were noted by the British who saw them as 
evidence of a change of attitude by South Africa towards 
Commonwealth membership of independent African states. On 28 
November 1955 a memorandum by the Commonwealth secretary, Home, 
suggested that the British high commissioner, Liesching, pave the 
way for a meeting with Strijdom during the 1956 conference of 
prime ministers, on the Gold Coast issue. 
All our experience suggests that a 
relatively long time must be allowed for 
domestic consideration if the Union 
Government are to be brought to accept or 
acquiesce in a proposition so inherently 
distasteful to them. 10 
However, Strijdom's "recent statements" honouring the right of 
Non-European states in Africa were seen "by some" as a "softening 
of the Union's approach to the Gold Coast question" and 
"partially opened the door" to such a British approach. Liesching 
had told Home that a "personal" approach should be made in mid-
December in which he could deploy some of the arguments most 
likely to secure a favourable response from the "Afrikaner mind" 
and to elicit enough reaction to carry the matter further. He 
could then bring Strij dom' s views and his own impressions of 
first contacts with Strijdom to London. It was also advised that 
the opposition leader, Strauss, be informed in "strict 
confidence" of how matters were developing "in order to prevent 
the latter taking up an attitude which might be embarrassing to 
10 PRO, 
C.P. (55)182, 
Secretary of 
CAB 129/78 (14 October 31 December 1955) , 
"Commonwealth Membership: Memorandum by the 
State for Commonwealth Relations, 28 November 1955. 
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us through ignorance of how things stand". 
On 1 December the British cabinet discussed this memorandum and 
Home reiterated his argument about preparing for the 1956 meeting 
with Strijdom. 11 He noted that the South African government 
appeared to be "less rigid" concerning the issue of an 
independent Gold Coast. The colonial secretary, A. Lennox-Boyd, 
then noted that the Gold Coast would probably have self-
government by the end of 1956 or "at the latest" not before mid 
1957. Anthony Eden, the prime minister, stated his opinion that 
it would be preferable if the question of admittance to 
Commonwealth membership did not have to be considere.d at the June 
1956 Commonwealth conference and that it "would not be altogether 
disadvantageous" if discussions about constitutional development 
in the Gold Coast should take some further time. 
In discussion, strong approval was expressed for the general 
ruling that, in the context of Commonwealth membership, it was 
desirable that the term "full self-government" should be used 
instead of the word "independence" since the latter implied that 
the constitutional development of the colonial territories 
entailed the probability that they would "secede from the 
Commonwealth" and it might give unnecessary encouragement to this 
idea". The cabinet then authorised Liesching's approach and also 
decided to discontinue all reference to "independence" and rather 
to use "full self-government" in reference to constitutional 
development of colonial territories. 
Liesching reported back on his meeting with Strijdom and Louw in 
a letter of 13 December 1955 and noted that he had successfully 
broken the news of Britain's intention to introduce Ghana to the 
Commonweal th, 12 despite Strij dom' s lack of enthusiasm at the idea 
of a "native state" being given precedence over the Rhodesian 
11 CAB 128/129, C.M.(55)44, 5, "Commonwealth Membership", 1 
December 1955. 
12 Reported in Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", 
pp. 4 00-401. 
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Federation. It was Liesching's argument that Ghana could fall 
into communist hands or the Bandung group that had clinched the 
matter (rather like the argument in relation to India seven 
years earlier, which had persuaded Malan and Smuts) 
In January of the following year (1956), as a follow up to Louw's 
December speech, there was further evidence of South African 
movement on the issue. The World reported that Dr J.P. Bruwer of 
Stellenbosch University had stated that African diplomats who 
came to South Africa ''should not be put up in backyards''.n In 
an editorial entitled "Right is Right", the editor of The World 
congratulated the government for showing ''a markedly different 
attitude" to that of an earlier period when the British 
announcement of self-government for the Gold Coast had been 
greeted by South Africa "with anger". 
The need for friendship between South Africa 
and the emergent states is the "right 
thing". We congratulate the heads of this 
land on their courage to face facts and to 
be statesmanlike. 
At the same time however the editor noted the decision by an 
international science conference to abandon South Africa as their 
venue because of the treatment of Non-White delegates. This 
"should not be allowed to recur" and South Africa ''should have 
the courage to face questions that may in future be raised by the 
Black States whom she wishes to befriend". 
In London, meanwhile, at a meeting of officials at the CRO about 
the high commission terri tories 14 , it was reported that the 
permanent under-secretary of state had had talks with the South 
African high commissioner, Jooste. The latter had reportedly 
admitted that South Africa would have to recognise the 
13 The World, 28 January 1956. 
M DO 119, File 1182, No.38A, 26 January 1956. 
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independent African states such as the Gold Coast and Niger but 
that the high commission territories were ''a problem''. This had 
prompted Liesching to make his remark about the need to avoid a 
"head-on collision" with South Africa over the territories. 
Liesching had previously explained the change in the South 
African attitude to the Gold Coast as a realisation that it was 
the best way of wardinq off communist influence in Africa and 
that South Africa now u~derstood Britain's protective role for 
South Africa and the inevitability of constitutional advance in 
British Territories. 15 
As the year progressed the South African attitude became ever 
clearer. In February South Africa House issued a pamphlet 
entitled ''Co-operative Coexistence in Africa'' which welcomed co-
operation with independent or self-governing states to the north 
but which stressed the •fital importance of non-interference by 
states in each othec-' s affairs. 16 During the external affairs 
vote in April Strijdom, as we have seen, welcomed co-operation 
with black Africa while still declaring the need for whites to 
stand together. 
In June 1956, when the Commonwealth conference was in progress, 
The World reported that the admission of British West African 
territories to independe~ce and Commonwealth membership would be 
discussed but that the at ti t·cde of Strij dom "could only be 
guessed at" . 17 However it was likely to be "more reasonable" than 
that of Malan as was evidenced by the Union's quick recognition 
of Sudan's independence (according to Vale, Louw was proud that 
South Africa had been the first to congratulate Sudan) . 18 By his 
"very presence" at the conference Strijdom was demonstrating that 
he was "ready to deal with non-Europeans outside the Union on a 
15 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.329. 
16 Miller, Survev o: Commonweal th Affairs, p. 133. 
17 The World, 30 June 1956 
18 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p. 337. 
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basis of complete equality". In London he sat at the same table 
as the prime ministers of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, ''all men 
of colour" and he would soon be sitting with Dr Nkrumah of the 
Gold Coast when that country became independent in the 
Commonwealth. No decision about the matter was likely at the 
conference, The World noted, as: 
The purpose of such a conference is not to 
make joint decisions on the spot but to 
discuss the world situation from the point 
of view of that great free association of 
free nations, the Commonwealth, which used 
to be called British but which is becoming 
less British every year. 
In July The Star reported that Strijdom and Lord Malvern (prime 
minister of the Rhodesian Federation) were giving "serious 
attention" at the Commonwealth conference to the question of 
admitting new members to the Commonwealth and that it would come 
up again in discussions in Downing Street. 19 It was reported that 
Gold Coast would be given a date for ''self-government" after the 
forthcoming general elections in the territory. Strijdom had 
earlier told the Senate that the South African government could 
not possibly interfere in Britain's affairs when it came to the 
Gold Coast but still might have a say when an attempt was made 
to include any country in the Commonwealth which the Union did 
not think was "sufficiently developed" for membership. 20 
It is clear, however, that by July or August 1956 or perhaps even 
earlier the Nationalist cabinet had decided to abandon any 
thought of public opposition to the idea of independent African 
states joining the Commonwealth. Perhaps Liesching's talks with 
Strijdom and Lauw in December 1955 or the informal discussions 
in London during the prime ministers'conference in June and July 
19 The Star, 2 July 1957. 
20 Ibid. 
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of 1956 were crucial in this regard. At any rate, the 
announcement of Ghana's imminent independence elicited no public 
opposition from the South African government and at the special 
Commonwealth conference held in London in June 1957 it was 
unanimously decided to admit the newly independent state to 
Commonwealth membership. South Africa publicly welcomed the new 
state to independence and Lauw promptly sent the head of the 
newly created Africa division of the department of external 
affairs to Accra for the independence celebrations on 6 March. 
There, promises of friendship and co-operation in the economic 
and technical fields were announced and Nkrumah praised South 
Africa's technical and scientific development as important for 
all of Africa. 21 
(b) The "honeymoon" ends: local and international reactions to 
Strijdom's Africa policy 
As some writers have pointed out, the honeymoon in relations 
between South Africa and Africa, Ghana in particular, did not 
last long. It soon became clear that neither government would 
abandon bedrock political principles for the sake of diplomatic 
friendship.n South Africa refused to modify apartheid for the 
sake of international opinion and continued to hope for British 
and Commonwealth support in its domestic jurisdiction argument. 
Ghana and the other African states which later joined the 
Commonwealth 
5. 
while asserting domestic jurisdiction in 
their own cases and especially against one 
another, regarded South African racial 
policy as affecting the whole of Africa and 
therefore 'international' rather than 
21 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.407. 
22 See, for example,. Vale, pp.407-8, Miller, Survey, pp.134-
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domestic. 23 
Increasingly, as we shall see in following chapters, the newly-
independent African states began to take the lead in challenging 
South Africa's policies both within the Commonwealth and outside 
of it. Miller notes that while South Africa could still rely on 
Britain "not to fling aside all the economic and strategic 
advantages of its association with South Africa in order to 
please new members" it could not rely on her "active support" . 24 
Certainly this was the case after Sharpeville and was 
demonstrated at the conferences of 1960 and 1961. India, 
Australia and, to a lesser extent, New Zealand also continued to 
support the domestic jurisdiction argument but mainly because the 
plea remained important to them for other reasons. 
Within South Africa, black opinion welcomed Ghana's independence 
and admission to the Commonwealth and was cautiously approving 
at first of Strijdom's diplomacy. This quickly turned sour as it 
turned out that welcoming Ghana did not mean any modification of 
apartheid at home and did not even lead to an immediate exchange 
of diplomats. The refusal by Strijdom's government to take up 
invitations to political conferences in Ghana (usually on the 
grounds that colonial powers were not also invited) was taken as 
another sign of the government's lack of sincerity, as was 
Strijdom and Louw's negative response in 1958 to constitutional 
developments in Basutoland. 25 
In June 1957, Liberation, one of the Congress Alliance monthly 
journals, attacked the Nationalist Party's approach to Ghana as 
"grudging" and "reluctant", noting that the NP had been forced 
to recognise a new force in world politics, the Afro-Asian 
n Miller, survey, p.135. 
24 Ibid. 
~See above p.266. 
278 
bloc.u It described South Africa as the "weakest link'' in the 
"imperialist" chain, unable to count on imperialist aid because 
strategically South Africa lay outside ''the main cockpits of a 
new anti-Communist war". In April the same journal had stated 
that it "echoed the joy felt by Ghanaians" at their independence 
and that this now marked the beginning of the end for imperialism 
and white domination "from the Sahara to Cape Town ... and the 
declining power of British imperialism''.n 
The Empire is vanishing; it has all but 
disappeared; and the so-called 
"Commonwealth" which is supposed to replace 
it is becoming more and more of a myth. 
At the ANC national conference of the same year (1957) Ghana was 
welcomed as "the first independent Africa state freed directly 
from British Imperialism". The "enemies of national independence" 
were criticised as those who were now trying to find evidence to 
deny other countries in Africa independence by describing Nkrumah 
as a 11 dictator 11 .u 
Ghana's independence 
had a profound effect on the racist theories 
of our Nationalist government. Once more the 
protagonists of apartheid 
have found themselves in a dilemma of 
pursuing their racialistic policy in South 
Africa and being compelled to accept the 
''Black States" as an equal. 
26 AD 2186 (ANC Collection), Box H, b (Publications, 
Periodicals), Liberation, No.20, August 1956, pp.6-7. 
27 Ibid., Liberation, No. 24, April 1957, pp.1-2. 
28 AD 2186, B a 4 (45th Annual Conference of the ANC, 
Orlando 1957), Report of the National Executive Committee, pp.1-
5. 
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Strijdom's refusal to accept an invitation to a proposed Pan-
African conference to be hosted by Nkrumah the following year was 
also noted. The excuse used had been that the European colonial 
powers were not invited. The report noted, ''This reveals the 
imperialistic attitude of the South African Government•.N 
Indian Opinion also found cause to rejoice in Ghana's 
independence and in the fact that Ghana would head the anti-
apartheid movement. 30 Ghana's admission would mean •a voice in 
the Commonwealth against continued colonial rule". Nkrumah had 
offered asylum to any African •who considers himself persecuted 
by colonial or any other authorities• . 31 Noted with approval also 
was the statement in India by the British Labour party spokesman, 
Aneurin Bevan, that Nigeria, Malaya, Uganda, Tanganyika and Kenya 
were to join the Commonwealth soon.n It would be •foolish", 
Bevan was quoted as saying, for India to withdraw from the 
Commonweal th just as Ghana was joining and he predicted that 
India's influence within the Commonwealth would soon transcend 
that of the "metropolitan power". 
On 3 May Indian Opinion reported that Nkrumah had "declared war 
on apartheid" . 33 He had reportedly appointed a committee to look 
into the memorandum of the anti-apartheid campaigner, Reverend 
Michael Scott, who had accused South Africa of defying the world 
over apartheid and South West Africa. The memorandum had stated 
that a ''plan of action'' would have to be devised "which will 
achieve what moral persuasion and ten years of debates and 
attempted conciliation in the United Nations have failed to 
achieve". In the same issue an editorial entitled "Nkrumah, 
Strijdom and the Funkhole'' noted Strijdom's refusal to attend a 
29 Ibid. 
30 Indian Opinion, 8 March 1957. 
31 Ibid. , 29 March 1957 
32 Ibid., 12 April 1957 
33 Ibid., 3 May 1957. 
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conference of sovereign independent states the following year 
(the Pan-African conference) and also his statement to the effect 
that he personally would not attend the June Commonwealth 
conference which would decide on Ghana's admission to the 
Commonwealth (Eric Louw was to be sent instead). This, said the 
editor, would confirm the impression that "the Union's premier 
thinks he will solve ugly problems by continually running into 
his funkhole". 
On the other hand, Indian Opinion approved Strijdom's "tangible 
demonstration of goodwill" to Ghana on independence day, 6 March, 
and his not standing in the way of Ghana's Commonwealth 
membership. 34 This, said the editor, had made "some impression" 
in Ghana notwithstanding Nkrumah's speech on the same day to the 
effect that he "hated and loathed apartheid". Nkrumah could have 
gone to UNO and excited the whole world against South Africa but 
instead had reciprocated with a friendly invitation to Strijdom 
to attend the Pan-African conference, although the topics for 
discussion would include race problems and dependent territories. 
Strijdom had declined the invitation with the excuse that the 
scope of the conference was too narrow and that if it were more 
broadly based with representatives of the colonial powers he 
would attend. This, said Indian Opinion was a "strong point in 
Mr Strijdom's favour" as "his government was not alone in 
preaching race oppression in Africa''. 
Indian Opinion reported in July that during the Commonwealth 
conference which had met to decide on Ghana's membership Eric 
Louw had invited Nkrumah to lunch and that this was the first 
ministerial level meeting between representatives of South 
Africa and Ghana.~ It reportedly took place at the Dorchester 
Hotel after the morning session of the prime ministers conference 
at No. 10 Downing Street. Louw was accompanied by G.P. Jooste, 
the South African secretary of external affairs and Nkrumah by 
35 Indian Opinion, 5 July 1957. 
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Kojo Botsio, the Ghanaian minister of trade and labour. Louw 
informed SAPA's correspondent that the discussion he had had with 
Nkrumah "had been very interesting and most constructive" and 
that it had been arranged towards the end of the previous week. 
Whether the above-mentioned demonstrations of goodwill were 
planned simply as public relations exercises by the south 
Africans or whether they were genuine attempts to start off on 
a good footing in relations with Africa's first independent 
Commonwealth member remains to be discovered. However, it does 
seem that "moderate" non-European organs of opinion were to a 
certain extent impressed by such demonstrations. Taken together 
with reported statements from government which seemed to indicate 
some hesitancy at the time about future apartheid laws, there was 
enough evidence to give the impression in some quarters of an 
imminent turn-around in Nationalist race policy. Louw had been 
reported 
sure if 
by Indian 
South 
Opinion 
Africa 
as saying in London that 
would introduce more 
he was not 
apartheid 
legislation. 36 This was interpreted as "a retreat by apartheid 
in the face of mounting world hostility to race oppression" and 
there was "talk" of Verwoerd being "kicked out of Native Affairs 
to Finance'' as proof of the effects of world-wide condemnation. 
An article of 2 August in Indian Opinion by Jordan Ngubane, the 
anti-ANC Liberal leader, had praised Louw's announcement that 
South Africa would welcome Ghana's ambassador in Pretoria and had 
described it as having required "courage and intelligence" . 37 
Taken together with statements by "a certain Mr Van Heerden, one 
of the topmost brains in Afrikaner journalism and one who holds 
36 Indian Opinion, 28 June 1957. 
37 Indian Opinion, 2 August 1957. In an article by Brian 
Bunting in New Age, the Congress of Democrats (COD) newsletter, 
on the black press in South Africa, Indian Opinion was firmly 
identified as a "mouthpiece of the anti-Congress Jordan Ngubane 
of the Liberal Party" and was by implication placed in the same 
camp as the "capitalistic" white -owned newspapers such as Bantu 
World, Ilanga and Imvo Zabantsundu. (Brian Bunting, "Who Runs our 
Newspapers? The Story behind the Non-white Press", New Age , 4 
December 1959, pp.l-9). 
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a key position in the Strijdom chain of papers" there was 
indication of "growing fissions" with the "potential to be 
ultimately splits on fundamentals". Van Heerden had reportedly 
advised Afrikaners that it was time they ''discarded outmoded 
concepts". An article in Die Burger quoting an "important, 
influential'' Afrikaner pleading for more ''social equality'' was 
further evidence of "some hope for the future". 
Ultimately, of course, these hopes were to be dashed and the 
uncompromising policies of the Nationalists continued to be 
asserted with a vengeance in the months which followed the 
recognition of Ghana's Commonwealth membership. While in June 
Indian Opinion was arguing for a let up in the sanctions applied 
by India since 1947 against South Africa38 in the same month 
protests were mounting against an apartheid bill which intended 
to separate white and black nurses in the same way as the 
"Separate Universities" bill was proposing to do for students and 
academics. Louw had in any case made it clear on his return from 
London that while the Nationalist policy was to "extend the hand 
of friendship" to newly independent states it was also to inform 
them that "our policy is a policy which is founded on the basis 
of separation, but at the same time on justice towards the Non-
Whi te races" . 39 Diplomatic representation would have to be 
considered "carefully" and the government could not act "over-
hastily". The subject of a guest-house for diplomats ''bristles 
with ... difficulties ... We are living in a country where certain 
conceptions have taken root, and have been here for ages", he 
said, "you cannot change them overnight". 40 
38 Indian Opinion, 7 June 1957. 
39 House of Assembly Debates, col.7669, 10 June 1957. 
40 Ibid., col.7670, 10 June 1957. 
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Chapter 13. The Suez Crisis, the Economy 
la) Introduction 
As has been pointed out at the beginning of this section, the 
Suez crisis of 1956 did not affect South Africa's official 
relations with Britain to any significant extent although it did 
have the effect of calling into question Britain's commitment to 
the Commonwealth in general. In the sense, therefore, that 
Commonwealth bonds were weakened by British failure to consult 
the Commonwealth and by the display of Commonwealth disunity 
engendered by Suez it can be argued that South Africa's 
Commonwealth relations were indirectly affected. 
The official white opposition party in South Africa concentrated 
its attack on the Strijdom government for not coming out publicly 
in favour of the British actions in Suez but stopped short of 
demanding that South African troops should have actively assisted 
the British. However, this position, as was shown by the events 
and repercussions of the crisis, proved to be untenable and 
unrealistic. When "white" Commonwealth countries with greater 
histories of loyalty to Britain such as Canada could come out 
publicly against the British/French actions then South Africa's 
position of neutrality, although adopted for different reasons, 
seemed in retrospect more reasonable. As the disastrous 
repercussions of the event in terms of Commonwealth relations in 
general became more and more apparent to all who witnessed them, 
so parties like the UP could only have come to the conclusion 
that they would have to reassess their priorities and loyalties. 
It could be argued that Suez represented one more milestone 
towards a white consensus on foreign affairs and that it weakened 
English South African resolve to remain a monarchy and to remain 
in the Commonwealth. 
As far as extra-parliamentary opinion is concerned the effects 
of the crisis were even more serious. It was mentioned at the 
beginning of this section that the ANC and its Congress allies 
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unequivocally condemned the British/French action and called into 
question the whole basis of the Commonwealth connection for South 
Africa. Describing the attack on Egypt variously as an act of 
11 naked aggression 11 , as 11 imperialistic 11 and as 11 racist 11 or 11 anti-
African", African and Indian opinion expressed their revulsion 
at the attack and their dire forebodings for the future of 
British relations with its colonies and former colonies. Taken 
together with criticism of the way Britain handled the Seretse 
affair and the way Britain seemed to be colluding with apartheid 
by supporting South Africa at the UNO, it seems as if the Suez 
crisis was a watershed in black feelings towards Britain. As one 
commentator noted in reference to Canada, it was like finding a 
"beloved uncle arrested for rape" . 1 Or as The World, quoted 
earlier, remarked, "She [Britain] has lost her prestige among 
Afro-Asian peoples and nations ... they are no longer for 
Britain" . 2 
(b) The South African response to Suez 
It has been noted by one commentator that the Suez crisis 
represented the other facet of the Nationalist government's 
relations with the Commonwealth - the facet of "frustration and 
resentment" . 3 The government displayed a "cool" attitude to 
Britain over the crisis despite the opposition clamour for 
support and it abstained on the UN vote condemning the invasion. 
The motives for this stance were various and included South 
Africa's suspicions of Israel's attempts to build up its 
relations in Africa. 4 The main motive, however, say Barber and 
Barratt, was, as Strij dom put it at the time, to keep South 
1 J. T. Saywell, "Canada and the Commonwealth", Dept. of 
History , University of Toronto (Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs) , Paper presented to the 6th Commonwealth 
Unofficial Relations Conference, Palmerston North, New Zealand 
(SAIIA, Jan Smuts House), January 1959, p.4. 
2 The World, 17 November 1956 
3 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.60. 
4 Ibid., p.61. 
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Africa's head "out of the beehive". 5 In other words, Strijdom's 
government wanted to avoid entangling South Africa in something 
that could have adversely affected its relations with the ex-
colonies of Africa and was in any case averse to getting involved 
in Britain's wars - as had been the party's policy for decades 
before. Furthermore, the breakdown in communication "infuriated 
Louw" and ended up embarrassing the UP opposition and the British 
high commissioner, Liesching, who had to try to defend the 
British action publicly. 
But, as Barber and Barratt put it, "Pretoria's attitude during 
the Suez crisis reflected more a judgement on Britain's ham-
fisted policy, than any desire to remain uncommitted" . 6 Soon 
after the crisis was over, the Nationalists started criticising 
the Afro-Asian bloc again and Egypt's ties to the USSR. Verwoerd 
later argued it was a mistake for the UK to withdraw from Suez. 
This, say Barratt and Barber, was "characteristic" of the 
Nationalist government's view of the Commonwealth. 
anti-communistic Commonweal th and one which 
It wanted an 
brooked no 
interference in internal affairs of member states - and it did 
not want the Commonwealth to become an instrument of 
decolonisation despite the relatively welcoming stance adopted 
by Strijdom and Louw to African independent states. 
J. D. B. Miller places the Suez crisis in the context of the 
changing nature of the ''Commonwealth System''' the 
Commonwealth's evolution from a closely knit and like-minded 
grouping of states in the 193 0' s and 194 0 's to a much more 
diverse and loose association of the late 1950's and beyond. 
By 1960 it was recognised that the most obvious change in the 
Commonwealth system was the fact that "serious differences of 
5 Quoted in Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign 
Policy, p.61. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Miller, Survey, ch.18, "A Commonwealth System?", pp.409-
429. 
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policy divided the members in international affairs, and that the 
system of consultation was now partial and selective rather than 
general". 8 The Suez affair was but one example of the 
"substantial change in Commonwealth consultation" by the latter 
part of the 1950's. Even before Suez, India's non-alignment had 
cut it off from the ''frank exchange of intelligence information 
which was common between Britain, the US, Canada, Australia and 
New Zealand" . 9 There was already a "basic dichotomy" between 
those who were fully accepted within the US alliance system 
(making Pakistan an "equivocal" factor because of its importance 
to the anti-communist Baghdad Pact agreement) and those who were 
outside of it altogether. 
It could be argued that South Africa, like Pakistan, but for 
different reasons, also remained an ''equivocal factor'' because 
of its reluctance to get involved in any commitments in the 
Middle East and because of its racial policies. At any rate the 
specific failure of the Commonwealth system of consultation 
during the Suez crisis was much wider than Miller seems to 
suggest for in reality no Commonwealth country was consulted, not 
even those fully integrated into the US alliance system. 
As another commentator has noted, "the Suez affair became the 
most glaring failure of Commonwealth consultation". 10 Australia 
and New Zealand were the only countries that seemed to be "in 
step" with Britain (although they were also not consulted). 
Robert Menzies the Australian premier played a major role in the 
efforts to negotiate with Egypt. Sidney Holland of New Zealand 
declared his country would stand by Britain "through thick and 
thin ... New Zealand goes and stands where the motherland goes and 
stands" . 11 But Canada was most "dismayed" and India "indignant". 
8 Ibid., p.412. 
9 Ibid. 
10 W. D. Mcintyre, Colonies Into Commonweal th (London, 
Blandford Press, 1968), p.349. 
11 Ibid. 
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Canadians had objected from the start to the 
military force against Egypt and when the 
idea of using 
British/French 
bombardment and invasion began without consultation, the Canadian 
minister of external affairs, Lester Pearson, pointed out that 
Canada was no longer "a colonial chore boy running around 
shouting ready, aye ready" . 12 However, Pearson did then play an 
active part in setting up the UN force that entered the Canal 
zone after the British withdrawal. He was alarmed that the 
forcible condemnations of Britain by India and Pakistan (to a 
lesser extent, Ceylon} could mean the possible disruption of the 
Commonweal th. By then New Zealand had had "second thoughts" about 
the initial •instinctive rallying to the mother country'' and, 
together with Australia, also offered detachments to the UN 
(which were declined} . It was soon after the Suez crisis that 
both Australia and New Zealand began to take a closer look at 
their relations with Asia and in New Zealand the election of a 
Labour government in 1957 was followed by a prolonged tour of 
Asia by the new premier, Walter Nash. 
Thus the Suez war not only illustrated the 
diplomatic and military looseness of the 
modern Commonwealth. It forced the old 
Dominions to reconsider their own 
international goals. 8 
James Eayrs's very detailed account of the crisis gives a full 
picture both of the general breakdown of Commonwealth co-
operation and consultation and of the specific nature of the 
responses by each Commonweal th country. 14 A commentary on each 
stage of the crisis beginning with the nationalisation of the 
Canal by Egypt in July 1956 is followed by extracts from 
pertinent speeches and statements by politicians and parties in 
12 Quoted in Mcintyre, Colonies into Commonwealth, p.350. 
13 Ibid. 
14 James Eayrs 
Documentary Survey. 
(ed.} , The Commonwealth and Suez. A 
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Commonwealth countries. The sections on South Africa's response 
are both relevant and complete concerning the reactions of the 
white government and opposition party and there is at least some 
mention made of the official statements by the leading extra-
parliamentary political grouping, the ANC. All that needs to be 
added, perhaps, is a summary of some further newspaper commentary 
from the leading organs of black opinion. 
When the canal was nationalised, the South African government, 
as Eayrs points out, greeted events very differently to the other 
''Old Dominions•. 15 Strijdom's reaction was one of ''conflicting 
emotions". On the one hand he was worried about the possible 
effects of Nasser's brand of Pan-Arabic nationalism on the rest 
of Africa but on the other hand he felt there was the danger that 
intervention against Egypt might abrogate the important principle 
of non-interference in domestic affairs. Moreover he could gain 
little politically by rushing to Britain's side in the conflict. 
South Africa would not in any case suffer from the closure of the 
canal. Instead she would gain extra revenue and bargaining 
power. 16 Australia and New Zealand, however, would experience a 
grave economic threat. It would be more profitable for South 
Africa to keep pressing for a NATO-style security organisation 
for Africa to hold communism at bay. Thus Strijdom's initial and 
perhaps "reflexive" statement of 27 July reported in the Cape 
Times: 
We are on friendly terms with the various 
States in that part of the world and cannot 
favour one at the expense of another ... it is 
best to keep our heads out of the 
beehive .... But the Middle East, which has 
always been a dangerous spot, is of the 
utmost importance to South Africa as 
geographically it is the gateway to this 
15 Ibid., p.16. 
16 Ibid., p.17. 
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continent. 17 
A few days later Eric Louw issued a statement describing the 
nationalisation as "a domestic affair of Egypt's in which South 
Africa would not presume to intervene" followed by a hasty 
modification the next day to the effect that while South Africa's 
government was determined not to become involved, it was neither 
unconcerned nor indifferent. 18 Egypt, which still had diplomatic 
relations with South Africa, was contacted via its ambassador, 
in order to urge it to avoid any breach of the 1888 Convention 
(allowing all states unhindered use of the canal) The UP 
opposition leader, Strauss, who seemed to have accepted 
uncritically Anthony Eden's views of Nasser, made a statement 
on 9 August in parliament demanding solidarity with 
all those whose aims are to maintain the 
Suez Canal as an open, international 
gateway, not subject to the arbitrary whims 
of a dictator reverting to the methods of 
Fascism .... This is no local issue. The call 
of the Egyptian State Radio to the people 
of Africa to throw off an imaginary "yoke of 
imperialism" is an ominous warning that we 
in South Africa cannot afford to blind 
ourselves to the intolerant extremism of 
Egypt's new nationalistic regime. 19 
He went on to link events in Egypt with the "expansionist 
policies of the communist states" and criticised the government's 
lack of support for Britain. An editorial of the Cape Times 
noted on 21 August that "The Nats are far more interested in 
making it clear that they don't want to fight Britain's wars than 
in throwing in their moral weight strongly on the side of the 
17 Ibid., p.62. 
18 Ibid. , p. 1 7. 
19 Ibid., pp.65-66. 
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West. r120 
But, as Eayrs points out, the "overwhelming majority" of South 
Africans, those without the vote, sided with Egypt. A key reason, 
furthermore, why the ANC supported Egypt during the Suez crisis 
was that its ally, the South African Communist Party, was pro-
Soviet. The ANC statement of 27 September stated: 
The threats of war.against Egypt, the mobilisation of 
armies and the actual transportation of troops and 
dispatching of battleships to the Mediterranean by the 
British Government, are a clear indication of the 
determination of these governments to maintain their 
decaying colonial systems in Africa, the Middle East, 
Asia, by brutal force and through military terrorism. 
We pledge our solidarity with the Egyptian people and 
are confident that the people of Africa will not allow 
themselves to be used against their fellow Africans in 
any predatory way. 21 
Further evidence of black support for Egypt (and praise for the 
Soviet Union for intervening on Egypt's side against Britain and 
France) was to come later, as the crisis developed. 
In the meantime, the Nationalist government's non-committal 
stance was being demonstrated as negotiations were pursued in 
London over a proposed Canal Users' Association. Strijdom decided 
not to press for representation at the London conference and 
neither South Africa nor Canada were invited because they were 
not principal users of the canal. The UP opposition argued that 
South Africa should have been there as there was no African state 
other than Egypt and Ethiopia to argue "from an African point of 
view 11 • 22 
w Quoted in Eayrs, p.17. 
21 Quoted in Eayrs, p.66. 
22 Eayrs, The Commonweal th and Suez. p. 83. 
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In August Strijdom stated in parliament that "Our actions must 
be such as not to make enemies of the 200 million non-whites on 
the continent of Africa .... In view of these facts ... [I] hope 
very strongly ... an acceptable agreement will be reached which 
will obviate friction in the future.''n On 5 October Louw stated 
that the government found nothing illegal in the Egyptian 
decision to nationalise the canal company but hoped the 1888 
Convention would be observed. 24 
Having thus stated South Africa's neutral position in the crisis, 
it was simply a question of waiting for matters to develop. 
Secretly, Britain, France and Israel went ahead with plans to 
attack Egypt while negotiations continued in London. The American 
foreign secretary, Dulles, had made it clear to Eden that the 
United States opposed any forceful resolution of the situation 
but the British, despite initial hesitation, went ahead with 
their joint action plan which precluded any possibility of 
consultation with Commonwealth allies. On 31 October the British 
and French ultimatum to Egypt (and Israel) was sent while the 
Israelis, according to plan, advanced towards the canal having 
easily overrun Egyptian forces in Sinai. 
As Eayrs points out, most white South Africans were in favour of 
the initial Israeli pre-emptive strike against Egypt, more so 
than in the rest of the Commonwealth, and he ascribes this partly 
to the relatively large and influential Jewish population in 
South Africa. 25 There was also something "in common between the 
outlook of the Afrikaner and the Zionist which predisposed many 
more South Africans than these to favour Israel in her warfare 
with her Arab neighbours". But the involvement of Britain in the 
war produced "something of a conflict of loyalties" for NP 
supporters. It was not in their nature to rally to the British 
n Quoted in Eayrs, p.141. 
24 Ibid. 
25 b' d I l . , p. 188. 
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side.u "Prudence quickly reinforced habit ... The bees were now 
swarming around the hive.• The NP government was now more than 
ever resolved to keep a distance. At UNO South Africa's 
representative pleaded lack of time and information in order to 
excuse himself from the voting on a ceasefire resolution of 2 
November. 
In Pretoria cabinet delayed consideration of the crisis until 5 
November. Then after the cabinet meeting, Lauw issued a statement 
expressing South Africa's belief that it was "not involved" in 
the hostilities although it was ''deeply concerned'' about 
maintenance of peace in the Middle East. 27 He hoped a solution 
would be found and that "hostilities will remain limited and 
localised". Die Transvaler took a similar stand, saying South 
Africa should stand aside from the Egypt/Israel dispute as well 
as the British/French action.u But when it became clear that 
this action was not succeeding, Die Transvaler lost its ''pose of 
neutrality" and stated on 5 November that failure "would without 
a doubt bring catastrophe to the West". 29 
The United Party made its stance clear even before the government 
did. Strauss's statement of 2 November dissociated the UP from 
"harsh condemnation directed at Britain and France" . 30 Britain 
had been provoked and the UP could only applaud the British 
response. "The aggressor is not always he who fires the first 
shot". Most English South African newspapers said much the same 
but the Cape Times in an editorial of I November criticised 
Britain and France for having weakened the UNO by their 
unilateral resort to force. They had also, it argued, weakened 
the force of the "Free World's" criticism of what Soviet Russia 
26 Ibid., p.189. 
27 Ibid. , p.189. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid. 
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was doing in Hungary. 31 
It was at this point in the crisis that South Africa's concerns 
about the lack of consultation by Britain in the Commonwealth 
context emerged. In his first statement of 31 October Louw 
stressed that there had been a complete lack of forewarning from 
London and that he had learnt of the British ultimatum from a 
news broadcast over the .SABC. When he phoned the prime minister, 
Strijdom, he found him to be just as much in the dark. 32 Three 
days later Louw issued a further statement which said that the 
absence of consultation ''would seem to indicate a major change 
of policy" on the part of the UK government" and that the failure 
to consult absolved South Africa from any responsibility in the 
event of a wider conflict.n This evidently upset the British 
high commissioner, Liesching, who, Eayrs claims, remained a true 
believer in the ''gospel of consultation at all costs". Liesching 
sought out Louw on 4 November to offer an explanation of the 
extenuating circumstances which had led to such a lapse. Louw 
replied on 5 November in a letter of which only the final 
paragraph was made public. It read as follows: 
In this connection, I would remind you that 
while the Union Government could reasonably 
have expected to be taken into the 
confidence of your Government in regard to 
a proposal which involved risk of a Middle 
East conflagration, and even a Third World 
War, the South African Premier, Mr.Strijdom, 
made it clear to you that it was, of course, 
for the United Kingdom Government to decide 
whether or not the circumstances required a 
departure from the procedure of 
consultation, or of giving prior 
31 Ibid., p.190. 
32 Ibid., p.190. 
33 Ibid. 
294 
information. The Union Government's attitude 
in this matter was governed primarily by the 
fact that Sir Anthony Eden had stated in 
public that consultation had taken place 
and, as you are aware, that statement was 
not corrected by him.M 
Liesching was not prepared to let the matter rest and countered 
with a statement reiterating that "the United Kingdom's object 
has always been and will 
countries about issues of 
statement then inevitably 
remain to consult all Commonwealth 
importance affecting them". This 
attracted attention in the South 
African press. Die Transvaler said that the absence of 
consultation was to be expected because the Commonwealth could 
only function on the lines of the strictest observance of the 
principle of non-intervention. 35 The Star regretted that there 
had been no consultation and hoped it was an isolated lapse and 
lectured Louw for indifference. "If Mr Louw believes that the 
practice may fall into disuse as far as South Africa is 
concerned, his duty is not to welcome it but to do everything in 
his power to oppose such a tendency."~ 
At this point it is necessary to consider the reaction of extra-
parliamentary parties and organs of opinion. On 1 November, a day 
after the British and French ultimatum, a joint statement was 
issued on behalf of the working committees of all the Congress 
Alliance organisations, which included the ANC, the SAIC, the 
Congress of Democrats (COD), the Federation of South African 
Women, and the Trade Union movement. It condemned the Israeli, 
British and French intervention in Suez as "a serious act of 
aggression against Egypt, which will have world wide 
34 Reported in the Cape Times of 10 November 1956 (in Eayrs, 
p.190). 
~Quoted in Eayrs, p.191. 
36 Quoted in Eayrs, p.191. 
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repercussions''. 37 
The statement went on to note that Britain and France had used 
Israel as a "spearhead" to re-establish themselves as the 
"masters" of the Suez Canal "in order to maintain their 
domination over Colonial countries in Africa and the Middle 
East" . It called upon the Afro-Asian nations and all other 
peoples to "stand with Egypt in preventing the violation of its 
sovereignty". 
A letter of the same day was drawn up for circulation to all 
Congress Alliance provincial branches calling the invasion "an 
unprecedented crisis in the soil of Africa" which would have 
serious consequences world wide. 38 It called for meetings of 
support for Egypt to be organised "everywhere" and for religious 
leaders also to be contacted to "preach the message of peace and 
solidarity with our brothers in the North". 
The COD Journal, Liberation, devoted its November editorial to 
the crisis and referred to the British/French/Israeli action as 
a ''wanton, premeditated act of aggression taken in defiance of 
solemn undertakings and the UN Charter". 39 It stated that the 
British prime minister's excuses were ''flimsy" and that ''If it 
really was a 'police action' following the Israeli invasion, why 
attack Egypt? .... the English and French imperialists are out for 
loot. They want to grab the Suez Canal." The editorial did not 
accept the official British view and claimed that the Israeli 
invasion was arranged "in advance" in order to punish Nasser for 
nationalising the Canal. The whole aim was to "teach the people 
of the colonies and former colonies of Africa, Asia and the 
Middle East, a lesson". It accused the British Conservative Party 
37 AD 2186 (ANC Collection), Box G (Correspondence - ANC and 
other organisations) No.4 (1956), Press Statement, 1 November 
1956. 
38 Ibid., "Circular Letter to the Provinces", 1 November 
1956. 
39 Liberation , No.22, November 1956, p.l. 
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government and the French government of "living in the past". The 
whole exercise had "misfired" as a result of American disapproval 
and the only support for Britain came from Australia and New 
Zealand. South African newspapers were criticised for a "torrent 
of propaganda" against Russia's invasion of Hungary which was 
taking place at the same time as the Suez invasion.~ 
In a later editorial which was mainly directed against British 
colonial policy, Liberation claimed that the Suez invasion had 
shown the "true colours" of Britain and France, i.e. "naked 
force i• • 41 
Gone is the picture of benevolent Britain 
kindly granting independence to colonial 
peoples as in the opinion of Downing Street 
they are 'sufficiently advanced to receive 
it'. The whole world had realised that only 
violence holds the empire together. 
The World's response to the Suez invasion was given in the 
editorial quoted earlier which claimed that Britain and France 
had lost prestige and had lost the support of the African 
people. 42 As a moderate and usually "loyal" organ of opinion, and 
one that was not in the ANC political camp, the tone of aggrieved 
hurt used in The World's editorial was even more telling than the 
harsh condemnation expressed by the anti-imperialist Congress 
Alliance. It claimed that the issue was "one which vitally 
touches the heart of every African". The "common opinion" of 
Africans was that the Anglo-French invasion was "grossly unjust". 
Egypt had been given an "unjust ultimatum" concerning the Canal 
Users' Association and· the canal "belongs to the Egyptians". 
Britain and France had not attacked Israel despite the ultimatum 
to both sides to separate. This showed "beyond any doubt" that 
40 b' d Ii., p.2. 
41 Liberation, No.24, April 1957, pp.2-3. 
G The World, 17 November 1956. 
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Britain and France were in alliance with Israel. Britain knew 
that New Zealand and Australia would "always come to their side 
and lack the character to say no". In the minds of Africans 
"Russia's threat saved the Middle East situation". The war in 
Egypt had only served to "fan the flames of African nationalism" 
and Africans in Africa had been brought together by what they 
regarded as their "common enemy". 
In January 1957 Indian Opinion commented upon Anthony Eden's 
resignation as British prime minister and his replacement by 
Harold Macmillan. This was seen as an attempt to placate the USA 
after Suez. 43 Britain's "eagerness to please" the Americans was 
seen as having special significance for South Africa. 
If American pressure can have the effect of 
unseating a British Prime Minister it seems 
clear that American influence can be used in 
other directions as well. At the moment the 
Conservatives are messing up the relations 
between the White and the Non-White world. 
The Anglo-French invasion of Egypt and 
Britain's activities in the Yemen have not 
only offended non-White opinion in Asia and 
Africa but they have deepened the suspicions 
which the non-White world has of Western 
intentions. 
The USA "should use her truly tremendous prestige" in endeavours 
to find a way out of the "stalemate" in the South African 
situation. She was advised to choose friends other than South 
Africa's "neo-Nazi friends, Britain, France and the Belgian 
imperialists". 
In January 1957 during the no confidence debate the UP continued 
to lash out at the government for not taking a stand in the 
43 Indian Opinion, 8 January 1957. 
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crisis and tried to use the communist threat as a rallying point. 
Major P. Van der Byl, the opposition member for Greenpoint noted 
that whether Britain and France had acted wisely or not •was a 
matter of opinion" but that they had at least had the courage to 
stand up to •an Egyptian dictator who obviously was in close 
association with Russia".M 
Here was a chance for our Government to 
rally to a cause which was our own, for once 
Russia is established in the Middle East, 
and stands in the 
is 
gateway to Africa, our 
in jeopardy. Whether it very existence 
was due in [sic] ineptitude, sheer folly or 
their personal dislike of Britain, I don't 
know. I don't know whether it was due to 
anti-Semitism .... All I do know is that they 
informed an astonished world that the Suez 
crisis was not their affair. In short they 
were neutral in a matter which vitally 
concerned South Africa. 
He was answered by the Nationalist member for Stellenbosch, Dr 
J.H.O. du Plessis, who pointed out that Canada, New Zealand and 
Australia had been humiliated by Nasser when they offered to 
send troops to take part in the UN Emergency operation after the 
war and that ''our government followed the sensible policy of 
keeping out of the Suez dispute" thus avoiding a similar 
humiliation. 45 Du Plessis also made some capital later about the 
attitude of the Cape Times to the whole dispute by noting that 
in a series of articles immediately after the crisis had arisen 
some strong condemnations of the British and French action had 
emerged in that newspaper. 46 He quoted the Cape Times as saying 
that Britain and France had "most of the world against them•, had 
44 House of Assembly Debates, col. 54, 22 January 1957. 
45 Ibid., col.60, 22 January 1957. 
46 Ibid., cols.587-589, 4 February 1957. 
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thrown "great strains on the alliance with the United States" and 
had "done about as much damage as they can do". 
Du Plessis also pointed out that Dr Z. de Beer, MP for Maitland 
(and future leader of the Democratic Party), the son-in-law of 
the ex-opposition leader Strauss, had opposed the British action 
in a speech at a UP fete in Durban on 6 November. He had 
reportedly criticised the absence of consultation with Britain's 
Commonwealth partners and had claimed that "the effect on 
Commonweal th solidarity must be unfortunate" . 47 The unilateral 
action by Britain had come as a "shock", de Beer had said, "to 
us who set such great store by Commonwealth solidarity". 
It was only Eric Louw's ham-handed action in relation to the 
banning of Indian ships from using South African ports after the 
closure of the canal that had turned the debate over Suez briefly 
in favour of the UP opposition. Louw's example of "knobkerrie 
diplomacy''g had briefly rescued the opposition from what seemed 
to be an embarrassing "catch-22" situation. By supporting Britain 
they were aligning themselves against the rest of the world and 
most of the Commonwealth and yet they were the party that posed 
as the champion of the Commonwealth connection in South Africa. 
They risked alienating themselves even further from African and 
Indian opinion at home and appeared to be further to the Right 
than the government on issues such as decolonisation, the 
communist "threat" and foreign affairs in general. 
Ultimately the Suez crisis can only have weakened the UP's 
opposition to republicanism and its resolve to maintain the 
Commonwealth connection. If Britain herself could show such 
disregard for Commonwealth sentiment what hope would there be for 
its embattled defenders in the southern tip of Africa? Although 
the UP had already shown that it distinguished clearly between 
the white and black Commonwealth and valued the former more than 
47 Ibid., col.589, 4 February 1957. 
48 Ibid., col.571, 4 February 1957. 
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the latter, only scant comfort could be derived from the fact 
that two members of the white Commonwealth had rallied behind 
Britain. The attitude of Canada was more significant and Canada 
had shown herself to be unambiguously condemnatory of the British 
action. However much Britain under her new prime minister, the 
debonair Harold Macmillan, might try to repair the damage, it was 
clear to contemporary observers in South Africa and abroad that 
something had gone forever from the Commonwealth ideal. Britain 
could no longer be described as a first-ranking world power and 
the looseness of the Commonwealth association had been displayed 
for all the world to see. As the British Labour leader Hugh 
Gaitskell put it in a broadcast of 8 November 1956: 
What are the consequences? We have violated the 
Charter of the UN .... A deep, deep di vision in the 
Commonwealth - only Australia and New Zealand support 
us. Canada and South Africa have abstained. India, 
Pakistan and Ceylon are all against us. This is a very 
grave consequence. For I believe, as do millions of 
others, that this Commonwealth of ours was - and could 
have been - the greatest force for peace and unity in 
the world: above all, a bridge 
of incalculable value. That 
destroyed .... Only one thing 
between East and West, 
bridge is now almost 
can now save the 
reputation and honour of our country. Parliament must 
repudiate the Government's policy. The Prime Minister 
must resign. 49 
Eden did resign in January of the following year. It was clear 
to many that he had to go for the sake of the Anglo-American 
alliance although it was claimed at the time that illness and 
overwhelming stress had made it necessary. However, the 
Conservatives continued· in power for another eight years under 
Harold Macmillan who led Britain, as Round Table put it, "in a 
gay and elegant manner towards the acceptance of the status as 
49 Quoted in Eayrs, pp.217-218. 
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a second-rate power•.m 
It could also be argued that after Suez a fundamental 
reorientation of Britain's relations with the outside world 
ensued. "And it was instinctively to Europe rather than the 
Commonweal th that [British] people turned. • 51 It was left to 
countries like India and Canada to take over from where Britain 
had left off. Much of the damage created by Suez was repaired by 
the personal initiatives of Nehru, Pearson and Diefenbaker. 
Nehru, especially, was prepared to work hard to prevent the 
break-up of the Commonwealth despite his own strong condemnation 
of the British invasion and despite renewed calls within India 
to leave the organisation.~ 
(c) Economic themes: 1954-1958 
As a post-script to the Suez crisis it is worth considering the 
economic connection with the Commonwealth during Strij dom' s 
premiership because the Suez affair occasioned yet another 
sterling area crisis which, in turn, indirectly highlighted South 
Africa's importance to the smooth functioning of the system and, 
also, the effect of economic downturns in Britain on South 
Africa. 
Economically, the Strijdom years were not marked by any 
significant break with the previous trends evidenced in the 
period after the war. The economy continue to expand rapidly as 
new gold mines were opened up and new industries were established 
or expanded. The balance of payments crisis of 1948-9 was not 
repeated although a temporary shortage of foreign exchange and 
investment was experienced in 1956 and again in 1958, largely as 
so Quoted in Eayrs p.378. 
51 Ibid., pp.381-2. 
52 See Nehru's statement of 7 December 1957 (quoted in Eayrs 
p. 3 76) in which he claimed there was enough "breakage• in the 
world not to add to it by destroying the Commonwealth. 
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a result of economic downturns in Britain and the USA, but 
necessitating the introduction of exchange controls with sterling 
countries as well as dollar countries. The latter indicated how 
important the Commonwealth and British economic connection in 
particular still was to South Africa in the mid-50's. 
It also led to accusations in parliament and outside of it that 
foreign confidence in South Africa was being undermined by the 
government's policies. For example, the Congress Alliance journal 
Liberation noted in an editorial of 1956 entitled ''The Capitalist 
Crisis and South Africa'' that a •coming depression in England" 
could affect South Africa severely and that Nationalist 
insistence on •apparent independence• from Britain could well 
lead to •wrong and unsound decisions•.E Using information from 
the Commonweal th and Sterling Area 75th Statistical Abstract, the 
article claimed that, of. South Africa's exports in 1954, some 34% 
went to Britain, 27% to the rest of the Commonwealth, 9% to the 
USA, 25% to Europe and 3% to other countries. 54 Imports told a 
similar tale of dependence on Britain and the Commonwealth with 
35% coming from Britain and 17% from the rest of the 
Commonwealth. 
What this demonstrated, claimed the article, was how dependent 
South Africa was on the Commonwealth economically and how 
especially vulnerable South Africa's exports were. It was pointed 
out that over 40% of South Africa's exports were primary products 
and over 70% of imports were manufactured goods and that in times 
of depression the prices of primary products usually fell faster. 
Furthermore, a squeeze on capital imports from Britain, ascribed 
to the •unfavourable reaction of investors to South Africa's 
future'' as well as to high interest rates in Britain, was seen 
as "dangerous• for the South African economy as Britain was still 
the main source of the country's capital. 
53 Liberation, No.20, August 1956, pp.6-7. 
54 Ibid. 
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In parliament in January 1956 Eric Louw had boasted how easy it 
had been for South Africa to achieve a loan in the USA of some 
$17m ''oversubscribed in just two days" and placed in the ''A" 
category. 55 This he said was at a time when sources of foreign 
capital were ''generally limited'' and when Britain, traditionally 
South Africa's main provider, was not able to provide enough for 
South Africa and the Commonwealth. South Africa, he said, had 
been able to obtain loans from the Swiss, the Dutch, the 
Americans and the International Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development. Her financial and economic position was •with the 
exception of Canada's, the soundest in the Commonwealth". He 
denied that the government considered imposing restrictions on 
the repatriation of foreign capital investments as a "rumour 
spread by malicious persons, with the object of instilling 
fear''.~ Not even in times of emergency as in 1949, when the 
reserves fell to £58m , had the government thought of it so why 
should they do so now when reserves at the end of 1955 totalled 
£126m , he said. The unfavourable decrease in investment capital 
of "recent months" he ascribed to the "unfavourable position on 
the Stock Exchange'' which was in turn the result of "British 
credit policy". 
An editorial in the weekly Labour Party journal, Forward, 
debunked Louw's bravado under the words "Confidence and 
Credit''.n It accused Louw of "time and again" claiming 
confidence in South Africa by foreign investors and of now 
exulting over a 9.5m pound loan while having to •pull his rank" 
to retain bank rates of 4.5% and to devise protective measures 
to prevent money leaving the country. It compared the situation 
with that of the Central African Federation (CAF) where loans had 
been offered of over £38m , "four times more than Louw' s effort", 
and of which some £4m came from South African banks. This, 
claimed the editorial, indicated ''a note of confidence" in the 
55 House of Assembly Debates, cols. 307-308, 25 January 1956. 
56 Ibid., col.309, 25 January 1956. 
57 Forward - The Peoples' Weekly, 2 March 1956. 
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CAF's future that was "lacking" in South Africa. 
In June 1957 Louw wrote to Strijdom from the Commonwealth 
conference in London to complain that the opposition was using 
"scare tactics" to undermine foreign confidence and was reverting 
to "Smuts's tactic" of "sabotaging the economy" by negative 
reporting of the government's economic policies. 58 He went on 
to claim: 
It is very clear that, as happened shortly 
after 1948 when Smuts began his 
sabotage campaign with the 
frightening off foreign capital 
economic 
aim of 
["met die 
doel om die invloei van kapitaal af te 
skrik"], the United Party and its new leader 
have begun the same reckless campaign 
[ "dieselfde roekelose kampanj e voortsi t"] . 
What was becoming increasingly evident, however, was that despite 
Louw's claims of economic sabotage by the opposition, a 
structural problem concerning South Africa's capital needs was 
emerging that related to the country's position as a rapidly 
industrialising economy and that made her particularly vulnerable 
to fluctuations in capital flows for political or other 
reasons.w In 1957 the Reserve Bank review of the economy by its 
chairman, G. De Kock, noted with concern the deficit on capital 
account and stated that unless productive capacity continued to 
58 TA, A2 (Strijdom Collection), Vol.3 (Official 
Correspondence), File 68 (Official Correspondence: Foreign 
Affairs, 1956 Dec.4 - 1958 Jul.7), Eric Louw - J.G. Strijdom, 21 
June 1957. 
59 See Natrass and Ardington (eds), The Political Economy of 
South Africa, pp. 73-78 for a discussion of various views 
concerning South Africa's economic growth rates in the post-war 
period, and pp. 6 -23 for an periodization of the political economy 
of the country. Hobart· Houghton's chapter entitled "Economic 
Development 1865 -1965" in Wilson and Thompson (eds), The Oxford 
History of South Africa, Vol.2, South Africa 1870-1966, pp.1-32 
remains a useful historical summary of the main factors 
influencing South Africa's economy in the modern period. 
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be increased by investment in new means of production at a rate 
commensurate with the growth in the population there would be a 
decline in per capita national production and standards of 
living.6<l De Kock had referred to the increased repayments of 
foreign loans and the decline in foreign investments of the 
previous two years and said that this underlined •the need to 
maintain a favourable economic climate for investment in order 
to attract capital''. 
In February 1956, notwithstanding Louw's earlier promise to the 
contrary, temporary exchange controls were imposed that were only 
lifted again a year later but which were destined to become a 
permanent feature of the South African economy after the 
political upheavals of 1960-61. For the first time such 
restrictions began to affect South Africa• s sterling area capital 
movements, previous restrictions having only applied to dollar 
area and other ''hard currency'' countries. In 1958 restrictions 
on transactions by South African residents with sterling area 
countries were introduced after the gold and foreign reserves 
fell to £79m in May. 61 Concessions allowing South Africans to 
retain as much as £10, 000 in other sterling countries were 
withdrawn and applications for sterling currencies for travel 
purposes were now to be subject to the same restrictions as those 
on non-sterling countries. It was such measures that prompted 
angry opposition comments to the effect that the government was 
trying to remove South Africa from the sterling area, accusations 
that had been strenuously denied by Louw in 1955 in regard to the 
ending of the Gold Sale Agreement with Britain in that year. 62 
Lauw had predicted in 1955 that South Africa would "soon not be 
6<l Quoted in Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 3., No .18, "De Kock• s 
Review of the South African Economy", 3 September 1957, pp.782-
783. 
61 Ibid., Vol.4, No.11, 27 May 1958, p.519. 
62 House of Assembly Debates, col.1339, 18 February 1955. 
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quite so dependent on the inflow of capital from abroad" 
although, he added, this did not mean that such capital was 
"unwelcome". 63 New gold and uranium mines and conservative 
government financial policies had resulted in "a large proportion 
of capital expenditure being met from current expenditure", he 
claimed. After making similar remarks in 1958, he was criticised 
in parliament for implying that South Africa would be better off 
without what the defence minister, Erasmus, had once called 
"Jewish-American" foreign capital. He had aroused the suspicion 
that the government had a xenophobic attitude to foreign capital 
as a carry-over from the anti- "Hoggenheimer" attitude of the 
Nationalists in the 1930's.M More pertinent, however, was the 
Nationalist aim of self-sufficiency in the economic field which 
implied a lessening of dependence on foreign capital wherever it 
came from but which proved to be an elusive goal as the country's 
expanding industrial infrastructure necessitated ever-greater 
quantities of foreign investment. 
South Africa's gold production continued to be important to the 
central reserves of the sterling area although after 1954 the 
agreement was terminated whereby the Union had undertaken to 
provide a fixed minimum quantity annually. The precarious 
position of the sterling area reserves in the 1950's made South 
Africa's gold sales crucial to the smooth functioning of the 
system as some British officials hastened to point out whenever 
the threat of deteriorating relations between the two countries 
loomed. 65 In the first half of 1955 the central reserves were 
£55m lower than in the corresponding period of 1954 and the 
balance of trade with the rest of the world had shifted once 
again into deficit. The post-war structural weakness in the 
sterling area reserves system made it vulnerable to sudden 
63 INCH, PV4 (Eric Louw Collection), File 72 (Articles and 
Manuscripts), "The Financial Situation of the Union of South 
Africa", 7 June 1955, pp.3-4. 
M House of Assembly Debates, col.24, 22 January 1958. 
65 See, for example the memorandum quoted on p. 254. 
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flights of capital such as occurred during the Suez crisis in 
November 1956. 66 The latter crisis unleashed waves of speculation 
against the pound which led to a fall in the reserves of $279m 
for the month of November alone. Although the threat was repelled 
by the rapid mobilisation of British second-line reserves the 
structural problem continued to plague the sterling area system 
for years to come.m Essentially the problem was one of a low 
ratio of reserve assets to liabilities - a ratio of just 16% in 
1956 compared to 56% in 1937 and one which reflected Britain's 
changed position from a net creditor nation to a net debtor 
nation after World War II. Writing in 1958, Thomas noted that the 
future of the sterling area system would depend on whether there 
was going to be a long-run tendency towards a dollar shortage. 68 
The prospects, he said were "not promising" and depended upon the 
bargaining power of the United Kingdom and individual sterling 
area members in unison or individually. 
South Africa's position within the sterling area system had been 
unique since the late 194 0 's, as her status as gold provider 
meant she no longer drew on the central reserves nor was she 
obliged to settle her dollar debts through the central London 
banking system. This had given the country considerably more 
latitude to diversify her international trade, an aim of some 
importance politically to the Nationalist government. Despite 
this, South Africa in 1962 still drew the largest portion of her 
trade from the Commonwealth and Britain in particular (a year 
after her departure from the Commonwealth) . 69 Tn terms of her 
share of all foreign investments in South Africa Britain still 
held 52% in 1960 against the 19% of her nearest rival, the USA. 70 
66 Brindley Thomas, "The Evolution of the Sterling Area", 
pp.196-7. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid., p.199. 
•Miller, Britain and the Old Dominions, p.228. 
70 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.51. 
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However, it appears that in line with a general trend towards a 
decline in the preference margins on intra-Commonwealth trade, 
the margins of Commonwealth preference on goods entering South 
Africa from Britain and vice versa were declining in the mid-
50' s. 71 In terms of South African wine and fruit exports the 
preferences still remained important but in terms of imports from 
Britain, declining preference margins could only have contributed 
to the gradually declining share of South African trade held by 
Britain (a phenomenon which was mainly related to Britain's 
declining industrial competitiveness world-wide). In 1961 the 
average margin of preference on all imports from the UK into 
South Africa was only between 1 and 2%, compared to 17-18% for 
New Zealand or 10% for Australia. 72 
71 Commonwealth Survey Vol.6, No.18, 30 August 1960, 
pp.839-840. 
72 Ibid., Vol.12, No.4, 18 February 1966, pp.252-257. 
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Introduction 
South Africa's last four years in the Commonwealth, before 
withdrawal in 1961, were marked by increasing racial violence 
inside the country and externally by increasing isolation and 
an unprecedented degree of international opprobrium. Under the 
leadership of H.F. Verwoerd, the ideologue of apartheid chosen 
to replace Strijdom in 1958, the Union moved inexorably towards 
the racial explosion of 1960 and the consequent political and 
economic uncertainties which formed the background to the 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth in 1961. Economic growth was 
temporarily halted by a massive flight of capital at a time when 
material prosperity was crucial in order to avert further unrest. 
It was only by the deployment of all the military and police 
resources of the Nationalist government that a catastrophe was 
averted in 1960-61 but at the result of a further abandonment of 
democratic principles and the rule of law. The outlawing of all 
the main institutions and organs of black political 
Sharpeville in March 1960 and the arrest of 
protest after 
thousands of 
opponents of the regime. drew huge condemnation from abroad and 
initiated a new phase in South Africa's international relations -
the campaign for economic sanctions sponsored by the newly-
independent African and Asian countries and supported by the 
communist bloc. 
This was the backdrop to south Africa's withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth in 1961. The Union's position in the Commonwealth 
had become untenable by 1961, however much people like Harold 
Macmillan and the Australian prime minister, Robert Menzies, 
might have wished otherwise. 1 It is clear that only South 
Africa's removal from the organisation, in the absence of a 
1 Harold Macmillan's political memoirs, entitled Pointing 
the Way. 1957-1961 (Macmillan, London, 1972), indicate the 
reluctance with which he greeted the withdrawal and the lengths 
he went to try to avert it. Similarly, Robert Menzies in his 
memoirs, Afternoon Light (London, Cassell, 1967), indicates 
considerable impatience with the degree of interference in South 
Africa's internal affairs expressed at the conference and noted 
his forebodings at the precedent created for Australia. 
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complete change of heart by the country's rulers, could have 
saved the Commonwealth from a looming racial split and the 
possible resignation of some or all of the black members. Julius 
Nyerere's statement before the 1961 conference had made that 
clear2 and Nehru's statement after the conference confirmed it. 
As Nehru put it to the Lok Sabha on 24 March 1961: 
And therefore, this deadlock arose and as 
South Africa's government, that is, its 
Prime Minister, was completely unwilling to 
make the slightest change in the policies 
pursued by then in South Africa, there was 
no way out of the deadlock, except some kind 
of cleavage in the Commonwealth itself. 3 
The question remains, however, whether South Africa's withdrawal 
was inevitable and whether the traditional explanations of the 
roles of the various players involved in the drama of 1961 are 
still valid. This question is one which will receive some 
attention in this section and conclusions will be drawn in 
chapter 19 following a reassessment and re-examination of some 
of the more important interpretations. 
J.R.T. Wood and Peter Lyon, for example, have re-interpreted the 
role of the Canadian premier, John Diefenbaker, traditionally 
regarded by white South Africa as the architect of South Africa's 
removal from the Commonwealth. 4 It i.s wrong, says Peter Lyon, to 
2 In the London newspaper, The Observer, Nyerere of 
Tanganyika wrote on 21 March 1961 that "We cannot join any 
'association of friends' which includes a State deliberately and 
ruthlessly pursuing a racialistic policy .... We believe that the 
principles of the Commonwealth would be betrayed by an 
affirmative answer to South Africa's application for readmission 
as a Republic." Quoted in N. Mansergh, Documents and Speeches on 
Commonwealth Affairs, 1952-1962 (London, OUP, 1963), pp.370-1. 
3 Quoted in Mansergh, Documents and Speeches, p.390. 
4 Peter Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies and Attitudes 
to South Africa", pp.36-38 and J.R.T. Wood, "The Roles of 
Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd in the Withdrawal of South 
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claim that Diefenbaker played a "determinative part" in the drama 
of South Africa's removal from the Commonwealth. The dominant 
figures at the conference were Nehru, Verwoerd and perhaps 
Macmillan. 5 Drawing on Basil Robinson's biography6 , Lyon claims 
that Diefenbaker "temporised at first" and although the most 
sympathetic of the white prime ministers to the position of the 
non-whites, he had been constant in his search for a tolerable 
way of averting South Africa's withdrawal. He had been personally 
impressed with Verwoerd and later often remarked upon the "calm 
and dignity" shown by Verwoerd in the closing stages of the 
drama. He had also shown marked reluctance after the South 
African withdrawal to adopt any sort of economic measures that 
would have meant terminating trade or other preferences with 
South Africa. 7 
J.R.T. Wood comes to similar conclusions after a fresh 
examination of the minutes of the two prime ministers' meetings 
of 1960 and 1961. 8 Drawing on these minutes and on an examination 
of the Welensky papers, he outlines a slightly differing view of 
the roles of these three which tends to debunk the key role 
ascribed by Verwoerd and others to South Africa's withdrawal 
played by Diefenbaker. In particular, he emphasizes (as did 
Welensky) Macmillan's role as the convenor and chairman of both 
conferences. It was Macmillan who, by ignoring advice by Menzies 
on the one hand not to include any sort of prescriptive formula 
on race policy for the Commonwealth, and by Diefenbaker on the 
other to arrange the 1961 conference in such a way that his own 
Africa from the Commonwealth", Journal of Contemporary African 
Studies, Vol.6, No.1/2, April/October 198,7 pp.173-179. 
5 Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies", p.37. 
6 Here Peter Lyon quotes from H. Basil Robinson, 
~D~i~e~f~e~n~b~a=k~e'=-=r-'~s~~W~o~r~l~d~.~~A~~P~o~p~u"'-=l~i~s~t~~1~·n~~F~o=r~e~i~g~n~~A~f~f~a=1~·r~s (London, 
University of Toronto Press, 1989), p.187. 
7 Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies", p.38. 
8 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
pp.153-179. 
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strongly anti-apartheid views could be heard last of all, was 
responsible for the failure to keep South Africa in. According 
to Welensky' s memoirs, Diefenbaker's intention had been to avoid 
Canada giving a lead to the Afro-Asian states in their tendency 
to link Commonwealth membership with the need to alter South 
Africa's race policies. 
Other authors seem to exonerate Verwoerd, partially at least, by 
claiming that he went to the 1961 prime ministers' conference 
with a sincere determination to secure South Africa's continued 
membership after becoming a republic. J.D.B. Miller, for example, 
believes that Verwoerd was sincere in his desire to keep South 
Africa in and acted consistently before and after the republican 
referendum in October 1960. 9 Vale largely concurs with this view 
and lays some stress on the attempts by the British, in prior 
collusion with the South Africans and Australians, to prevent 
South Africa's withdrawal. 10 Contemporary South African officials 
such as Piet Meiring, the head of South Africa's information 
service at the time and Gerhardt Jooste, the secretary of 
external affairs, felt Verwoerd acted fairly and honourably and 
laid the blame for the failure of the conference at the door of 
Diefenbaker and the Afro-Asians. 11 
Historians such as Kruger12 and Geyser13 concur with these views 
and claim Verwoerd did everything he could to avoid the 
possibility of a veto, even going to the extent of al lowing 
informal discussions of his government's internal policies 
something which was anathema to him and to a few other prime 
ministers present. According to Geyser, it was only after it had 
9 Miller, Survey, pp.151-152. 
10 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp. 415-41 7. 
11 See Piet Meiring, Inside Information (Cape Town, Howard 
Timmins, 1973), pp.163-169 and G. Jooste, Diensherinneringe, 
pp.294-200. 
12 Kruger, The Making of a Nation, p.334. 
13 Geyser, Watershed for South Africa, pp.76-98. 
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become clear to Verwoerd that certain Commonwealth countries were 
determined, if not to expel South Africa, then to subject her 
government to continued and unacceptable interference in her 
internal affairs, that he decided to withdraw South Africa's 
application for continued membership. "National pride and self 
respect" demanded withdrawal, claims Geyser. 14 In a similar vein, 
Geldenhuys claims that a potential "setback" was then turned into 
a "triumph" for Verwoerd when 50 000 people turned out to accord 
him a hero's welcome at Jan Smuts airport. 15 His speech, as 
quoted by Geldenhuys, reaffirmed the traditional reasons which 
the National Party saw as being responsible for South Africa's 
isolation: 
We have triumphed not over another 
country, nor over Britain, but we have freed 
ourselves from the pressure of the Afro-
Asian nations who were busy invading the 
Commonwealth. We were not prepared to allow 
these countries to dictate what our future 
should be .... Therefore, we now go forward 
alone . 16 
He ruled out a return to the Commonwealth in future, with the 
rationale that such a return would "entail giving up the struggle 
of the White man to maintain himself in this country". 17 As 
Geldenhuys notes, this theme of survival was a frequent theme of 
Verwoerds and was used to justify a policy of no compromise in 
internal and external affairs. 18 
However, some British officials at the time, notably the British 
14 Geyser, Watershed, p.86. 
15 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p. 24. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. , p. 2 5. 
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high commissioner, Sir John Maud, felt that Verwoerd cared 
nothing for the Commonweal th. The correspondence between Maud and 
the CRO in mid-1960 reveals this assessment of Verwoerd's 
motives . 19 Maud felt that Verwoerd was only concerned with 
attracting a high enough vote for the republic in the referendum 
campaign by promising he would do all he could to keep South 
Africa in the Commonwealth. 
It will be argued here that it was the inability of Verwoerd 
(supported to some extent by the Australian prime minister, 
Menzies) to compromise, not the Afro-Asian onslaught, that drove 
South Africa out of the Commonwealth. The interpretations of Lyon 
and Wood will be supplemented and modified to some extent by one 
which, while placing the ultimate responsibility for the 
withdrawal on Verwoerd, gives a wider economic and political 
explanation to the events of 1960 and 1961 in the context of the 
British response to Verwoerd' s republican campaign, and the 
increasing racial crisis in South Africa following the 
Sharpeville incident. (A secondary speculation in this section 
will be one which also surmises that Verwoerd was not, perhaps, 
as sincere as some would like to think about his desire to remain 
in the Commonwealth after bringing about a republic. Certainly, 
as the airport welcome indicated, the NP rank and file saw 
withdrawal as a cause for celebration and triumph, not despair. 
In London, as one writer has noted, Verwoerd was somewhat 
"cavalier" after the withdrawal and "doggedly refused to court 
the British Press") .w 
It will be argued that the role of the British prime minister, 
Harold Macmillan, was crucial in setting the stage for South 
Africa's withdrawal by making it increasingly clear to the South 
African government throughout the period 1959 -1961 (despite some 
19 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No. 79, Maud - Sandys (Commonwealth 
Secretary), 20 August 1960. 
20 Peter Vale, "Full Circle", South Africa's New World, 
Leadership International Publications, Johannesburg, 1991, pp. 
6-10. 
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initial uncertainty) that leaving the Commonweal th would not 
expose South Africa to any punitive economic or diplomatic 
measures from their most important Commonwealth partners, Britain 
especially. In the crucial months after the Sharpeville incident 
and the 1960 prime ministers' conference, British officials and 
politicians gave conflicting signals to the Nationalists on the 
possible effects of the 1960 republican referendum on South 
Africa's Commonwealth relations, thus revealing a hesitancy and 
a degree of willingness to collude with Verwoerd that could only 
have encouraged him to proceed further with his constitutional 
programme. In the process, the anti-republican cause inside South 
Africa was weakened. The black extra-parliamentary opposition 
received further evidence of British unwillingness to interfere 
on their behalf in the context of a whites-only constitutional 
issue that contained far-reaching implications for the position 
of blacks in a future republic outside the Commonwealth. 
It will also be seen, further, how in the aftermath of South 
Africa's withdrawal from the Commonwealth the long process of 
"toenadering" between the English and Afrikaans voters on racial 
issues resulted in the final abandonment by most of the former 
of their traditional allegiance to "Crown and Commonwealth". The 
official opposition party, the UP, opposed Verwoerd's decision 
to withdraw - a decision which was taken by Verwoerd (and his 
advisers in London, including Eric Louw) without reference to 
cabinet or parliament. 21 Nevertheless, Verwoerd's justification 
to parliament on his return earned him support from the English-
speaking population who, when faced with the hard-headed argument 
that Verwoerd posed to .them (that of losing white dominance or 
losing the Commonwealth), inevitably preferred the latter. As 
Barber and Barratt point out, it was this factor that eventually 
"killed the Commonwealth issue" for white English speakers, not 
the commitment to a republic. 22 The United Party demonstrated its 
lack of regret by ruling out, at its 1961 conference, the 
21 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, p.25. 
22 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.83. 
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possibility of a future return to the Club unless it were "in 
South Africa's interests''.~ 
The contemporary economic debate surrounding the withdrawal of 
South Africa from the Commonwealth will be mentioned as a 
background factor which had an important effect on the republican 
campaign and the circumstances surrounding withdrawal in 1961. 
The debate centred largely on the question as to whether South 
Africa would suffer financial and trading losses and whether the 
existing Commonwealth preferences would be withdrawn and sterling 
area membership terminated. This was a dispute conducted on party 
political lines, with the UP arguing that the worst possible 
consequences would follow withdrawal and the NP arguing that 
there would be no effect whatever on South Africa• s economy 
because Commonweal th economic co-operation was a matter of 
bilateral agreements between members and was not a sine qua non 
of membership of the Commonwealth. 24 
The debate was, to a 
general background of 
proportion to world 
certain extent, contextualised by the 
declining intra-Commonwealth trade in 
trade and by the declining value of 
Commonwealth preferences generally (not only in South Africa's 
case) . 25 It was also contextualised by Nationalist policies of 
trade and foreign capital diversification, industrialisation and 
self-sufficiency which received impetus as capital movements 
became increasingly erratic during the political upheavals of the 
late 1950s. 26 
23 Ibid. 
24 See, for example, Geyser• s argument in support of 
Nationalist statements on this question in Watershed, pp.72-75. 
25 Miller, Survey, pp. 444-445. 
26 M.M. Sejamamane and T.M. Shaw, "Continuing Crisis: 
Regional Coercion, Cooperation and Contradiction in Southern 
Africa" in Z.A. Konczacki, J.L. Parpart and T.M. Shaw (eds), 
Studies in the Economic History of Southern Africa, Vol. II, South 
Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland (London, Frank Cass, 1991), pp.260-
287. 
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Britain's attitude to the debate inside South Africa about the 
possible economic consequences of a republic inside or outside 
the Commonwealth was also of great importance. Whatever British 
officials may have said publicly, British interests, as much as 
those of South Africa, dictated that there would be a minimum 
disruption of the extensive trading, financial and cultural 
relations between the two countries. Macmillan's government 
negotiated with Verwoerd to ensure that South Africa would remain 
a Commonwealth country in fact if not in name after 1961. The 
white dominions followed the British lead and the precedent 
already created with Ireland in 1948 and allowed certain trade 
and other preferences to continue despite withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth. Unlike Ireland, however, these privileges did not 
last long. The international campaign against apartheid soon 
ensured that even the white Commonwealth countries began to adopt 
sporting, cultural and eventually economic sanctions against 
South Africa. 
Developments in black politics after the ANC's final acceptance 
of the Freedom Charter in 1956, which postulated a non-racial and 
vaguely socialistic course for the organisation, had led to an 
increasing redefinition of strategy by the more Africanist 
section of opinion inside and outside the Congress Alliance. 27 
It led to the formation of the PAC at the Orlando conference in 
Soweto in April 1959 and the formal allegiance of the new 
organisation with the doctrine of Pan-Africanism which had 
emerged from the All-Africa Peoples Conference in Accra in 
1958. 28 Thus, while the anti-colonialism of the ANC continued 
to be 
with 
expressed in 
Marxist and 
the context of the non-aligned movement tinged 
socialist rhetoric, it was now vigorously 
challenged by the unvarnished Africanist slogan of •Africa for 
the Africans". 
27 See Hudson, "The Freedom Charter and the Theory of 
National Democratic Revolution", pp.8-11, Lodge, Black Politics 
in Sou th Africa, pp. 7 0 - 7 4 and Gerhart, =B=l~a~c=k~=P~o=w=e=r~=i=n~S=o=u~t=h 
Africa, pp.181-246. 
u Gerhart, Black Power In South Africa, pp. 207-208. 
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This had implications concerning the differing attitudes shown 
by the two organisations to the republican issue and to the 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and these differences will be 
discussed in chapters 19 and 20. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
black population was never consulted about either the republic 
or the withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and that its opinion was 
not heeded by the mainly white-dominated press led to black 
opinions being strongly and pointedly expressed in the pages of 
the leading organs of extra-parliamentary debate. The opinions 
were, with the exception of those of the PAC, hostile to the 
decision to become a republic and to the manner in which the 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth took place. 
In an atmosphere of unprecedented political crisis after 
Sharpeville, with the main extra-parliamentary parties outlawed, 
their leaders in prison or in exile, the republican referendum 
and the Commonweal th issues were not as immediate to black 
concerns as those of a more directly political and economic 
nature. However, the realisation that increasing oppression at 
home went hand in hand with increasing isolation from sympathetic 
allies in the outside world was another bitter pill for the 
majority of South Africans to swallow. As Indian Opinion noted 
in its analysis of the implications of the withdrawal, "the non-
Europeans must be prepared to face a worsening future in this 
country ... the laws of Apartheid ... will be intensified and will 
batten down on the blac~ people".n With considerable bitterness 
it was also noted how the white Commonwealth countries led by 
Australia and Britain had played a role in allowing Verwoerd to 
"cushion the effects" of withdrawal by signing bilateral economic 
agreements, in a manner which was "contrary to the purpose and 
the spirit of the Commonweal th" . 30 
A study of the files of the British high commissioner in South 
Africa for the period 1958 to 1961 reveals how important for 
29 Indian Opinion, 24 March 1961. 
30 Ibid. 
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British policy-makers the economic and financial implications of 
South Africa's possible withdrawal were. It seems that much of 
the British response to Verwoerd' s republican policy was informed 
by the hope that, by accommodating Verwoerd as much as possible, 
it would be easier to "cushion the effects• of withdrawal, if 
withdrawal became necessary. However, this approach resulted in 
something of a dilemma for Britain. If British policy makers gave 
the impression that nothing would really change in the 
relationship between Britain and South Africa after the 
introduction of a republic, it would undermine the anti-
republican campaign of the mainly English speaking United Party 
opposition and would make Verwoerd's task easier. 
On the other hand, it was of great importance to Britain to keep 
South Africa in the sterling area and to safeguard investments 
and trade. Verwoerd and Louw were not averse to using these 
factors as bargaining . chips in their attempts to persuade 
Macmillan to be as helpful as possible concerning the republican 
referendum. Balancing these two policy considerations proved a 
difficult task for British policy- makers and led to accusations 
from within South Africa and from anti-apartheid forces in 
Britain and elsewhere that Macmillan was arranging a ''sell-out• 
in order to satisfy financial interests . 31 
At the same time, the realisation was growing among black 
opinion-makers in South Africa that British conservative 
leadership of the Commonwealth meant the continued flouting of 
the sentiments of the Afro-Asians and that as such it could only 
lead to a further erosion of sympathy by the black majority for 
the Commonwealth in its then existing form. 
It was perhaps timely for the future of South African black 
support of the Commonwealth ideal that the Tories were defeated 
only three years after South Africa left the Club and that a more 
expressly pro-African British Labour government came to power at 
31 Indian Opinion, 3 March 1961. 
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a time when the Commonwealth non-racial ideal seemed to be fast 
fading in theory and practice. 
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Chapter 14: The Colllillonwealth and South Africa in the Late 1950s 
(a) The 1959 Commonwealth relations conference 
An indication of the direction in which Commonwealth thinking was 
moving on the issue of South Africa's racial situation in the 
Commonwealth had already emerged at the sixth unofficial 
Commonwealth relations conference in Palmerston North, New 
Zealand in January 1959. Here delegations reflecting di verse 
political parties could speak openly and without the inhibitions 
of official conferences concerning interference in the internal 
affairs of member states. As at Lahore in 1954 South Africa's 
policies came under considerable scrutiny but not all of it was 
hostile. What emerged was an attitude of forthright disapproval 
of South Africa's racial policies but at the same time a 
willingness to continue talking and an acceptance that contacts 
through the Commonwealth medium should continue. There was as yet 
no talk of expulsion or of any form of sanction against South 
Africa other than the "force of public opinion". Cautious 
conservatism was still the rule when it came to questions such 
as interference in the internal affairs of member states, 
settlement of disputes and the value of personal contacts at 
prime ministers' meetings. 
During the sessions of the conference which discussed 
parliamentary government, for example, it was stated that while 
there appeared to be unanimity about the common aspiration to 
democracy in the Commonwealth there were "departures" from the 
"democratic tradition" as in South Africa.' It was politely 
stated that: "In the case of South Africa there did not exist the 
homogeneous society which was a prerequisite of a full democracy 
embodying a uniform universal franchise". This meant that even 
if every Commonwealth country aspired to democracy it did not 
1 Report of the Sixth Commonwealth Unofficial Relations 
Conference, Palmerston North 14-21 January 1959 (S.A.Institute 
of International Affairs, Jan Smuts House, Johannesburg), "The 
Parliamentary System of Government", p.2. 
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ensure the unity of the Commonwealth "because one country's 
parliamentary democracy could be a source of offence to others". 
The value even of entrenched clauses was questioned because "it 
had proved possible to circumvent them, eg. in South Africa" and 
it was felt that rather than entrenched clauses a case could be 
made for arguing that the essential safeguard lay in peoples' 
attitudes towards their fellow citizens, not legislation or 
institutions. 2 
This conservative and cautious attitude towards lack of democracy 
within the Commonwealth was then mirrored in the discussion by 
delegates on the question of non-interference in each other's 
affairs. It was agreed that there should be the principle of non-
interference but it was suggested that if the dispute between 
Commonweal th members had an "international character" members 
should offer to mediate but only at the request of both parties 
to the dispute. 3 There was some support for the idea of using 
the sanction of public opinion throughout the Commonwealth for 
a policy which other members felt to be unwise (a polite 
reference again to apartheid) . The conclusion was that existing 
personal contacts between prime ministers or high officials in 
conference had done much to alleviate past disputes and would 
continue to do so. 4 It was this reliance on the efficacy of 
personal contacts at Commonwealth conferences that was to feature 
so strongly in the official British rationale for keeping South 
Africa in the organisation during the turbulent conferences of 
1960 and 1961. 
When the discussion moved to "multi-racial communities", however, 
differences of a less polite nature emerged. The opening South 
African speaker immediately went on the defensive, insisting that 
apartheid was not unfair to the Bantu people and saying that it 
2 Ibid. , p. 3 . 
3 Ibid., Report of Plenary Session, Monday 19 January, p.3. 
4 Ibid. , p. 4 . 
324 
was a "realistic policy developed over a long period" . 5 Other 
South African speakers pleaded for patience and urged that they 
should not be "hustled into taking precipitate action in this 
complex situation". When the question arose as to whether South 
Africa's racial policies might force her to withdraw from the 
Commonwealth, two of the South African delegates stated that 
although South Africa envisaged the introduction of a republic, 
no "responsible" government speaker had advocated secession from 
the Commonwealth. 6 
A speaker from Ghana argued that, as far as he was concerned, a 
"Bantu government for the Bantu" should be introduced "now" in 
South Africa. 7 . A Pakistani delegate stressed that the gravity 
of the charge against South Africa for its treatment of the 
Indian population was South Africa's refusal "to allow people 
of Indian origin to be integrated into the life of the nation''. 
Individual delegates expressed their opinion that "all men must 
achieve equal status and equal rights irrespective of colour'' 
throughout the Commonwealth. A British delegate stressed how bad 
the majority of Commonwealth delegates thought the South African 
case to be and referred to discrimination against the English-
origin South Africans as well as the African population. 8 The 
United Kingdom, he said, might not be able to abstain much longer 
in the UNO and elsewhere from "revealing the degree to which its 
people opposed the official policy in South Africa". Public 
opinion, he said, might force a change in British policy in this 
respect. 
This was followed by a statement from a Canadian delegate who 
claimed that apartheid could not work in South Africa and that 
5 Ibid., Report of Plenary Session on Multi-Racial 
Communities, p.2. 
6 Ibid., p.3. 
7 Ibid. , p. 5. 
8 Ibid. , p . 9 . 
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"territorial apartheid" was impracticable. 9 The Canadian said 
that the "idealistic" side of apartheid was not being put into 
practice and that thus the whole policy stood open to 
condemnation by the West and Africans. He quoted Lord Charnwood's 
comment on Abraham Lincoln's attitude to the South at the time 
of the Civil War in the United States: "They are neither base nor 
senseless, but the South is wrong." 10 
A South African delegate, Senator J.H. Grobler, gave a 
pessimistic summary of the debate up to that point, saying: 
We must accept that there are fundamental 
differences between members of the 
Commonwealth in this approach to racial 
issues. Let us consider the United Kingdom 
and South Africa. There is not the slightest 
possibility of reconciling South Africa's 
policy of separate development with the 
policy of Her Majesty's Government in Great 
Britain as long as the British Government 
insists on a policy of paramountcy of the 
Bantu in multi-racial African territories . 11 
The extent to which racial issues had come to dominate 
Commonwealth meetings such as this unofficial conference is clear 
from the above statements and shows how South Africa was being 
forced on the defensive, even in the more congenial circumstances 
of an unofficial conference. The address by the New Zealand 
Labour prime minister, Walter Nash, to the first plenary session 
of the conference further stressed the point. He said: 
The emphasis on racial equality is a feature 
9 Ibid. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid. , "Policy of Separate Development", Statement by 
Senator J.H. Grobler, p.5. 
326 
of the Commonwealth that I value very 
highly. At a time when racial hatred and 
oppression seem to be on the rise in the 
world, our association of nations stands out 
boldly as an 
in practice 
granted. 12 
example of 
and is 
racial partnership 
almost taken for 
However, the conference was not without its surprises. One of the 
African delegates from the Central African Federation, G. 
Lewanika, stated in the context of a discussion on multi-racial 
communities that he was not in a position to "blame South Africa 
for its racial policy" . 13 He went on to say that: "They have 
their own experiment and we have ours in Central Africa. If we 
succeed they will copy us and if we fail we shall copy them." 
This statement, which proved to be quite accurate as a prediction 
of what happened subsequently when the CAF collapsed and Southern 
Rhodesia went its own way under Ian Smith, indicates the extent 
to which cautious conservatism still dominated the thinking of 
many Commonwealth statesmen, even those from African countries, 
when it came to South Africa. A willingness to carry on talking 
and to avoid outright condemnation of South Africa was a feature 
of Commonwealth conferences right up to and including those of 
1960 and 1961. 
The South African delegation to the conference also included a 
non-Nationalist member, H.V. Roberts, who read out a paper 
(originally delivered to the S .A. Institute of International 
Affairs in November 1958) , and it summed up what he saw as South 
Africa's deteriorating position in the Commonwealth at that point 
12 Ibid., Presidential Address to the First Plenary Session 
by the New Zealand Prime Minister, the Rt.Hon Walter Nash, 12 
January 1959, p.5. 
13 Ibid., Rapporteur's report on plenary session on multi-
racial communities: comments by G. Lewanika, 19 January 1959, 
p.6. 
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in time. 14 Roberts claimed that the re-election of the 
Nationalists in 1958 had "undoubtedly weakened the Commonwealth 
tie with South Africa'' and that it represented the rise to power 
in South Africa of a "nation within a nation" - a nation which 
spoke a language foreign to other Commonwealth nations and with 
a culture "more from Holland" than from Britain.H The 
Nationalist government, said Roberts, had no ties of sentiment 
to the Commonwealth: there were only ties of "expediency" such 
as important commercial relations which at that time still 
favoured the retention of the Commonwealth link. However, 
Strijdom and Malan had reiterated that South Africa would remain 
in the Commonwealth only as long as it was in her interests to 
remain. 
Three further papers read out at the conference expressed the 
Indian, Australian and Canadian governments' reactions to recent 
developments in the Commonwealth and also indicated their 
attitudes to South Africa. The Australian paper16 claimed that 
successive Australian governments "appreciated well enough" the 
implications of the "transformed Commonwealth", and had accepted 
republicanism and the trend towards a "preponderance" of non-
European members. Menzies, the Australian prime minister, had 
however voiced concern that ways should be devised to "prevent 
the Commonwealth degenerating into a loose association for 
temporary advantage, an association which might well lack 
spiritual unity and the will to pursue common ends" . 17 Menzies 
envisaged the "Two-Tier" Commonwealth with an inner core of "old 
members" like Canada, Australia and New Zealand, although he 
14 H.V. 
Commonwealth" 
Roberts,"The Position of 
(SAIIA), November 1958. 
15 Ibid. , p. 1. 
South Africa in the 
16 
"Australian Attitudes to the Commonwealth", Sixth 
Commonwealth Unofficial Relations Conference, Palmerston North, 
New Zealand, January 1959. 
17 b"d 
.L.l,_., p.5. 
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foresaw difficulty in accepting an ''intransigent" South Africa 
within the core of like-minded states. 
In general the paper argued that Australia was adopting a 
"legalistic" adherence to the non-interference clauses at UNO, 
as was South Africa, and this "legalistic" attitude, it was 
argued, "should change" in order to prevent a "loss of goodwill 
in Asia and India" towards Australia . 18 
As far as India was concerned, a paper on "The Structure and 
Function of the Commonwealth" noted how republicanism was not 
just confined to the Asian Commonwealth any more, but that: "The 
late Mr Strijdom's utterances suggest that it may be a near thing 
whether Ghana or the Union of South Africa gives the lead to the 
other in disowning mon;;i.rchy. " 19 It noted how the monarchy for 
India no longer symbolised •subjection" but rather a "focus of 
association", and how the ties with Britain were declining 
economically and politically, especially since the Suez Crisis, 
which resulted in India's Commonwealth connection being "widely 
criticised" . 20 Furthermore: "Racialism" in South Africa, 
oppression in Kenya and discrimination against Indian origin 
people in Ceylon "have all been referred to ... by opposition 
members of Parliament in India ... urging severance of the 
Commonweal th relationship. 1121 
Nehru was still, three years after Suez, experiencing difficulty 
in justifying the value of the Commonwealth to some groups in his 
parliament. While the Commonwealth Relations conference was in 
session in New Zealand, the Rand Daily Mail reported that Nehru 
18 Ib. d 19 
__ l_.' p. . 
19 Karanukar Gupta, "The Structure and Function of the 
Commonwealth - An Indian View" (Indian Council of World Affairs, 
New Delhi, n.d.), Paper presented to 6th Commonwealth Relations 
Conference, January 1959, p.8. 
20 Ibid., p.23. 
21 Ibid. , p. 24. 
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"came to the rescue of the Commonwealth connection once again" 
when challenged in his own party congress about the matter." He 
reproved critics who objected to his sitting at Commonwealth 
conferences with South African prime ministers and said that 
al though he strongly disapproved of apartheid, he would have 
nothing to do with any demand that the Commonwealth relationship 
should be broken over it. He restated his belief in the value of 
the Commonwealth relationship which, as the Rand Daily Mail 
approvingly noted, for all its "vagueness and flexibility", still 
provided the machinery for informal consultation between 
countries "that otherwise might be completely estranged". 
A Canadian paper read at the 1959 Commonwealth Relations 
conference reflected how concerned Canada had become about 
maintaining the unity of the Commonwealth (after Suez) and 
keeping the developing Afro-Asian countries in. This was as much 
a function of Canada's desire to escape the claustrophobic 
presence of the American giant next door as it was a function of 
the newly developing "Indo-Canadian entente" in world affairs. 
It was noted how "in her epic struggle for the realisation of 
self", the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth offered an anchor 
which Canada could firmly grasp when the "tides of Americanism 
seem to pull too strongly" . 23 Canada was "proud" to be associated 
with Australia and New Zealand and "with understandable 
reservations", South Africa. As far as South Africa was 
concerned, Diefenbaker, the prime minister, could still defend 
South Africa's right to remain in the Commonwealth and his 
foreign minister, Howard Green, could still warn as late as 
February 1960 that thoughts of kicking South Africa out were 
"foolish'' because, as he put it, "nothing would remain of the 
Commonwealth" if such ideas were put into practice. 24 
22 Rand Daily Mail, 15 January 1959. 
23 J. T. Saywell, "Canada and the Commonwealth", Department 
of History, University of Toronto (Canadian Institute of 
International Affairs), Paper presented at the 6th Commonwealth 
Relations Conference, January 1959, p.l. 
24 Reported in Die Vader land, 12 February 1960. 
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Aside from the differing perceptions of the value of the 
Commonwealth connection which these three papers presented in 
their less than 1959, they were similar in one respect 
enthusiastic attitude to South Africa. India adopted the most 
hostile attitude but they were all concerned not to appear too 
closely associated with South Africa and were all aware of the 
effects of "racialism" on the Commonwealth. This demonstrated the 
extent to which the South African "problem" was becoming a 
Commonwealth problem. It would soon prove to be the main focus 
of attention at the prime minsters conferences of the forthcoming 
two years. 
On his return from New Zealand Senator Grabler gave an interview 
to the SABC which gave his impressions of the conference to his 
listeners. 25 He mentioned Godfrey Lewanika as the "Bantu MP" from 
the Central African Federation and described him as a "noteworthy 
exception to the usual contemporary Bantu intellectual" (" 'n 
merkwaardige uitsondering op die hededaagse intellektuele 
Bantoe"). He said that Lewanika told him he respected South 
Africa's attempts at apartheid but that he also expected respect 
for the CAF's "partnership" policy. But if partnership failed, 
he told Grabler, he wouldn't hesitate to "adopt apartheid". 
Grabler concluded his speech by saying the conference had 
reflected something of a ''disturbing image" of South Africa to 
the outside world. There had also, however, been "understanding" 
and a desire for "reconciliation". 
(b) South Africa's weakening international standing 
As Vale notes, strong criticism of apartheid was being stimulated 
in several western countries by the end of the 1950's by domestic 
lobbies, and was embarrassing those governments for their 
25 INCH, PV 93 (Verwoerd Collection), File 1/55/2/1 (1959-61: 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers'Conferences), SABC Interview 
Senator Grobler's Impressions of the 6th Commonwealth Relations 
Conference in Palmerston North, 3 February 1959. 
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provision of moral support for South Africa.• Similarly, in the 
UNO it was being stimulated by ever-increasing difficulties for 
South Africa in the General Assembly. Thus, by the time South 
Africa was able to broach the question of a republic in the 
Commonwealth "its international standing was so weak already that 
its withdrawal was virtually a foregone conclusion" . 27 What 
emerges from the attitudes expressed at the Palmerston North 
conference, however, is not so much a desire to expel South 
Africa from the Club but more of a desire to feel at liberty to 
direct forthright criticism at her in the hope that this would 
induce a change in attitude. While this may have led to a "false 
confidence" among the white population about South Africa's 
chances of remaining in the Club, there was as yet no indication 
of any moves to withdraw, whether from South Africa's side or 
from that of other countries. This was only to become a distinct 
possibility after Sharpeville. 
The Rand Daily Mail in 1959 was probably representative of a 
substantial portion of opinion in 
Nehru for his defence of the 
South Africa when it praised 
Commonwealth and for not 
withdrawing from the organisation simply to satisfy his critics' 
indignation over apartheid. 28 By stressing the value of the 
Commonwealth for South Africa at a time when relations with the 
UNO had become "fragile" and when "the Downing Street link" was 
seen to have an increased importance, the newspaper was 
reflecting the hope that the Commonwealth connection would remain 
as a constant pillar of support in the coming y~ars. 
26 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p. 408. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Rand Daily Mail, 15 January 1959. 
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Chapter 15: Verwoerd and the Republican Question 
la) Verwoerd's post-election policy statements 
Verwoerd' s victory in the electoral contest after Strij dom' s 
death in August 1958 was achieved by the votes of a solid block 
of Transvaal MPs together with the nominated senators. 1 The fact 
that there was not unanimous support for him and that his main 
opponent, the Cape leader Dr T.E. Donges, was only voted down 
after a second round of balloting indicates considerable doubts 
about the future leadership of the country from within the 
National Party. 
According to Geldenhuys, Verwoerd differed from Strijdom in his 
handling of foreign policy. 2 His ministerial portfolio, native 
affairs, had been •far less insulated from foreign affairs• than 
Strijdom's, "given the internationalisation of South Africa's 
racial policies" in those years. Furthermore, says Geyser, as a 
former editor of Die Transvaler, a newspaper which he had •from 
the first edition put ... in the service of the republican ideal", 3 
he had often commented on matters such as the British connection, 
republicanism and South Africa's involvement in the Second World 
War. He had been "firm friends" with Strijdom through their 
common belief in the republican ideal and he believed that if the 
republic were not brought in within five years after Strijdom's 
death it would never be. 4 He retained Eric Louw as minister of 
external affairs and, as Geldenhuys notes, it was •unlikely" that 
Verwoerd considered replacing Louw in view of the latter's 
"expertise" and seniority in the party. 5 Furthermore, Louw's 
''tough-minded" approach to foreign affairs ''was still widely 
1 Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.314. 
2 Geldenhuys, The Diplomacy of Isolation, p.22. 
3 Geyser, watershed, p.48. 
4 Ibid., p.49. 
5 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, p.22. 
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applauded in National Party circles (although, as Geldenhuys 
points out, his standing in the party gradually diminished with 
"age, irritability, intolerance and quarrelsomeness") . 6 
As far as the perceptions of the non-white majority about 
Verwoerd's election are concerned, the prospects, republican or 
otherwise, for the future seemed bleak. Albert Luthuli, 
president-general of the ANC, noted at the December 1958 
conference of the organisation that Dr Verwoerd's accession to 
the premiership of the country "added to our concern but not to 
our surprise". 7 The experience of Verwoerd by Africans when he 
was minister of native affairs made them "most apprehensive" of 
their future and that of the Union". Luthuli went on to describe 
Verwoerd as the "relentless apostle of Apartheid" determined "to 
keep the native in his place". 
In a similar manner, the conservative Jordan Ngubane, writing in 
Indian Opinion, had noted with concern even before Verwoerd's 
election that if Verwoerd were to replace Strijdom, he would 
"take South Africa to a republic the hard way ... even if it meant 
civil war" . 8 
Soon after his election as prime minister Verwoerd outlined his 
attitude to the republican issue in a radio speech to the nation. 
He hoped, he said, to follow in Strijdom's footsteps and he 
asserted his conviction that a "toenadering" of English and 
Afrikaner South Africans would only occur in a republic. 9 
Apartheid would be the only solution, he said, to South Africa's 
race problems. 
6 Ibid. 
7 AD 2186 (ANC Collection), 
Meetings), No.5. (1959 Conference, 
Presidential Address, p:l. 
8 Indian Opinion, 15 August 1958. 
B(a) (National Congress 
Durban 13-14 December), 
9 INCH, PV93 (Verwoerd Collection), Vol.l (Subject files), 
File 1/11/2 (Verwoerd's election as Prime Minister, 1958 Sept.), 
Radio Speech 3 September 1958. 
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At a press conference a few days later he refused to be drawn on 
a possible date for the introduction of a republic. As to whether 
the republic would remain in the Commonwealth or not, Verwoerd 
repeated the formula agreed to in 1951 that: "This can only be 
decided at the time a republic is introduced and in light of 
world conditions. Circumstances may be entirely different in 
three or four years time. 1110 
It was predicted that some time in 1960 or 1962 would be the date 
for a decision (on a republic) and it was expected that Verwoerd 
would come under pressure from his supporters to introduce "an 
early republic". The enfranchisement of white 18-year-olds had 
already "set the scene" for a republican campaign and the 
government believed it could count on the majority of those 
teenagers to support it. Verwoerd had assured the world that the 
republic would "maintain democratic traditions" and would 
continue to welcome foreign investment. 
He also claimed that his policy was not to "oppress" the 
country's 11 million non-Europeans but to bring about racial 
separation "with mutual benefits ... humanity and justice". There 
would be "no ceiling" to non-white development in "their own 
areas" but he was emphatically opposed to non-whites ever sitting 
in the central all-white parliament. As the Christian Science 
Monitor noted, there wa~ something about these views that had a 
''theoretical and academic ring'' which appeared "strangely out of 
tune with the realities and turbulence of existence in the 
African townships". Would Africa's "mounting black nationalism" 
wait for South Africa's future to be "mapped with the leisurely 
deliberation of a game of chess?" 11 
Verwoerd elaborated on his attitude to the republic during the 
course of debates in parliament during September 1958 and January 
1959. A republic, he said, would end the hostility between the 
10 The Christian Science Monitor (Boston) , 8 September 1958. 
11 Ibid. 
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white language groups, it would improve the relationship with 
Britain by getting rid of the suspicion of ulterior motives in 
choosing friendship with that country and would end the 
''bickering" over the •colour policy" that currently existed. 12 
He refused to be drawn yet on the question as to whether the vote 
would be by referendum or by a general election but he stated 
that under certain conditions a "simple majority" of white voters 
would be sufficient. 13 
(bl Reactions to Verwoerd's republican statements 
The official opposition under the leadership of Sir de Villiers 
Graaff opposed the idea of a republic, claiming that it would 
inevitably take place at the expense of South Africa's 
Commonwealth membership. He also claimed that the republican 
issue was based purely on "sentiment" and that it was dangerous 
to approach a matter ''so heavily charged with emotion" on the 
basis of sentiment. 14 What was lacking, was a debate on whether 
a republican form of government was any better than a monarchy 
and since the latter had been in existence since 1910 it needed 
"no justification". 15 Al though the prime minister had stated that 
the introduction of a republic was not a case of "revenge" 
against the English for the war of 1899-1902, Verwoerd could not 
deny that "all over South Africa today" racial sentiment was 
being ''hitched to the republican wagon". 16 
As for the attitude of the British government, the immediate 
reaction was to maintain a position of careful neutrality in 
order to avoid accusations of influencing the republican debate 
inside South Africa. There was no talk from the side of British 
12 House of Assembly Debates, cols 55-60, 27 January 1959. 
13 Ibid., col.58, 27 January 1959. 
14 Ibid. , col. 21, 27 January 1959. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid. 
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policy-makers of insisting that the wishes of the black majority 
should be taken into account. Only later was this point to be 
used as a justification for the view that automatic support for 
South Africa's Commonwealth membership application could not be 
expected. 
However, the difficulties involved in trying to maintain an 
appearance of neutrality when most British officials privately 
opposed the idea of a republic soon became clear. A "Guidance 
Memorandum" drawn up by the British high commission in November 
1958 referred to this situation and said that since the question 
of the republic was "now ... being so actively debated between 
political parties, we are in serious danger of 'interfering', or 
appearing to interfere, in internal politics by what we say in 
answer to the subject 11 • 17 
The memorandum referred in particular to "certain United Party 
complaints" that local British representatives were saying that 
there would be no change in trading and economic relations 
between Britain and South Africa if a republic were to be 
introduced. These statements had "sabotaged" the UP's anti-
republican 
damaging 
campaign. This, 
and dangerous 
said the memorandum, was a •very 
impression" for United Kingdom 
representatives to give and it was advised "at all costs" to 
"avoid giving any cause for such impressions of interference 
being sustained - by either Party''. 
Guidelines were then suggested for high commission staff and 
others to use in answering questions: 
political question of whether the 
for example, on the general 
republic would make any 
difference to South Africa's position in the Commonwealth, the 
"right" answer was to say "that membership of the Commonwealth 
in such circumstances would be a matter for all the members to 
decide and no one can possibly say now what the decision would 
17 PRO, DO 119, File 1206 (The Republic and South Africa: 
Membership of the Commonwealth, 1958-60), No.l, Guidance Memo. 
by the Acting High Commissioner, R.H. Belcher, 24 November 1958. 
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be" .1s 
On the question of possible economic and trading relations the 
memorandum noted that they would "probably" remain unchanged 
depending on the public confidence at the time. It would depend 
also on whether there were "strong nationalist economic demands" 
or whether there was an "authoritarian-type constitution". So the 
right answer was therefore to say that 
if one assumes that the change will come about in 
circumstances which involve no shock to confidence 
then there will be no significant effect on general 
economic and trading relations but if one 
there will be a shock to confidence 
relations will naturally be affected. 
assumes that 
then these 
Staff were advised not to go out of their way to say there were 
"grave doubts" (which would suit the UP), nor to give the 
impression that all would be "plain sailing" (and so please the 
Nationalists). This was a "South African decision" and Britain 
was to give "no opinion" because the consequences could "not be 
foreseen". It was also pointed out that this note was not 
concerned with the question of a republic "outside the 
Commonwealth" - a possibility "not being seriously canvassed at 
present", so there was "no objection" to staff making general 
statements "pointing out the advantage of the Commonwealth and 
its institutions''· This could be done "on all suitable 
occasions", but even here "we should not do so in a manner which 
too directly suggests the Union context" - ie., the statements 
were to be of general, not particular reference. 
Building on this advice, a note was sent by the acting high 
commissioner, R.H. Belcher, to Sir John Maud who was about to 
arrive in South Africa to take up the high commissioner's post, 
18 Ibid. 
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giving similar advice on the trade question. 19 Belcher said he 
did not want "to give unnecessary votes to the NP" by giving the 
"right answer" which was that there was "no doubt that a republic 
need make no difference". However, the question of membership 
depended on a "Commonwealth decision later" and South Africa's 
trade and economic relations would depend on continued 
Commonwealth membership (eg. "for preferences") They would also 
depend on "estimates of future economic risks suggested by the 
circumstances surrounding the declaration of a republic and the 
form of the republican constitution''. 
Once he was installed in off ice in Cape Town, Maud took up the 
theme with the CRO in London, noting that if British 
representatives continued to say the republic would make no 
difference Britain would "lose the goodwill" of those who are 
traditionally her friends and "actively assist" in hastening the 
coming of the republic. 20 He said Belcher had been "right" in 
instructing "our people here to keep quiet or be non-committal". 
There was a need for a parallel warning "discreetly to be given 
in the United Kingdom". For ministers and officials most likely 
to be confronted there was no problem but other public figures 
"present a problem of great delicacy and the wisest thing may 
well be not to attempt anything in that field". He concluded: 
But it must be said that the fact that public opinion 
in the United Kingdom is understood to have accepted 
the inevitability of a republic and no longer to feel 
any concern about· it contributes just as much as 
statements by individual United Kingdom spokesmen to 
the encouragement of the republican cause. 
Belcher had given Maud his personal assessment of the republican 
19 DO 119, File 1206, No. 2, Belcher - Maud, 22 December 1958. 
2° File 1206, No.4, Maud (Cape Town) - H. Lintott (C.R.O.), 
26 February 1959. 
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movement and how Britain should react to it. 21 Belcher believed 
there was "in reality, one goal" of the Nationalists and that was 
"to make South Africa a wholly Afrikaner-dominated state, with 
the English-speaking South Africans relegated to what, in fact, 
though no doubt, not in name, would be a position of permanent 
inferiority". 
The Afrikaners, he said, saw the republic as a "huge victory" 
over the English- speaking section. This was not so much the case 
with the "moderates" in the party, but more with the extremist 
leaders of the NP, and their education system which inculcated 
it "in the young". Once the republic was achieved, it "might 
loosen the bonds uniting NP leaders to their followers" because 
they would no longer be united against the English. But then 
"other struggles" would follow, for example, the struggle for 
"economic supremacy". 
South Africans themselves should decide on the issue, he 
continued, but Britain ''should not welcome the republic" and, 
indeed, if he were right about the NP "we should deplore it" and 
give no encouragement. That was why the statement by R.A. Butler 
(home secretary under Macmillan' government) in Salisbury in 
October 1958 "was so damaging". Butler had said that the republic 
"need not" make a difference to the Union's Commonwealth 
relations or trading and economic relations and Eric Louw 
consequently "rejoiced" in the statement. The UP, on the other 
hand, were "indignant" that their anti-republican stance was 
being undermined. Belcher went on to advise British 
representatives to use statements such as "it depends on the 
circumstances at the time". He personally felt that trade and 
economic links would "probably continue" as long as they were 
"profitable" but investments "may dry up" if there were signs of 
an "authoritarian constitution and anti-English discrimination". 
The CRO took up the advice of both Belcher and Maud and drew up 
21 File 1206, No.4, R.H. Belcher, "Statement by United 
Kingdom representatives on the Republican Issue", n.d. 
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a "Heads of Department" notice to be circulated within the CRO 
and other government departments in London. 22 It began: "Please 
draw the attention of all members of your staff to the attached 
note about the undesirability of spokesmen for the United 
Kingdom government expressing views in public on the Republican 
issue in South Africa." The notice continued with an explanatory 
confidential memorandum attached saying that statements by 
British representatives could "give encouragement to the 
republican cause, since the Nationalists feel the need for some 
significant support for a republic 
Africans and moreover they have 
from English- speaking South 
doubts about the external 
economic and political consequences that might follow''.D 
At the same time, these statements 
weaken the position of the non-Nationalists, who are 
for the most part English-speaking and who consider 
that the change would produce no advantage and would 
involve not only the danger of an authoritarian 
constitution but also the risk of grave economic and 
political disadvantages, in particular, the loss of 
Commonwealth membership. 
The British government could not, however, "take sides" as there 
was a "division along party lines" and ''silence should, ideally, 
be the rule". But where silence was not possible the answer to 
questions about the republic should be that "this must depend on 
the circumstances at the time" and that "continued membership of 
the Commonwealth by a Republican South Africa would be a matter 
for all the Members to decide". 
22 File 12 06, No. 5, Lintott - Maud, 20 April 1959 and No. 6, 
E.N. Larmour (C.R.O.) - J.B. Johnstone (Cape Town), 29 April 
1959. 
23 File 1206, No.8, Heads of Department Letter with attached 
confidential note entitled "The Union of South Africa and the 
Republican Issue". 
341 
British worries about how to respond to the republican campaign 
received fresh impetus at the beginning of the following year. 
In January 1960 Verwoerd made the announcement of an imminent 
move towards a republic to a shocked and surprised opposition and 
stated that a referendum would be held within a year. 24 It was 
desirable and necessary that the two 
Commonwealth membership should be 
issues of a republic and 
treated separately, he 
stated. 25 An ordinary majority of voters would decide, the 
republic would be "democratic and Christian" and the equality of 
the official languages would be maintained as well as the 
parliamentary form of government. 26 The state president would be 
a constitutional head of state and not the prime minister at the 
same time. He would not be elected by the electorate. This would 
mean he would be "above politics" and so no drastic change from 
the monarchical form of government would occur. The republic 
would maintain friendly relations with all states including 
Britain and the Commonwealth. If, however, a Labour Party were 
to come to power in Britain Verwoerd would "seriously consider" 
taking South Africa out of the Commonwealth. 27 
At first he stated South West Africa would not take part in the 
referendum and then in March he announced that on "second 
thoughts", it would. 28 The second thoughts were more than likely 
a result of pressure from the National Party of South West Africa 29 
as well as a hope that more votes for the republic would be 
forthcoming if the territory were to be included. Verwoerd' s 
stated reason was that he had excluded South West Africa at first 
because it was "only right that this community which had suffered 
so much unpleasantness should be spared further unpleasantness 
24 Kruger, The Making of a Nation, p.322. 
25 Geyser, Watershed, p.51. 
26 Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.322. 
27 Quoted in Mansergh, Documents and 
a Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.322. 
3 Cape Argus, 16 March 1960. 
Sgeeches, p.361. 
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and suspicions". 30 He also claimed that the United Party would 
protest that South West Africa was being included only because 
a republic could not be achieved without the territory's support. 
But as the UP had now pledged itself in favour of the territory 
joining the referendum the point fell away. The voters had also 
made it clear they were anxious to take part in the referendum. 
(In the end they voted 19938 to 12017 in favour of the 
republic, 31 which may have indicated a policy miscalculation on 
the part of the UP) . 
The British high commission reacted to the announcement with 
some surprise. A telegram of 23 January to the CRO expressed 
"surprise" that Verwoerd had announced the republic "so early in 
the session" and after the governor-general had said there would 
be no contentious legislation in the first five months because 
of the Union celebrations. 32 However, it was noted that the 
republic would not be authoritarian but "moderate", suggesting 
that extremists were "not as strong" as was thought. The Cape 
moderates like Donges ·would support this (as Die Burger's 
approval of the announcement indicated) and although Natal would 
"fight" it, the moderate nature of the republic would help "woo" 
the UP and PP support. Verwoerd had realised that it was 
important not to "alienate financial interests". 
Possible reasons why Verwoerd had announced the referendum were 
then postulated: that he needed popularity after public 
"disenchantment with the Bantustans"; to heighten nationalism 
before Union celebrations; the hope that British statesmen would 
say a republic (especially a moderate one) would mean no 
difference to relations; a desire not to alienate all English 
speakers by leaving the Commonwealth and a feeling that his 
position would be strengthened by speaking to other prime 
30 South African Digest, Vol.7, No.6, 18 March 1960, p.9. 
31 Miller, Survey, p.151. 
32 DO 119, File 1206, No.19, High Commissioner, Pretoria -
Secretary of State CRO, 23 January 1960. 
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ministers first; this approach could "spike the guns" of the 
opposition who predicted South Africa would be kicked out of the 
Commonwealth. 
It was pointed out, furthermore, that the UP had attacked the 
republican announcement for excluding "black voters" and for not 
giving convincing reasons for a republic. Others had spoken of 
Verwoerd breaking his vow of a "broad will of the people" in 
favour of a 1 vote majority.n 
Verwoerd, in his referendum announcement, had undertaken to 
discuss the whole matter of the republic with Macmillan during 
the latter's forthcoming visit to South Africa.M However, the 
UP opposition was not mollified and De Villiers Graaff in reply 
stated that his party would oppose the referendum and the 
republic and stated that he was convinced the introduction of a 
republic would take place at the expense of the Commonwealth 
connect ion. 35 
Opposition newspapers were generally hostile to the announcement 
but also expressed some frustration with the way the United Party 
had handled it in parliament. The Rand Daily Mail, for example, 
published an article by the journalist Laurence Gandar which 
criticised the UP for missing the opportunity to choose its own 
ground on the issue of how the republic would be brought about. 36 
The UP, Gandar wrote, should never have accepted the principle 
of a simple majority vote for bringing about such an important 
constitutional change. It would be a precedent for other future 
constitutional changes. It should have also insisted that there 
be only "nominal changes from the present system" and that South 
Africa should remain a member of the Commonwealth. He argued for 
33 Ibid. 
M Geyser, Watershed, p.52. 
35 Ib'd 52 __ J._.' p. . 
36 Rand Daily Mail, 29 January 1960. 
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a more "positive form of anti-republicanism" to avoid the 
spectacle of English-speakers being dragged "kicking and clawing" 
into the republican age. He also pointed out that Verwoerd had 
at least pre-empted the "extremists" in his own party who wanted 
the republic to be outside the Commonwealth and to be a return 
to a "Kruger-type republic". 
From the point of view of the extra-parliamentary majority, 
however, the prospects for South Africa as a republic, whether 
in or out of the Commonwealth, aroused only the deepest gloom. 
A press statement by the ANC on 23 January 1960 responded to 
Verwoerd's announcement of an impending republican referendum 
with suspicion and forebqding. It noted that "Consistent with the 
practice and policies of the Nationalists", the Europeans alone 
would decide by simple majority whether South Africa would become 
a republic - the non-Europeans being wholly excluded from these 
"far-reaching changes" . 37 The statement noted the "shrewdness" 
of the Nationalists in making this announcement a few days before 
the British prime minister's visit and on the eve of the 50th 
anniversary of the Union celebrations: 
Europeans will be united in welcoming Mr Macmillan, a 
large number of them will also be united in 
celebrating the 50th anniversary and this would be a 
favourable atmosphere for a republic. The Nationalists 
have attempted to conceal their real purpose of 
establishing a republic by giving an impression that 
they want a democratic Parliamentary form of republic. 
These tactics can only deceive Europeans whose concept 
of democracy has been warped by racialism. 
However, the ANC had "no illusions" about the fact that the 
Nationalists intended to establish a •fascist republic'' which 
their leaders had been "advocating for years". It was opposed to 
37 AD 2186 (ANC Collection), Box.E (Press Statements), No.21 
"Announcement on a Republic", 23 January 1960. 
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both "the form and the method" of bringing about the republic and 
would fight "uncompromisingly" for a form of government "in which 
everybody, irrespective of colour or creed will have the right 
to participate". It warned the people of South Africa not to be 
deceived by the "mild language in which Dr Verwoerd' s 
announcement had been couched", noting that this was merely a 
tactic "to win over the English speaking section of our people". 
It concluded by saying that the fact that the government had 
"completely ignored Non-European opinion" on so important an 
issue further demonstrated the "utter contempt with which the 
opinion of the majority is regarded by the Nationalists". 
On 6 February 1960, under the heading, "Voteless Africans Speak 
their Mind on the S.A. Republic," The conservative Johannesburg 
newspaper, The World, said the reason why the Nationalists wanted 
a republic was to unify whites and "to make the Englishman more 
of an Afrikaner" because of the "Black Menace". 38 The Africans' 
view of the republic was that it was "sinister and undesirable" 
and that it would "seal the doom of the African and further 
entrench white domination". It "conjured up the old Boer 
Republics with their unholy dictum of 'no equality between white 
and black' in church and state". The Africans feared that the 
"worst excesses of apartheid would be given free rein under a 
republican form of government". The aspirations of Africans in 
South Africa were similar to those in the high commission 
territories, namely "evolutionary attainment of independence 
under the British Crown". They viewed "any suggestion to develop 
along lines incompatible with the British monarchical form of 
government with the greatest suspicion and mistrust". 
The reaction of the Pan-Africanist Congress under its national 
secretary, Potlako Leballo, was much more dismissive of the whole 
affair. "Our view is that the African people have never been a 
party to the Union of South Africa, for, at its formation they 
38 The World, 6 February 1960. 
346 
were not consulted", he said. 39 The cons ti tut ion of the Union was 
"not of our choice" so the republican question was "purely white 
politics". The aim of the republic was to entrench white 
domination and to perpetuate "herrenvolk policies". The PAC 
programme of national liberation remained to be fulfilled: 
"Republic or no republic we are concerned with a massive drive 
towards a free, independent democratic United States of Africa". 
Indian Opinion commented in the context of the fiftieth 
anniversary of Union in June 1960: "Not much note has been taken 
of the fact that simultaneously with the consummation of fifty 
years of Union the old liberal tradition of the South died 
completely and fully". 40 The "North" was now completely in the 
saddle, as had been shown by the abolition of African 
representation in parliament and the death of the Cape Liberal 
tradition. 
It is now for the 
question of Union. 
Non-European people no 
It is simply a matter 
more a 
of the 
domination of the country by the narrow Afrikaner 
Nationalist creed of the North. A new era now opens in 
this country - an era that is on all fours with the 
rise of the Mussolini and Hitler regimes. 
In September 1960 the Congress of Democrats newsletter, Counter 
Attack, urged whites to vote against the republic in the 
referendum, even though it "was not a matter of life and death 
to South Africa". 41 At the same time the referendum would be 
exposed as 
majority and 
"meaningless" without the participation 
the white population would be made aware of 
of the 
this by 
putting before them "the real alternative to the present social 
order - a fully democratic multi-racial order". 
39 Quoted in The World, 6 February 1960. 
40 Indian Opinion, 3 June 1960. 
41 AD 2186, Box H (Publications), b (Periodicals), No.8, 
Counter Attack, 7 September 1960. 
347 
By then, however, events such as Macmillan's visit to South 
Africa, his "Winds of Change" speech and the Sharpeville incident 
in March of that year had changed the climate of opinion among 
whites in South Africa to the point where what little liberal 
sentiment remained was being further subordinated to the dictates 
of white racial solidarity. 
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Chapter 16: Macmillan's Visit to South Africa 
(a) The ''Winds of Change• speech 
In November 1959, before the referendum announcement, Verwoerd 
had made it known that he intended to ask the British prime 
minister, Harold Macmillan, to visit South Africa on the last leg 
of his African tour scheduled for January and February of 1960. 
Among other things, Verwoerd intended to broach the subject of 
a republic and Commonwealth membership during the visit. 1 
According to Geldenhuys, this was to be Verwoerd's 
"test" in terms of his own brand of personal 
first great 
diplomacy. 2 
Macmillan's visit was to afford him his first opportunity for 
direct talks with a "distinguished counterpart" and for measuring 
his "political convictions" and "diplomatic skills" against those 
of a foreign leader. It also proved to be a severe test of nerves 
and patience for Macmillan, as the British prime minister 
recalled in his memoirs. 3 
For Britain the 1960's promised to be a decade of turbulence in 
the Commonwealth and Empire. It had already opened with an 
unprecedented onslaught in the UNO against colonialism and 
imperialism, sponsored largely by the Soviet Union. Macmillan was 
highly conscious of the need to retain the newly-independent 
states of Africa in the western sphere of influence and thus of 
the crucial importance of his 1960 visit to the continent. Ghana 
and Nigeria had indicated their desire to join the Commonwealth 
and Macmillan was determined to ensure a smooth entry for them 
to the "Club• despite increasing evidence in the case of Ghana 
of internal dissensions and signs of political oppression. He was 
1 INCH, PV93 (Verwoerd Collection), File 1/42/1/1 1951-1960 
(Protectorates-General), Editorial in South Africa Magazine 
(London), entitled "Dr Verwoerd at the Summit", 28 November, 
1959. 
2 Geldenhuys, Diplomacy of Isolation, p.23. 
3 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp.150-161. 
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also hoping to smooth the way for a visit of the queen to Ghana 
later in the year, a visit which, as it turned out, was almost 
cancelled as a result of the dangerous political situation in 
that country. 
It was, however, the white-ruled south that was to occasion the 
most anxiety for Macmillan during his African tour. 4 The second-
last leg, before his arrival in the Union, was spent in the 
increasingly unstable Central African Federation where Macmillan 
encountered considerable hostility from a section of white 
opinion suspicious of a possible British •sell-out''. The 
appointment of a commission of inquiry into the political affairs 
of the Federation (the Monckton commission) had become necessary 
as a result of the growing feeling among the black population 
that only a break-up of the territory into its constituent parts 
would provide a way out of the strangle-hold on political power 
maintained by the white settlers of Southern Rhodesia. For 
Macmillan, caught between the "Scylla" of the powerful right-wing 
bloc in his own party (over which the Federation prime minister, 
Roy Welensky, seemed to have considerable influence) and the 
"Charybdis" of African opinion, the Federation proved to be his 
main source of worry in Africa and seemed to occasion him an 
undue amount of time and effort at a period when the superpower 
tensions of the Cold War were at their height. 5 At times the 
South African problem seemed, in comparison, to be a "welcome 
distraction" from these worries. 6 
The CRO had been preparing briefs for Macmillan's visit to the 
Union since November of the previous year and these briefings, 
based largely on the advice given by the British high 
commissioner in South Africa, Sir John Maud, indicated 
4 See Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp.131-161. 
5 Alistair Horne, Macmillan 1957-1986. The Official 
Biography, Vol.2 (London, Macmillan, 1989), pp.191-193, 200-202, 
205-211. 
6 Ibid. ,p.204. 
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Macmillan's line of strategy to be adopted in his talks with 
Verwoerd. A briefing of 4 December suggested that Verwoerd would 
try to tell Macmillan a republic was essential for unity in South 
Africa and would ask for Macmillan's co-operation in bringing it 
about. 7 It stated that Verwoerd would be "greatly encouraged" if 
the prime minister gave the assurance that the republic would 
make no difference to British/South African relations but that 
"passionate anti-republicans" among the English speakers would 
regard such a statement as a "sell-out to the Nationalists". 
In handling this question we 
body of English~speaking 
cannot ignore the large 
sentiment for the monarchy 
fear that Dr Verwoerd 
South Africans whose 
is strong and who genuinely 
intends to set up an 
authoritarian republic outside the Commonwealth. 
It was noted that English-speakers were moving towards a position 
of "resigned acquiescence" and that the government would probably 
get a numerical majority in the referendum, but not in Natal. 
"Non-Europeans would, of course, not be consulted". 
This latter point, however, did not seem to be the main factor 
against the republic in the eyes of British officialdom. 
Throughout this period of intense policy debate on the republic 
and Commonwealth membership it was clear that the British 
government was most concerned with the opinions of the white 
electorate in South Africa, not of the voteless black majority. 
The wording of memoranda and telegrams makes it clear that when 
phrases such as "the majority of South Africans" were used, 
British officials were referring to "white" South Africans only. 
This approach meant tacit acceptance of the rules of the game 
devised by Verwoerd for the referendum and it meant that any sort 
of direct appeal by Britain to the loyalties of the black 
majority was out of the question. 
7 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.10, Brief on forthcoming visit 
of Prime Minister to South Africa in February 1960, from High 
Commissioner's office, Pretoria, 4 December 1959. 
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The briefing of 4 December was very much a reflection of this 
type of thinking. It suggested that Macmillan should, firstly, 
assure Verwoerd that only the "people of South Africa" (by which 
was meant "white people") could decide on a republic, and, 
secondly, that it was impossible to forecast the effects of such 
a change on British/South African relations; that this would 
depend on the circumstances and that it would probably only be 
accepted by Britain if the "great majority of the population" 
supported it. Then "other Commonwealth precedents would apply and 
unimpaired relations would follow". But if it were brought about 
in circumstances of "bitter controversy" without a clear 
expression of "national will" it would be "unrealistic" to think 
this might not have repercussions on sentiment in the United 
Kingdom towards South Africa. 
Macmillan should express the hope that South Africa would wish 
to stay in the Commonwealth, and that "this would certainly be 
an important factor influencing British reaction to the change". 
The briefing seemed to be quite sanguine about South Africa's 
prospects of remaining in the Commonwealth. (This was still some 
time before Sharpeville) . If Verwoerd were to raise the 
procedural question, Macmillan would have to say there was an 
agreed procedure of (1) first informing fellow prime ministers 
of the intention and (2) that others would have to signify 
agreement. Macmillan could add that the Indian, Pakistani and 
Ghanaian precedents "created an expectation that Members would 
accord the same treatment ... to South Africa". As far as Britain 
was concerned, "we would not want to exclude any country from 
Commonwealth membership because of a change in its constitution". 
It was also surmised that Verwoerd was interested in the Irish 
option of "external association" with the Commonwealth in a 
manner which would give South Africa some of the "benefits" but 
none of the "obligations" of membership and without recognising 
the queen as head of the Commonwealth. This was to be 
"discouraged", as Eire (and Cyprus) were "special cases" which 
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for reasons of geography or affiliation had been granted external 
association and the same could not be said of South Africa. 
Macmillan would "be pressed" by Verwoerd to issue some sort 
of agreed communique at the end of the talks and here "special 
care" was needed when referring to the republic. The communique 
should aim to say that .the republican question was a domestic 
issue (thus avoiding giving the "sell-out impression"). Verwoerd 
should be persuaded to agree to say that he wanted South Africa 
to remain in the Commonwealth, although it was "not likely" he 
would want to be committed on this. The communique should also 
say that it was for all members of the Commonwealth to decide 
whether South Africa remained a member and that Britain would not 
want to exclude any member because of a change to its 
constitution. 
In the meantime the British high commission in Ghana informed 
South Africa and other Commonwealth high commissions that Nkrumah 
had sent personal letters to all prime ministers including 
Verwoerd announcing his intention of introducing a republic 
before the May conference. 8 It was then suggested by the British 
high commission in Cape Town that an addition to Macmillan's 
briefing be made pointing out that, in the light of Ghana's 
application, Verwoerd "might be tempted to ask permission" for 
South Africa at the same time. 9 It would "be difficult" for the 
assembled prime ministers to disagree if both requests were 
presented. 
On the other hand it was unlikely that the republican referendum 
in South Africa would have been held by that time and so it was 
surmised that Verwoerd. might not want to alienate the anti-
republican opposition even more by making a premature application 
in May. Nevertheless, it was possible that he would try to make 
8 File 1206, No.16, High Commission (Ghana) to CRO and all 
High Commissions, 25 December 1959. 
9 File 1206, No.17, H.C's office, Pretoria - Secretary of 
State, CRO., 30 December 1959. 
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South African approval for Ghana's application contingent on 
approval for South Africa's later. It could "be pointed out" that 
"other South Africans in the past", including C.R. Swart, had 
"put themselves on record against any such advance commitments". 
While the British prime minister was being briefed on his 
forthcoming meeting with Verwoerd both the ANC and the SA Indian 
Congress sent letters to him asking him to make his stand against 
South Africa's apartheid policy clear and to meet their leaders 
while he was in South Africa. 10 Soon after Macmillan had arrived 
in the Union, Duma Nokwe·, the secretary-general of the ANC, wrote 
to him to say: 
We regret that you, Sir, as Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom have visited our country at the 
invitation of the Nationalist Government because we 
are convinced that the Nationalists will attempt to 
use your visit to quell the mounting world-wide 
condemnation of their racialistic and oppressive 
policies. It would indeed be most unfortunate and 
regrettable if the Nationalist Party should be given 
an opportunity to claim that their policies have the 
sympathies of the head of the Government of the United 
Kingdom. 
at the 
Already the fact that the British delegation 
United Nations Organisation supported the 
tenuous contention of the Nationalist Government that 
its racialistic policy and ruthless oppression of the 
Non-European people is a domestic issue had aroused 
serious doubts about the attitude of the British 
Government towards racialism. 11 
The letter went on to describe the "Chamber of Horrors" which 
South Africa had become for Africans under apartheid and ended 
10 AD 2186, (ANC), Box E, No.23, Press Statement by SAIC (by 
Dr G.M. Naicker, President) and the ANC (by Duma Nokwe, 
Secretary-General) on Mr MacMillan's visit to Africa. 
ll Ibid., Nokwe - MacMillan, 25 January 1960. 
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with a request to Macmillan to meet the leaders of the ANC at a 
"time and place which would be most convenient" to him. 
With expressions of regret Macmillan declined this request saying 
that "arrangements" had not enabled him to receive any 
deputations from organisations "not represented in Parliament". 12 
This was in fact a polite way of saying that the Nationalists 
frowned upon the idea of him visiting such organisations and that 
he did not want to strain the patience of his hosts too much. In 
Pointing the Way Macmillan said that although the South African 
government had refused to allow him to see leaders of the ANC he 
had been able to meet "individuals" such as Margaret Ballinger, 
Dr Joost de Blank, Archbishop of Cape Town and the Liberal Party 
leader, Patrick Duncan. 8 
In a private note, Verwoerd's reaction to the criticism of his 
refusal to allow Macmillan to visit extra-parliamentary leaders 
was peevish. He asked how Macmillan would have reacted if 
visiting politicians to Britain asked to speak to leaders of 
political groups outside parliament, "even those looked down 
upon", like Moseley (the fascist leader) and his junior. 14 
By now fully briefed for his talks with Verwoerd and expressing 
some anxiety and foreboding, Macmillan arrived in Cape Town on 
2 February. Preliminary talks began almost immediately between 
Eric Louw and Verwoerd on the one side, Macmillan, Maud and Sir 
Norman Brook, the cabinet secretary, on the other. 15 The talks 
continued the day after the formal delivery of Macmillan's "Winds 
of Change" speech on 3 February. It was during these conferences, 
12 AD 2186, E, 24, MacMillan- Nokwe, February 1960. 
13 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 151. 
14 INCH, PV 93 (Verwoerd Collection), File 1/55/2/2 (1960-61: 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conferences), Memo: "Meeting 
With ANC, Liberal or other Extra-Parliamentary Leaders", by H.F. 
Verwoerd, n.d. 
15 Macmillan. Pointing the Way, pp. 152-155. 
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Macmillan wrote, that he began to realise to the full extent "the 
degree of obstinacy, amounting really to fanaticism, which Dr 
Verwoerd brought to the consideration of his policies" . 16 On only 
one point, said Macmillan, was there some gain for Britain: the 
question of the high commission territories had been raised and 
Verwoerd made it clear he would not pursue the matter of transfer 
for the present. 17 (However, in the talks with Verwoerd and Louw 
on 4 February, the high commission territories had been brought 
up again and then it seemed to Macmillan that both South Africans 
had been "affronted" by the constitutional changes which Britain 
was introducing "without prior consultation" with the Union in 
those territories. Macmillan, however, "refused to do more than 
take note" of these protests) . 18 
On the question of a republic, Macmillan found that Verwoerd 
tried to extract some "impression or view" from him that he could 
use to his advantage during the referendum campaign. 
I refused to lend myself to this and said nothing to 
suggest that public opinion in the United Kingdom was 
indifferent as to whether the monarchical system would 
be abandoned. Indeed it was clear from my reception, 
especially in Cape Town and Durban, that there was a 
strong minority determined to do everything possible 
to remain both under the Throne and within the 
Commonweal th. 19 
As for the position of the queen as head of the Commonwealth, 
Macmillan found Verwoerd's attitude "not merely illiberal but 
definitely shabby". 20 Verwoerd had said there was still "strong 
16 Ibid. , p.152. 
17 Ibid., p.153. 
18 Ibid., p.160. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid., p. 154. 
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feeling" in South Africa against recognising the queen as head 
of the Commonwealth and Macmillan replied he was "amazed" at 
this. Was it not ''ungenerous• to the forty-five percent of the 
population who were of 
of the Commonwealth, 
British descent to deny the queen as head 
he asked. would it not contradict the 
reconciliation policy Verwoerd himself espoused? Verwoerd "hummed 
and ha'ed" at this saying there was still great feeling against 
the monarchy in South Africa and that it would help future 
relations if this could be removed. 21 
Verwoerd had then brought up the subject of Ireland and Macmillan 
told him it was "not relevant". De Valera had accepted the 
British monarch as head of the Commonwealth and Ireland had later 
left the Commonwealth "for different reasons". 22 Verwoerd talked 
about Cyprus and Macmillan had to tell him he thought Cyprus was 
another matter. The question there was whether a country "whose 
policy was more or less under the protection of two foreign 
powers• could be regarded as fully independent and qualified for 
Commonwealth membership. Verwoerd "acquiesced in this" and said 
no more, but expressed his pleasure in getting Macmillan's views 
"frankly". 
On 4 February Macmillan reconsidered the question of what he said 
about procedural questions relating to the Union's remaining in 
the Commonwealth as a republic. 23 In a note to Verwoerd he said 
he wanted to put in writing what he had said on that morning 
regarding procedural questions. He now stated that the precedent 
of other countries was that they could remain in the Commonwealth 
after becoming republics and that since the question was likely 
to arise within •the next two years• it would be in accord with 
precedence if it were raised as a hypothetical question in May. 
21 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.24B, Extract from a provisional 
note of a discussion between the Prime Minister and Dr Verwoerd 
at Groote Schuur, Cape Town, 4 February, 1960. 
22 Ibid. 
23 File 1206, No.25, Note handed to Verwoerd by D.W.S. Hunt, 
Groote Schuur, Cape Town, 5 February 1960. 
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Macmillan now felt it was better to raise it verbally in May than 
leaving it to correspondence later. He hoped Verwoerd would 
attend the May meeting and that the membership question would be 
an added reason for him to attend. It was also important because 
it was a "pre-Summit" meeting (USA, USSR and UK) and because 
Ghana's continued membership of the Commonwealth would be 
discussed as well as that of Nigeria. 
Moreover, as I told you, I would feel it would be a 
great advantage if at such a meeting you and I and 
say, Menzies and Diefenbaker and Nash could have 
informal talks together about all these problems. I am 
sure we could all gain. 
In conclusion, Macmillan asked Verwoerd to regard the letter as 
private and confidential as it would cause "great inconvenience 
if known directly or indirectly". 
The "Winds of Change" speech" had been delivered on 3 February, 
in between the private conferences with Louw and Verwoerd. There 
is no indication in Macmillan's memoirs nor in the official 
summary of the talks whether the speech, which came as a shock 
to Verwoerd by all accounts, affected the talks to any extent or 
changed Verwoerd's views about retaining Commonwealth membership 
at those talks. One could surmise, however, that the deep 
resentment he felt at the way Macmillan handled the speech24 
hardened Verwoerd's determination to achieve his primary aim of 
establishing the self-sufficient "white" republic, with or 
without Britain's support. D.W. Kruger, refers to Macmillan's 
speech as an "explosion" 25 and a "surprise" because, "contrary 
to custom", Macmillan omitted to divulge its contents to his 
hosts. Piet Meiring, the head of the department of information, 
M Wood, The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd, 
p .155. (Here he refers to Fred Barnard, Verwoerd' s private 
secretary, who wrote Thirteen Years with Dr H.F. Verwoerd, 
Voortrekkerpers, Johannesburg, 1967, p.62) 
25 Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.323. 
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noted that nobody was prepared for anything but complimentary 
platitudes from Macmillan in his speech to the two houses of 
parliament. 26 
Macmillan recalled that the address to both houses of parliament 
had caused him some "trepidation" beforehand and he had prepared 
his speech carefully. 27 He acknowledged that it had caused some 
"surprise" and "shock" to Verwoerd although he claimed to have 
given the latter "some indication" of what he was going to say. 28 
The shock had not been confined to Verwoerd only. As Die Burger 
said in commentary on Macmillan's speech: 
South Africa has been formally served notice in the 
British Prime Minister's speech of a state of 
emergency in our relations with the West and our 
situation in Africa. And let us have no illusions, 
this British policy is also the general western 
attitude. 29 
Round Table's comments on the Macmillan speech were: 
There has never been a speech to which so much 
attention has been paid in South Africa. The sudden 
demonstration that South Africa was so far out of step 
that even friendly Britain was forced to disown us, in 
the polite but unmistakable terms used by Mr 
Macmillan, came as a shock.w 
26 Piet Meiring, Inside Information, p .160. 
27 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.155. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Quoted in the South African Digest, Vol. 7, No. 4, 19 
February 1960, p.5. 
30 
"South Africa in Turmoil. From Boycott to Assassination", 
Round Table, Vol.51, December 1960 - December 1961, p.245. 
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Kruger notes that Macmillan began by condemning the anti-South 
African boycott movement in Britain. This was applauded by the 
assembled parliamentarians, but when he went on to discuss race 
politics he was listened to in ''cold but polite silence". He 
informed his audience of his most striking impression of his 
recent African tour, that is the strength of growing "African 
national consciousness" and then delivered his much-quoted phrase 
which gave the speech its famous description: 
The wind of change is blowing throughout the 
continent. Whether we like it or not, this growth of 
national consciousness is a political fact. We must 
accept it as a fact. Our national policies must take 
account of it. 31 
He went on to compare African nationalism with Afrikaner 
nationalism in terms of what one contemporary admirer, the 
journalist and writer, Anthony Sampson, claimed to be "a wide 
sweep of history .. and with superb deftness". 32 
The words "Winds of Change" were, according to Macmillan's 
biographer, Alistair Horne, derived from the speech of a previous 
conservative prime minister, Stanley Baldwin, in 1934: "There 
is a wind of nationalism and freedom blowing around the world" . 33 
Macmillan had, as he went on, softened the impact of these words, 
however, dwelling meaningfully on the words "nationalism" and 
"nation" to appeal to his audience's pride in creating a new 
nation, the first of the African nationalisms. 
Macmillan went on to claim that although it was a basic principle 
of the Commonwealth to respect each other's sovereignty as 
nations, in the "shrinking world of today" the effects of one 
nation's policies were felt in nations outside it. Britain was 
31 Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.323. 
32 Quoted in Horne, Macmillan, p.195. 
33 Horne, Macmillan, p. 195. 
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committed to equal opportunity and shared political power in her 
dependencies. Macmillan felt, frankly, that British people were 
unable to support some aspects of South Africa's policies without 
being false to their own deep convictions about the destinies of 
free men. 
Verwoerd's off-the-cuff reply, described by Kruger as "brief and 
courteous", thanked Macmillan for his frankness but stated 
plainly a difference of opinion. 34 Verwoerd claimed that what 
South Africa was doing was in full accord with what was happening 
in Africa. Al though South Africa would never presume to criticise 
what Britain was doing in Africa, South Africans frankly differed 
with Britain. The whites also needed justice and had nowhere else 
to go. White South Africa was a nation in its own right in 
Africa. The blacks would have a full but separate future. 
(b) Local and international reactions 
Kruger claims that South Africans received the news of the speech 
"calmly" and that there was "nothing ... new" in it besides the 
veiled threat that Britain might oppose South Africa when 
necessary. 35 It was, however, the jubilant response of the 
"liberal press" overseas that caused an angry reaction in South 
Africa and "indirectly . · .. added to the estrangement between South 
Africa and Britain". Macmillan himself wrote that the local press 
reaction was "much less hostile than I expected" and it was only 
when the news of its reception in Britain and else where came 
through that "criticism combined with a good deal of self-pity 
and resentment began to develop". 36 
The reaction of many whites to the speech could be summarised in 
the words of Douglas Mitchell, the United Party MP for South 
Coast, Natal. "This one thing is certain", he said, "Britain is 
34 Kruger, Making of a Nation, p.324. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p .159. 
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getting out of Africa ... [but] ... The white people are here to 
stay" . 37 These words were later repudiated by the MP for Salt 
River, Harry Lawrence, who claimed that Britain was facing her 
responsibilities bravely in Africa and that Britain could not be 
expected to" wash her hands of" her responsibilities in areas 
such as the high commission territories because she was concerned 
to win over "the hearts and minds" of the blacks. 38 
Dr Jan Steytler, chairman of the new Progressive Party, declared 
his party's support for Macmillan in parliament by denying 
Mitchell's inference that Britain was getting out of Africa. 
Instead, said Steytler, Macmillan had made suggestions which "in 
his opinion and in the opinion of the Western world, could 
constitute the basis on which we who live in South Africa ... can 
live in peace and co-operation with hope for the future. 39 
It was to be expected that the reaction to Macmillan's speech 
inside South Africa would fasten upon those passages in which 
Macmillan had stressed Britain's policies of race partnership, 
self-government and rejection of racial superiority.~ As Miller 
points out, Macmillan's words on South Africa's race policies 
"effectively disengaged Britain from public support for South 
Africa" which meant in effect that South Africa could no longer 
count on British support at UNO "and it raised doubt whether 
Britain might withdraw support in other spheres too. Miller 
claims it induced "something of a note of uncertainty" in South 
Africa and gave Macmillan some room for manoeuvre in his future 
negotiations with other Commonwealth countries in Africa. He 
rejects the views of those like Lord Kilmuir, the lord chancellor 
in Britain, who claimed that the speech directly caused South 
Africa's secession from the Commonwealth and encouraged other 
n Quoted in Geyser, Watershed, pp.63-64. 
38 Cape Times, 19 February 1960. 
39 House of Assembly Debates, Col.3129, 10 March 1960. 
~Miller, Survey, p.140. 
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Commonwealth nations to pose as champions of human rights. 41 
Gerhardt Jooste, the secretary of South Africa's external affairs 
department lamented that Macmillan's speech had had such wide 
publicity overseas while the spontaneous reply of Verwoerd had 
been largely ignored. 42 He also felt that the fact that Macmillan 
had criticized South Africa publicly in her own parliament made 
the "impact" of the speech ( "trefkrag") even greater and gave 
encouragement to South Africa's opponents to make unprecedented 
attacks on her at Commonwealth conferences. 
The white press was largely divided on ethnic lines in its 
reaction with leading English newspapers giving Macmillan guarded 
praise while Afrikaner papers rejected him. Indian Opinion gave 
what could be regarded as the most cogent indication of non-
European reactions by praising Macmillan for his support of 
African nationalism but criticising him for not taking harsher 
measures against South Africa. 
On 4 February, The Star under the gloomy headline "South Africa's 
Isolation", noted how a statesman "whose voice commands the 
attention of millions throughout the world" 43 had warned whites 
of the "dangers" of ignoring the "surge of nationalism" sweeping 
over the continent and of the need to come to terms with African 
aspirations on the basis of "justice and human dignity". Britain 
had "disagreed radically" with South Africa's racial policies and 
might no longer support her. The speech illuminated "with painful 
clarity" the "spiritual isolation" into which South Africa had 
fallen. Verwoerd's initial reaction "did nothing to dissipate the 
impression of a nation apart and out of step" with western 
civilisation. The introduction of a republic would reinforce this 
isolation by "cutting us off from the Commonwealth". 
41 Ibid., n.l, p.141. 
42 Jooste, Diensherinneringe, p.190. 
43 The Star, 4 February 1960. 
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Die Burger, on 15 February, praised the Natal leader of the UP, 
Douglas Mitchell, for speaking plainly ("reguit") about 
Macmillan's speech and for "raising the flag of the white nation" 
in response to Macmillan.M It praised Mitchell also for 
understanding that "outside pressure would unite the whites". 
This was "not enough", however, because the UP was busy carrying 
out a "civil war" against the Nationalists over the republican 
question. The monarchy had become a "divisive factor" for the 
white nation that it could "ill afford'' at that time. 
The Cape Times published an article by Anthony Delius on 16 
February which argued that Britain was not quitting Africa and 
that blacks were not waving Britain goodbye when they turned out 
in vast numbers to say farewell to Macmillan. 45 Instead they were 
there to "celebrate a new relationship with her". Thus it was 
better to heed Macmillan's advice that any attempt by whites to 
"to maintain their presence in Africa by political dominance, 
police force or barricade, had no future for them or for the 
West" . Rather develop a racial "partnership" unblinded by racial 
hostility, argued Delius. 
Professor A.C. Cilliers, writing in 
very differently, however. 46 As 
the Cape Argus, 
an Afrikaner 
saw it all 
academic, 
nationalistically inclined but passionately wedded to the idea 
of English-Afrikaner reconciliation, he saw Macmillan's speech 
as the 
signal for an ideological invasion and onslaught on 
South Africa and her internal racial policies by 
practically the whole socialistically inclined, or 
ill-informed and uncomprehending outside world which 
it will need all our fortitude and all our unified 
strength to withstand. 
M Die Burger, 15 February 1960. 
45 Cape Times, 16 February 1960. 
46 Cape Argus, 11 February 1960. 
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Even before Macmillan's Visit Indian Opinion had been speculating 
about the possible political effects and reactions. Jordan 
Ngubane' s column noted on 11 December 195947 that Macmillan's 
forthcoming visit aroused the "suspicion" among Africans that it 
was intended to "boost up apartheid" and to be a "pat on the 
back" for Britain's support of South Africa in the UNO. 
On 19 February 1960, reporting on the aftermath of the Macmillan 
visit, Indian Opinion expressed the comments of Dr G. Naicker, 
president of the SAIC, at a meeting in Durban: 
We naturally were all anxious to hear what political 
message the British Prime Minister had for all South 
Africans. His speech must have a tonic effect for all 
political groups in South Africa. In the last few 
years the Afro-Asian Powers have made their influence 
keenly felt in international affairs and it is indeed 
heart-warming that Macmillan recognises this trend and 
the important role it was to play in the future of 
world history. Only one aspect of the Prime Minister's 
speech jarred as far as we are concerned. He did not 
meet Congress leaders in South Africa to know and 
understand their point of view and the Congress 
struggle for full democratic rights in South Africa. 48 
Naicker also felt it was "unjustified" of Macmillan to criticise 
the economic boycott movement in Britain because if he was aware 
of the "plight of the non-white peoples" he would realise it was 
a "weapon ... in support of the struggle for freedom". 49 It was 
the Labour Party in Britain which supported the boycott and the 
SAIC was not "unmindful" of this. Macmillan would have thought 
47 Indian Opinion, 11 December 1959. 
48 Indian Opinion, 19 February 1960. 
49 Ibid. 
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twice about speaking about the boycott in parliament if he had 
met members of the Congress alliance. If he was "sincere" about 
his opposition to apartheid he would support the Afro-Asians at 
UNO against racialism, Naicker concluded. 
A press summary of the overseas reactions to Macmillan's visit 
issued by the South African Information Service50 shows the 
extent to which foreign commentary was in general favourable to 
Macmillan and hostile to the South African government. This was 
especially so in the United States where the New York Times of 
4 February captioned its front page report with the heading 
"Macmillan in South Africa censures Apartheid Policy". 51 The New 
York Herald Tribune described Macmillan's speech as both "polite 
and courageous", courageous especially because "South Africa is 
looking for an excuse to leave the Commonweal th" . 52 
The conservative Canadian paper, The Toronto Globe and Mail, 
however, claimed Macmillan had broken the rules by criticising 
a Commonwealth member's internal policies. 53 It reported how the 
Canadian prime minister, Diefenbaker, had rejected a Canadian 
Labour congress demand for the expulsion of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth only a week before and had defended South Africa's 
right to deal with her internal problems as she saw fit. The 
newspaper went on to suggest that Macmillan's words "might well 
push" Verwoerd into holding a plebiscite to determine if South 
African voters favour a withdrawal from the Commonwealth. 
When it came to white opinions in settler colonies like Rhodesia 
and Kenya the reaction was cautiously welcoming of Macmillan's 
50 INCH, PV 93 (Verwoerd Collection), File 1/9/3/5 (Foreign 
Affairs, Britain, 1959-60) S.A. Information Service, Summary of 
Press comments on Macmillan's Tour, in the USA, Canada, 
Switzerland, Rhodesia, Kenya, Australia, Portugal and the UK, 
n.d. 
51 Ibid. , p. 2. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. , p. 5. 
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speech. In Rhodesia, the Bulawayo Chronicle said that critics of 
Macmillan would be "annoyed" by his expressions of friendship 
towards South Africa - "as though these things were a crime, 1154 
while the Northern News claimed the Commonwealth could "clearly" 
not criticise South Africa's desire to become a republic while 
so many other of its members were accorded that status and 
expressed "satisfaction" that Macmillan had no wish to sever ties 
with South Africa. Leading Australian and New Zealand papers were 
described as favourable to Macmillan and gave prominence to the 
African demonstration on his arrival in Johannesburg and to his 
reception in the protectorates.~ 
British newspapers were divided in their attitude with the Daily 
Express leading the conservative viewpoint: "After hearing him 
[Macmillan}, South Africans will realise that the ridiculous 
proposal for the boycott of their goods is not representative of 
British action. 1156 The Daily Herald, on the other hand, claimed 
Verwoerd was "desperate" for someone like Macmillan to come out 
in support 
earn the 
of apartheid, 
support of 
and if he were to condemn it he would 
millions of Africans. 57 The Times, 
Telegraph, Mirror and other leading dailies adopted cautiously 
approving viewpoints in favour of their prime minister and his 
warnings to South Africa.g 
Miller claims that Macmillan's statements had to be seen in the 
context of Verwoerd's previous announcements in parliament (20 
January) about the republican referendum. In particular, he says, 
Macmillan "did not want to bind himself to accept in advance" 
Verwoerd' s views on a Labour party government coming to power and 
its effects on South Africa's Commonwealth membership. (Verwoerd 
54 Ibid. , p.11. 
55 Ibid., p.12. 
56 Ibid. , p.18. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Ibid., pp.18-20. 
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had threatened in January that if a Labour government came to 
power he would consider taking South Africa out of the 
Commonwealth. If Macmillan had been seen to acquiesce in this by 
mollifying Verwoerd he would have been sharply criticised at 
home) . At the same time he did not want to accept Verwoerd' s 
views on membership "being dependent on how other members treated 
South Africa". So, in other words, the "Winds of Change" speech 
represented Macmillan's refusal to "acquiesce in all that South 
Africa might do". 59 
But at best it could be argued that this was only a qualified 
refusal to acquiesce because, as Macmillan's actions later 
indicated, Britain appeared more concerned about the danger of 
losing her close relationship with South Africa than with the 
danger of alienating the African majority. On his return to 
Britain Macmillan adopted a much more conciliatory attitude to 
South Africa in a speech in which he reported back on his African 
tour. He said that 1960 was a jubilee year for South Africa and 
that the Union of 1910, had been an act of "unparalleled 
generosity".® He said that good faith in self-government for 
South Africa then had been seen as "far-sighted" and had "drowned 
out voices to the contrary". He went on to say that whites in 
South Africa and Rhodesia should have a sense of security about 
their continued stay in Africa and that "the rights of minorities 
should be guaranteed". 
In reference to his Cape Town speech he said he had made it clear 
the differences between the policies of the British and South 
Africans concerning race partnership and that "South Africa was 
wrong". But he had also pointed out the areas of co-operation in 
the Commonwealth and the world between South Africa and Britain. 
He stressed that it was impossible in the modern world to "send 
any country to Coventry" and his efforts to thaw relations with 
59 Miller, Survey, p.140. 
00 Journal of the Royal Commonwealth Society, "The Prime 
Minister on Africa", Vol. 3., No.3, May-June 1960, p.77. 
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the USSR illustrated this. The British 
that of the Roman or Ottoman in 
Empire 
that 
was different to 
it 
independence", he said. This had been the lesson of 
revolution. 
"encourages 
the American 
What was being said here summed up the basics of Macmillan's 
approach to the South African "problem". He was demonstrating a 
determination to push ahead with decolonisation in Africa but was 
at the same time willing to continue talking to South Africa and 
treating South Africa for all intents and purposes as a valuable 
Commonweal th ally and trading partner. His thoughts on the merits 
of Union in 1910 did change somewhat in the aftermath of the 
Sharpeville incident (and by the time he wrote his memoirs ) 61 
but in Pointing the Way Macmillan made clear that he had been 
determined to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth and he stated 
his belief that "the pressure not merely of public opinion in the 
world but the actual necessities of living alongside their 
African neighbours, would lead to a gradual change in the 
philosophy which lay behind this rigid Calvinism". 62 
This "gradualist" approach, or what later came to be called by 
the Americans, "Constructive Engagement", informed the whole 
British approach to the South African situation and was adopted 
to varying degrees by both Labour and Conservative governments 
before and after Macmillan. Underlying it were the entirely 
practical imperatives of trade, economics and cultural 
connections that we have already seen to be the main factors in 
the British-South African relationship since 1945. 
61 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.292. 
62 Ibid. , p . 2 9 3 . 
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Chapter 17: Sharpeville, the Commonwealth Reaction and the 1960 
Commonwealth Conference 
(a) Sharpeville intrudes on the republican debate 
Before the events surrounding Sharpeville and the attempted 
assassination of the South African prime minister (9 April 1960) 
there had been speculation in the press that verwoerd would not 
go to the May Commonwealth conference out of spite or anger at 
Macmillan's "Winds of Change" speech. Verwoerd countered these 
allegations in parliament on the day of the Sharpeville shootings 
and followed with a major statement of policy towards the 
Commonwealth and the forthcoming conference: 
I want to say quite clearly that although I know that 
the British Prime Minister and I hold different views 
in certain matters, I am at the same time also aware 
of the fact that there are many points in connection 
with which we and our respective countries can and 
will help one another. My attitude towards him 
personally is of the most friendly nature, a fact 
which I hope was clearly demonstrated while he was 
here in South Africa. 1 
He went on to reject the "lie" that whatever his attitude towards 
attending the conference was, that it was motivated by a "grudge" 
against Macmillan. He considered the prime ministers' conferences 
to be very important occasions and that South Africa would ensure 
she was represented there if the prime minister was unable to go. 
He had stated previously that it would be difficult for himself 
to attend but he would ensure the country was represented. 2 He 
did not feel it was necessary for the prime minister to attend 
every meeting and other countries had similar feelings. However, 
he wished to announce that in respect of the forthcoming 
1 House of Assembly Debates, col.3775, 21 March 1960. 
2 Ibid., col.3776, 21 March 1960. 
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conference, he did intend to attend "because I am convinced it 
is in the best interests of South Africa". 3 (For this statement 
there were cheers from both sides of the House) . He intended also 
to bring along with him the minister of external affairs, Eric 
Louw, for which statement an opposition member interjected: "That 
is a mistake". 4 
Verwoerd then went on to answer a previous question about his 
attitude to Commonwealth membership put to him by De Villiers 
Graaff: 
In certain matters membership of the Commonwealth is 
of no assistance to us at the present time and in 
other matters it is valuable to us. Membership of the 
Commonwealth, when viewed soberly, is not based on any 
sentimental reason. There are some members and some 
people in this country who like this Commonwealth 
connection for sentimental reasons. Hon. members would 
not believe me if I said that for sentimental reasons 
I recognize the value of the Commonwealth connection 
at this stage .... On the other hand I hope they will 
believe in my honesty when I say that we believe that 
on sober common-sense grounds the Commonwealth is of 
value to us to-day .... I believe that in connection 
with our colour problems the Commonwealth is of no 
value to us . 5 
Dealing with De Villiers Graaff's intimation that other 
Commonwealth countries may not wish to continue South Africa's 
membership if it became a republic Verwoerd countered that while 
it was true that it depended on the other members to say, yes, 
South Africa would not be the first to object to any other 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid., col.3777, 21 March 1960. 
5 Ibid. 
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member's application. 6 He referred here to Ghana's impending 
application to join as a republic and stated 
For example, it is possible for us, seeing that Ghana, 
as we know, is going to apply for membership of the 
Commonwealth, to oppose it at the Conference of Prime 
Ministers. We can do so, but we shall not do so. We 
will support Ghana's application. 7 
South Africa had supported India's application as well and thus 
how could the opposition could say that other members should 
"want to kick us out?" This, he claimed, was opposition 
"propaganda" against the republic and would not succeed in 
delaying the republic. He then defended himself against a 
previous opposition accusation that he was anti-monarchist on 
personal grounds because of his stance during the Royal Tour of 
1947 when as editor of Die Transvaler he had refused to report 
the tour's progress. This was not out of a personal grudge but 
rather because of the "political propaganda" which the UP had 
then tried to make out of the king's visit and which was counter 
to the convention that the monarchy should be kept out of party 
politics. 8 
He ended his speech with an appeal to the opposition to accept 
the republic as a means of unifying the country on economic 
grounds and for the sake of ending "differences" on the colour 
problem. 9 
De Villiers Graaff in reply said he was "delighted" that both 
Verwoerd and Louw were going to the conference and that the 
latter could only benefit from the personal contacts with other 
6 Ibid., col.3779, 21 March 1960. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid., col.3781, 21 March 1960. 
9 Ibid., col.3783, 21 March 1960. 
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Commonwealth leaders.'° "I feel that much good can flow to South 
Africa as a result of that decision". He also thanked Verwoerd 
for "reacting so speedily to the events in Vanderbijlpark and 
other areas ... in respect of protests by a certain section of the 
Bantu people apparently concerning passes".u 
After this display of "toenadering" and congratulation De 
Villiers Graaff went on to discuss the prime minister's 
conference. He asked Verwoerd to try to ascertain what the 
attitude of the other countries would be to South Africa's 
republican application as Ceylon, Ghana and Pakistan had done. 
That would "destroy the danger of any misunderstanding" 
concerning the alleged misrepresentation of the Commonwealth 
attitude before the referendum. Rejecting Verwoerd's view that 
the Commonwealth had not helped South Africa with the colour 
problem, he said 
I believe very firmly that it is because we are 
members of the Commonweal th ... that there have not 
been far greater difficulties in respect of that 
matter than there are at the present time. 12 
Finally, in reply to Verwoerd's statement that the republic could 
unify South Africa more than ever before, he stated that the 
opposite could occur "as what had happened in Ireland, India and 
Ceylon". By denying the registered coloured voters their right 
to vote on the issue they were avoiding a "fairer trial of 
strength". 
ground for 
He concluded, "they [the NP] may be laying up a 
division which will take a very long time to live down 
in the future". 13 
10 Ibid. 
II Ibid., col. 3 784, 21 March 1960. 
12 Ibid., col.3787, 21 March 1960. 
13 Ibid., col.3788, 21 March 1960. 
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Verwoerd's measured tones and De Villiers Graaff's warnings for 
the future were soon drowned out by mounting world-wide anger at 
South Africa's racial policies and in particular at the 
Sharpeville shootings, the worst" of the series of confrontations 
between police and demonstrators called out by the PAC to defy 
the Pass Laws. The response to the PAC call had been patchy but 
the police at Sharpeville had acted in a particularly violent 
manner by firing into a crowd surrounding the police station. 67 
Africans were killed and 186 wounded. 14 The memory of Sharpeville 
remains above those of .other police shootings before and after 
because, as Barber and Barratt put it, "it was seen as part of 
the broader struggle which was sweeping Africans into power 
across the continent" and one which the PAC leader, Robert 
Sobukwe, had promised would result in "freedom and independence" 
for South Africa by 1963. 15 
It had occurred at the most inopportune time as far as South 
Africa's Commonwealth prospects were concerned. Macmillan dwelt 
at length in his memoirs on the effects of Sharpeville on 
Commonwealth relations in general and on South Africa in 
particular. He pointed out how Britain had been forced to abstain 
in the UNO Security Council resolution condemning South Africa. 
It was, he said, a necessary action to prevent the Commonwealth 
from disintegrating. 16 If Britain had supported South Africa on 
this issue and had voted against the resolution the consequences 
may well have been a disintegration of the Commonwealth, with 
enraged African opinion demanding the pull-out of African 
countries from the club. 
Alistair Horne's biography of Macmillan further describes the 
effect of Sharpeville on British policy towards South Africa and 
on Macmillan's own efforts to keep South Africa in the 
14 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 69. 
15 Ibid., p. 70. 
16 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp .166-169. 
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Commonwealth. 17 Noting that the British press had "gone to town" 
over the "tragic incid·ent" of 21 March with "all sorts of 
dreadful pictures, etc.", Macmillan now foresaw there would be 
"a tremendous effort to stoke up similar riots in Rhodesia or 
Nyasaland or Kenya, in order to put the United Kingdom in the 
dock" . 18 Britain had taken the "not very noble but very sensible 
course", of abstaining on the UN resolution condemning South 
Africa. 
What is clear from British cabinet records is how very much 
concerned Macmillan's government seemed to be at that time to 
avoid offending South Africa over the UN Security Council vote. 
This emerges from the cabinet discussion of 29 March on the vote. 
The whole tenor of the· argument was how to avoid an "extreme" 
resolution from the Afro-Asians which would possibly call for 
sanctions against South Africa and which would be a "precedent" 
for action against other colonial powers including Britain. It 
was advised that Macmillan should send a message to Verwoerd 
explaining to him that Britain would not support inscription on 
the Security Council agenda of South Africa's race policies but 
would also not oppose it because of the danger of offending Ghana 
and Nigeria. The message would explain the "reason for these 
tactics" 19 It was hoped that the general line of debate in the 
council would be "to avoid inflaming the situation or isolating 
the South African government since that would not be in the 
interests of the inhabitants of South Africa". An independent 
investigation of Sharpeville by the UN would be "unacceptable" 
to South Africa and would be a "most undesirable precedent for 
disturbances in Colonial territories". 
On 1 April Macmillan's cabinet discussed the Ecuadorean 
resolution condemning South Africa. It was seen as "unacceptable" 
to Britain in terms of clause 2 (7) (non-interference) and because 
17 Horne, Macmillan, pp.202-204 
18 Quoted in Horne, Macmillan, p.203. 
19 PRO, CAB128/34, C.C. (60)21,3, 29 March 1960. 
375 
it declared South Africa's situation a threat to world peace. 
But, as the foreign minister, Selwyn Lloyd, pointed out to the 
cabinet it could not be vetoed by Britain because there would 
most likely be a demand for a special session of the General 
Assembly, something that would "exacerbate the situation still 
more" . 20 It would also antagonise the "other Commonwealth 
countries, particularly Ghana and Nigeria". He thus advised 
abstention. The Commonwealth secretary, Lord Home (Alec Douglas-
Home), agreed with Lloyd and suggested that "we could explain to 
South Africa that it was not in their best interests" if Britain 
voted against the resolution and if discussion in UNO was thereby 
prolonged. 
Sir David Eccles, the education minister, was the only cabinet 
minister to advise voting for the resolution. He argued that "the 
inevitable development of nationalist forces in Africa and 
elsewhere ... [made it] .. not possible in future to rely on 2(7) 
as protection for circumstances such as in South Africa 
recently". Britain should, he said, try to persuade the South 
African government to "adjust" its internal policies. The general 
feeling of the cabinet was, however, against interfering in the 
policies of an independent Commonwealth country and that 
therefore abstention was the best course. It would, said 
Macmillan, seem to be "the course least likely to lead to an 
immediate crisis in Commonwealth affairs". The "forthcoming" 
Commonwealth conference would provide the best opportunity for 
bringing the opinion of the rest of the Commonwealth to bear on 
South Africa, although, he said, her racial policies would not 
be discussed there. 
Sharpeville had been widely reported in Commonwealth newspapers 
and had been strongly debated in various Commonwealth 
parliaments. Nehru had displayed some hesitancy when it was 
debated in the Indian parliament on 23 March, saying that 
"Normally ... this is not a matter which this House should 
20 PRO, CAB128/34, C.C. (60) 22, 3, 1 April 1960. 
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discuss, I mean some internal matter within the internal 
jurisdiction of some other country''. 21 What had happened, 
however, had "shocked the conscience of the world" and so "normal 
rules and procedures" were no longer adequate. Three days later 
he allowed a formal resolution of condemnation of South Africa 
to be passed, and he extended the idea of abnormality to take 
account of ''deep-seated and powerful'' expressions of feeling.n 
Tunku Abdul Rahman of the Malaysian Federation, who was about to 
attend his country's first Commonwealth conference, initiated a 
more "shrill" debate on Sharpeville in his parliament on 26 
April, and expressed his 11 abhorrence 11 at the violence used in 
pursuit of the apartheid policy. 23 He still, however, made a 
distinction between criticising the policy of apartheid which 
was, he said, ''purely a domestic and internal affair of South 
Africa" and the "atrocities" which had resulted from the policy 
and which had to be condemned. 
Menzies of Australia, on the other hand, put the emphasis on 
caution about interfering with another country's internal affairs 
when Sharpeville was debated in his parliament on 29 March. "We 
do have our own Native population and we do have ... our own 
responsibilities in respect of Papua and New Guinea", he pointed 
out.~ Menzies, who had been for many years a strong believer in 
the non-interference principle, was not prepared to allow 
anything stronger than a resolution of sympathy to be passed by 
the Australian parliament despite opposition Labour Party calls 
for further condemnation of South Africa. Menzies also urged 
Macmillan later to use the British veto in Security Council to 
prevent discussion of Sharpeville and he reminded South Africa's 
critics that the Commonwealth was "composed of countries not 
21 Quoted in Miller, Survey, p.143. 
22 Ibid., p.144. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., p.145. 
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governments". His approach was that expulsion of South Africa 
would merely punish the South African white opposition as well 
as the millions of voteless blacks.~ 
Canada's parliament debated Sharpeville on 27 April with the 
opposition calling for the government to dissociate itself from 
South Africa. Diefenbaker's response was to warn against public 
disapproval of South Africa and to point out that there would be 
opportunities at the Commonwealth conference for informal 
discussions. 26 
On 8 April a Labour opposition motion was adopted in the House 
of Commons, and accepted by the Macmillan government. It noted: 
That this House, deploring the 
policies now being pursued by 
present racial istic 
the South African 
Government ... urges Her Majesty's Government to take 
the opportunity at the forthcoming Commonwealth Prime 
Ministers' Conference to bring home to the South 
African Government the strong feelings of British 
people on the question. 27 
The minister of state for Commonwealth relations, Alport, trying 
to deflect much of the motion's impact, responded that there 
would be such an opportunity during the informal sessions at the 
Commonwealth conference and that therefore the motion already 
partly reflected existing Commonweal th procedures. 28 He also 
pointed out the need for circumspection concerning interference 
in other Commonwealth government policies because this could be 
seen as an attempt to reassert the old dominance of the United 
Kingdom in the Commonwealth. The "antidote" to the South African 
"tragedy", he continued, was for Britain to help lead South 
25 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.156. 
a Miller, Survey, p.145. 
27 Commonwealth Survey, Vol.6, No.9, 26 April 1960, p.381. 
28 Ibid. 
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Africa out of the "cul de sac of history from which there could 
be no escape except through violence and tragedy". 
According to Miller, the most "striking" of the Commonwealth 
parliamentary debates on Sharpeville was this House of Commons 
debate in London on 8 April. The Labour opposition motion 
deploring South Africa's racial policies was adopted without a 
division and, as Miller remarks: "It was remarkable that a 
Conservative government should have permitted such a resolution 
to be adopted about the government of a country with which 
Britain had such close ties.''D It suggested, says Miller, that 
Macmillan endorsed two significant aspects of the motion; namely, 
that repression following from apartheid was threatening the 
welfare and security of all races in South Africa (i.e. that a 
"bloodbath" could result) and, secondly, that the situation 
threatened good relations between members of the Commonwealth. 
In other words, Macmillan's mind was beginning to run along the 
lines that it would not be worth breaking up the Commonwealth 
"merely because a minority government in South Africa insisted 
upon a racial policy which hardly anybody outside the Union was 
prepared to defend" . 30 
When the first Labour motion criticising South Africa immediately 
after Sharpeville came to the cabinet's attention the discussion 
indicated a rather different view of the British government's 
feeling than that illustrated above. It appears that Macmillan's 
cabinet was then far more worried then about the effect of 
discussing South Africa's internal affairs on British relations 
with the Union than about showing sympathy and outrage over the 
shootings at Sharpeville. Macmillan said on 24 March that the 
government should "avoid lending public support to the view that 
the recent disturbances in South Africa were the inevitable 
result of the racial policies of the Union Government". 31 
a Miller, Survey, p.146. 
30 Ib. d 146 l . ' p. . 
31 PRO, CAB128/34, C.C. (60)20,2, 24 March 1960. 
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Although he admitted that government supporters would find it 
''difficult" to vote against the Labour motion (which had been 
described by Macmillan as having been drawn up in terms 
•carefully chosen• and unlikely to be ruled out of order by the 
Speaker) it was necessary, he said, to place an amendment which 
expressed •sympathy" and •regret• but which also reaffirmed that 
it was not Commonwealth policy to •pass judgment• on the internal 
policies of member states. 
In South Africa's parliament the external affairs vote in April 
was dominated by the implications of Sharpeville on South 
Africa's international relations. The worsening diplomatic 
situation highlighted by the British parliamentary motion of 
censure the previous week was outlined by the opposition: •we 
have had the British prime minister forced by public opinion in 
his own country to try to persuade our people at the Commonwealth 
Conference to amend our policies" . 32 
Louw' s reply to the opposition simply denied that government 
policies had anything to do with South Africa's isolation but 
instead put the blame on •reports that have been sent from this 
country to the Press abroad''.n He then announced that Verwoerd 
would not be going to the Commonwealth conference as a result of 
his injuries but that Louw himself had been instructed to 
represent South Africa instead (to which Harry Lawrence remarked: 
"That is disastrous•) . 34 Louw then proceeded to avoid the 
question of why Britain and France had not vetoed the Security 
Council resolution against South Africa but harped instead on the 
question of "unjustified intervention" in South Africa's affairs 
by UNO and other countries. 35 
32 House of Assembly Debates, col.5512, 19 April 1960. 
33 Ibid., col.5557, 19 April 1960. 
34 Ibid., col.5558, 19 April 1960. 
35 Ibid., col.5563, 19 April 1960. 
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On 19 April, the high commission wrote to London with an update 
on the latest political developments since the announcement of 
a state of emergency. 36 It was claimed that the referendum could 
be postponed •as a result of preoccupations with the domestic 
front•. The UP had opposed the first reading of the Referendum 
bill on 11 March on the grounds of the exclusion of the coloured 
vote and Dr Steytler of the Progressives had also opposed it on 
the grounds of the exclusion of qualified blacks. Both opposition 
leaders were opposed to the proposed wording of the ballot paper 
which was ''Yes'' to a republic and ''No'' if in favour of the 
monarchy. It would give a "psychological 
republicans. Verwoerd was •unlikely to attend" 
and thus it was unlikely the republic would 
advantage• to the 
the May conference 
be raised. It may 
also be •more difficult" to get the agreement of the other prime 
ministers since the state of emergency, "but circumstances may 
change•, it was surmised. 
On 23 April the high commissioner reported that Louw had been 
asked in the Assembly whether South Africa had yet sought the 
views of other Commonwealth prime ministers as Ghana had. Louw's 
reply was that the Referendum bill was not yet passed and that 
so far the government had only indicated its intent of a republic 
and its desire to test opinion but had nothing more to add. 37 On 
the same day the bill was unexpectedly brought to the top of the 
list of government business and a guillotine of 25 hours placed 
on the second reading debate for remaining stages of the debate. 
In Britain, meanwhile, public outrage against South Africa was 
mounting. The anti-Conservative government Daily Herald called 
for a •national demonstration• against Verwoerd if he attended 
the Commonwealth conference in May and that this should take the 
form of a •two-minutes' silence throughout the country in 
36 • 1 R . PRO, DO 119, Fl e 1206, No.40, E.J. Emery - .G. Britten, 
CRO, 19 April, 1960. 
37 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.41, High Commissioner's office 
- CRO, 23 April 1960. 
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mourning for the men and women butchered by Verwoerd' s police". 38 
It also condemned Macmillan's government and the conservative 
Times newspaper for "refusing to judge in advance of the 
evidence" that "Seventy African men and women were massacred". 
On the eve of the conference an article in Indian Opinion written 
by India's former ambassador to China, Egypt and France, K.M. 
Panikkar, called for the Commonwealth to adopt a "joint 
declaration of principle" about racial policies "in order to show 
South Africa's leaders that they stand alone".w It was noted 
that no sanctions were at the Commonwealth's disposal, including 
expulsion, as so many people were calling for in South Africa's 
case and that only such a declaration against racism was left as 
a weapon. It would "raise the moral stature" of the Commonwealth. 
''Silence ... would have the reverse effect". 
A few days before the conference began Eric Louw denied reports 
that he intended to walk out if South Africa's internal affairs 
were discussed. However, he admitted that things would be "far 
more difficult" than at previous conferences and that the 
''recent'' British parliamentary motion against South Africa had 
not made his position any easier. 40 
On 29 April the British Labour Party independent weekly journal, 
Tribune, argued the pros and cons of expelling South Africa from 
the Commonwealth and noted that Commonwealth pressure had not 
succeeded "in pulling the Nationalists one millimetre off their 
course towards apartheid". 41 Expulsion, it argued, "might be a 
decisive factor in toppling Verwoerd from power". It also 
suggested that expulsion would so affect the country economically 
38 Reported in Indian Opinion, 1 April 1960. 
39 Indian Opinion. 27 May 1960. 
~ The Star, 28 April 1960. 
41 INCH, PV 4 
clippings 1960-63, 
1960. 
(Eric Louw Collection) , File 184 (Newspaper 
7 April- 1 May 1960), No.54, Tribune. 29 April 
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and militarily that it would make her more vulnerable to outside 
pressures and help the "sane South Africans to get rid of the 
hateful regime". However, this should only be considered after 
consultation by the Labour Party policy makers with "those 
African leaders who can still be consulted and those Europeans 
like Trevor Huddlestone and Ronald Segal, with first-hand 
experience of South Africa". 
Diefenbaker, meanwhile, was reported to have said just before he 
left Canada for the conference in London, that while he was 
against racial discrimination, he would not "follow the popular 
course . and denounce Canada's Commonweal th partner for its 
apartheid policy". He would instead approach the issue rather 
with "moderation and restraint".a 
Statements in the Times of London by some Commonwealth prime 
ministers before the conference began indicated that most did not 
support bringing up South Africa's policies officially but rather 
in private discussion as had been arranged beforehand. Ayub Khan 
of Pakistan stated: "There is a need for wisdom so that racial 
animosity does not spread any more, but whether it will do any 
good to discuss it at the conference I am not an expert to 
comment on that point. "43 The representative for Ceylon, 
deputising in the absence of his prime minister, revealed a 
certain naive optimism by stating that he favoured setting up 
some sort of "central Commonwealth court to try matters relating 
to the Commonwealth" . 44 
The Observer predicted that South Africa would not be "put in the 
dock by most Commonwealth leaders and that Macmillan was already 
sounding out their views in order to prevent a "row". The Tunku 
of Malaysia, however, was the "rebel" who was already committed 
42 PV 4, File 184, No. 55, Daily Gleaner, (Frederickton, 
Canada}, 29 April 1960. 
43 PV 4, File 184, No.57, Times, 30 April 1960. 
44 Ibid. 
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by a resolution of his parliament to bringing up the apartheid 
issue. 45 
(b) The 1960 Commonwealth conference 
On 4 February, the day after the "Winds of Change" speech, 
Macmillan and Verwoerd had met to discuss South Africa's 
republican referendum and the chances of remaining in the 
Commonweal th thereafter. 46 As Geyser points out, Macmillan had 
told Verwoerd that he could expect British support to keep South 
Africa in47 and that he was convinced that Diefenbaker, Menzies 
and the New Zealand prime minister would support him. He had been 
uncertain, however, about Nkrumah although "Nehru would put him 
in his place''.~ Geyser claims that events were to prove how 
•wrong" Macmillan was in his expectations of Diefenbaker and 
Nehru. 
It could be argued, however, that both before and during the 1960 
conference, there was no real evidence of a hard-line approach 
by either of these statesmen to South Africa and that it was only 
the intransigence of Eric Louw, South Africa's representative at 
the conference, that drove them and others to demand that South 
Africa's policies be discussed. As Macmillan pointed out later, 
none of the prime ministers had committed himself to a position 
on South Africa's future membership of the Commonwealth, either 
before or after the May 1960 conference. 6 
By mid-March it was still uncertain, however, whether Verwoerd 
would be attending the May conference in person and whether he 
45 The Observer, 1 May 1960. 
~ See above pp.356-357. 
n Geyser, Watershed. p.64. 
48 Ibid. , p. 6 5. 
49 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 285-286. 
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would be raising the republican question. so The first indication 
for British officials that he intended raising the matter came 
on 22 March when Verwoerd asked De Villiers Graaff in parliament 
to support a republic if South Africa could get assurances of 
continued Commonwealth membership at the May conference. 51 
Verwoerd had written just before the conference to Macmillan 
outlining his desire to stay in the Commonwealth but had 
threatened to "blackball" Cyprus's application if there was to 
be any hint of South Africa's application being "blackballed".~ 
According to Macmillan the rules of procedure concerning 
republican membership were not an issue and should not have been 
a problem for any country applying for membership after becoming 
a republic. Menzies of Australia had also promised all his help 
in persuading the others of South Africa's desire to stay in the 
Commonweal th. 53 
In the interim all the events surrounding the Sharpeville 
massacre and attempted assassination of Verwoerd had taken place 
and on 19 April it was announced that Eric Louw would go to the 
conference in Verwoerd's place. Geyser describes the choice of 
Louw as "unfortunate". 54 Macmillan had no liking for him and had 
on one occasion (in a personal interview with Geyser in the 
1980's) referred to Louw as an "evil genius". The Commonwealth 
secretary, Douglas-Home, was also of the view that Louw was not 
the right person to handle such a delicate issue as the continued 
membership of the Commonwealth. 55 
50 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.33A, Home - Maud, 3 March 1960. 
51 File 1206, No. 3 9, E. J. Emery (High Commission, Cape Town) 
- J. Chadwick (CRO), 24 March 1960. 
52 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 289. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Geyser, Watershed, p.67. 
55 Ibid. 
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During April the British cabinet was being prepared for the 
conference and for the issue of South Africa in particular, in 
briefings drawn up by the CRO. These briefings dealt with 
questions such as the implications of South Africa's becoming a 
republic on trading relations with Britain, the question of South 
Africa's likely attempts to get British support for a republic 
and the position of the queen as head of the Commonwealth. The 
briefing of 18 April, while advising that there should be no 
commitment by Britain on membership prior to the referendum, and 
that Verwoerd would try to obtain such a commitment, also advised 
circumspection concerning the mentioning of Britain's immediate 
interests in the republican campaign.~ 
What was of unusual interest was the remark that Macmillan would 
•probably not want to refer to Britain's interest in English 
South Africans during the talks or our suspicion that the 
voteless majority may favour remaining in the Commonwealth". He 
would also be reluctant to mention "our interest in remaining in 
as close relations as may be with the country that can so easily 
dominate the high commission territories"; nor "the effect that 
the declaration of a republic would have on Section 151 of the 
South Africa Act of 1909 which made permissive provision for 
transfer to the Union". 
A second brief of 29 April referred to the question of the queen 
as head of the Commonwealth and suggested in its "Talking Points" 
that if the matter were to be raised by South Africa, Macmillan 
should point out there would be a "sharply hostile• public 
reaction if South Africa tried to get the benefits of association 
with the Commonwealth without recognition of the queen. It would 
mean "ignoring the wishes of half the white population". 57 
56 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.46, Secret: PMM (UK) (60), 18 
April 1960. Cabinet: Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting 1960. 
"South Africa: Declaration of a Republic", Brief by the 
Commonwealth Relations Office. 
57 No.47, PMM (UK) (60) 29 April 1960. Brief by the CRO. 
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The events of the conference (3-13 May 1960) have been 
extensively covered by authors such as Miller, Geyser, Horne and 
Wood as well as in the memoirs of statesmen such as Macmillan and 
Menzies. Drawing on the Welensky papers and the official minutes 
of the conference, J.R.T. Wood gives the fullest summary of the 
conference to date. 58 What emerges from Wood (and from some of 
the other accounts) is, firstly, how diverse the opinions of the 
various prime ministers were and, secondly, how little evidence 
there was of a concerted attempt to force South Africa out of the 
Commonwealth or to get her to change her policies. This may have 
been a result of the efforts of Macmillan and Menzies behind the 
scenes to avoid a serious split over South Africa. More than 
likely it reflected the force of convention (which corresponded 
with the self-interest of most governments concerning 
interference in the internal affairs of member states) . 
Certainly, there is little evidence to support the traditional 
Nationalist South African view which tends to demonise the 
actions and personalities of the Afro-Asian prime ministers and 
the "maverick" white prime minister, Diefenbaker. This applies 
as much to the 1960 conference as it does to the more important 
withdrawal conference of March 1961. The fact that Macmillan 
found Diefenbaker particularly irritating has contributed to this 
demonisation of his attitude. Macmillan felt that Diefenbaker was 
sabotaging his attempts to get the old "white" Commonwealth 
countries to stick together59 in their attempts to moderate the 
attitudes of the newer members. This was more revealing of how 
Macmillan regarded the general transformation of the modern 
Commonwealth than of Diefenbaker's alleged inconsistency. 
58 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
pp.156-157. 
59 Macmillan's later comment on Diefenbaker's "holier-than-
thou" attitude to South Africa is especially revealing. He 
referred to the difficulty of persuading the "brown• and black 
members of the Commonwealth to moderate their attitudes when even 
the "Whites" were taking an anti-South African line. Macmillan, 
Pointing the Way, p.293. 
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A third aspect of the 1960 conference and one which is common to 
all accounts was the intransigence of Eric Louw and the 
irritating effect he seems to have had on many of the assembled 
prime ministers. According to Geyser, Louw's aggressive manner 
created a climate in which "even a statesman of Dr Verwoerd' s 
calibre'' would have found it difficult to act. The outcome of the 
conference could, he said, have been different if Verwoerd had 
gone instead. 60 Macmillan's comment 61 on Louw, the "dour 
Minister of External Affairs'', was that he was ''rude and ill-
informed". 
An example of Louw's effect on the others was the press 
conference of 4 May which created a storm of outrage and led to 
a clash between Louw and the Tunku of Malaysia. 62 The Tunku 
accused Louw of forestalling the results of the talks and for 
being uncompromising and unyielding. This opinion seems to have 
been shared by others both at home in South Africa and abroad. 
Indian Opinion reported that the press conference had been "Flat, 
barren" and "unprofitable" and quoted the Daily Herald 
correspondent's view that it was the "most extraordinary - most 
belligerent - Press Conference that I have ever known in 38 years 
of reporting around the world". 63 The British cabinet, which had 
been monitoring the progress of the conference, noted the effects 
of Louw.' s "unfortunate press interview" on relations with 
Malaysia and the other members, saying that "as a result feelings 
were exacerbated" . 64 
As for the events of the rest of the conference, much of it was 
taken up by the efforts of Macmillan and Menzies to prevent any 
sort of split emerging on the South African problem. They had 
60 Geyser, Watershed, p.67. 
61 Horne, Macmillan, p.204. 
62 Miller, Survey, p.147. 
63 Indian Opinion, 13 May 1960. 
64 PRO, CAB 128/34, C.C. (60)129,4, 6 May 1960. 
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been unable on the first day to prevent the Tunku's attack on 
apartheid but Louw had agreed with Macmillan's suggestion to 
allow informal discussion on the apartheid question. Wood claims 
that Diefenbaker's response to the call for discussion of South 
Africa's race policies was simply to warn delegates ''that the 
Commonwealth had not conferred a judicial role on the 
Conference 11 • 65 
While Macmillan had found the Tunku's press statement in 
criticism of Louw's press conference "offensive and 
[inaccurate] ,,M, Louw had then angered Diefenbaker by trying to 
seek his opinion on the argument. At this point Macmillan began 
to despair about the future of the conference and he had resolved 
to host private discussions at Chequers on the weekend to try to 
find a way forward. At Chequers Macmillan tried to test the views 
of the others and found them varied. Nehru wanted a collective 
statement on apartheid and Nkrumah did not want to force South 
Africa out. Macmillan was delegated by them and the other guests 
- Menzies, the Tunku and Nash - to find a formula for keeping 
South Africa in.~ 
But Macmillan's task was made more difficult by Louw's ignoring 
of the ban on formal debates of apartheid when formal plenary 
sessions resumed on May 9. Louw had provoked a debate on a point 
of order that lasted two and a half hours. This in turn led to 
an airing of views on apartheid which was not unwelcome to 
Macmillan although, as chairman, he tried to place a formal 
restriction on the debate. 68 But then Louw claimed the debate 
should not have been allowed and said there had been a press leak 
of the discussions. He said he would publicly deny that South 
Africa's affairs had been discussed. 
65 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.157. 
M Ibid. 
67 Ibid., p.158. 
68 Ibid. 
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Ghana and Nigeria had been accepted as republics on 9 and 10 May 
and on 10 May Louw asked the meeting whether it would similarly 
approve of South Africa's future application. The British cabinet 
had in the meantime resolved to try to persuade Louw not to make 
such a request "in view of the feelings already aroused on the 
racial question" . 69 On 10 May the cabinet acknowledged it had 
not "proved possible to dissuade Louw" from raising the question 
but it appeared •unlikely" the others would oppose it.m It was 
predicted that the others would "content themselves" with taking 
note of the intention of the Union Government without committing 
themselves finally to the view that South Africa could continue 
in the Commonwealth if she became a republic. 
The conference meeting of 10 May did agree that South Africa 
should remain a member of the Commonwealth but said this did not 
imply approval of apartheid. 71 Louw had been instructed to ask 
the conference two questions: (a) would South Africa's continued 
membership as a monarchy be welcomed and (b), if so, would she 
also be welcome as a republic?n Macmillan gave his unhesitating 
"yes• to the former and according to Jooste, the South African 
external affairs secretary, the other members seemed to agree. 73 
But in reply to the second question Macmillan said that an 
unconditional guarantee by the conference would prejudge the 
referendum results. Diefenbaker agreed with Macmillan and cited 
the non-interference rule which would rule out the sanctioning 
of Louw's request before the referendum had taken place. Louw 
cited Ceylon as an example of a state which had been granted 
approval prior to becoming a republic but Macmillan and 
Diefenbaker countered this with the argument that Ceylon was a 
69 PRO, CAB128/34, C.C. (60)29, 4, 6 May 1960. 
7° C . C . ( 6 O ) 3 0 , 3 , 10 May 19 6 0 . 
71 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.158. 
n Jooste, Diensherinneringe, p.194. 
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different case because all of Ceylon's political parties had 
supported a republic and there was universal suffrage. 74 In South 
Africa, however, no blacks would be allowed to vote and the 
United Party opposed a republic. 75 
Following on this statement Nehru had then pointed out that the 
referendum in South West Africa was also ''significant" as it 
appeared to give legitimacy to South Africa's position in the 
territory by a •minority of the population". 76 Louw replied that 
South West Africa had originally been excluded from the 
referendum but the government regarded the situation as 
11 anomalous 11 since the territory already had several 
representatives in the Union parliament. The referendum, however, 
would not change the territory's constitutional status. Menzies 
had been annoyed at Nehru for bringing up the question of South 
West Africa which, he felt, was not a Commonwealth 
responsibility. 77 
Louw had then offered the meeting a guarantee that if the others 
were to assent to South Africa's future membership he would not 
disclose such assent before the referendum (to avoid the charge 
of influencing its result). Macmillan had still refused to allow 
this saying that if it had been a purely constitutional question 
there would have been no problem but that "the difficult point 
of timing" meant that there would be interference in the 
referendum process by other Commonwealth members . 78 He felt it 
was better to wait until the referendum results and then, if 
74 Wood, "The roles of Macmillan, Diefenbaker and Verwoerd", 
p.159. 
n PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.418, Extract from the final 
communique, Prime Ministers' Meeting, PMM (60)13th Meeting, 13 
May 1960. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Wood, 
p.159. 
78 PRO 
' communique, 
"The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
DO 119, File 1206, No.418, Extract from the final 
13 March 1960. 
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necessary by correspondence, to get rapid assent to South 
Africa's request. 
On 12 May difficulties arose over the wording of the final 
communique. Louw rejected any reference to private discussions 
on apartheid. 79 Nehru said it had to mention racial 
discrimination and the Commonwealth's position without specific 
reference to South Africa. Menzies would not allow that because 
it implied that there had been a formal debate on racialism. The 
Tunku and Nash then suggested a statement of the multi-racial 
nature of the Commonweal th and the ef feet of South Africa's 
policies on it. 80 Diefenbaker and Nehru wanted an immediate 
debate on this because of apartheid's international implications. 
Louw refused and so Macmillan's compromise was to suggest a 
reference both to the multi-racial character of the Commonwealth, 
the international effects of apartheid and Louw's stand on non-
interference. Louw disagreed and said this would endanger South 
Africa's Commonwealth membership. 
Macmillan and Home worked late at night on a draft communique, 
which they presented to the conference on 13 May. Macmillan had 
felt that the "great danger" of no agreement on the communique 
was that there would be a splitting of the Commonwealth into 
groups based on colour. 81 During the discussions on 13 May Louw 
wanted the conference to state that South Africa would remain a 
member of the Commonweal th after the referendum. The others 
refused, and the majority of delegates then demanded specific 
mention of the discussions on racial discrimination. 82 Sensing 
deadlock, Macmillan adjourned the conference. Menzies then 
berated Louw in private for being intransigent and pointed out 
79 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.159. 
80 Ibid. , p. 16 0 . 
81 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.175. 
82 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.160. 
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that his support for South Africa had cost him votes in 
Australia. 83 It was "perhaps as a consequence", says Wood, that 
Louw finally agreed to accept the draft. 
According to Macmillan's biographer, Horne, the whole conference 
had been "tight-rope walking" all the way. The communique at the 
end was full of "double-think and double-talk". 84 This is evident 
from the tortuous wording of the sections dealing with non-
interference and South Africa's policies. The communique 
emphasised that the Commonwealth was a "multi-racial association" 
and expressed the need for good relations between member states 
and peoples. It also reaffirmed the traditional principle of non-
interference in the internal affairs of member countries. At the 
same time, however, it stated that ''Ministers availed themselves 
of Mr Louw's presence in London to have informal talks with him 
about the racial situation in South Africa.''g 
It noted also that if South Africa were to become a republic she 
would have to obtain the consent of the other members to remain 
in the Commonwealth, 
conference of prime 
either by correspondence or at a 
ministers. This latter point 
later 
about 
correspondence caused some anxiety for British officials later. 
It became important for them to persuade Verwoerd to attend in 
person so that the African and Asian prime ministers could be 
brought around to accept South Africa's continued membership. 
Macmillan was satisfied that the unity of the Commonwealth had 
been saved, at least for the time being, "without any sacrifice 
of principle". 86 But he also knew that it was "at best a 
papering-over job, deferring the moment of decision at the latest 
83 Ibid. 
84 Horne, Macmillan, p.205. 
85 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.176. 
86 Ibid. 
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to the following year's meeting". 87 
In South Africa Nationalist spokesmen declared satisfaction with 
the results of the London conference and tried to place the most 
optimistic interpretation they could on the question of future 
membership of the Commonwealth. A parliamentary statement read 
out by the minister of internal affairs, T.E. Donges, said that 
the republic had not been an issue concerning South Africa's 
future membership of the Commonwealth and that any other 
interpretation would mean South Africa was being discriminated 
against. 88 He claimed that the negative response by some local 
and foreign 
popularity" 
commentators was an attempt at "affecting Government 
and a way of influencing the referendum. But the 
principle of non-interference had been upheld and there had been 
an ''unambiguous yes answer" to South Africa's question whether 
South Africa would be welcome in the Commonwealth after a 
republic had been introduced. South Africa had, furthermore, been 
prepared to lay out and explain its policy towards blacks at the 
conference. 
Press reactions to the conference in South Africa were diverse. 
Die Burger noted with satisfaction on 5 May that South Africa's 
race policies were not discussed officially at the conference. 89 
On 6 May Die Transvaler praised Eric Louw for his defence of 
South Africa and criticised the Tunku of Malaysia for his remarks 
on Louw's press conference.w On 10 May Die Transvaler said that 
the Commonwealth might aggravate the problem for South Africa of 
outside interference and that the Commonwealth was disintegrating 
anyway. Continued membership might be too high a price to pay for 
maintaining "white civilisation". 91 
ITT Horne, Macmillan. p.205. 
88 South African Digest, Vol. 7, No. 10, 13 May 1960. 
"Die Burger, 5 May 1960. 
w Die Transvaler, 6 May 1960. 
91 Die Transvaler, 10 May 1960. 
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The English South African newspapers were on the whole critical 
of Louw and they took a "sympathetic" view of the Tunku dispute 
(which they blamed on Louw) . 92 They also tended to praise 
Macmillan and Menzies and the "old Commonwealth" friends for 
avoiding a split. They noted that the question of membership of 
the Commonwealth was now very much open despite the republican 
issue. The Star, however, expressed the hope on the eve of the 
conference that the Commonwealth would "recognise diversity" and 
not examine "too closely" each country's reasons for being 
members. In that way it would avoid "self-righteousness and cant" 
about South Africa's merits and demerits as a member. 93 
The British high commission in South Africa noted that the local 
press had reported Sauer, Donges and Naude as saying that 
Commonwealth membership was simply a matter of form and 
convention. 94 It noted that the "moderate" Afrikaans newspapers 
such as Die Burger were saying that South Africa came out of the 
conference "rather well" and that the principle of non-
interference was upheld. They were also hoping that those who had 
exerted themselves to preserve the unity of the Commonwealth 
would do it again when the formal request came up. 
The high commission also reported on the "di visions" in the 
National Party between 11 moderates" and "extremists 11 as 
represented by Die Burger and Die Transvaler. It surmised that 
the former had refrained from attacking the latter for the sake 
of a 11 show of solidarity" over the republic but noted that the 
moderates saw Louw\s presence in London as 11 tragic 11 • 95 The 
moderates were putting a 11 brave face 11 on the fact that no 
reassurances about Commonwealth membership emerged from the 
92 Rand Daily Mail, 5 May 1960, The Star, 5 and 6 May 1960. 
m The Star, 2 May 1960. 
94 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.44, High Commission Cape Town -
Secretary of State, CRO, 14 May 1960. 
95 No.45, High Commissioner - Secretary of State, CRO, 14 May 
1960. 
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conference. The reaction of Transvaal ministers was, however, 
"awaited with interest". The UP, on the other hand, had expressed 
"private satisfaction" that Verwoerd was unlikely to get 
assurances of membership and this "helps their anti-republican 
campaign". 
Indian Opinion's assessment expressed, perhaps, the feelings of 
most of the voteless majority in South Africa about the 
conference. It expressed disappointment that the attempt to have 
South Africa's racial policies put on the official agenda had 
"failed" . An "East-West alignment" was taking place in the 
Commonwealth itself "under the cover of diplomatic usage and 
Commonweal th conventions". 96 The "European countries" of the 
Commonwealth, "or more correctly the white countries, led by 
Britain", were more sympathetic to the "cause of White South 
Africa than to the interests of plain, downright humanity", and 
a ''line-up of Afro-Asian countries against the "White countries'' 
was taking place with Britain taking the role of a "biased 
chairman". The newspaper called on the Commonwealth to make clear 
its stand for "principles of democracy and justice irrespective 
of colour" or to admit that it was divided into two camps, white 
and non-white over the South African issue. It was not likely 
that the Afro-Asian countries would "continue to accept the 
hesitation of Britain on the subject of honesty and justice in 
South Africa". 
Later, Indian Opinion claimed that the communique at the end of 
the conference had merely concealed "cracks in the Commonwealth" 
and that the "impassable gulfs" dividing the members would mean 
that if there were to be another conference it would be to "bury 
the remains" . 97 It went on to belittle the "pretence" that there 
was any unity left in the Commonwealth. 
What was needed, claimed Indian Opinion, was to build a "true 
96 Indian Opinion, 6 May 19 6 0. 
97 Indian Opinion, 1 O June 19 6 O . 
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Commonwealth" inside which one standard of human values was 
guaranteed to all members". 
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Chapter 18: From Conference to Referendum, May to October 1960 
(a) Macmillan's post-conference diplomacy 
After the May conference Macmillan's efforts to contain the 
political ''fall-out• from the Sharpeville incident and other 
political developments related to South Africa's future 
Commonwealth membership redoubled. 
the British high commissioner, 
Much correspondence between 
Sir John Maud, and the 
Commonwealth relations office took place, as well as between the 
prime ministers themselves, about this issue. The main theme, as 
far as British policy-makers were concerned, seemed to have been 
the need to persuade Verwoerd not to go ahead with the referendum 
until the atmosphere had calmed down. Macmillan, fearing South 
Africa's expulsion from the Commonwealth, tried to persuade the 
other. prime ministers to accept South Africa's continued 
membership if the republic were introduced. Verwoerd and Louw, 
from their side, refused to consider any sort of concessions on 
racial policy and held steadfastly to their line that 
Commonwealth membership would be •automatic" and that Macmillan 
and the other "white'' prime ministers were duty bound to help 
South Africa achieve this aim. 
Macmillan was split between his desire to keep South Africa in 
and his feeling that Verwoerd and Louw were being less than 
honourable in their refusal to accept his warnings that unless 
some concessions were forthcoming South Africa's membership was 
in jeopardy. From their side, Verwoerd and Louw were not above 
using threats if Britain did not support their membership 
strategy. Threats of economic retaliation and also the threat 
of a veto on the membership of other new members such as Cyprus 
were communicated on various occasions to the British. 
In the meantime the political temperature was raised by 
Nkrumah's muffled threat in a statement in Dublin shortly after 
the May conference that if a future South African republic 
refused to uphold UNO principles Ghana would find it 
"embarrassing 11 
Commonweal th. 1 
to 
This 
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remain with 
was followed 
such a 
by the 
republic in 
June conference 
the 
of 
independent African states in Addis Ababa which urged African 
Commonwealth members to take all steps necessary to exclude South 
Africa from the Commonwealth. The same conference also adopted 
wide ranging economic sanctions against South Africa and, in 
July, Ghana demanded that any South African visitors to Ghana 
make a formal renunciation of policies of racial discrimination. 
The Tunku stated in the Malayan parliament in June 1960 that he 
would ask the others whether they would subscribe to any measures 
Malaya would take against South Africa. 2 Nehru said in August 
that he had written to the others about India's attitude and that 
of the other members. Miller points out how Menzies's initiated 
considerable correspondence with Verwoerd in which he tried to 
persuade the latter to be more flexible but found that Verwoerd 
would not budge an inch on racial policy. 3 Menzies urged Verwoerd 
to present the future republican application in person, not by 
correspondence, so the "frankest" possible discussion could ensue 
on the procedures and principles of Commonwealth membership. He 
also stated his belief that people like himself, Macmillan, Nash 
and Diefenbaker would think it a misfortune if South Africa were 
not in the Commonwealth. 4 
Ghana and Malaya had adopted an economic boycott of South Africa 
in response to the Addis Ababa conference and were soon to be 
joined by Tanganyika. In August Macmillan wrote to Nkrumah what 
Horne calls a "sagacious letter in the light of subsequent 
history", saying it was difficult for any country to "modify its 
way at the behest of outside critics'' as opposed to internal 
1 Miller, Survey, p.149 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid., pp.149-50. 
4 Ibid., p.150. 
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pressures. 5 External pressure, said Macmillan, could "harden" 
opinion inside South Africa. The United Kingdom on the other hand 
favoured "patience and persuasion''. 
In July and August Macmillan had also warned Verwoerd that if the 
republican referendum gave a "yes" answer some countries might 
oppose South Africa's application for continued membership. 
Verwoerd in return "appreciated" that if it were to be so, South 
Africa would have to be outside the Commonwealth. 6 He would 
"never give a single inch on anything" said Macmillan years 
later. 7 
Macmillan stated in his memoirs that the Tunku and Nkrumah had 
shown themselves ready to take a moderate line on South Africa's 
re-admission. He claimed that his August letter to Nkrumah 
"seemed to have paid off" 8 but that Diefenbaker remained a 
''threat'' - a claim which, as we shall see in a later chapter, was 
to a large extent unfounded. 
Back at home in South Africa the lines were being drawn between 
the political parties on the republican referendum. In March 
Verwoerd had warned the UP that if it continued to claim the 
referendum would be meaningless without the participation of 
other population groups, it would provoke the government into 
adopting other ''harsher" methods of bringing about a republic, 
namely by bare parliamentary majority. 9 
Die Transvaler, in support of Verwoerd's statement (which had 
caused an uproar in the opposition ranks), denied that this 
warning meant intimidation or any other means of influencing the 
5 Horne, Macmillan, p.391. 
6 Ibid., p.392. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Ibid. 
9 House of Assembly Debates, col.3767, 21 March 1960. 
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vote as the opposition had accused Verwoerd of doing, but said 
that it simply meant that 
achieve a republic if the 
republicans would work harder to 
referendum failed. 10 If the ''other 
methods• of bringing about a republic 
became necessary it would be the 
referred to by Verwoerd 
UP leadership's 11 own 
foolishness'' that had made such measures necessary. 
On 22 April the second reading of the Referendum bill had taken 
place and De Villiers Graaff had tried to move an amendment which 
rejected the idea of a referendum at such an "inopportune" time 
in the country's history. Other grounds for its rejection were 
its failure to guarantee South Africa's continued membership of 
the Commonwealth and the exclusion of "a section of the 
electorate" (the coloureds) from the voting. 11 De Villiers Graaff 
denied, however, that the 24000 coloured voters would affect the 
referendum results to any extent. 
During the same debate Dr J. Steytler moved a Progressive Party 
amendment to the Referendum bill which demanded a postponement 
of the referendum until South Africa's "internal" and "external" 
security was assured by participation of "all sections of the 
population" in the constitution and by continued Commonwealth 
membership . 12 This was followed by Margaret Ballinger' s amendment 
demanding the participation of the black population in the 
referendum and declaring that the relations between the races 
were "never so bad" as at "present" . 13 Furthermore, she argued, 
the republic would not necessarily bring English and Afrikaner 
together and that Afrikaner nationalism was an "utterly selfish, 
self-centred religion''. 14 
10 Die Transvaler, 25 March 1960. 
11 House of Assembly Debates, col.5885, 22 April 1960. 
12 Ibid., col.5929, 25 April 1960. 
13 Ibid. , col.5951, 25 April 1960. 
14 Ibid., col.5956, 25 April 1960. 
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Ballinger's position in parliament was then in danger for at the 
end of the previous parliamentary session the Nationalists had 
forced through legislation to deprive the natives representatives 
of their seats. Margaret Ballinger was then in her last session 
of parliament and had been returned by her constituency every 
year since 1936. 15 
(b) Maud's advice to London: ''Keep South Africa in" 
After the May Commonwealth conference and as the referendum 
campaign began to heat up, the British high commissioner, Sir 
John Maud, began to warn London of the dangers of allowing 
Verwoerd to claim that South Africa's future Commonwealth 
membership was assured if South Africa were to become a republic. 
On 6 June he wrote that he had communicated his surprise to 
Jooste, the Union's secretary of external affairs, that Verwoerd 
had said after the Commonwealth conference that South Africa's 
application after becoming a republic would be just a 
formality. 16 He was also surprised to find that Jooste accepted 
this as well, despite the minutes of the May prime ministers' 
meeting having indicated otherwise. Maud was also •indignant" at 
Nehru's remark in Dublin "that it was all a matter of timing and 
procedure". Maud asked Jooste if Louw was serious about wanting 
South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth after his remark about 
the organisation rapidly becoming a "mini UNO" with up to twenty 
new members. Jooste assured Maud that both he and Louw were "full 
of support for the value of the Commonwealth in the world". On 
apartheid, however, Jooste claimed there would be no concessions 
but rather •short cuts• which would meet some of the criticisms 
of South Africa before the next Commonwealth meeting. 
Maud reported that the UP and PP did not share Verwoerd's view 
of the outcome of the May conference and that De Villiers Graaff 
15 Indian Opinion, 10 June 1960. 
16 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.48, Extract from a letter to 
Sir Alexander Clutterbuck from Sir John Maud, 9 June 1960. 
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had warned at a UP rally that South Africa might not be accepted 
as a republic by the rest of the Commonwealth. This would be "the 
major theme of the referendum campaign", Maud surmised. 
In mid-June Macmillan undertook a major reshuffle of his cabinet 
in which Lord Home was moved to foreign affairs, to be replaced 
by Duncan Sandys, his former "hatchet man" from the defence 
portfolio. 17 On the 7 July the new Commonweal th secretary wrote 
to Maud saying that a speech by Verwoerd at Groblersdal had been 
reported prominently in Britain. Verwoerd had said that the "old 
Commonwealth" plus India would push South Africa's membership 
through. 18 Sandys asked Maud whether Louw must have given 
Verwoerd the wrong impression of the conference "for his own 
sake". Reports of Verwoerd's speech had resulted in the colonial 
secretary having to say after a question in the Commons that the 
communique had emphasized no decision would be taken until after 
the referendum and that no undertaking had been given by the 
British government. 
Sandys went on to tell Maud he felt sure Ghana, Malaysia and 
Nigeria would vote against South Africa's membership on the 
grounds of the Union's race policies and on the grounds that it 
was a referendum by a "minority of whites''. His next telegram 
would contain a draft letter to Verwoerd about this. It was 
"tempting", he said, to suggest to Verwoerd two concessions that 
might reduce Commonwealth hostility: (1) that he should give the 
coloureds the vote and representation in parliament (by 
coloureds) and (2) that Africans should have some say in white 
areas concerning "legislation in early stages". There was no 
guarantee, however, that these reforms would in fact "stave off 
a Commonwealth crisis''. 
The draft letter to Verwoerd said that Britain did not commit 
itself in advance but just hoped that South Africa would stay a 
17 Horne, Macmillan, p.242. 
18 DO 119, File 1206, No.51, Sandys - Maud, 7 July 1960. 
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member of the Commonwealth. 19 The letter warned that aspects of 
South African policy were likely to be criticised by one or more 
members as had happened in May and that "we should then be faced 
with a sharp divergence of views on an issue of major importance, 
namely membership, on which collective agreement is required". 
A ''critical situation'' could thus be created, the result of which 
could not be forecast. There were, however, certain proposals 
which the prime ministers had in mind that he thought could help 
the situation (the extension of coloured and African political 
participation mentioned earlier) 
Maud's reply expressed agreement with the draft and said it was 
necessary if only to "put the record straight" with Verwoerd in 
case of "recriminations" that the British had led him "up the 
garden path" concerning membership. 20 However, "nothing we say 
will deter him from his line that the Commonwealth will accept 
him" because he needed it for "propaganda purposes". Verwoerd 
did not "really care" for the Commonwealth anyway. Maud 
suggested that Sandys's proposal to Verwoerd to make two 
concessions be deleted from the draft letter as it "would 
probably not have the desired effect". 
The final letter to Verwoerd (sent on 13 July by Macmillan) 21 
contained all the above points except the reforms suggested by 
Sandys. It referred to the Groblersdal speech and warned "there 
would be more than one Commonwealth country which despite the 
practice adopted hitherto would for reasons of policy oppose the 
continued membership of South Africa''.n 
In July a briefing for Maud to present to the CRO was drawn up 
19 No. 52, Draft letter from Commonweal th Secretary to 
Verwoerd, 7 July 1960. 
20 No. 53, Maud - Secretary of State, CRO, 8 July 196 0. 
21 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp. 285-286. 
22 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.54, Secretary of State, CRO -
Maud, 13 July 1960. 
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by the high commission which mainly confined itself to a 
''Prognosis on the Republic''.n It stated that it seemed •certain'' 
the Nationalists would win the referendum, especially after the 
"offensive" by Ghana and Malaya (sanctions against south Africa). 
There would be a division between "Boer'' and "Briton'' on party 
lines with only the Progressive Party arguing for a "non-racial 
republic" . Verwoerd was 1 ikely to announce the date for the 
referendum in August for sometime in October and, despite 
warnings, was likely to campaign on the assumption Commonwealth 
membership was a formality and that the "Old Commonwealth" would 
"ensure the new members stick to the rules". Ghana and Malaya 
were "likely to oppose" South Africa's application although 
Pakistan's prime minister had said in June that South Africa 
should remain in the club so as to be under the influence of the 
rest of the Commonwealth. 
Britain would find it an "awkward precedent" if South Africa were 
to be expelled and it was in her interests to keep South Africa 
in as well in the interests of the black population. Throwing out 
South Africa would "reduce influence" over her and the interests 
of the •whole population" should be considered. The Commonwealth 
"ideal" was to "work together despite differences" and the new 
Commonwealth would only be "playing Verwoerd's game" by 
expulsion. It was suggested that perhaps Macmillan should begin 
writing to the other prime ministers in his capacity as chairman 
of the previous conference to "gauge views" and to set out a case 
for continued membership as well 
Commonwealth's 
Commonwealth". 
views in putting 
as 
the 
to get 
case to 
the 
the 
"old 
new 
On 2 August Sandys wrote to Maud to tell him that the South 
African high commissioner in London had written to tell him that 
the referendum date of 5 October would be announced by Verwoerd 
the following day and that if the result was in favour of a 
23 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.59, Secret Brief for the High 
Commissioner's Visit to London: Prognosis on a Republic, July 
1960. 
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republic, the Union would "make the customary request to the 
Commonwealth Prime Ministers that after the establishment of the 
republic the Union of South Africa be permitted to retain its 
membership of the Commonweal th" . 24 
A copy of a letter from Macmillan to Verwoerd was sent the same 
day with the request to Maud to pass it on to Verwoerd. It 
expressed Macmillan's "deep concern at the dangers which may be 
involved for the cohesion of the Commonwealth if such a course 
is embarked upon at the present time" . 25 It stated that he 
(Macmillan) had received messages concerning the referendum that 
made this letter to Verwoerd necessary. "Di ff icul ties" had 
increased since the July letter he had sent Verwoerd and it was 
now very probable that some countries would oppose South Africa's 
membership. He warned of possibly all the "non-European" 
countries opposing South Africa and the ''painful results likely 
to follow from a division of the Commonwealth on racial lines on 
an issue of such importance for us all". 
So seriously indeed do I view the prospects that I 
feel impelled to ask you in all friendship and with 
the Union's interests uppermost in my mind to reflect 
before proceeding with your announcement at this 
juncture. Taking a long-term view would it not serve 
your interests better to postpone it until times in 
Africa are calmer? To secure a breathing space amid 
all these fast-flowing developments would be very 
valuable. 
Notwithstanding this advice, on 3 August Verwoerd went ahead and 
announced that the voting date for the referendum would be 5 
October. In a broadcast on the SABC he declared that only when 
the constitutional problem of a republic had been disposed of 
24 File 1206, No.61, Sandys - Maud, 2 August 1960. 
25 File 1206, No.62, Sandys - Maud, 2 August 1960. 
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would racial tension slacken and economic growth resume. 26 
In his reply to Macmillan's letter Verwoerd said that the 
decision to hold the referendum in October was taken after 
"careful consideration" and that it would be "quite impossible 
to reverse'' it.n South Africa did not want to create ''divisions'' 
in the Commonwealth and could not help it if certain states were 
allowed to pursue a "feud" against her domestic policy. This 
would not deter South Africa from adopting a constitution which 
had been "accepted and even welcomed" in the case of other 
Commonwealth countries. The ''aspirations'' and needs and rights 
of her people would not be helped by postponing the referendum 
and a postponement, under the pressure of countries like Ghana, 
would only "intensify demands" and lengthen the uncertainties 
with "adverse" effects economically and in terms of "social 
order" in South Africa. He ended by saying he valued Macmillan's 
friendship and that of Britain as a whole and hoped co-operation 
would be developed and maintained whatever happened. 
On the day of the referendum announcement Sandys wrote to Maud 
to state that a message had been sent by Macmillan to all the 
other prime ministers saying that "We cannot tell in advance what 
the result of the referendum may be but if it should be in favour 
of a republic it is clear from the discussions at our meeting in 
May that very difficult issues may arise for us all. "28 If he was 
asked about the Commonwealth attitude he would say it was "purely 
a matter for the country concerned" and would r::ofuse to be drawn 
on the British government attitude. It was for each Commonwealth 
government to decide what to say if they were asked but that it 
would be in the general Commonwealth interest "if we could all 
say as little as possible at this stage". 
u Krfiger, Making of a Nation, p.328. 
27 PRO,DO 119, File 1206, No.66, Secretary of External 
Affairs, South Africa - J.B. Johnstone, Deputy High Commissioner, 
4 August 1960. 
28 File 1206, No.65, Sandys - Maud, 3 August 1960. 
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Nkrumah was reported by the British high commissioner in Accra 
to have agreed with Macmillan's message. However, Nkrumah had 
also said that it was "what happens after [the referendum] that 
is important". Nkrumah would not refer in full to the issue yet 
but if forced to would place as much emphasis on South Africa's 
possible expulsion as on the republican constitution. 29 
Macmillan reported that Nehru had said it would not be possible 
to avoid all reference to "considerations relevant to the 
question of South Africa's retention of its membership".w 
Canada had also responded to the referendum announcement and 
Diefenbaker had said in the Canadian House of Commons that it was 
"for South Africa to decide" and that Canada had given no 
undertaking in advance in May as it would have been an 
interference with the referendum process. 31 By September, as we 
shall see, however, Diefenbaker was having second thoughts about 
this and was expressing reservations about the general British 
approach to the question. 
A message was also received by the CRO from Wellington outlining 
Nash's view which was in agreement with Macmillan that it would 
be generally in the Commonwealth interest if "we could all say 
as little as possible at this stage" . 32 Nash felt Verwoerd' s 
statement after the May talks had been "contrary to the facts and 
the spirit of the confidential view expressed at the meeting''. 
He feared that Louw and Verwoerd would continue to claim the 
others would agree to South Africa's future membership, but he 
felt that was "not at all likely'' and that Ghana, Nigeria and 
Malaya were not favourable to the idea. He hoped some way could 
29 No. 6 9 UK High Commissioner, Accra 
August 1960. 
C . R . O , London , 4 
30 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.287. 
31 PRO, D0.119, File 1206, No.70, Sandys - Maud, 6 August 
1960. 
32 No. 71, UK High Commission, Wellington 
State, CRO, 10 August 1960. 
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be found "to ensure that the real facts of the situation and the 
somewhat bleak prospects of retention of Commonwealth membership 
are understood by the South African Government". 
A later note stated that Nash and his external affairs secretary, 
Mcintosh, had amended this statement. They now suggested that all 
Commonwealth leaders "take steps to ensure that the Union 
Government" was not under any misapprehension" about the possible 
consequences of the referendum on South Africa's future 
membership of the Commonweal th. They felt that South African 
ministers had been ''disingenuous" and that some effort should be 
made to counteract the ''deliberate misleading" of South African 
public opinion. 33 
On 11 August the CRO asked Maud for information on what type of 
majority was expected for the republicans in the referendum. He 
was also asked to ascertain whether the South African public was 
aware that membership could be refused and what effect it would 
have on the result if this was made "unequivocally plain" to 
them. 34 Maud wrote back to say that (a) there was already a 60%-
40% split in the Afrikaner - English ratio in the population and 
that some Afrikaners in the UP and PP were likely to vote for the 
republic thus giving the Nationalists a "modest majority"; (b) 
that most voters were aware of the possibility of expulsion and 
that Verwoerd' s 3 August announcement of the referendum had 
''eliminated any lingering confusion'' in that regard ; and (c) 
that a more forthright effort to enlighten the public would have 
little effect since most Afrikaners were •committed anyway" to 
the republic with or without the Commonweal th. 35 
The UP's attempts to •frighten the floating vote" with 
predictions of economic disaster if South Africa left the 
33 No.72, UK High Commissioner, Wellington - CRO (repeated 
to Pretoria), 10 August 1960. 
34 No. 73, CRO (Clutterbuck) - Maud, 11 August 1960. 
35 No.75, Maud - CRO (Clutterbuck), 12 August 1960. 
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Commonwealth were offset by propaganda from the NP that pointed 
out the examples of Ireland and Burma and that claimed that 
"mutual self-interest" would prevail. There was also the "growing 
feeling" that Ghana, Malaya, etc. "should be resisted". There was 
also the Nationalist propaganda that it might be against South 
Africa's interest to stay in a multi-racial Commonwealth 
"dominated by the Afro-Asian countries" anyway. 
Maud added some further thoughts in another telegram of 13 August 
and gave some advice on British policy.M The whole drift of his 
argument was that Britain should keep South Africa in the 
Commonwealth "in the hope of the Union's eventual redemption" and 
because of the possibility of some "enemy or rival" inheriting 
Britain's position. He used the example of Britain and the West 
"sitting it out" with the Russians in UNO and argued the same for 
South Africa. Britain might still keep South Africa in if she 
''managed the operation'' correctly. Britain could persuade the 
others by playing strongly the "line" that people not governments 
were being punished by expulsion. Macmillan and Menzies could 
exchange ideas on this at "early stages" first with Nehru, 
Nkrumah and the others and then with Diefenbaker and Nash who 
could be "sold" on the outcome without difficulty. "I am sure", 
he wrote, "if we do not take a discreet but firm grip of the 
situation we shall finish with South Africa out of the 
Commonwealth". 
The urgency which British officials were beginning to feel 
concerning the question of South Africa's future membership was 
increased by threatening public statements emanating from 
Nationalist ministers such as Eric Louw. On 16 August Eric Louw 
made a speech at a republican rally in Paarl which referred to 
"scare stories" from the UP about economic damage that would 
follow expulsion. 37 He said that in the "unlikely event" of Ghana 
and India achieving expulsion South Africa in any event held the 
36 No. 76, Maud - CRO ( Clut terbuck) , 13 August 1960. 
37 Die Transvaler, 17 August, 1960. 
410 
"trump cards" in the form of gold and other minerals if Britain 
refused to sign a bilateral trade agreement. Such an agreement, 
he said, would not be prohibited by GATT as De Villiers Graaff 
had predicted. This speech was reported by the high commission 
to the CRO on 19 August with the comment that Die Transvaler was 
a "reliable mouthpiece of the NP" and that although the UP had 
already described Louw's statement as ''irresponsible'', "it may 
reflect the views of at least some NP ministers and we may hear 
it again as the campaign hots up". 38 
In late August Verwoerd announced at a republican rally in 
Lichtenburg that he would end the state of emergency on or before 
5 October because he did not want anyone to feel that he was not 
completely free to vote as he thought he should. 39 (It was lifted 
on 31 August) . He admitted that South Africa derived certain 
economic advantages from the Commonwealth but said these should 
not be over-exaggerated. Preferences were not as important as 
before. He also recognised that Commonwealth membership was a 
matter of ''mind and heart'' for English South Africans. 
At a meeting in Johannesburg, Dr Steytler of the Progressive 
Party declared, on the other hand, that the referendum was a 
choice to ''live in harmony with or to fight fellow black South 
Africans". The only reason why Verwoerd had come forward with the 
republican issue at that point in time was that "he wants to 
cover up the mess he has made of race relations in South 
Africa" . 40 
Even private companies entered the fray over the republic as a 
letter in the Donges collection illustrated. A certain Edward 
Searle of Edward Searle and Company in Cape Town sent a circular 
to his staff advising "deep and careful thought" about the 
~ DO 119, File 1206, No.77A, T.W. Aston, Pretoria - D.E. 
Richards, CRO, 19 August 1960. 
39 South African Digest, Vol.7, No.17,19 August 1960, p.5. 
40 Ibid. , p. 6. 
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republican referendum to his employees. 41 The circular noted that 
much "misunderstanding among working people" existed about the 
role of the monarchy in South Africa, but that the queen could 
not just ''hand over South Africa'' to the blacks as had happened 
in the Congo - but that she was "just a figurehead" who could not 
overrule the Union government. However, the loss of economic 
preferences if South Africa had to leave the Commonwealth was 
"serious". His firm would have to "reduce staff after 1961" if 
South Africa left the Commonwealth because it dealt primarily 
with imports and exports. 
In the meantime Eric Louw was displaying an attitude of mingled 
threats and inducements in discussions with the British high 
commissioner, Maud. On 20 August Maud cabled Sandys to say that 
he had spoken to Louw who suggested to him that if Ghana vetoed 
South Africa's application and if Britain did nothing to ensure 
South Africa's membership, South Africa could use its gold and 
minerals as bargaining chips or could indeed sell them 
elsewhere. 42 Maud had "evaded questions" from Louw about the 
"unanimity rule" at Commonwealth conferences and said that 
Macmillan was just worried about "the timing of the present 
problem". 
Louw had then "flourished" the possibility of the governor-
general delaying legislation for the republic and thus, in 
effect, allowing South Africa to remain in the Commonwealth; 
then, in more threatening vein, of South Africa using its veto 
to exclude Ghana and Nigeria and others. Maud asked him when 
South Africa intended to present her application but Louw replied 
it was not yet settled and he preferred it not to be by 
correspondence but rather at a prime ministers' meeting. The high 
commissioner concluded: "He clearly sees the advantages of 
41 CA, Al646 (Donges Collection), (e) MIN Correspondence 
Files, Vol.331 (Republic: 1953 July - 1961 May), Circular Letter 
by E. Searle and Co. to employees, 1 September 1960. 
42 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.79, Maud - Sandys, 20 August 
1960. 
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playing the Commonwealth issue as long as possible although one 
cannot count on his persuading Verwoerd to this view." 
Sandys cabled Maud on 30 August to say he had spoken to Van 
Rhijn, the South African high commissioner in London and had 
asked him if Verwoerd really wanted South Africa to stay in the 
Commonwealth. 43 Van Rhijn had replied that earlier it had not 
been so but now Verwoerd saw the Commonwealth's value in a 
"troubled world". He also saw the value of economic preferences, 
particularly for the "politically important farmers'' whose 
support he valued. He said Verwoerd was "deeply committed" to the 
line that South Africa would remain a member after becoming a 
republic and did not want to be "proved wrong". 
Sandys then suggested he might want to discuss the line to take 
with "potentially hostile members'' and asked whether legislation 
could be delayed as long as possible to allow tempers to "cool". 
He also urged Van Rhijn to tell Verwoerd not to apply by 
correspondence but rather to attend a prime ministers' meeting 
where the "steadying influence" of some Commonwealth members 
could be used. He urged delay while "like-minded governments" 
considered. Van Rhijn had promised to communicate the gist of 
what Sandys said. 
Maud cabled back on the same day to warn Sandys that Verwoerd 
might use the tactic of postponement to get the maximum 
commitment by Britain to use her influence to keep South Africa 
in the Commonwealth and that he was also "unpredictable" and 
could raise all sorts of issues such as the high commission 
territories. 44 Maud thus recommended an informal meeting between 
Verwoerd and the Commonwealth secretary when the latter visited 
the Federation in the following month and that this would avoid 
press speculation about the subject of talks. (The meeting was 
rendered unnecessary by Louw's talks with Macmillan in Scotland 
43 No.BO, Sandys - Maud, 30 August 1960. 
«No 81, Maud - Sandys, 30 August, 1960. 
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on 7 September in which Verwoerd's views were then communicated 
directly to the British prime minister) . 
On 31 August Sandys asked Maud for comment on an editorial in the 
Financial Times of Johannesburg (29 August) which had suggested 
that voters should support the republic in order to give Verwoerd 
the chance to introduce reforms in coloured representation, bantu 
affairs, bantu trade unions, etc. The article had stated that 
such reforms would make it likely that South Africa would be 
accepted at the Commonwealth meeting and that boycotts would 
end. 45 
Maud cabled in return to say the article reflected "Un-objective 
political propaganda" inspired by Johannesburg business interests 
"who were putting their money on a republic" and wanted to "whip 
in" English voters. However, Verwoerd was the "High Priest of 
Apartheid" and was unlikely to abandon it for the sake of 
Commonwealth membership for which he "feels nothing". Verwoerd 
had "said as much" in his personal letter to Macmillan of 2 
August. Modifications to the Pass Laws, the Liquor laws, etc. 
were being canvassed "solely 
English/Afrikaans business 
to appease Cape Nationalists'' and 
interests ''worried about their 
international image" . It did not "involve any change in basic 
apartheid" . 46 
In the meantime Macmillan had written to Menzies about what to 
do about a republic and Sandys enclosed this message in a 
telegram for Maud.~ Macmillan had asked Menzies for his views 
first and stated that he then intended to speak to Diefenbaker 
and Nash about an approach to Nehru and other new members about 
delaying legislation in the Union and about persuading Verwoerd 
not to apply by correspondence but to wait preferably until the 
next prime ministers' meeting. He hoped to appeal to the new 
45 Nos. 83 and 84, Sandys - Maud, 31 August 1960. 
46 No.85, Maud - Sandys, 2 September, 1960. 
47 No.86, Sandys - Maud, 29 August 1960. 
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members to "impress upon the Afro-Asians" the need for 
Commonwealth solidarity and to keep South Africa in for the sake 
of the black majority. 
The first fruits of this approach seem to have been harvested in 
early September when Nkrumah indicated he would not oppose South 
Africa's membership. on the 9th of September Sandys met Nkrumah 
and reported to Maud that he had persuaded Nkrumah not to oppose 
South Africa's membership. 48 Nkrumah had at first said he would 
oppose South Africa because of public opinion but after some 
thought had agreed not to although he reserved the right to 
attack apartheid at the next Commonwealth meeting. He went to the 
length of adding that it was important not to give Verwoerd the 
impression that South Africa might be ref used because he might 
therefore decide not to make an application at all "rather than 
risk the indignity of rejection''. 
Although the Tunku of Malaysia had not been as accommodating in 
his reply it seems that Verwoerd was encouraged enough by 
Macmillan's campaign to send Lauw to Scotland, where Macmillan 
was on holiday, to discuss further approaches. 49 Macmillan was 
irritated by Louw's approach which, as a letter from Sandys 
indicated, included his usual tactless threats and complaints. 
Macmillan was told that if the unanimity rule applied and Ghana 
vetoed South Africa, Verwoerd would establish a republic outside 
the Commonwealth but would sign a trade agreement with Britain. 50 
However, he had then also threatened that Verwoe:i:d' s attitude to 
Cyprus's application would depend on the attitude of the others 
to South Africa. 
Louw had gone on to suggest a special prime ministers' meeting 
48 No.90, UK High Commission, Accra to CRO and Pretoria, 9 
September 1960. 
49 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.288. 
50 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No. 92, Sandys - Maud, 9 September 
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in 1961 to discuss the South African application and said that 
draft legislation would be introduced in January. He suggested 
that Macmillan should not support the unanimity rule at prime 
of substance as opposed to ministers\ 
procedure. 
meetings 
Macmillan 
on questions 
replied there was in theory no "binding" 
rule on unanimity and that it was just past ''precedent" but felt 
the need for an informal meeting to clear it up. Lauw then 
suggested that the whole issue could be expressed "positively" 
rather than "negatively" by means of a direct motion stating that 
South Africa's request for membership was to be denied. This 
would mean that South Africa could also veto any refusal to 
accept her request for continued membership. 
Sandys reported to Maud that his impression was that Lauw' s 
meeting with Macmillan was purely for the purpose of the 
referendum and was not related to any "genuine concern about 
Commonweal th membership" . 51 Louw had al so met the minister of 
state for Commonwealth relations, G. Alport, and had discussed 
South West Africa and the Ghana/Tanganyika boycotts. It seems 
that he had indicated some concessions concerning the South 
African reaction to the boycotts and to the issue, then becoming 
embarrassing to Britain, of political refugees in the high 
commission territories. Alport had advised Sandys to contact 
Verwoerd about the necessity for flexibility on SWA and reported 
that Louw had agreed not make a public protest about the boycotts 
in the hope that they would ''peter out''· Louw also told Alpert 
that South Africa planned "no drastic action" in connection with 
political refugees (in the high commission territories) and would 
allow the rest to be airlifted out of Bechuanaland that week. 
In the interim a minor clash between Britain and Canada was 
developing on the issue of the unanimity rule and South Africa's 
future membership. Diefenbaker seems to have been less than happy 
about the British approach which he saw as being too 
accommodating to Verwoerd. On 19 September Diefenbaker had made 
51 File 1206, No.93, Sandys - Maud, 9 September 1960. 
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a speech in which he had claimed that: "As consent to [South 
Africa's] membership required unanimity these words become 
significant and important. "52 But almost at the same time a 
contradictory statement in Washington by Lord Home, the British 
foreign secretary, had been reported by Toronto newspapers. They 
reported an "ambiguous" answer on South Africa's Commonweal th 
membership from the British foreign secretary at a press 
conference in Washington. This answer clashed with Diefenbaker's 
statement on 19 September. The British statement could be taken 
as support for Verwoerd's ''racist'' policies, claimed the 
Canadians. 53 It also meant that "some South Africans could be 
persuaded that they can pursue their policies of race repression 
without endangering their Commonwealth membership". 
On 24 September the Canadian high commissioner for the UK in 
Ottawa cabled Maud to say that Diefenbaker was "seriously 
exercised" by the South African situation. 54 He was worried about 
appearing out of step with Britain concerning Lord Home's 
Washington statement but felt that South Africa was now claiming 
that the old Commonwealth would work to keep South Africa in. 
Louw had claimed this after the London conference and so 
Diefenbaker had made a statement on the unanimity rule on 19 
September. He felt there was some ambiguity about the British 
approach to Verwoerd. Verwoerd should be persuaded not to go 
ahead with the republic until he was sure of a bigger majority 
and to allow time for things to cool off in the hope that this 
would improve South Africa's relations with the UNO through the 
Hammarskoljd talks. Canada was seriously "worried" and wanted the 
opinions of the others on what to do. 
On the same day Home apologised to Diefenbaker for any 
52 No. 97A, High Commission, Ottawa CRO (repeated for 
Pretoria), 20 September 1960. 
53 No. 97B, Sandys - Maud, 23 September 1960. 
54 No. 98, UK High Commissioner, Ottawa - Maud, 24 September 
1960. 
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"embarrassment" he might have caused the latter by his press 
conference in Washington and said he had been unaware of 
Diefenbaker's speech at the same time and that his was on 
"different but related issues" . 55 He had just said that it was 
better to have South Africa in the Commonwealth where it could 
be influenced while Diefenbaker was stressing the unanimity rule. 
Some damage had been done, however, to the anti-republican 
campaign in South Africa by Horne's statements. They had been used 
by Senator De Klerk in parliament. De Klerk had said that Horne's 
statement that everyone must try to keep South Africa in the 
Commonwealth led to the 
undoing of intimidating stories that South Africa 
would be kicked out .... A Minister of External Affairs 
does not talk without the permission of his Premier 
and what Lord Horne said is the word of Britain. I 
don't know what new stories the monarchists will offer 
in an attempt to intimidate the people; South Africa 
will not be kicked out. 56 
On 29 August Verwoerd again addressed the question of 
Commonwealth membership in a speech to a special congress of the 
NP in Bloemfontein. He said that the government's ''honest and 
upright principle" was that South Africa would stay in the 
Commonwealth as long as the nature of the organisation remained 
such as to make it possible for the Union to remain. 57 He said 
he was "proud" of the English speakers who were in "increasing 
numbers" corning forward to declare thernsel ves in favour of a 
republic and reiterated that a republic would be the only means 
55 No.99, UK Mission to UNO, New York - UK High Commission, 
Ottawa, 23 September 1960. 
56 No.99A, E.J. Emery, Pretoria 
September 1960. 
57 Die Transvaler, 30 August 1960. 
R.G. Britten, CRO, 27 
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of achieving "true unity". He would not, however, apologise for 
the fact there were no English speakers in the cabinet and 
claimed that when his party was in opposition no Afrikaner 
nationalist had demanded representation in Smuts's cabinet. 
De Villiers Graaff replied to this by way of a special message 
to the readers of The Friend of Bloemfontein and claimed that 
Verwoerd's republic would jeopardise South Africa's Commonwealth 
membership, whatever Verwoerd said, and would place the country 
in danger of further international isolation at a crucial time 
in the Cold War. Voting "No" would, on the other hand, leave the 
question of Commonwealth membership open and make it possible to 
"amend" the decision later whereas a "Yes" vote would be 
irrevocable. 58 
A few days before the referendum Eric Louw took the London Times 
to task for criticising South Africa's handling of the South West 
African Mandate and for suggesting (in an article entitled "Theft 
of a Mandate" on 14 September) that the Nationalists had "stolen" 
extra seats in parliament by including the territory in general 
elections . 59 He also criticised it for "giving ammunition to 
South Africa's enemies" by saying the South West Africa issue was 
a "burning" one at the time and that it could lead to "awkward" 
questions at UNO if South Africa became a republic. The timing 
of the editorials, said Louw, was undoubtedly "also intended to 
influence the results of the republican referendum". He asked the 
Times whether an attack such as this on South African government 
policy by "Britain's leading newspaper" was an attempt to induce 
Commonwealth members to reject South Africa's future application 
to continue membership. 
The Natal Daily News pointed out, however, that was at issue, and 
what Louw was choosing to ignore in his flurry of belligerency 
was the implication of a constitutional change in South Africa 
58 The Friend, 30 August 1960. 
59 Natal Daily News, 30 September 1960. 
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on the international status of South West Africa. The status of 
the territory could change if South Africa left the Commonwealth 
and became a republic and this could in itself would provide a 
"fresh argument" for placing the territory under UN 
Trusteeship. 60 
Two days before the referendum the British high commission sent 
to the CRO in London a summarised report, without comment, of one 
of Verwoerd's last campaigning speeches in which he had said that 
when the time came South Africa's Commonwealth membership would 
be discussed in a "good, calm and reasoning manner'' because of 
the need for the Commonweal th "to keep its members together" . 61 
Verwoerd would "go personally" to put South Africa's case and 
there was no need to fear ''economic reprisals'' because of South 
Africa's strong economic position. There was also no danger of 
isolation because South Africa had "friends" in the UNO and no 
need to fear the creation of "Communist Con gos tans" on her 
borders. 
(c) The referendum results and black opinion 
As for the voteless majority, relegated to the role of angry 
onlookers, the ANC and the Congress Alliance in general set out 
in vain to try and persuade the white voters to reject the 
republic. Despite the official stance of rejection of the 
"fraudulent" nature of a "whites-only" referendum it was decided 
to try and distribute (illegally, by then, because of the recent 
bannings of the main liberation movements) pamphlets at public 
meetings urging whites to "Vote Against A Minority Republic" and 
declaring that South Africa could not afford to be "side-tracked" 
from the struggle of the voteless majority for equal rights. 62 
Voters were urged to say "no" to a "Verwoerd Republic" and "yes" 
60 Ibid. 
61 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No. lOOA, 3 October 1960. 
62 AD 2186 (ANC) ,H(a) (Pamphlets), H(a)l3, "Vote Against a 
Minority Republic", n.d. 
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to a multi-racial democracy. 
On 5 October the referendum was duly fought and won by the 
Nationalists, but only by a margin of 4% and with one province, 
Natal, remaining firmly monarchist. 63 Natal achieved a two thirds 
majority in favour of retaining the monarchy by 135,598 votes to 
42,299.M the voting figures indicated, to a large extent, the 
predicted split on language lines between Afrikaans and English. 
The results were described in a COD pamphlet as "fraudulent" 
because "Even among the three million Europeans, nearly half are 
opposed to the Nationalist Party, which got the barest majority" 
and "who ever heard of a referendum in which four-fifths of the 
public was debarred from the referendum?" 65 
The campaign had been essentially a dialogue between the white 
groups and the non-European population had been relegated to the 
role of interested (or disinterested) spectators.M Indian 
Opinion67 noted after the referendum that the non-Europeans "by 
and large, are not particularly interested whether South Africa 
is a republic or a monarchy, nor are they overmuch concerned 
whether South Africa will remain in the Commonwealth or will be 
compelled to leave it". But they had looked on "with some 
interest" at what was primarily a clash between "Boer and Briton" 
and what appeared to be a ''settling of scores'' between the two 
white groups. Whether South Africa remained in the Commonwealth 
or not, the position of the non-European people would "continue 
to deteriorate". 
The article went on to criticise Britain's historical role in 
m The official results according to Round Table (Vol.51, 
1960-61, p.81) were 850458 in favour of a republic and 775878 
against. 
M Miller, Survey, p.151. 
65 AD 2186 (ANC), H(a)l7, "In defence of South Africa", n.d. 
M Miller, Survey, p.151. 
~ Indian Opinion, 14 October 1960. 
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South Africa and stated that the non-European population would 
not ''shed a tear" for the loss of the British connection: 
On the occasion of this historic decision it might be 
recalled that it was the Liberal Government of 
Campbell-Bannerman which in 1910 approved of the 
Colour-Bar being written into the Constitution of 
Union, and since then successive Governments under the 
British Monarchy have supported the suppression of the 
non-White people by the White people here. So there is 
no need for any shedding of tears by the non-European 
for the loss of the British Connection. 
The "next question", continued the article, was the attitude of 
the non-white countries to the continued membership of South 
Africa in the Commonwealth. It was "almost certain• that 
Britain ... would do everything to keep South Africa in the 
Commonwealth for there were •vast British commercial and 
industrial interests in the country•. It would "not be 
surprising'' if she succeeded, in spite of Malaya and Ghana, 
because she could use the ''excuse" that if South Africa remains 
in, the members of the Commonwealth would be able to exercise 
some influence on her. Ultimately, however, black nationalism in 
South Africa would ''collide with White nationalism'' in order to 
resolve the situation. 
The response of the ANC to the result of the referendum was given 
in its official organ, Congress Voice, in November 1960. 68 
Despite the Nationalist victory in the referendum, the "people 
had to realise", it said, ''that victory over the Nationalist 
Republic" was a "practical proposition". It asked for a campaign 
"on all fronts" to unfold so that by the time the republican bill 
was introduced into parliament, the country would be in "a state 
of readiness for militant action" in every corner of South 
Africa. The slogan would be ''No Republic without the 
68 AD 2186 (ANC Collection), Box H (b) (Publications 
periodicals), Congress Voice, November 1960, p.2. 
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participation of our people", 11 No taxation without 
representation", "End all Pass Laws", "Lift the Ban on the ANC 
and PAC", etc. It asked for the campaign to reach its "highest 
pitch" between March and 31 May 1961 and ended with the call, "We 
will not allow a Fascist Republic.'' 
The battle had been lost before it had even begun, however, for 
disunity within the ranks of the black opposition and the lack 
of response by anti-republican whites to calls made by extra-
parliamentary organisations made any such forceful attempt to 
stop the republic virtually impossible to achieve in the face of 
Nationalist determination. The possibility remained, however, 
that by calling on the Afro-Asian nations to put pressure on the 
white Commonwealth countries, South Africa might be isolated in 
the Commonwealth or even expelled at the next prime ministers' 
conference scheduled for March 1961. The fate of such an appeal 
will be discussed in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 19: The 1961 Conference and South Africa's Withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth 
(al Introduction 
Once the referendum was over all eyes were focused on the 
question of South Africa's future application for membership of 
the Commonwealth as a republic. Putting aside all regrets at the 
defeat for the defenders of the monarchy in South Africa, Round 
Table and many other supporters of the Commonwealth connection 
now argued that membership of the Commonwealth should be 
automatic and that, as a republic, South Africa "should command 
in the Commonwealth as much sympathy and respect as were accorded 
at their inception to the republics of Ireland and India''·' If 
the continued membership were now to be debated it would not be 
because of the republic itself but because of the "conflict of 
social principles between South Africa and all the other 
countries of the Commonwealth". 
On 20 November Verwoerd had publicly declared his wish for South 
Africa to remain in the Commonwealth provided no humiliating 
conditions were attached, and he had accepted Macmillan's advice 
to refer the question to a March 1961 meeting of the prime 
ministers which he had said he himself would at tend. The 
question now was whether the disapproval of some statesmen would 
go so deep as to make them unable to approve South Africa's 
membership. Round Table pointed out that if the conference in 
March were to expel South Africa from the Commonwealth it would 
not be just the "National Government, or even the white 
electorate" that would be expelled but the "whole South African 
nation'', of which its ten million disfranchised non-whites were, 
"in the eyes of the Commonwealth at large ... , as fully members 
as any others". Once the Union was out, the possibility of using 
Commonwealth influence ''to help these" was gone. 
1 Round Table, Vol.51 (1960-61), No.201, December 1960, p.4. 
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What Round Table was forgetting, however, was the general context 
of South Africa's weakening Commonwealth ties before the events 
of 1961. Twelve years of Nationalist rule had seen a whittling 
away at the symbols of the British connection while the rise of 
African nationalism inside and outside of South Africa had driven 
English-speakers closer to the Nationalists on racial and foreign 
issues. Britain's changing place in the ranks of the world powers 
had hastened South Africa's exposure to the "harsh winds" of 
international reprobation. 2 Without the protective umbrella 
provided by Britain, increasing isolation for South Africa had 
resulted from her racial policies which were seen as 
irreconcilable with modern practices in the old Commonwealth as 
well as the new. As for the new Commonwealth, while Africa had 
been too weak to achieve a result at the 1960 conference, the 
year 1961 would see the situation completely transformed as more 
African states qualified for membership and South Africa was 
placed in the position of having to re-apply as a republic for 
membership. 3 
As Vale points out, the increase in membership changed the 
Commonwealth into a "genuinely multi-racial" and 
"intercontinental" organisation and with it external pressures 
had mounted on South Africa. More publicity and public concern 
surrounded prime ministers' meetings and the scrupulous concern 
of the past for non-interference in members' domestic policies 
was less important to the African members. Thus the environment 
at the 1961 meeting was not favourable to South Africa's 
continued membership in spite of the efforts made by Britain and 
Australia. 4 The Africans, on the other hand, were about to win 
their first 
Africa. 
major victory in the campaign to isolate South 
At the end of 1960, the British high commissioner in South 
2 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.395. 
3 Ibid., p.411. 
4 Ibid. , p. 412 . 
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Africa, John Maud, reviewed the difficult year for British-South 
African relations noting that: "Internationally, the Union is the 
most disliked and reviled country west of the Iron Curtain. "5 
South Africa had invited the opposition of the other members of 
the Commonwealth to its continued membership and it 
argue that "the Commonwealth would be better 
was easy to 
rid of so 
disreputable a member". Maud, however, still advised making every 
effort to keep South Africa in for the sake of keeping "faith'' 
with the loyal whites and the "inarticulate" non-European 
majority which needed Commonwealth friendship and encouragement 
and who could ''look elsewhere'' if abandoned by Britain and the 
rest. 6 
The British attitude was to be crucial to the question of whether 
the republic would be in or out of the Commonwealth. Both before 
and after the referendum this attitude to South Africa was based 
on a complex series of political, economic, military and cultural 
considerations. These factors interrelated in such a way as to 
produce a remarkably consistent overall policy stance that did 
not change much with successive administrations. By Macmillan's 
time that policy was firmly grounded on the premise of what 
later came to be called "Constructive Engagement", or the belief 
that by constantly encouraging the Nationalist government to 
remain engaged in dialogue through the medium of organisations 
such as the Commonwealth, that government would begin to moderate 
its apartheid policies and would remain within the western sphere 
of influence. 
This had been the approach before the republican referendum and 
it continued thereafter. It was made necessary by the history of 
close economic and political ties between the two countries -
ties which Britain could not afford to break by antagonising the 
apartheid government. But it led to a complex and difficult 
series of diplomatic manoeuvres for Macmillan's government as it 
5 Ibid., p.413. 
6 Ibid. , p. 414. 
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tried to balance Britain's interests in Africa and Asia with 
those in South Africa. And, inevitably, as we have seen, it led 
to the alienation of those in South Africa who counted upon 
Britain to support their struggle against the minority 
government. 
Towards the end of 1959 British officials in the high commission 
in Cape Town had drawn up a guidance memorandum on policy towards 
South Africa that contained a revealing summary of ''pros• and 
"cons" concerning the value to Britain of a continuing 
Commonwealth relationship with South Africa. The memorandum was 
entitled "The Union, Asset or Liability to the Commonwealth, What 
does it cost us?", and it had been prepared initially for the 
high commissioner, Maud, in anticipation of questions during 
talks with a party from the Industrial Development Corporation 
in August 1959. 7 It was a summary of British assessments of the 
economic and political value of South Africa's Commonweal th 
membership. Divided into four columns headed: "What do we gain?", 
"What does it cost us?", "What do we lose by a break?" and "What 
do we gain by a break?", it analysed the British-South African 
relationship in categories of trade, finance, defence and general 
factors. The overall picture was one of important financial and 
trading losses that could be incurred if South Africa were to 
leave the Commonwealth, although in defence and foreign affairs 
the losses were compensated to some extent by the advantage of 
being rid of a cause of "embarrassment" in UNO. 
It was noted that Britain would lose ''an established link with 
a potential friend" and would be "deserting the English- speaking 
South Africans•. It could also mean "the first step in the break-
up of the Commonwealth". Concerning the high commission 
territories, the memorandum noted that Britain would lose 
"freedom of access'' and that there could be a loss of trade for 
7 PRO, DO 119,File 1206, No.10, Brief on forthcoming visit 
of Prime Minister to South Africa, Memorandum for High 
Commissioner, "The Union, Asset or Liability to the Commonwealth, 
What does it cost us?", August 1959. 
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the territories. '' 
A summary under the same headings followed for South Africa's 
gains and losses which stated that for trade and finance, South 
Africa would gain freedom from imperial preference (enabling her 
to "horse trade on the world market"), and freedom from sterling 
if she "chose". On defence, South Africa would lose a "flow of 
information" and "special treatment" over weapons development and 
might have to choose a "less welcome partner". On the other hand 
South Africa would gain independence in defence matters. On 
foreign affairs she would lose her "last outpost of support in 
UNO", sources of information and the Commonwealth prime 
ministers' forum but would gain freedom to follow her ambitions 
and to "hit back" at her detractors and opponents without 
reference to the rules. As far as the territories were concerned, 
South Africa would lose British co-operation and possibly some 
trade whereas she would gain "a better position to get a 
stranglehold". 
As far as economic advantages for South Africa of leaving the 
Commonwealth were concerned, the British memorandum had touched 
upon a 
African 
factor which was not often stated publicly by South 
officials and ministers but which was nonetheless 
something of an potential inducement to cut Commonwealth links 
or to be less concerned about breaking these links than might 
otherwise have been the case. The UP parliamentary opposition 
might harp upon the economic disasters that could follow the 
withdrawal of Commonweal th preferential tariffs or the 
termination of sterling area co-operation but the other side of 
the argument was the potential expansion of South African export 
markets, the greater 
sources of capital, 
freedom of choice 
as well as the 
concerning imports and 
greater freedom which 
governments would gain to protect and promote strategic military 
and industrial sectors of the economy. It would facilitate what 
one commentator has called the "reorientation of foreign 
relations away from metropoles [Britain] and towards neighbours 
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[the protectorates and the sub- saharan region as a whole] "8 . In 
other words, the potential for South African capitalist expansion 
and hegemony in the southern African region would be greatly 
enhanced. In a similar way, opportunities for the Nationalist 
government to act more aggressively in the political field in the 
context of regional coercion and control (as B. J. Vorster's 
"Outward Policy soon demonstrated), would be expanded. 9 
It was with these and other considerations in mind that 
Macmillan's government had approached the discussions in May of 
1960 and the question of Commonwealth membership for South Africa 
as a republic after the October referendum. At all times 
Macmillan's policy was informed by the overriding concern to keep 
South Africa in the Commonwealth. That much is certain from his 
memoirs and from much of the commentary on the course of events 
which has emerged since 1961. Ultimately, however, when faced 
with the possibility of a split in the Commonwealth, he was to 
jettison South Africa. British interests in Asia and Africa as 
well as considerations of national prestige demanded that the 
Commonwealth be maintained intact, despite the loss of such an 
important member as South Africa. At the same time, however, the 
loss was to be cushioned by the negotiation of agreements in the 
economic, defence, financial and immigration fields, agreements 
which were seen by both governments as mutually beneficial but 
which were hotly criticised by South Africa's non-white majority 
and left-wing opinion overseas. 
There seems to be a consensus of opinion that Verwoerd was 
genuine in his commitment to try and keep South Africa in the 
Commonwealth although there were some, like the opposition 
leader, De Villiers Graaff, who claimed immediately after the 
8 M.M. Sejanamane and T.M Shaw, "Continuing Crisis: Regional 
Coercion, Co-operation and Contradiction in Southern Africa", in 
Z.A. Konczacki, J.L. Parpart and T.M. Shaw (eds), Studies in the 
Economic History of Southern Africa, Vol. II, South Africa. 
Lesotho and Swaziland, p. 261. 
9 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp. 423-
425. 
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withdrawal that Verwoerd had "gambled recklessly" with South 
Africa's Commonweal th membership. 10 
J.D.B. Miller believes that Verwoerd was sincere about wanting 
South Africa to stay in the Commonwealth after becoming a 
republic and that his approach both before and after the 
referendum was "consistent"." This view is supported by writers 
such as Geyser and Geldenhuys. The recent commentaries by J.R.T. 
Wood, Peter Lyon and others, while not disputing the motivation 
of Verwoerd, reserve an opinion on the question as to whether he 
was ultimately responsible or not for the withdrawal because of 
his intransigence. What is clear from all accounts is that 
Verwoerd was at all times aware that his domestic policies would 
cause a reaction at the conference and that if there were to be 
a case of "unacceptable interference" in South Africa's affairs, 
he would value South Africa's sovereignty and honour above 
Commonwealth membership. His statements and attitude after the 
conference seem to confirm this view and to cast doubt on the 
depth of his commitment to Commonwealth membership. After all, 
the whole political and ideological background of Verwoerd' s 
career had been anti-British and anti-Commonwealth. He had only 
aligned himself with the idea of a republic inside the 
Commonweal th, "almost against his better judgment", 12 because of 
the practicalities of the situation and the realisation that 
leaving the Commonwealth would not be acceptable to a large part 
of the population. 
As for the attitudes of the other prime ministers at the 1961 
conference, much nas been said about the roles of Diefenbaker as 
opponent of South Africa, Menzies as the only "friend" of 
Verwoerd and the "implacable" Afro-Asians: Nkrumah, Balewa (of 
Nigeria) , the Tunku (of Malaya) , Bandaranaika (of Ceylon) , Khan 
(of Pakistan) and Nehru. The roles of the Afro-Asians and 
10 Round Table, Vol.51, No.203, June 1961, p.238. 
11 Miller, Survey, pp.150-151. 
11 Geyser, Watershed, p.98. 
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Diefenbaker, in particular, have been heavily emphasised, in a 
negative manner, by South African Nationalist opinion . 13 Non-
white opinion, on the other hand, highlighted the roles of 
Nehru and Nkrumah as the prime movers in getting the hated regime 
"expelled" from the conference. Macmillan blamed Verwoerd, the 
Afro-Asians and Diefenbaker in that order, and regarded Menzies 
as a staunch ally. 14 There have been reassessments of these 
portrayals in recent years and, in particular, that of J R.T. 
Wood, whose article has thrown some extra light on the roles of 
the three important personalities, Verwoerd, Macmillan and 
Diefenbaker. 15 
It is necessary to look in greater detail at the developments 
after the referendum and the events of the conference itself in 
order to obtain a clearer perspective on the aims and motives of 
the principal players and of the causes of South Africa's 
withdrawal. Wood's account, supplemented by the accounts of other 
historians, press reports and Macmillan's memoirs would offer a 
picture which, while confirming the view held by most 
commentators that South Africa's policies made it impossible for 
that country's Commonwealth membership to continue, also makes 
it clear that her withdrawal was by no means inevitable and was 
not expected by virtually anyone before and during the 
conference. Only Verwoerd and Louw seemed to have been prepared 
for that eventuality. 
(b) Pre-conference opinion: The debate inside South Africa. 
During debate on the Republic of South Africa Amendment bill in 
13 D.W. Kruger, for example, says that Verwoerd's application 
for membership was " ... opposed by the Afro-Asian members, 
supported by the Prime Minister of Canada, Mr John Diefenbaker" 
and his decision to withdraw was greeted ''with relish" by the 
Afro-Asian group and by the ''gleeful Diefenbaker• (Making of a 
Nation, pp.334-335). 
~Macmillan, Pointing the Way, pp.290-305. 
15 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
pp.161-178. 
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January and February of 1961, De Villiers Graaff and Steytler had 
tried to introduce amendments to the bill that would, in the eyes 
of their respective parties, have guaranteed Commonwealth 
membership after becoming a republic. The amendments included 
(from the Progressive Party side) reforms such as broadening the 
franchise and postponing the republic until a better climate was 
in place for making a Commonwealth membership application. But 
Verwoerd dismissed them out of hand as attempts to stop the 
introduction of the republic by "making demands which they know 
to be impossible" . 16 
He said the government's mandate had been that "South Africa, 
when it becomes a republic, wants to remain a member of the 
Commonwealth". He would do his "best" to achieve that and if he 
succeeded he would ensure South Africa remained in the 
Commonwealth "as long as the Commonwealth remains what it is". 
If it tried to interfere in internal affairs of member states 
then South Africa would not remain. 17 But, he went on, if the 
Commonwealth refused membership to South Africa or stated 
membership would be granted subject to "humiliating conditions" 
then South Africa would become a republic outside the 
Commonwealth. 
During the second reading debate he said that in the past the 
Nationalists had not recognised Commonwealth membership as one 
of the "characteristics of a Republic of South Africa" . 18 But 
"recently" it had been realised by them that just as the republic 
was "deeply engraved" in the hearts of the Afrikaans people, so 
was Commonwealth membership "deeply engraved" in the hearts of 
the English-speaking community. The Afrikaners did not come to 
that realisation out of any concern for the "material" benefits 
of Commonwealth membership, which were in any case "not as great 
as some people would profess" but more out of a desire to assist 
16 House of Assembly Debates, col.25, 23 January 1961. 
17 Ibid., col.25, 23 January 1961. 
18 Ibid., col.327, 23 January 1961. 
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in ''welding us together into one nation in the new republic''. 19 
He then went on to appeal for unity in the new republic and 
suggested that he might take English speakers into the Cabinet 
if they were to join the National Party as a demonstration of 
national unity. 20 De Villiers Graaff 's answer to Verwoerd 
concentrated mainly on the Commonwealth membership question and 
on the lack of guarantees that the republic would be in the 
Commonwealth. He also attacked Verwoerd's intimation that 
Commonwealth membership was one of the ''sacrifices• made by the 
Nationalists in order to achieve their republic, noting that this 
made the opposition even more wary of the sincerity of the 
government in its desire to remain in. 21 
He also questioned Verwoerd's statement that he could not give 
guarantees concerning Commonwealth membership because it would 
give other countries the right of veto over South Africa and the 
right to interfere in South Africa's affairs. This he should have 
thought of before he introduced legislation for the republic, 
said De Villiers Graaff. What was more important to Verwoerd, the 
advantages of Commonwealth membership or the introduction of a 
republic •for sentimental reasons?", he asked. 22 
De Villiers Graaff stressed, further, the opposition of the 
coloured population to any attempt to withdraw from the 
Commonwealth and was supported by one of the coloured people's 
representatives, A. Bloomberg, who remarked that the government, 
by excluding the coloureds and •11 million non-whites• from the 
referendum vote, had demonstrated to the outside world "it had 
no intention whatsoever of paying any heed to the wishes of the 
20 Ibid., col.332, 30 January 1961. 
21 House of Assembly Debates, col. 352, 3 0 January 1961. 
22 Ibid., col.353, 30 January 1961. 
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non-Whites". 23 
Verwoerd replied that he believed "common sense" would triumph 
at the conference (in March) and that South Africa would remain 
a member. He would do all that he could short of compromising his 
principles and ''only prejudice and unjustifiable interference'' 
would keep South Africa out. 24 As for the coloureds, he said that 
if he had allowed them to vote it would not have made much 
difference to the voting figures and in any case they were more 
concerned with "bread and butter'' issues than a republic.~ He 
had made it clear from the beginning it would be a whites-only 
decision as the whole issue was between English and Afrikaans 
South Africans anyway. It would be a mistake to bring in the non-
whites as ''arbiters• on the issue.a 
A somewhat fiery speech by the UP member for South Coast, Douglas 
Mitchell, was reported in February in which Mitchell tried to 
make a ''last ditch stand'' for Natal over the republic. He had 
said that Natal would "refuse to accept" the republic. 27 Natal 
would be compelled to obey the new constitution, he had said, but 
''we shall seek the first opportunity to make our own laws''. From 
then on Natal would consider that it was being ruled by force and 
without its consent: "I can speak for Natal and say that we have 
got political unity in the province such as we have not enjoyed 
for 25 years''. But the time had come when Natal had to say it 
would not accept the republic and was not willing to assist in 
bringing it into being. 
De Villiers Graaff had been questioned by Die Transvaler 
23 Ibid., col.28, 23 January 1961. 
24 Ibid., cols.1039-1040, 9 February 1961. 
25 Ibid 
--· 
26 Ibid., col.1041, 9 February 1961. 
27 Digest of South African Affairs, Vol.8, No. 4, 17 February 
1961, p.7. 
434 
concerning these remarks and was reported to have said he 
understood the Natal desire to bring about amendments to the 
constitution that would contribute to "real unity" in South 
Africa although he admitted that once the republic had been 
brought about it could not be undone.a Mitchell's statements 
were further repudiated by the Rand Daily Mail and by three 
Progressive Party MPs who described them as "fatuous and 
melodramatic" . 29 
The position of the 
membership was seen, 
UP over the republic and Commonweal th 
by some, to be rather weak and based, 
ironically, largely on the premise that Verwoerd would be proved 
wrong at the conference. This was pointed out in an article in 
the East London Daily Despatch in early February. The Daily 
Despatch said that success for Verwoerd at the conference could 
"seal the fate of the UP" because the Commonwealth issue was "De 
Villiers Graaff' s only platform" . 30 The "irony" was that the 
United Party, which fought so vigorously against the 
establishment of the republic could only benefit from a decision 
to exclude South Africa from the Commonwealth. Despite the 
"efforts of Macmillan and Sandys", membership was not yet assured 
and the UP could claim "with some justification'' that if it were 
the government, better terms could be obtained for South Africa. 
However, if South Africa were accepted at the conference the UP 
would be left without "a vote-catching slogan". Many of its 
supporters would then defect to the Nationalists. 
Speaking on behalf of the voteless majority (but not necessarily 
the ANC) , 31 Indian Opinion, on the other hand, was predicting 
28 Ibid., pp. 7-8. 
29 Reported in "Press Comment, Diqest of South African 
Affairs, Vol.8, No. 4, 17 February 1961, p.14. 
w East London Daily Despatch, 7 February 1961. 
31 Indian Opinion was regarded as being in reactionary, 
"bourgeois" hands by Brian Bunting, author of an article in New 
Age, the COD journal. (See Part 3, The Strijdom Years, chapter 
12, p.281, n.37). 
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that the decision as to whether or not South Africa would be 
readmitted would depend "more on economic considerations than on 
principles of equity". 32 The "immense British investments" in 
South Africa would make sure the British tried to persuade the 
others to allow South Africa to stay. Afro-Asian prime ministers 
did not seem to be committing themselves which "shows they might 
not object to Verwoerd's racial republic remaining in the 
Commonwealth". 
The British reason for trying to keep South Africa in, continued 
Indian Opinion, was that leaving the Commonwealth would hurt the 
non-whites more than the whites, but, "whatever their reasons", 
it was clear that non-Europeans had "always suffered in South 
Africa even while in the Commonwealth and Britain has not been 
able to do anything". Verwoerd was going to the conference in a 
defiant mood and not "as a supplicant" and would only stay on his 
terms. The other prime ministers would not be able to move 
Verwoerd ''one iota'' from his course and only economic measures 
in the form of loss of preferences would "succeed where 
principles failed". In that case the public would rather be told 
that it was out of concern for the "profits of British and other 
investors" in South Africa rather than concern for the non-whites 
that motivated the efforts to keep South Africa in. 
This, then, was the state of opinion in South Africa before the 
conference began. While it is probably true to say that most 
white South Africans hoped that South Africa would be allowed to 
stay in the Commonwealth without too many conditions being 
attached to that membership, 33 the attitude of non-whites would 
have been almost directly opposite. The banned ANC and its 
Congress Alliance associates called for the expulsion of the 
n Indian Opinion, 3 March 1961. 
33 The Cape Times of 10 February 1961 had stated that it 
agreed with Verwoerd that South Africa could not accept any sort 
of "probationary" membership of the Commonwealth because if it 
were accepted it would mean the Commonwealth prime ministers' 
conference had "taken over supervision of the political morals 
of member states". 
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republic from the Commonwealth and at the same time embarked on 
a campaign to oppose the introduction of the "racist republic". 
Noting that years of Commonwealth membership had not mitigated 
the suffering of the majority to any extent, on the eve of the 
conference Albert Luthuli appealed for expulsion to mark 
international disavowal of the apartheid ''mania''.N As for the 
PAC, it declared itself to be unambiguously opposed to South 
Africa's membership and declared satisfaction after the 
conference that she had been forced out. 35 At the same time the 
PAC opposed the ANC call for a general strike against the 
introduction of the republic in May 1961, arguing that the change 
from a monarchical to a republican constitution was irrelevant 
to the sufferings of the black majority. 
(c) The economic debate 
A large part of the debate between government and opposition in 
South Africa on the Commonwealth connection and the republican 
application centred on the possible economic consequences of 
South Africa having to leave the Commonwealth. The United Party 
had a vested interest politically in claiming there would be a 
serious possible losses, 
to show that there would 
implications had been 
while the Nationalists were concerned 
be a minimum of damage. The political 
particularly important before the 
referendum and the British government had tried, not very 
successfully, to avoid damaging the United Party's anti-
republican campaign by ordering British officials not to make 
statements implying that economic relations would remain the same 
whether South Africa stayed in or departed from the 
Commonweal th. 36 
The Nationalists, after the republican victory, could claim with 
34 Reported in The Daily Worker (London) , 9 March 1961. 
35 AD 2186 (ANC Collection) , Box H (b) Publications 
periodicals, No.17, "Mafube", May 1961. 
36 See pp. 335-339. 
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greater confidence that there would be little change to the 
economic relationship because, they argued, Britain would not 
throw away such a valuable trading relationship. In any case, the 
economic preferences were bilateral agreements outside the 
Commonwealth ambit and could be continued if both sides were 
willing. There were the precedents of Burma and Ireland to 
support their point of view. 37 
During the budget debate on 15 March when the final decision on 
membership had not yet been communicated to parliament, the 
minister of finance, T.E. Donges, noted that he had drafted the 
budget on two assumptions: that South Africa would remain in the 
Commonwealth and that even if she were to be expelled it would 
not necessitate the estimates having to be changed.Y 
He quoted the brother of the leader of the opposition, the 
economist Jan Graaff, who had said that the economic consequences 
of severing the Commonwealth relationship would be "none at all" 
and he argued that trade preferences were bilateral agreements 
which the United Kingdom was unlikely to cancel. It had not done 
so in the cases of Ireland and Burma and such agreements were 
"not in conflict with GATT". Similarly, membership of the 
sterling area was not dependent on Commonwealth membership as 
countries such as Ireland were still members while Canada was a 
member of the Commonwealth but not of the sterling area. The 
capital flows from the United Kingdom to South Africa could 
continue unhindered or those more recently from South Africa to 
Britain. 
Opponents of the Nationalist view argued that the preferences 
would not automatically be extended after withdrawal. Sir Arnold 
Plant, professor of commerce at the London School of Economics, 
had said in 1960 that there would be great resistance from GATT 
to Britain extending preferences to a non-Commonwealth country 
37 House of Assembly Debates, col.1188, 13 February 1961. 
38 Ibid., col.2998, 15 March 1961. 
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(in the event of South Africa leaving) and would probably refuse 
to allow it. 39 Commonweal th preferences were acceptable to GATT 
but the extension of preferences to countries outside the system 
was outlawed unless this measure led to the creation of a customs 
union. 
Round Table argued that although South Africa would remain in 
the sterling area she would ''no longer participate in its loose 
system of management that was confined to the Commonwealth 
members of the Area". She would lose her "privileged access" to 
the London capital market which still provided a high proportion 
of South Africa's development capital. She "might forfeit her 
imperial preferences", and although the value of these 
preferences had declined since the 1930's half of South Africa's 
commodity exports still went to Commonwealth countries and she 
received preferences in some of them. Almost one third of her 
exports went to the United Kingdom which gave her preferences 
averaging almost 10% over non-Commonwealth competitors in a wide 
range of commodities including fresh and tinned fruit, fish and 
wattle products, maize, "kaffir corn" and asbestos. It was 
estimated that those preferences applied to about 60% of her 
exports to the UK or 20% of her total commodity exports. "These 
are facts that even a Nationalist Government cannot afford to 
ignore". 40 
The Nationalists claimed, however, that preferences were more 
valuable to the British than to South Africa and that in any case 
they were declining in importance and that South Africa could not 
base her economy on them. Verwoerd had said that he was 
determined to diversify South Africa's export markets and that 
trade missions would be sent out to Europe, the Far East and the 
Americas. 41 
39 Pretoria News, 5 August 1960. 
~Round Table, Vol.51, No.197., August 1960, p.369. 
41 Quoted in Geyser, Watershed, p. 73. 
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The British view of the value of preferences and other economic 
connections was given in the memorandum of 1959 in preparation 
for Macmillan's visit. 42 On trade, for example, it gave figures 
for British, Commonwealth and world exports and imports to and 
from South Africa and noted that imperial preference was worth 
"about £2m annually to Britain (on £187m of total British exports 
to South Africa). Under the heading: "What does it cost us?", it 
noted that imperial preference cost Britain an "occasional 
conflict of choice over buying their [South African] goods or 
other Commonwealth goods". Britain gave imperial preference of 
£6m annually on South African imports of £106m, which included 
a subsidy on sugar worth £2.5m. What would affect Britain were 
there to be a break with South Africa would be South Africa 
possibly turning to foreign suppliers, because there was "little 
trade sentiment'' left. But there remained the ''strong bait" of 
preferences on wine, fruits and sugar and without these there 
would be the urge to sell Britain less "and selling elsewhere 
leads to buying elsewhere''. What would be gained from a break 
would be "freedom of movement on wine" and "no worry about a 
contracted supplier". 
On "finance", however, the costs for Britain of a break were seen 
to be much higher because of the danger of a possible 
''nationalisation" of Britain's substantial investments in South 
Africa, as well as the weakening of the sterling area if South 
Africa were to leave. Britain had £900m invested in South Africa 
of which £600m was "private". London handled all of South 
Africa's gold sales which gave Britain a "useful commission". 
Britain maintained a close liaison with the South African central 
bank and South Africa's gold was a "source of strength" to the 
sterling area. Also, South Africa maintained a favourable balance 
of trade with the non-sterling area that helped the general 
balance of trade of the sterling area as a whole. On the other 
hand, British investment in South Africa was to a certain extent 
42 PRO, DO 119, File 1206, No.10, Brief on Macmillan's visit, 
"The Union, Asset or Liability to the Commonwealth: What does it 
cost us?", Memorandum for the High Commissioner, August 1959. 
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"at the expense" of other Commonwealth areas, particularly when 
it concerned ''official loans''. As for semi-official loans, the 
memorandum noted that South Africa, drew £lm more out the 
Commonwealth Development Finance Corporation than she put in. 
In the immediate aftermath of withdrawal from the Commonwealth 
the economic debate grew more urgent as it had not yet become 
clear whether Britain would sign new agreements with South Africa 
on preference and other matters. On 22 March Helen Suzman for the 
Progressives brought up the question of economic uncertainty in 
the context of the Railways and Harbours vote, pointing out that 
no one could predict what ''pressure is going to be brought to 
bear on Britain by other Commonwealth countries with whom we 
compete for markets" . 43 Fifty percent of South Africa's exports 
went to the Commonwealth, she argued, yet no one could know what 
the future of South Africa's trade relations would be after the 
withdrawal. 
no longer 
Boycotts in 
could the 
Africa and elsewhere were mounting and 
loophole label of "Product of the 
Commonwealth" be used to disguise South Africa's manufactures. 
The Nationalist member for Paarl, W.C. Malan, then criticised the 
opposition for harping on the value of preferences in the United 
Kingdom for deciduous fruit, some 65% of which was sent to that 
country, and suggested instead that more effort should be made 
to break away from the "colonial mentality" concerning exports 
to Britain and that markets in Europe should be developed as an 
alternative. 44 
The minister for economic affairs, Dr N. Diederichs, came into 
the debate on 27 March to rebut opposition accusations of 
economic damage as a result of withdrawal and stressed again the 
contractual and bilateral nature of preferences not only with 
Britain but with other countries like Canada.~ In respect of the 
~House of Assembly Debates, col.3415, 22 March 1961. 
44 Ibid., col. 3459, 22 March 1961. 
~Ibid., col.3723-3725, 27 March 1961. 
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latter he quoted his Canadian counterpart who had said that 
Canadian-South African preferences dated from the Ottawa 
agreements of 1932 and were terminable with 6 months notice by 
either party but that Canada •sells more goods to South Africa 
than we buy from them". 46 The time was "not too far distant", 
he predicted, when Britain would be forced to abandon preferences 
altogether as a result of pressure from the European Economic 
Community or GATT. 
The Financial Times of London had virtually confirmed the 
Nationalist argument on 16 March, the day of South Africa's 
withdrawal, when it said preferences and bilateral ties would 
continue. 47 The precedents of Ireland and Burma would hold and 
Whitehall was ''determined to restrict any other effects of the 
break" and assumed that present arrangements would continue. The 
reason was that "English South Africans had to have continued 
access'' economically and that also the protectorates could not 
be lost. Just less than one third of South Africa's exports and 
just under one quarter of its imports were to and from Britain 
in 1959. 50.6% of her exports went to the Commonwealth as a whole 
and 46. 6% of her imports were supplied by those countries. 
Although some countries might break bilateral economic ties the 
volume of trade was "so small" in those cases that it was not 
important. 
As we shall see, these assessments proved to be completely 
accurate for after a brief period of uncertainty the British 
government embarked on a policy of maintaining its economic ties 
with South Africa virtually unchanged, ignoring criticisms from 
the Labour opposition and anti-apartheid forces that it was 
nullifying all the effects of South Africa's exclusion from the 
Commonwealth. 
The debate between government and opposition in South Africa over 
46 Ibid., col.3723, 27 March 1961. 
~ Financial Times, 16 March, 1961. 
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the economic effects of South Africa's withdrawal had been 
further contextualised by the British moves to join the EEC in 
the late 1950's and by the establishment of the European Free 
Trade Agreement (EFTA) by Britain and the Scandinavian countries 
in 1959. 48 South Africa approached the formation of the EEC with 
a British perspective because of her close ties with Britain 
economically and tended to adopt a ''wait-and-see'' attitude 
concerning British negotiations after 1957. 8 This did not stop 
her, together with other Commonwealth countries, from expressing 
great concern over the possible effects on imperial preference 
and access of agricultural goods in particular to the British 
market, which the EEC's general tariff would have. In 1957 Eric 
Lauw represented South Africa at the special Commonwealth 
economic conference in July 1957, and joined the other 
Commonwealth countries in expressing unanimous concern that if 
Britain joined EEC the Commonwealth preferences would lapse and 
adversely affect their agricultural products' access to that 
country.m For its part the British government was reluctant to 
inform the others of the progress and aims of negotiations with 
the EEC and remained unsure whether to commit Britain 
wholeheartedly to the EEC, preferring initially to set up a free 
trade area rather than a political and economic union. This 
uncertainty had an adverse effect both on Britain and on the 
Commonwealth's confidence in her and in 1961 Edward Heath's 
secret discussions with the council of ministers where he 
presented his application for Britain amplified this distrust. 
Commonwealth pressure led Britain to place more value on the 
Commonwealth preferences than on the European market at first but 
the Six claimed the effects of an enlarged European market would 
benefit Commonwealth producers. However, South Africa shared the 
48 P. Kapp, "Suid-Afrika en die Ontstaan van die Europese 
Ekonomiese Gemeenskap", Historia, Vol.37, No.2., November 1992, 
pp.86-97. 
49 Ibid., pp. 87-88. 
so Ibid., p.88. 
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fears of the others that the general tariff would shut out 
important sugar (80% tariff), fruit, wine and canned vegetables 
and grapes, and all processed products in particular. Other 
agricultural products were unprocessed and therefore free of 
duty. Minerals and ores were only subject to a 3% tariff and 
were therefore not affected to the same degree. Manufactured 
goods which were not a major part of her exports also had high 
tariffs applied to them. Nevertheless the wine and sugar 
industries approached the problem seriously after 1961 noting 
there was a 12-year adjustment clause during which the external 
tariff would be applied in stages . 51 
After 1958 Britain realised the EEC would not compromise on its 
aims and that attempts to persuade the Six to adopt a free trade 
area rather than a customs union (with external tariff) had 
failed. So she negotiated with the Scandinavian countries to set 
up EFTA52 which allowed 90% of Commonwealth preferences to remain 
and did not have a general external tariff. Agricultural products 
were cut out of the Stockholm agreement. Nevertheless in practice 
Commonwealth countries had to share the preferential access to 
Britain now with Scandinavian countries and were not entitled to 
the same in Scandinavia. It affected South Africa's wattle and 
box-wood exports in particular. 53 
But Britain realised the EFTA experiment had failed as the EEC 
continued to grow at a faster rate than the EFTA economies and 
so began again to negotiate for admission to the EEC. This 
provided the context to the uncertainties experienced by many 
Commonwealth countries about the future of the Commonwealth 
preferences. In South Africa the possibility of withdrawal from 
the Commonwealth was to provide something of an incentive to the 
government and many industries most likely to be affected by the 
loss of preferences to start searching for alternative markets. 
51 Ibid., p. 89. 
52 Ibid. , p. 90. 
53 Ibid., p. 90. 
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The diversification of South Africa's import and export markets 
had been an aspect of Nationalist policy for years prior to 
withdrawal. 
(d) The withdrawal conference 
Between October 1960 and March 1961 a flurry of background 
diplomacy conducted by Macmillan and Menzies seemed to have 
resulted in a situation which, in the eyes of Macmillan and many 
others, guaranteed South Africa's future membership of the 
Commonweal th. 54 Verwoerd had indicated to Macmillan that he would 
attend the prime ministers' conference in March and that he would 
not dispute the membership of Cyprus if criticised by the others. 
He would not, however, "bargain" over Commonwealth membership by 
succumbing to pressure to adopt reformist policies at home. 
Diefenbaker, although displaying a "holier-than thou" attitude 
(according to Macmillan) had been asked not to take a position 
before the conference began. 55 Nkrumah and the Tunku had 
indicated they would not force the issue. 56 Menzies remained 
Macmillan's "and indeed, South Africa's, steadiest ally". He had 
agreed before the 1961 conference to persuade New Zealand and 
Canada to avoid a crisis.fl 
Macmillan and Menzies wanted to establish the convention that 
constitutional changes were a "domestic matter" that would lead, 
as for South Africa's case, to "automatic renewal". 58 
Subsequently when Macmillan and Menzies put the idea to Verwoerd, 
he agreed. Macmillan then appealed to Nehru for restraint and was 
pleased with the response. Indian Opinion reported on 25 November 
54 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 297. 
55 Ibid., p.295. 
56 Ibid., p.293. 
57 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.164. 
58 Ibid. , p. 16 5 . 
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1960 that opinion in New Delhi was inclined to the view that 
any expulsion of South 
might close what is, 
political channel left 
Africa from the Commonwealth 
perhaps, the most effective 
through which South Africa can 
be reached and influenced and would render untenable 
the British position in the Protectorates of 
Basutoland and Swaziland and perhaps even 
Bechuanaland. It would add to the isolation of the 
African people in South Africa and might affect the 
nature and purpose of the Commonwealth. 59 
To Macmillan, then, South Africa's membership seemed assured by 
the end of 1960.w He stated in his memoirs that he had all along 
been determined to "make every effort to keep South Africa in the 
Commonwealth" . 6 ' It was "unfair" use of the procedural point to 
refuse republican membership on the basis of domestic policy and 
South Africa would not change anyway. If others felt it necessary 
to expel South Africa for this it should be at a special meeting 
with "due solemnity". By keeping South Africa in, pressure could 
be put on her to change. Any "trivial" concession from Verwoerd, 
Macmillan said, would have been accepted with relief. 62 Verwoerd, 
however, had made it clear he was not going to change his 
policies to suit the Commonwealth and had already told Macmillan 
as much in the letter of 24 October.m 
J.D.B. Miller's account of the 1961 conference begins with 
Verwoerd's parting message when he left for London, saying that 
he would not allow his feelings towards Britain and the British 
59 Indian Opinion, 25 November 1960. 
w Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.165. 
61 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.292. 
62 Ibid., p.297. 
63 b. d 
.L.1.._., p.291. 
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people to be influenced by "groups consisting of ignorant persons 
and inexpert fanatics" (referring to the British demonstrators 
against apartheid) .M But, as Miller points out, the antagonism 
towards South Africa was not just confined to the young, the 
fanatical and those on the extreme left of the political spectrum 
in Britain. There was a 
broad band of feeling ... which rejected the idea of 
continued connection with South Africa, for what were 
considered to be good and sufficient British reasons -
those associated with a liberal political system, a 
rejection of colour bars, and a conviction that the 
Commonwealth would work better without South Africa. 65 
Even conservative newspapers such as the Times and Economist were 
also calling South Africa's continued partnership with the rest 
of the Commonwealth "a gross anomaly" or an "implacable 
contradiction".u The Labour Party and trade union movement was 
declaring in favour of expulsion67 unless Verwoerd committed 
himself to the abandonment of apartheid, and had organised 
massive protest rallies to greet Verwoerd on his arrival in 
London. 
For British policy-makers it seemed, before the conference began, 
that British policy in Africa hung "in the balance" between 
success and failure. South Africa's failure to change its racial 
policies was the most severe obstacle to success. 68 In direct 
contrast to the difficulties in southern and central Africa was 
the success of the queen's visit to India in early March. It had 
M Miller, Survey, p.152. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Daily Telegraph, 6 March 1961. 
68 Miller, Survey, p .153. 
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symbolised the smoothness of post-independence relations with 
India and the fact that much of this was owed to India's 
remaining within the Commonwealth. 
It was hoped that relations with Nigeria, the biggest of 
Britain's African colonies, would be just as smooth. Nigeria had 
just gained independence and would be represented for the first 
time at a Commonwealth conference, while Sierra Leone and 
Tanganyika were on the verge of attaining independence as well. 
On the other hand, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was 
in a critical phase after the Monckton report had intimated the 
possibility of a break-up. Nevertheless there was some confidence 
that constitutional advance there would continue. 
This was the problem facing Macmillan and Sandys before the 
conference began. Both wanted South Africa in the Commonwealth 
and both were committed to rapid advance in Africa and the 
enlargement of the Commonwealth by African members. They were 
also aware of the anti-apartheid feelings in Britain and while 
they themselves rejected apartheid, they knew of the "close 
connections between the British and South African economies".• 
What line, asks Miller, were the British to take? 
Miller concludes that the British line was to condemn apartheid 
forcefully so as to win the support of the other prime ministers 
and then to persuade them to retain South Africa in the 
Commonweal th. 70 The constitutional issue would be disposed of 
first and then there would be debate on South Africa's policies. 
This tactic would depend on the others' willingness to realise 
that using South Africa's racial policies as a reason to force 
her out would expose themselves to the same possible situation 
perhaps for other reasons in future. "The principle of domestic 
jurisdiction could be sustained if members were convinced of the 
dangers to themselves of its being breached in South Africa's 
•Ibid., p.154. 
70 Ibid. 
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case. 1171 
It seemed, before the conference (which began on 8 March) , that 
the plan might succeed because none of the prime ministers had 
committed themselves to South Africa's expulsion. 72 Nehru, 
however, had made some ambiguous remarks on his arrival in London 
which may have been construed as opposition to South Africa's 
continued membership. On 5 March Nehru was reported to have said 
"We are not going to put up with this racial discrimination in 
any shape or form.''n It was also reported that Diefenbaker had 
denied he would seek a head-on collision with Verwoerd while the 
Tunku of Malaysia "seemed to hint at delay" and thought South 
Africa should first become a republic and then ''let's see".n 
The South African press was generally confident about the chances 
of membership being accepted and even the English-opposition 
newspapers were prepared to "wish Verwoerd well" at the 
conference. The Rand Daily Mail on 2 March said that, thanks to 
Macmillan, there was an 85% chance of South Africa staying in and 
that it was up to Verwoerd to look after the other 15%.~ The 
blame would be "uniquely his" if he failed because "he exposed 
us to the risk of expulsion in the first place". The Star said 
on 6 March that Verwoerd would "find it hard to avoid defending 
apartheid", but that he had the government and the UP opposition 
"behind him'' in his mission.Tu Die Transvaler claimed on 9 March 
that "South Africa will stay in the Commonwealth" and said that 
Nigeria and Canada were "against attempts to kick South Africa 
72 Ibid., p.155. 
73 The Sunday Express (London) , 5 March 1961. 
n The Observer, 5 March 1961. 
75 Rand Daily Mail, 2 March 1961. 
Tu The Star, 2 March 1961. 
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out u • 77 
During the conference the British press commented extensively on 
developments. It is worth looking in some detail at the day-by-
day commentary in the press because of the accusation by 
Macmillan (and the South Africans) that the attitude of the 
British press had contributed to the failure of the conference 
to keep South Africa in. 78 If one examines the overall commentary 
one cannot fail to be struck by the diversity of opinions 
expressed in the leading British dailies and on the substantially 
accurate predictions and reports of what was happening. There was 
also a clear division between those who wanted South Africa out 
(the socialist Daily Worker, the Labour supporting Guardian and 
others on the left or liberal side of the spectrum such as the 
Reynold News) and those on the conservative side, led by the 
Times, the Telegraph, the Daily Express or the more independent 
papers such as the Observer, who wanted South Africa in. 
Providing an interesting position in favour of expulsion, but 
from the Irish perspective, was the Irish Times, which also made 
some pointeu comparisons with what had happened to Ireland in 
1948. 
What Macmillan and other critics of the press coverage of the 
conference ignored was that the climate of public opinion in 
Britain by 1961 was decidedly anti-South African. (This was 
despite efforts by Piet Meiring's department of information to 
counter Verwoerd's negative image by taking out full-page 
advertisements in favour of South Africa just before the 
conference began) .N The British press, with a few exceptions, 
reflected the anti-South African mood and expressed the outrage 
that many felt about the South African government's often-stated 
refusal to adopt any changes to apartheid. Fresh in many memories 
was the May 1960 conference and Eric Louw's abrasive attitude. 
n Die Transvaler, 9 March 1961. 
78 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p.298. 
N Piet Meiring, Inside Information, p.163. 
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Sharpeville, the state of emergency with its mass arrests and 
bannings and South African actions in South West Africa were all 
relatively recent events that continued to attract attention. 
It was not surprising that the liberal press should have demanded 
conditions on South Africa's membership of the Commonwealth and 
that a certain amount of "egging on" or encouragement of the 
Afro-Asian leaders should have taken place during the conference. 
The anti-apartheid movement was growing and had powerful support 
in the form of the Labour Party and Trade Union movement and all 
were calling for expulsion. Furthermore, they were assisted by 
a group of South African exiles in London called the South 
African United Front and under the leadership of Yusuf Dadoo and 
Oliver Tambo who played an important role in lobbying the press 
and the delegates to the conference for South Africa's 
expulsion. 80 A climate of opinion was being created that, to a 
certain extent, the press reflected and which may have influenced 
some of the prime ministers to oppose South Africa more 
forcefully. For example Nyerere's threat not to take up 
Commonwealth membership for Tanganyika was published in the 
Observer on 12 March, the day before the conference talks on 
South Africa began, and it reportedly influenced Nkrumah's 
attitude. 81 
Some of the varied comments in the British (and Irish) press just 
before the conference began are worth looking at more closely. 
The Irish Times reported on 4 March that South Africa was 
interested in the Irish case and what had happened after Ireland 
left in 1948. It noted the "ironic fact" that Malan was the only 
Commonwealth prime minister to have queried the Ireland Act and 
to have insisted that it should be a unique arrangement. 82 He 
w Indian Opinion, 31 March 1961. 
81 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
pp.175-6 and Miller, Survey, p.155. 
a Irish Times, 4 March 1961. 
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''may have had Natal in mind as a potential Ulster''. It was clear 
that South Africa's case would dominate the conference and that 
the British hoped it would be a routine affair. It also reported 
that relations between the prime ministers was likely to be a 
"prickly affair" and that Diefenbaker of Canada had cancelled his 
booking at the Dorchester Hotel and had booked in at the 
Claridges instead because of Verwoerd. 
On 6 March the same newspaper said that "every diminution of the 
Commonwealth is ... inevitably ... a diminution of Britain's new and 
vulnerable status as a second rate power". 83 It said that Britain 
was resigned to the Commonwealth becoming a mini-UNO and that 
dominions saw the Commonwealth as more real because of employment 
and historical links. As for the non-whites, they saw it as a 
"type of super-welfare institution". 
The Daily Herald argued that the Commonwealth could not survive 
racism and so South Africa was a ''menace'' and a "liability". M 
It urged the Commonwealth to draft a set of principles and to 
leave South Africa to "make the grade or not". 
The London Times85 argued that the "blossoming" multi-racial 
club which the Commonwealth was becoming might make the case 
against South African membership "strong" but that the 
''voiceless'' majority had to be encouraged in South Africa by 
keeping South Africa in. 
The Daily Telegraph argued that there would be a better chance 
of change in South Africa if she remained in the Commonwealth and 
that it could mean a precedent for others if she were to be 
expelled. 86 The Reynold News, on the other hand, argued for 
~ Irish Times, 6 March 1961. 
M Daily Herald, 6 March 1961. 
m Times, 4 March 1961. 
M Daily Telegraph, 4 March 1961. 
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expulsion saying that there had been no change in South Africa 
yet, despite Commonwealth membership and that Britain in fact 
often "softened" her stance against the Union because of the 
Commonwealth. 87 Africans in South Africa "might regard the shock 
of isolation as good" and no other Commonwealth country 
discriminated against its population ''by statute•. 
By 12 March, the day before the South African discussions began, 
the press was generally predicting a comfortable win for 
Macmillan at the conference, and newspapers on the left stepped 
up their call for expulsion as their prospects seemed to dim by 
the day. There were, however, some omens to the contrary. On 12 
March the News of the World reported that Ghana's high 
commissioner in London had said that Ghana's position in the 
Commonweal th would be reconsidered if South Africa stayed in. "We 
don't want apartheid inside the Commonwealth. We are totally 
opposed to it. ,,ss 
The Reynold News reported that there was a "flood of news" in 
South Africa predicting that South Africa would remain in and 
that newspapers there had "twisted the likely truth of the 
matter" . 89 The South African public "felt it had won already". 
(The Sunday Times in Johannesburg, for example, stated on 12 
March under the headline "A Personal Triumph", that although the 
outcome was "not yet certain", Verwoerd had •created a favourable 
impression• and was seen as arr.an •of charm and culture") . 90 
The Observer on 12 March91 printed Nyerere's article which has 
been seen by many as being one of the primary causes of South 
Africa's withdrawal. The article was headed: "Commonwealth 
87 Reynold News, 5 March 1961. 
88 News of the World, 12 March 1961. 
"Reynold News, 12 March 1961. 
w Sunday Times (Johannesburg), 12 March 1961. 
91 Observer, 12 March 1961. 
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Choice: Them or Us'' and it outlined Tanganyika's threat not to 
apply for membership if South Africa stayed in. 
The discussions on South Africa beg~n on 13 March and almost 
immediately the original plan hatched by Macmillan and Menzies 
to separate the constitutional from the racial discussions 
failed. It appeared that most of the prime ministers wanted to 
combine the two and Verwoerd, under pressure, had reluctantly 
agreed. (Verwoerd said to parliament after the conference that 
he had made the concession of allowing the constitutional debate 
to be merged with the racial because "others wanted it" and 
"wanted it immediately". 92 It was not in accord with what had 
been arranged, he said, but Macmillan had allowed it. However, 
he ''accepted responsibility'' for it) . 
Wood mentions the background discussions held before this by 
Macmillan with Diefenbaker in order to head off an Afro-Asian 
attack. He points out that Macmillan had dined with Diefenbaker 
on 10 March and had then told Welensky the following evening 
that Diefenbaker had promised him he would not unilaterally 
oppose South Africa.m In 1965 Welensky visited Canada and held 
conversations with Diefenbaker about their recollections of the 
events of the 1961 conference. Diefenbaker recalled the promise 
to Macmillan but said he had also warned Macmillan bluntly that 
if the conference sought his opinion he would make plain Canada's 
hostility towards South Africa. He had gone on to suggest that 
if he spoke last instead of first (as was the custom because of 
his seniority) it might help preserve South Africa's membership. 
He claimed that Macmillan had accepted the idea94 but that 
Macmillan had later reversed the position. (There is, however, 
no mention of it anywhere in Macmillan's memoirs). 
m House of Assembly Debates, col.3495, 23 March 1961. 
93 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
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Wood notes that Menzies, in his memoirs, had blamed Diefenbaker 
for making an emotional speech on South Africa at the beginning 
of the conference. 95 Diefenbaker, however, told Welensky in 1965 
that before they went into the morning session of 13 March (the 
first day of the South African discussions) Macmillan had told 
him he could not reverse the order of speaking and so Diefenbaker 
would have to speak first. In fact it was not he but Nehru who 
spoke first (as the most senior Afro-Asian prime minister) . Nehru 
had said there was no difficulty for South Africa's membership 
as such but that the basis of Commonwealth co-operation was the 
recognition of it as a multi-racial association. 96 He had gone 
on to say that without a change of heart from South Africa South 
Africa's membership could endanger the Commonwealth's existence 
and influence. He insisted on condemnation of racial 
discrimination by the conference. 
Diefenbaker had spoken next and had regretted that there was no 
general discussion first of the South African problem and now 
that powerful emotions were aroused that it would be better to 
have time for reflection before membership was discussed. He 
bluntly stated Canada's opposition to apartheid and hastily added 
that Canada was busy extending the vote to the Red Indians in 
Canada. He then reinforced Nehru's call for a declaration on 
racialism and said the conference should sanction it. He warned 
that if the conference sanctioned South Africa's membership it 
would amount to endorsing apartheid. It would also damage the 
Commonweal th' s standing and bolster the communist effort in 
Africa. He then softened a little and suggested the postponement 
of the whole issue because South Africa was not yet a republic. 
Khan supported this and said that only if South Africa reformed 
could it stay in. 
Only Menzies, says Wood, struck a "discordant note" correcting 
a "certain assertion" and noting that South Africa's membership 
95 Ibid., p .166. 
96 Ib"d 167 __ l_.' p. . 
455 
had not been in question until it proposed to become a 
republic. 97 He decried using the membership issue to force South 
Africa to change its policies and cautioned that accepting a 
declaration on basic principles would result in future 
conferences ignoring the need to formulate a common view. It 
would just mean that it would in future "air differences". 
Nkrumah then ignored this and insisted on a declaration of racial 
equality while the Tunku agreed but said he would not oppose 
South Africa if the rest of the Commonwealth agreed. Holyoake of 
New Zealand praised this and said South Africa would have to 
reform if it wanted to stay in the Commonwealth but he also 
suggested postponement of the question. 98 But Mrs Sirmova 
Bandaranaika of Ceylon had then opposed this saying the 
Commonwealth should demonstrate its commitment to racial equality 
by expelling South Africa. Tafawa Balewa of Nigeria then said he 
was not hostile to South Africa and would accept her membership 
if she treated all Commonwealth members equally and exchanged 
diplomats as well as reformed her policies." 
Verwoerd's case in the afternoon session was presented in the 
knowledge that only Menzies supported him. He stated that he 
hoped the debate would not set a precedent for interference in 
other countries' affairs and argued that the constitutional issue 
was just a formality. Cyprus, he noted, had been confirmed long 
before and he echoed Menzies in saying that there would have been 
no doubt of continued membership for South Africa if there had 
been no constitutional change. JOO The Commonweal th was composed 
of separate, sovereign and independent states and a bill of 
rights would mean an incomplete constitution for the 
Commonwealth. He defended apartheid and denied it meant 
oppression and said that it was a policy of different people 
97 Ibid., p.167. 
98 Ibid., p.168. 
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living separately but without an element of superiority. Indeed, 
he said, this was a principle of the Commonwealth itself. He 
regretted South Africa's estrangement from countries like Ghana, 
Malaya and others but noted that their policies were far from 
perfect. 
Verwoerd was then subjected to a series of "searching questions" 
during which he reiterated there would be no diplomatic missions 
from unfriendly countries and that there would be no blacks in 
parliament because they would have their own "soon". In response 
to Nkrumah's demand for a bill of rights he retorted that perhaps 
it should also refer to democracy. 101 After further statements 
and criticisms Macmillan intervened to point out that the 1960 
conference had stated that constitutional change was an internal 
matter and that South Africa should remain in the Commonwealth 
as a matter of previous precedent. He did, however, acknowledge 
the difficulty of appearing to condone apartheid and so suggested 
a compromise which would entail the communique stating also the 
conference's disapproval of apartheid and that racial 
discrimination was against the ideals of the Commonwealth. 
This intervention did not, however, "blunt" the attack and 
Nkrumah, Nehru and Balewa continued to demand a statement of 
principles which Verwoerd continued to reject. 102 Menzies and 
Holyoake supported Macmillan's compromise as the only practical 
course. 
The evencs of that day caused the Rand Daily Mail to comment that 
the talks were now "In the Balance" ·and that the trend of 
discussions on 13 March had indicated that the question of 
membership had not been treated as a matter of procedure. 103 
The Star noted the seriousness of Nyerere's letter as a threat 
101 Ib"d 6 __ l_.' p.l 9. 
102 Ibid. , p. 170. 
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to the conference 104 and, on the 14th, wondered "to what other 
perils we may be led by men who so blatantly put their party 
before their country and their tribal emotions before the good 
of the whole" . 105 Die Transvaler commented under the heading 
"Dangerous signs" ( "Gevaarlike Voortekens") that it was "unjust" 
to say that South Africa should apply for membership. It "should 
be automatic''. The discussion of South Africa's race policies 
would be a "flagrant breach of Commonweal th principle". 106 
In Britain, on 13 March, the Daily Worker published an "open 
letter" to the conference demanding "Stand Firm Against 
Apartheid" and referring to "Shameful pressures" by Macmillan on 
the others to accept South Africa's membership. 107 The Daily 
Express, on the other hand, accused the communists of goading 
Nkrumah into threatening to "wreck the conference" . 108 The Daily 
Herald noted that Khan of Pakistan had heeded Macmillan's call 
to have the apartheid question treated separately from the 
constitutional 109 while the Guardian said that Nehru was seeking 
"decisive action" against South Africa and that the West Indies, 
Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar and others might have second thoughts 
about Commonweal th membership. 110 The Times noted that the 
opposition socialists in Canada were opposing any effort by 
Diefenbaker to compromise on South Africa 111 and the Irish Times 
claimed that Macmillan was trying to "paper over the cracks" . 112 
It also argued for a ''forthright discussion'' of the meaning of 
104 The Star, 13 March 1961. 
105 The Star, 15 March 1961. 
106 Die Transvaler, 13 March 1961. 
107 Daily Worker, 13 March 1961. 
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the Commonwealth in the light of the divisions and problems then 
evident and said the time had come for a "showdown". Keeping 
South Africa in had not changed anything and prime ministers 
might demand concessions from South Africa in return for staying 
in. Would the United Kingdom continue to "fence sit?" 
Wood goes on to discuss the course of events on the second day, 
Tuesday, 14 March. It began with Macmillan's draft communique 
being presented to the conference. This stated previous precedent 
about Commonwealth membership and accepted South Africa on that 
basis but also claimed it had been pointed out in full debate 
that the procedural question could not be separated from the 
question of South Africa's racial policies and their effect on 
the multi-racial Commonwealth. Such policies were incompatible 
with the ideals of the Commonweal th. 113 Verwoerd then rejected 
this as passing judgment on South Africa and Menzies supported 
him, noting the precedent of interference for other countries on 
other matters. Diefenbaker, on the other hand, saw nothing wrong 
with a declaration against racial discrimination and said it was 
necessary if the Commonwealth were to survive. He again claimed 
Canada was rectifying the position concerning the Red Indians and 
was interrupted by Menzies, annoyed at his ''sanctimoniousness", 
who passed him a copy of a newspaper reporting the expulsion of 
a non-white from a Canadian hotel . 114 
After further demands for the statement on racial discrimination 
from Nehru, the Tunku and Nkrumah (who also advised 
postponement), Macmillan again intervened to advise separation 
of the racial issue from the constitutional. He also suggested 
that two further drafts, one to be drawn up by Menzies, be 
submitted to the afternoon session. This was done and Macmillan's 
new draft was presented unchanged concerning the first part which 
reaffirmed South Africa's membership according to precedent. The 
113 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.170. 
114 b. d L_;i,_., p.171. 
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second part described the conference reaction to South Africa's 
policies and rejected these policies as inconsistent with 
Commonwealth ideals. 115 Menzies's draft said the constitutional 
matter was separate from the racial although it acknowledged the 
difficulty of doing so and it also recorded the debate with 
Verwoerd saying this had made plain the effects of apartheid on 
millions of people and on the multi-racial Commonwealth. 
The debate on the two drafts revealed the same divisions as 
before with Verwoerd emphatically rejecting any references to 
laying down of rules and claiming he would reject any communique 
which laid down conditions for South Africa's future 
membership. 116 He stated he preferred Menzies's draft but only 
if he could state his disassociation from it. The others 
preferred Macmillan's draft but Nkrumah, Khan and Nehru wanted 
a bill of rights as well as more reference to the need for reform 
in South Africa. Macmillan suggested an adjournment to give 
Verwoerd time to draw up his own version. When he presented it, 
Verwoerd referred to the need to separate the constitutional from 
the racial question and stated his defence of apartheid while 
acknowledging the opinions of the others in opposition. However, 
Diefenbaker objected and said there had to be a statement of the 
incompatibility of South Africa's policies with Commonwealth 
ideals. Balewa, Nehru and Holyoake agreed and Menzies said he 
would accept Macmillan's draft if Verwoerd's views were 
included. 117 Bandaranaika, however, stated she would refuse to 
accept South Africa's readmission to the Commonwealth without a 
change in policy. Macmillan again intervened saying everyone 
acknowledged the serious consequences of excluding South Africa 
and hoping Verwoerd would not object to his draft because it was 
just a statement of principles to which the others subscribed. 
He adjourned the conference again to give Verwoerd time to 
reconsider. 
us Ibid. ,p.172. 
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The British press commentary on the events of that day and the 
previous one (Monday 13 March) reported the ominous signs of a 
deadlock. The Daily Worker claimed there was a failure to reach 
a decision as the "storm" over apartheid continued. 118 It 
reported that Macmillan's plan for a "smooth acceptance" of South 
Africa had collapsed and the discussions at Lancaster House 
lasted longer than planned. The original plan was to keep 
discussions on the constitutional aspects to the 13 March meeting 
and discussions on apartheid to "today" but it went "awry" as 
only Menzies and Verwoerd supported it. First to speak were 
Nehru, Nkrumah and Diefenbaker and then Verwoerd "surprisingly" 
pointed out the shortcomings in African and other Commonwealth 
countries. Macmillan then pleaded for no exclusion saying it 
would begin a precedent. Mrs Bandaranaika left suddenly (on a 
"cultural visit") but ''more likely'' on a walk-out. The 
application of Cyprus was then accepted. 
The Scotsman reported that unlike Eric Louw a year previously, 
Verwoerd had "sat and listened" to his critics until the long 
morning session was over. 119 Then in the afternoon he had replied 
with a long defence of his policies and this was followed by a 
second attack from the others. There had been a "change of heart" 
by those premiers who had agreed originally to keep the 
constitutional separate from the racial discussions. This change 
was thought to have started with Nkrumah who received "intense 
lobbying" from his countrymen in London and from anti-National 
Party groups from South Africa and from his Ghanaian party at 
home. Diefenbaker had put forward the idea of a Commonwealth bill 
of rights. 
In South Africa, the Cape Times reported optimistically that, 
despite Verwoerd's rejection of Macmillan's drafts, it was still 
felt in Whitehall that Verwoerd would win by "sheer endurance and 
118 Daily Worker, 14 March 1961. 
119 The Scotsman, 14 March 1961. 
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patience" since "no one wanted his expulsion" . 120 Die Transvaler 
reported the day's deadlock in headlines which said "Dooie Punt 
Oor S.A. Duur Voort ... Tweede Dag Sonder 'n Beslissing" ("Deadlock 
on SA continues, Second Day Without a Decision") . 121 The Rand 
Daily Mail stated that "two of the tensest days for South Africa 
since the war" had taken place and that "Commonwealth membership 
never seemed so desirable as when it was in danger''. 1n 
Wood's account of the last day (15 March) begins with Macmillan's 
statement to the effect that Verwoerd would accept his draft if 
allowed to justify his policies in a separate statement. 
Macmillan asked for adjournment to the afternoon session in order 
to produce such a draft. When the afternoon session assembled 
Macmillan outlined the discussions and efforts to that point and 
then read out his new draft. 123 The first part about 
constitutional precedent remained unchanged and he concentrated 
on the second part. It described the criticism by the conference 
of South Africa's policies stating again their incompatibility 
with Commonwealth ideals. But it mentioned Verwoerd's defence of 
apartheid and the view that the standards laid down in the UNO 
Charter were not of relevance in the Commonwealth context. 
Macmillan claimed it would not suit everyone but it was the best 
possible compromise and he stated his desire to keep South Africa 
in the Commonwealth. But again he ran into opposition from both 
sides. Menzies objected to any reference to the UNO Charter 
saying it could influence the way Commonwealth members voted in 
UNO, and he was supported by Verwoerd in this. Diefenbaker 
disagreed saying the Commonwealth could not stand for less than 
the Charter. With Nehru's support he also claimed that Macmillan 
had overemphasised the views of Verwoerd. Others also claimed it 
12° Cape Times, 15 March 1961. 
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reflected an unbalanced view of the discussions and demanded the 
inclusion of a Commonwealth bill of rights. Balewa threatened to 
withdraw Nigeria from the Commonwealth because he said the UNO 
had condemned apartheid at every session and so he felt the need 
for the Commonwealth to accept racial equality as a basic 
precondition. Nkrumah threatened likewise to withdraw, provoking 
Verwoerd to retort he reserved the right to call for Ghana's 
expulsion on the grounds of its lack of respect for democracy. 124 
This was the crisis point referred to by Macmillan in his 
memoirs. 125 He now felt the game was lost and feared that 
Bandaranaika or Nehru would call for a vote which would result 
in the splitting of the Commonwealth. Only Australia and New 
Zealand would have supported him and Diefenbaker would have 
opposed him. So he decided to "sacrifice South Africa" . 126 He 
used an adjournment to convince Verwoerd 
application. (Alistair Horne's biography of 
to withdraw his 
Macmillan claims 
that the decision by Macmillan and Verwoerd to withdraw the South 
African application was originally an idea suggested apparently 
by Iain Macleod, the colonial secretary) . 127 Verwoerd then went 
ahead with his withdrawal announcement saying his nation's self-
respect would not allow interference in its internal affairs and 
that South Africa had no desire to belong to what had become a 
"pressure group". He had been shocked at the vindictive hostility 
of some members, he said, and felt the prime ministers had 
allowed themselves to be influenced by the Afro-Asians . 128 
Opposition to South Africa was ironic in the light of the 
flouting of democracy in some of the Commonwealth countries 
present. He predicted the Commonwealth would disintegrate once 
124 Ib' d 
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South Africa left. 
Macmillan, described as looking at his most "miserable", 129 got 
up and said it was inappropriate for the conference to question 
the decision and thanked Verwoerd for his "courtesy", expressing 
confidence that future Anglo-South African co-operation would 
continue. He read out the prepared communique concerning 
withdrawal. Verwoerd thanked him and got up to leave the room 
together with the external affairs minister, Eric Louw. Geyser 
reports that they were beaten to the door by a red-faced 
Diefenbaker 
out!" 130 The 
who shouted 
conference 
triumphantly "They're out, they're 
continued with Louw deputising for 
Verwoerd and at the final session Macmillan again expressed 
regret at the withdrawal. 131 Nehru disagreed, however, and said 
withdrawal would ease world tension. 
The British press commentary on the final day of the South 
African discussions, the day of withdrawal, reported with 
substantial accuracy the course of events. The Daily Mail claimed 
that apartheid had been condemned "Ten To One" and that South 
Africa had to accept this or leave. Talks had adjourned for a 
"Last chance" . 132 Verwoerd had a choice to submit to more 
denunciations or to walk out, although "none" had demanded 
expulsion the previous day, just the right to continue to 
denounce South Africa. Macleod, colonial secretary, had offered 
the "euphemism of the year" when asked how the conference was 
going and had replied: "Fine". Verwoerd had refused to agree to 
a communique which expressed abhorrence of South Africa's 
policies and believed no opinions should be stated. 
The Daily Express said Macmillan's draft was rejected by Verwoerd 
129 b. d L...±_., p.177. 
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and that the Tunku had suggested Verwoerd draw up his own, which 
was then "immediately rejected by the others". Diefenbaker and 
Nkrumah had said there could be only one statement adopted by the 
conference and based on that of Macmillan. Khan of Pakistan had 
then said that the Macmillan draft should be strengthened and 
Macmillan was told to "get tougher". 133 The Guardian said a 
"Critical Hour" had been reached and also reported a clash in the 
British parliament over the UN request for the Commonwealth to 
put pressure on South Africa over South West Africa. 1M 
Government speakers had claimed it was the wrong time to bring 
up the SWA question at "this delicate stage". 
In South Africa on 16 March glaring headlines greeted the 
withdrawal: "Union Quits the Club" 135 , "S.A Is Uit" 136 were some 
of the headlines and reports which traced the course of events 
of the previous day. Editorial comments varied according to the 
political colour of the various newspapers (see next chapter: 
"Post-mortems and Consequences") but most English newspapers 
blamed Verwoerd and declared their shock at the unexpected turn 
of events. Afrikaans newspapers supported Verwoerd's actions and 
blamed the Afro-Asians for what had happened. The end of the 
Commonwealth was predicted. 
It remains to consider the various explanations and analyses of 
the conference given by some historians (and protagonists 
themselves) and to attempt an overall assessment of "who, or what 
was to blame"; that, ultimately, is what has interested most 
commentators ever since. While the historical context of the time 
was crucial in setting the background "mood" or "temper" of the 
conference (and has been seen by some as making the expulsion of 
South Africa inevitable), it was decisions taken on the spot in 
133 Daily Express, 15 March 1961. 
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response to changing attitudes and statements of the main 
protagonists that was most important. 
The most recent analysis, that of J.R.T. Wood, concludes that: 
"It was pressure from the Afro-Asians - from Nehru and the others 
that finally forced South Africa out". 137 Wood down-plays 
Diefenbaker's role, stating that Macmillan, Verwoerd and Menzies 
highlighted Diefenbaker's vital role in the withdrawal because 
of his throwing in his lot with the Afro-Asians instead of 
exerting pressure on them as Menzies and Holyoake had done. But, 
Wood claims, it was "difficult to imagine" that pressure would 
have abated on South Africa had it been allowed to stay in 
1961. 138 Even if Diefenbaker had joined with Menzies, it would 
not have been long before the Afro-Asians exerted "intolerable 
pressure" and "An early withdrawal would have remained a 
likelihood for South Africa." 
Macmillan's own account stressed that Verwoerd was mainly to 
blame together with the British press and Nehru. 139 He believed 
he could have succeeded if there had not been so much newspaper 
"agitation" against South Africa and if Nehru had not decided one 
day before the conference to urge the Afro-Asians to refuse 
membership while "laying pretty low" himself. He also blamed the 
"rigidity of Verwoerd, from whom not the "slightest concession" 
was forthcoming. It was his ''Inflexibility" that finally ''turned 
the balance". Concessions on African diplomats might have helped. 
Every proposal made by himself and Menzies, was "destroyed" by 
Verwoerd. 140 (Verwoerd, in his own defence, said the issue of 
concessions on black diplomats was mentioned "in passing" by 
various members and he had said it applied only to ''unfriendly 
137 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p. 178. 
138 Wood, "The Roles of Diefenbaker, Macmillan and Verwoerd", 
p.178. 
139 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, p. 298. 
140 b' d l_____,),_ . ' p . 2 9 9 . 
466 
countries 11 ) 141 
To the end Macmillan was unforgiving about Diefenbaker who, he 
said, "played domestic politics" and who was "intoxicated by the 
exuberance of his own verbosity". 1~ Without Diefenbaker he felt 
that he could have "got through" although, he acknowledged, it 
was probable there would have been a failure at the next 
conference. Macmillan's views, says Wood, were shared by Lord 
Home and a section of the press in South Africa. 
Menzies and some conservatives in the British parliament, such 
as Lord Salisbury, said Macmillan should have stayed firm on the 
non-interference principle and that the Commonwealth would not 
stand up to the strain on this. But this argument, which, as 
Macmillan put it, was so "sound in logic and convention," broke 
down "against the march of events and "the force of human 
feelings" . 143 Lord Hailsham's analogy with Allied actions against 
Germany because of that country's treatment of the Jews disposed 
of Salisbury's argument. Macmillan claimed that what "shocked" 
most people was that South Africa had tried to set up an 
"abhorrent doctrine" which the rest of the world was trying to 
break away from. Apartheid transposed what was •wrong" into a 
"right". 
Geyser places some emphasis on Nehru as "one of South Africa's 
greatest enemies'' and the roles of the other •enemies'' 
(Diefenbaker and the Afro-Asians) of South Africa who had 
sabotaged the plan to separate the constitutional and racial 
discussions. 144 He agrees that Verwoerd had allowed the debates 
to be merged, but this, says Geyser, was evidence of Verwoerd's 
"sincerity• in wanting to keep South Africa in. Verwoerd, says 
141 House of Assembly Debates, col.3492, 23 March 1961. 
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Geyser, had realised at the outset that the plan might not 
succeed and had asked Louw to prepare a statement that could be 
changed with new developments arising. 
The views of contemporary South African officials such as 
Meiring, head of the information department and Jooste, secretary 
of external affairs, supported Verwoerd's decision to withdraw 
on the grounds of national self-respect and placed the blame on 
the Afro-Asians (Nehru in particular) and Diefenbaker. Jooste, 
for example, claimed that it was "already known before the 
conference began" that some of the prime ministers ("the Non-
whites and Mr Diefenbaker of Canada in particular") would once 
again attack South Africa's racial policies. 145 He also blamed 
Macmillan for not declaring the discussions on apartheid "out of 
order" and pointed out, with some justification, that Macmillan 
recognised all along that it would not be possible to force any 
concessions on racial policy from Verwoerd. 146 
Verwoerd justified his decision to withdraw as being for the 
sake of his "friends'' and for the sake of South Africa's ''self-
respect" . He felt he could not allow any changes to South 
Africa's policies because that would "wipe out the White man in 
South Africa" . 147 Furthermore, if he had allowed continued 
internal interference in South Africa's affairs it would have 
been in the knowledge that motions for expulsion could be 
introduced at any time (which would have meant sacrificing "our 
honour''). Finally, if he had decided to veto South Africa's 
expulsion it would have placed Britain in the "impossible 
position of having to choose between members". Thus he chose to 
voluntarily withdraw in the knowledge the United Kingdom would 
remain South Africa's friend and allowing the rest of the 
Commonwealth to stay together. He chose it because he had "no 
1~ Jooste, Diensherinneringe, p.194. 
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other choice". 148 
A number of conclusions can be arrived at after taking into 
consideration the above-mentioned comments and accounts. Firstly, 
it is clear that while the Afro-Asian prime ministers were the 
most strident in their criticism of Verwoerd at the conference 
their views varied in intensity and were not unanimous or even 
unequivocal in their demands for South Africa's exclusion from 
the Commonwealth. It seems that it was only after Verwoerd's 
unambiguous refusal, on the first day of discussions, to 
countenance any suggestion of reform that talk of expulsion began 
to be heard. It was not Nehru who brought that up, nor even 
Nkrumah, but the Ceylonese prime minister, Mrs Bandaranaika, who 
throughout the discussions seems to have adopted the hard-line 
position of expulsion unless significant concessions were 
forthcoming immediately. Her position was echoed by Ayub Khan of 
Pakistan who, according to Macmillan, had been offended again, 
as in the 1960 discussions, by what he saw as an implied racial 
slur by Verwoerd during the debate on non-white diplomatic 
representation. 1" 
Nkrumah seems to have been initially satisfied with supporting 
Nehru and Diefenbaker and their call for a declaration against 
racism and it was only after Verwoerd's refusal (supported by 
Menzies) to accept a minimum bill of rights or the reference to 
the United Nations Charter that he, together with Balewa and the 
Tunku, had threatened withdrawal. However, the emphasis given by 
Verwoerd in his account of the dramatic clash with Nkrumah over 
the issue of democracy and racism seems to have been taken up by 
the South Africans as evidence of Nkrumah's status as the "enemy 
number one" of the conference. In his statement to the Ghanaian 
National Assembly on 18 April 1961, Nkrumah said: 
Hitherto there have been two possible approaches to 
148 Ibid., col. 3502, 23 March 1961. 
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the South African problem ... persuasion and force of 
example ... to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth . 
. . . . I have always had my gravest doubts about the 
success of any such policy. However, we did apply it 
in the years which followed independence 
[and] ... offered to exchange diplomatic 
representatives with South Africa [But] ... it 
became clear ... that the South African government would 
never accept diplomatic representatives from any 
indigenous African state.•m 
Nehru has been seen in a similar light although he adopted a more 
subdued role than traditionally ascribed to him and did not 
appear to have made threats of withdrawal from the Commonwealth. 
This did not stop him being identified by Macmillan as a prime 
cause of South Africa's withdrawal. In anti-apartheid circles 
Nehru (and Nkrumah) were also identified (proudly) as being the 
prime movers behind it all. The London correspondent of the Cape 
Town weekly, New Age, stated: 
Mr Nehru and Dr Nkrumah were largely instrumental in 
removing South Africa from the Commonwealth .... As Mr 
Nehru advanced his powerful arguments against 
Apartheid and his pointed questions about inequality, 
the Australian and New Zealand Premiers froze into 
. l si_ence, while Mr Macmillan, 
African policy in 
with a discredited 
Central his hands, shuffled 
uncomfortably. 151 
Nehru's speech to the Lok Sabha on 24 March was quoted at the 
beginning of this section. 152 It put the blame squarely on 
Verwoerd's intransigence and went on to say that: 
im Mansergh, Documents and Speeches, p.400. 
151 Reported in Indian Opinion, 31 March 1961. 
152 See p . 311 . 
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This was a very significant step that the Commonwealth 
took, but I believe that it has strengthened it and 
certainly not weakened it. It has even a wider 
significance than it might appear at first sight, 
because thereby the question of racial equality has 
been put on the highest level in the world context. 153 
As for Diefenbaker, one can only concur with Wood that his role 
had been exaggerated by Macmillan and the South Africans. It was 
not he who first suggested the contentious bill of rights, but 
Nehru, and although he stuck fairly rigidly to the idea and was 
supported by the Afro-Asians, he never, it seems, called for 
South Africa's expulsion and was initially at least prepared to 
postpone the whole issue. Perhaps it was because he was seen by 
Macmillan and Verwoerd as breaking the solidarity of the white 
prime ministers that his role had been so strongly portrayed. 
Diefenbaker's speech 
conference was to the 
said: 
in explanation of his 
Canadian parliament on 
attitude at the 
17 March 1961. He 
I took the position that if we were to accept South 
Africa's request unconditionally our action would be 
taken as approval or at least condonation of racial 
policies which are repugnant to and unequivocally 
abhorred and condemned by Canadians as a whole ... We 
have declared that non-discrimination on the basis of 
race and colour is the foundation stone of a multi-
racial association composed of representatives from 
all parts of the world. 154 
Macmillan's role as chairman needs some reassessment. It might 
be argued that his determination to keep South Africa in had 
blinded him to the intensity of feelings of the Afro-Asians and 
153 Mansergh, Documents and Speeches, p. 390. 
154 b'd 3 1-L_., pp. 69-370. 
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that he consciously or unconsciously gave priority to Britain's 
int:erests rather than those of the whole Commonweal th. (In 
private Macmillan had told Harold Evans, his public relations and 
Press adviser, that it was the loyal British people he had met 
in the Union in 1960 and people in Durban who referred to Britain 
as t:he "Old Country" that he cared most about) 
he was prepared to sacrifice South Africa 
•
155 But ultimately 
for the sake of 
Commonwealth solidarity and that was the solution that he saw to 
be in Britain's best interests - as long as the economic and 
strategic connection remained (which he had deftly ensured by 
drawing Verwoerd in from the beginning on his side) . 
Nevertheless it is tempting to speculate whether a different 
solution might have been reached under a chairman with less to 
lose from the economic and political point of view and with less 
of an emotional interest in the whole debate, such as Holyoake 
of New Zealand, for example, or even Diefenbaker. Putting one of 
the Afro-Asians in the "hot seat" may also have had interesting 
results. A statesman with the stature of Nehru, whose commitment 
to the Commonwealth ideal and even to the principle of non-
interference was never in doubt, may well have swayed the 
conference towards a consensus on allowing South Africa to stay 
in (at least until the next conference) . 
But that brings the argument back to Verwoerd (and his closest 
supporter, Menzies of Australia). Verwoerd and Menzies stood firm 
on the non-interference principle and although they were prepared 
to countenance a separate statement of opinions against South 
Africa they drew the line at the proposal for a minimum statement 
of principles which might have bound their respective governments 
to future policy directions. In this Menzies was just as 
intransigent as Verwoerd, although he had advised Verwoerd 
initially to accept Macmillan's first draft. 
After the conference Menzies said that if he had been in 
1 ~ Horne, Macmillan, p.393. 
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Verwoerd's shoes he would have done the same, withdrawn from the 
Commonweal th. 156 Staying in would have meant dividing the 
Commonweal th into those for and those against South Africa. 
Menzies went on to say it was all "a most unhappy affair. I make 
no secret of my own view. I wanted to keep South Africa in". He 
argued that a precedent was being set for criticising the 
internal affairs of member states, for example, Australia's own 
migration laws. The fact that South Africa was out could even 
have the effect of "stiffening the government's racial policies", 
he surmised. "I won't mention any names", he said, "but 
certainly the most extreme speeches were made at the closing 
stages". He concluded by saying that boycotts would be counter-
productive and would affect the blacks more than the whites. 
But even Menzies hoped for some small sign from Verwoerd of a 
willingness to make concessions on racial policy, in particular 
on the question of diplomatic representation. Whether such a 
concession would have satisfied the conference in its later 
stages of heated discussion is a matter for speculation. It would 
probably, as Verwoerd , Jooste, Meiring and others claimed, have 
led to demands for more concessions and to South Africa's 
eventual expulsion at a later date. But if it had been offered 
by Verwoerd on the first day of discussions different results 
altogether may have been expected. 
While, therefore, South Africa's apartheid policies, the rise of 
African nationalism and the new emphasis in the UNO on anti-
colonialism provided the general context and the long-term 
background to eventual expulsion from the Commonwealth, Verwoerd 
ultimately bears most of the personal responsibility for the 
failure of the conference. One commentator has pointed out that 
Verwoerd's actions at the conference "reflected a passivity, if 
not an active disinterest, about the utility of continued 
156 INCH, PV 4 (Eric Louw Collection), File No.112 
(Statebonds Konferensies: Diverse Stukke, 1928-1961), No. 12, 
Report from the off ice of the Australian High Commissioner in 
South Africa, 19 March 1961. 
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participation [in the Commonwealth] , and a preoccupation with 
building up South African support against a threatening 
world" . 157 Verwoerd made no effort to conciliate Nehru and 
Nkrumah at the conference and had turned the outcome into a 
victory on his return. Piet Meiring, the head of the department 
of information, was told by Eric Louw as the latter walked out 
of the conference: "For heaven's sake, don't look so glum. This 
is not the end of the world. I would rather call it good riddance 
of bad company". J58 
157 Seiler, "South African Responses to External Pressures", 
p.455. 
158 Me iring, Inside Information, p .166. 
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Chapter 20: Post-Mortems and Consequences. Post script on the 
High Commission Territories 
(a) Post-conference reactions 
The attitude of the official opposition party in South Africa to 
the withdrawal from the Commonwealth was summed up in the words 
of De Villiers Graaff's reply to Verwoerd in parliament on 23 
March 1961. He noted three things firstly, that the mission 
overseas was a ''miserable failure which brought great comfort 
apparently to the communist countries of the world" and dismay 
to those on the Western side. 1 Secondly, it could all have been 
avoided if the prime minister and his party had not "gambled 
recklessly" with South Africa's Commonweal th membership. Thirdly, 
there would be "repercussions" for South Africa that would 
require the "greatest statesmanship" from all groups in the 
country. He went on to criticise the SABC for becoming a 
"propaganda machine" for the government and for portraying the 
events in London as a victory for Verwoerd. 2 
Dr Steytler, for the Progressive Party, referred to what Verwoerd 
and Louw had called ''national honour" and claimed that South 
Africa could not run the risk of •national suicide" for the sake 
of national honour. 3 The "baaskap regime" of twelve years of 
National Party rule had brought South Africa to this point and 
this was why South Africa was no longer in the Commonwealth. 
Verwoerd's plea to unite in order to maintain white domination 
would only lead to further isolation and ostracism. 4 
Harry Oppenheimer, speaking for those English South Africans who 
were still attached to the Commonwealth connection and for the 
1 House of Assembly Debates, cols.3510-11, 23 March 1961. 
2 Ibid., col.3512, 23 March 1961. 
3 Ibid., cols.3539-3540, 23 March 1961. 
4 Ibid., col.3541, 23 March 1961. 
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parliamentary opposition, said at a graduation ceremony at Natal 
University that no treaties or understandings with Britain and 
other former Commonwealth partners could compensate for the "old 
ties" that had been broken and for the confidence that had been 
"shattered''. 5 It had been a ''grave setback'' to national unity 
because one section of the population had been seen to "rejoice" 
at the other section's loss of something to which it had a "deep 
emotional attachment". Most serious of all, said Oppenheimer, was 
the fact that it was a ''moral disaster'' for South Africa because 
''our withdrawal was occasioned by the unanimous condemnation of 
South African policy by every member of the Commonwealth, 
including our closest friends. 
In a similar vein, the leading opposition newspapers saw it all 
as a huge blow for South Africa but at the same time claimed it 
demonstrated the need for reform. The Cape Times, expressed 
"bitter resentment of the mess which has been made" . 6 The Star, 
in an editorial entitled "The Reason Why", blamed Verwoerd for 
not giving "the smallest degree of compromise "7 and the Rand 
Daily Mail stated that this was not the beginning of the end of 
the Commonwealth but would instead strengthen the organisation 
and its "moral cohesion" . 8 The Commonwealth had demonstrated it 
was founded on certain "democratic and human principles" but 
South Africa had found itself "the odd man out". 
Round Table's commentary on the withdrawal was written in tones 
of sadness tinged with forebodings for the future. Entitled ''A 
Leaf Falls" , 9 it noted that Verwoerd's decision "should be a 
matter of regret" to the whole Commonwealth and "in particular" 
5 Digest of South African Affairs, Vol.8, No.7, 1 April 
1961. 
6 Cape Times, 16 March 1961. 
7 The Star, 25 July 1961. 
8 Rand Daily Mail, 17 March 1961. 
9 Round Table, Vol.51, No.203, June 1961, pp.219-223. 
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to the board and staff members of the Round Table, the origins 
of which were in the review publications for the Closer Union 
Societies that promoted the establishment of the Union of South 
Africa. It promised to continue reporting and criticising 
developments in the Republic which would not soon or "lightly" 
be thought of as an "alien land". It would maintain contact with 
"those elements" in the country which were able to work in 
harmony with the "more liberal thought of the Commonwealth" and 
would look forward to the day when they "win over" the electors 
to their side" . 
In a further article of the same issue, entitled "South Africa 
Departs",'" a more detailed analysis of the causes and 
consequences of withdrawal was offered which put considerable 
blame on Verwoerd and the National Party for creating the 
impression among the electorate at the time of the republican 
referendum that membership of the Commonwealth was assured. It 
also questioned Verwoerd's "curious" statement on his return to 
South Africa to the effect that a "miracle" had been achieved in 
London. 11 Verwoerd had explained this later as meaning that 
South Africa could still be out of the Commonwealth and retain 
friendship with Britain. 12 
As for the Nationalist reaction, it was 
jubilant airport welcome for Verwoerd 
historian, D.W. Kruger, noted that: 
demonstrated by the 
on his return. 13 The 
Afrikaner nationalists were not unduly perturbed about 
the exclusion of South Africa from the Commonwealth 
which they had always regarded as a disguised Empire. 
They saw no benefit in any further association with a 
10 Ibid., pp.235-242. 
11 Ib'd 238 __ l_.' p. . 
12 Round Table, Vol.51, No.203, June 1961, p.238. 
'
3 Meiring, Inside Information, p .168. 
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Commonwealth which had utterly changed its character 
and with which South Africa had far less in common 
than with may other States outside. 14 
Verwoerd stated to parliament on his return from the conference 
that the character of the group had changed in the previous ten 
months and "the United Kingdom realised this as well". 15 It was 
no longer a family of nations and had become like the UNO "on a 
smal 1 scale• . 
The Afrikaans press supported Verwoerd' s actions to the hilt. Die 
Burger stated on 16 March that Verwoerd could not continue to 
subject himself to the judgments and criticisms of the other 
members and that is why South Africa was •out". It was done, in 
effect, to maintain •our national honour''. 16 It noted, however, 
that ''clear dangers" remained for South Africa's foreign 
relations and that the damage would have to be limited. Relations 
with Britain, 
because they 
Australia and New Zealand would be strengthened 
•all did what they could, apparently". It also 
expressed some sympathy for the "section of South African opinion 
which valued Commonwealth membership" and argued the need to use 
the opportunity to "build bridges•. 
Die Transvaler adopted a more triumphal approach under an 
editorial entitled "End of the Commonwealth" ("Einde van die 
Statebond'') . 17 It stated that most ''voters'' in South Africa would 
not "shed a tear" for the loss of Commonwealth and claimed that 
•without a doubt" the Commonwealth was dying and belonged to the 
past. Blacks "now had the majority" in the Commonwealth and that 
was ''definitely the axe to the root" of the organization. 
M Kr0ger, Making of a Nation, p.335. 
15 House of Assembly Debates, col.3482-3484, 23 March 1961. 
16 Die Burger, 16 March 1961. 
17 Die Transvaler, 16 March 1961. 
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One year after withdrawal Verwoerd was 
South Africa had thought itself to 
saying that even though 
be independent in the 
Commonwealth, the bindings to the monarchy had been, in fact, 
limitations on complete independence . 18 This feeling, he said, 
disappeared with the republic and when south Africa left the 
Commonwealth. Other countries now saw South Africa as a fully 
independent state without having to keep "half an eye" on London. 
The "subtle atmosphere of seniority" vis-a-vis the United Kingdom 
had disappeared and now it was a case of "Staat tot Staat" 
relations ("a relationship of one independent country to the 
other"). It meant, he said, the "fulfilment of an ideal" of the 
greater part of the population and meant the end of the "gulf" 
between English and Afrikaner. 
The reaction of the two most important extra-parliamentary 
movements representing the non-white majority was in favour of 
South Africa's exclusion from the Commonwealth but they differed 
as to the way forward thereafter. In a publication put out by the 
banned PAC in May 1961, which criticised the ANC's call for a 
general strike and a stay-at-home to protest against the 
inauguration of the republic, it was noted that the ANC was wrong 
to protest against the "white republic" . 19 It went on to ask the 
question what the change "from one form of White Government to 
another" meant to the PAC, or why "we should protest" against a 
president instead of a governor-general which was all the change 
really meant. The rights of the Africans were being sacrificed 
on the "altar of multi-racialism" and it was nationalism that had 
made England the most powerful of European countries for a time. 
It was the "PAC programme", however, that had set in motion a 
process "that pushed out the Christian barbarians from the 
Commonwealth". The objective of severing the South African link 
18 INCH, PV93 (Verwoerd Collection), File 1/4 7 /1/6 
(Republiekwording: 1960-62), Al/7, No.8, "Die Betekenis Van 
Republiekwording vir Suid Afrika", Message from Dr Verwoerd, De 
Wildt, December 1962. 
19 AD 2186 (ANC Collection) , Box H (b) Publications 
periodicals, No. 17. "Mafube", May 1961. 
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wit:h the Commonwealth was "to isolate our adversaries". 
We ourselves are republicans and cannot very wel 1 
fight republicanism. The New Africa will be a 
Republic, not a Monarchy. We will have nothing to do 
with the Queen of England or any other queen for that 
matter. It is precisely because we are succeeding in 
isolating South Africa that the Whites here would have 
us join issue with them by way of demonstrating on the 
eve of the declaration of a Republic that has been 
kicked out of the Commonwealth. Most Whites would be 
happy with a Republic within the Commonwealth, not 
sparing a thought for our long-standing difficulties 
as an oppressed people.w 
Albert Luthuli, for the ANC, had welcomed South Africa's 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth the day after it had occurred. 21 
But the manner in which Verwoerd had achieved withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth was condemned in a pamphlet put out by the Congress 
of Democrats which said that "He went to London to try and keep 
South Africa in the Commonwealth. He failed. That was not a 
victory. It was a defeat for him.''n It went on to say that even 
Macmillan, who was one of Verwoerd's ''mildest critics'', spoke 
truly when he said that the Union's policy seemed "altogether 
remote from, and indeed abhorrent to, the ideals for which 
mankind is struggling in this country''. 
The reaction of the Natal newspaper with a mainly Zulu-speaking 
readership, Ilanga Lase Natal, was to ask what interest Africans 
had in the whole matter. It noted that "young Africans" thought 
that keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth would mean 
condoning government race policies, while the older felt that 
20 Ibid. 
21 Reported in the Yorkshire Post, 16 March 1961. 
22 AD 2186, H(a) Publications - Pamphlets, No.17, "In Defence 
of South Africa", Congress of Democrats, n.d. 
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South Africa "should stay in" because "isolation would encourage 
the government to continue its race policies" . 23 There was, 
however, ''another school of thought'' that stated that since nine 
million South Africans were never consulted they have no interest 
in the matter. The mere fact that the Commonwealth conference 
should have created such "conflicting views" among Africans 
illustrated the ''dangers of non-consultation and non-co-
operation. 11 
The World's editorial on withdrawal was entitled "Now is the hour 
for Verwoerd to keep his word" and it noted that whether Africans 
''exulted'' or were in "sorrow'' about the loss of Commonwealth 
membership the fact was that Verwoerd had been strengthened. 24 
"Even some English whites think he has done a great thing." 
Verwoerd now had to prove his Bantustan policy was not just an 
"opium smoke" disguising the "supremacy of whites". Time was on 
''the Africans' side", it concluded. 
Indian Opinion wrote an editorial on the progress of the talks 
which was published on 17 March but which had been written before 
Verwoerd' s "dramatic announcement" of withdrawal. 25 It expressed 
considerable disappointment at the developments during the 
conference to that point noting that South Africa's membership 
seemed to be assured and that Britain had used its financial 
clout to brow-beat the Afro-Asians into accepting South Africa -
"a sad commentary on either the economic weakness of the Afro-
Asian countries or on their attitude to self-respect''. On 24 
March, however, a new editorial brought matters up to date and 
was entitled "A Worsening Future" . 26 It noted Verwoerd's 
"triumphant" return and the reception accorded him which 
resembled "public appearances of the Nazi leader, Hitler". It 
23 Ilanga Lase Natal, 18 March 1961. 
24 The World, 25 March 1961. 
25 Indian Opinion, 17 March 1961. 
26 Indian Opinion, 24 March 1961. 
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claimed that he had gone to the conference determined to defy 
Commonwealth opinion and had "planned the dramatic withdrawal in 
order to become a demi-god in the eyes of the Nationalists in 
South Africa" . 
The consequences were that non-Europeans would have to face a 
"worsening future" in South Africa. The question was to what 
extent Britain and Australia would enter into "collusion" with 
South Africa by signing bilateral agreements to "cushion the 
effects of withdrawal". Verwoerd would try to draw the older 
Commonwealth members together against the Afro-Asians and Menzies 
of Australia had already "responded to his overtures". The "die-
hard" Tories in England would try the same by urging the 
government to sign "most favoured nation" treaties with South 
Africa, thus flouting the sentiments of the Afro-Asian prime 
ministers. 
Newspaper commentary on South Africa's withdrawal in Britain and 
Ireland was mostly against Verwoerd and on the side of the 
Commonwealth but two leading British newspaper refrained from 
expressing any blame. The Times editorial entitled "The 
Commonwealth Preserved" ended with the words: 
Relief that the Commonwealth has stood an 
unprecedented strain must be coupled with a message of 
heartfelt goodwill to the peoples of all colours in 
the Union of South Africa. 27 
The Financial Times editorial on withdrawal stated that: 
The chief function of the Commonwealth in the world 
today is to form a bridge between white and coloured, 
rich and poor, neutral and committed. That bridge has 
been preserved. But the price has been a high one -
27 Times, 17 March 1961. 
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the loss of one of the Commonweal th members. 28 
The Daily Sketch said "We must work for the day when white South 
Africans realise their policy is out of step with the world and 
reapply for admission to the Commonwealth. " 29 
The Irish Times had an editorial entitled ''Good Riddance'' which 
compared the situation with the time Ireland left the 
Commonwealth and when Ireland had been" criticised as "politically 
uninspired" and "troublesome". If the Commonwealth was to 
maintain a voice in the Free World it was "well rid of South 
Africa" . 30 But it was pointed out that the crisis in the 
Commonwealth was not yet over and that one group of states wanted 
close relations with South Africa to continue while others did 
not. An "Irish Solution" was being discussed on citizenship and 
other questions and Britain was "eager to be friendly''. 
The Glasgow Herald reported the "shock" with which the news was 
received in the House of Commons with the Labour MP, James 
Callaghan, saying that his first thoughts were for the millions 
of whites and blacks who disagreed with apartheid. 31 Socialists 
regretted that they would be cut off from the Commonwealth but 
said that the "struggle" would grow: 
Those who will suffer most in isolation are those to whom 
the Commonwealth meant something more than economic 
preferences: the South Africans, Dutch and English, who 
fought for the United Kingdom when Dr Verwoerd sympathised 
with her enemies. Those whom the Commonwealth action may be 
designed to help will gain nothing now that their rulers 
have lost touch with the more liberal outside world. 
28 Financial Times, 16 March 1961. 
29 Daily Sketch, 16 March 1961. 
30 Irish Times, 16 March 1961. 
31 Glasgow Herald, 16 March 1961. 
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The short and long-term consequences of withdrawal were difficult 
to predict at the time but most commentators then and since have 
noted how little change there was in South Africa's relations 
with the "old" Commonwealth countries at first. At the same time 
one can also note how soon it was that the English-speaking South 
Africans forgot about their ties to the Commonwealth and became 
reconciled to their new republic. Round Table noted in June 1961 
that: "Nowhere. . . was there the opinion being expressed that 
South Africa's return to the Commonwealth was a matter of 
"practical politics". Before March 15 it was probable that policy 
on the lines of the United Party's would have been seen as 
sufficiently liberal to keep South Africa in but not long after 
it was accepted that even a policy as "advanced" as that of the 
Progressive Party would be insufficient to get her re-admitted. 32 
The United Party leader, De Villiers Graaff, noted only a few 
months after withdrawal that there was a price that the UP was 
not prepared to pay for readmission to the Commonwealth and that 
included white leadership. The party conference at the end of the 
year also ruled out a return to the Commonwealth unless it were 
in South Africa's interests. 33 The staunch defender of the 
British connection in Natal, Douglas Mitchell, had also put 
racial solidarity above sentiment when in September he said that 
South Africa would only return to a "White Commonweal th". 34 
Vale notes that the main consequence for English South Africans 
was that with the loss of the Commonwealth and British 
connections their views took on more of a "truly South African 
coloration" and increasingly put their support behind the 
Nationalists.~ A more ''bi-partisan'' approach in foreign affairs 
between government and the UP opposition was the result. Those 
32 Round Table, Vol.51, No.203, June 1961, p.240. 
33 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.83. 
34 Reported in Digest of South African Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 7, 
4 September 1961, p.8. 
35 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p. 418. 
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who could not accept the loss of Commonwealth or the racial 
policies of both main parties threw their lot in with the 
"sharper" opposition policies of the Progressives.M 
Verwoerd had gambled on an early election to capitalise on the 
growing support in the ranks of the English speakers for his race 
policies and his decision to withdraw from the Commonwealth. In 
election speeches he said that the idea of rejoining the 
Commonwealth was •unrealistic• because of the dominance of the 
Afro-Asians and because the British EEC application would have 
an effect on the binding factors of the Commonweal th. 37 How could 
it be in South Africa's interest to return to the Commonwealth, 
he argued, when preferences had disappeared and when the Afro-
Asian group was giving instructions. 
The results of the election confirmed the National Party's 
diagnosis of the white electorate's feelings concerning the 
events of that year. There was an overwhelming election victory 
for the NP on 18 October, with the NP winning 115 out of 160 
seats and with only two seats short of a two-thirds majority in 
parliament. 38 Although the UP had increased its seats from 42 to 
49 it had lost votes, whereas the PP only obtained one seat, that 
of Helen Suzman in Houghton. For the first time since 1948 the 
Nationalists actually polled more votes than the official 
opposition. 39 It was after this election that the two new 
English- speaking ministers were appointed to cabinet, Frank 
Waring and E.A. Trollip, with Waring saying that he was one of 
thousands of English who were "not prepared to hand over 
36 Ibid. 
37 Digest of South African Affairs, Vol. 8, No .1 7, 4 September 
1961, p.12. 
38 Ibid., Vol.8, No.21, 30 October 1961, p.l. 
39 The voting figures as quoted by Digest of South African 
Affairs were 370431 NP, 302875 UP and 69042 PP. (Ibid., Vol.8, 
No.22, 13 November 1961, p.3}. 
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political responsibility to the Blacks''.w As Barber and Barratt 
put it, "overall the English speakers were being invited to join 
in the defence of the white state, not to have a full share in 
controlling it''. 41 
(b) British-South African relations after withdrawal 
As for the consequences of withdrawal for South Africa's 
relations with Britain, one commentator has noted that it "at 
least enabled South Africa to preserve its vital commercial and 
diplomatic relations with Britain outside of what was to become 
the highly-charged anti-Apartheid Commonwealth forum" . 42 Or, as 
Miller has noted, it was "business as usual" for Britain and 
South Africa. 4J 
However, this was not apparent at first to many people because 
of the conflicting statements which seemed to be coming out of 
South Africa and Britain soon after withdrawal. Round Table noted 
in June 1961 Verwoerd's desire to keep on friendly terms with 
Britain but there were, "on the other flank", statements by the 
Commonwealth secretary, Duncan Sandys, to the effect that South 
Africa could not expect the same treatment as Ireland. Similarly, 
African leaders such as Tom Mboya were saying that by continuing 
to grant South Africa economic preferences some Commonweal th 
countries would be undoing the "good work" of the London 
conference . 44 
During the debate in the British parliament on 22 March 
concerning South Africa's withdrawal, Sandys gave an ambiguous 
outline of his governments's future intentions. He said that 
40 Ibid. 
41 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p.92. 
42 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p. 416. 
~ Quoted in Vale, pp.419-420. 
44 Round Table, Vol. 51, No.203, June 1961, p.241. 
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Britain would no longer be inhibited about expressing opinions 
about apartheid in the UNO but would not ignore the "legal 
position".~ Britain did not believe in ''loosely worded 
resolutions". On defence ties with South Africa after withdrawal 
he had said that while several years previously the special 
arrangements regarding the Middle East had lapsed, there were 
still other arrangements such as 
continued. These arrangements 
the Simonstown Agreement that 
would be the subject of 
"examination" but there were no commitments yet. 
He had heard some suggestions concerning citizenship that South 
Africans should be given the same status as the Irish. But 
Ireland was a geographical part of the British Isles and so was 
a ''different situation''. As for trading relations, they rested 
on bilateral agreements and withdrawal from the Commonwealth did 
not affect them. He had welcomed Dr Verwoerd's statement that 
South Africa wished to remain a member of the sterling area and 
he hoped that trade between the two countries would be 
"maintained and expanded". However, he added that although he was 
aware Verwoerd thought there would be no changes in the British-
South African relationship and that Verwoerd hoped for continued 
strong links, "for us the Commonwealth is more than just 
'bilateral links' ... it is above all a collective relationship in 
which we move towards thinking, working together for broad, 
common objectives". He also said Britain had to be careful "not 
to destroy the value of Commonwealth membership by giving to 
those who are not members all the privileges of those who are". 
The UP opposition leader in South Africa, De Villiers Graaff, 
quoted from this speech in support of his view that Verwoerd had 
been mistaken in believing that relations with Britain would not 
45 CA, A1646 (Donges Collection), Vol. 331 (Republic: July 
1953 - May 1961), Minute 11/45 (United Kingdom Information Office 
Cape Town), Press Note 134, Text of Speech by Secretary of State 
for Commonwealth Relations replying to Debate on South Africa in 
House of Commons, 22 March 1961. 
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change. 46 He expressed doubts about the "non-contractual 
preferences'' and what would become of them as well as agreements 
such as the Commonwealth sugar quota and surmised that if there 
were to be a change of government in England these could easily 
be ended. He quoted a former Labour colonial secretary, A. 
Dugdale, who had said that South Africa should be treated as a 
"foreign country as she had chosen to be one". 47 Eric Louw 
replied by quoting the export-import figures to show that 
British exports to South Africa exceeded South African exports 
to Britain by some £82m in 1960 and no one could "imagine for one 
moment'' that Britain would risk losing such a valuable trade 
"just because she does not like our colour policy". 48 
Louw's predictions were in fact correct. Economic and military 
( Simonstown and arms sales) connections continued and South 
Africa remained one of the most important export markets for 
Britain. Indeed, as Vale points out, 49 the "economic imperative" 
together with British responsibilities in the protectorates and 
the Rhodesias ensured that there could be no suggestion of any 
support by Britain for the calls by the Afro-Asian and communist 
blocs for the breaking of all ties with the Republic. 
As far as Britain's UNO voting record was concerned its soon 
became clear that "Yes" votes on apartheid resolutions would be 
watered down by refusal to endorse sub-paragraphs that sought 
specific measures against South Africa. The British 
representative in the Special Political Committee in early April 
had supported the Asian-sponsored resolution condemning apartheid 
but had refused to endorse the paragraphs advising "separate or 
collective action" against south Africa.~ He had said earlier 
46 House of Assembly Debates, col. 3523, 23 march 1961. 
47 Ibid., col.3525, 23 March 1961. 
48 Ibid., col.3531, 23 March 1961. 
49 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", pp.419-420. 
5° Commonwealth Survey, Vol. 7, No.10, 9 May 1961, p.466. 
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in a debate on South West Africa that: 
The United Kingdom Government had, by its policies in 
Africa and elsewhere, probably done more than anyone 
to throw the practice of Apartheid into isolation and 
it had no wish to defend its application, but the 
United Kingdom declined to vote for resolutions which 
though sometimes acceptable in substance were 
objectionable in law. 51 
The reaction from Verwoerd, was, in any case, reassuring to the 
British government. He made a public statement in April saying 
that he did not regard the British vote as an ''unfriendly act" 
nor as signifying the end of bonds of friendship between the two 
nations. 52 
It was not long before the British government was to be arguing 
for the preservation of British-South African bilateral ties as 
a matter of utmost priority and in the interest of both 
governments. This was evident in the British cabinet discussions 
on the ''Standstill" bill (which allowed for a continuation of 
the status quo in British-South African relations at least until 
31 May 1962), and other longer-term bilateral issues following 
withdrawal. 
While Sandys had been arguing in parliament that the impression 
should be avoided that South Africa was still a Commonwealth 
country •in all but name", he was suggesting to Cabinet that 
bilateral interests should be preserved and that temporary 
arrangements should be made allowing South Africa to be treated 
in British law "as a Commonwealth country" . 53 His memorandum of 
51 Ibid., p.469. 
52 Reported in Digest of South African Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 8. 
14 April 1961, p.5. 
53 PRO, CAB 129/104, C. (61)39, "South Africa -Consequences 
of Withdrawal from the Commonwealth", Memorandum by the Secretary 
of State for Commonwealth Relations, 17 March 1961. 
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17 March noted Verwoerd's desire to maintain good relations and 
to co-operate as in the past and stated that the •range of 
interests on both sides was so wide that it would be impossible 
for us to arrive at a permanent settlement with the Union 
Government before the Republic is declared". It was advised that 
a short ''Standstill'' bill be introduced whose purpose would be 
to "preserve the existing position for a period of say ten months 
from 31 May•. This, wrote Sandys, would give Britain "elbow room" 
for negotiations and South Africa "would continue to be treated 
under United Kingdom law as though she were still a Commonwealth 
country". 
I think this would be perfectly acceptable to our 
Commonwealth partners. It is certainly the most 
practical way of ensuring that we arrive at a full and 
sensible bilateral understanding with South Africa. 
The British cabinet discussed these recommendations on 21 March 
and discussion showed there was general agreement in principle 
with the Commonwealth secretary's proposal and that it •would be 
important to avoid giving the impression that after her 
withdrawal South Africa was to remain a member of the 
Commonweal th in all but name". 54 But a more sufficient period was 
required for the ''Standstill" bill to apply so as to allow all 
the problems to be "fully considered". The expiry date was 
therefore amended to 31 May 1962. 
The "Standstill" bill was introduced by Sandys in the Commons 
on 29 March. It was entitled the "Republic of South Africa 
(Temporary Provisions) Bill" and was described by the 
Commonweal th secretary as "a .... measure designed to maintain 
unchanged the laws governing the relationship between the United 
Kingdom ... and South Africa for a period of one year after the 
54 CAB 128/35 Part 1, C.C. (61)15, 7, 21 March 1961, pp.100-
101. 
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latter becomes a republic on 31 May 1961''.~ Sandys claimed the 
bill was necessary as the withdrawal of South Africa had created 
some legal problems which could not be settled ''hurriedly'' or 
"without negotiation" with the Union Government. The bill would 
give a "breathing space" during which both governments could 
consider the important questions which had to be answered. These 
included the question of nationality and citizenship, financial 
arrangements and the relationship with the three high commission 
territories. 
From the South African side a similar process of stock-taking had 
begun concerning the effects of withdrawal and memoranda from the 
various state departments in 1961 had been collected by Donges 
in reply to a questionnaire his finance department sent out on 
how a republic outside the Commonwealth would affect certain 
treaties with Commonwealth countries. 56 The replies, which later 
formed the basis of various pieces of legislation tidying up the 
legal position after withdrawal, were notable for the degree of 
conservatism they expressed about the future relationship and 
their recommendations were, on the whole, in favour of unchanged 
relations with "old" Commonwealth countries while a "wait-and-
see'' attitude would be adopted concerning the reactions of the 
newer members. All of this concurred with the policy framework 
announced by Verwoerd in the Assembly in March when he had 
expressed the desire for normal relations to continue with South 
Africa's Commonwealth "friends". They also reflected the desire 
not to alienate English speakers in the interests of national 
"reconciliation" and thus recommended avoiding petty restrictions 
on matters like citizenship and immigration. 
While the British "Standstill" bill was being debated and 
ratified (with some Labour Party opposition) in the British 
parliament Sandys was sending morale-boosting telegrams to all 
55 Commonwealth Survey, Vol.7, No.8, 11 April 1961, p.361. 
56 A 1646 (Donges), Vol.331, MIN 11/45 (Republic: 1961 June -
November) , "Summary of Departmental Memoranda on Commonwealth 
Relations", n.d. 
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the British high commissioners in Commonwealth countries 
outlining the position as he saw it after withdrawal. 57 In them 
he reiterated the point made in parliament on 22 March that South 
Africa's withdrawal had had the effect of ''uniting more closely 
the nations of the Commonwealth". Now the "crisis" was over there 
was "no doubt" the unity and moral standing of the Commonwealth 
throughout the world had increased. South Africa's departure 
provided the ''psychological climate for a new step forward in 
Commonwealth co-operation". He told them that "we" should now 
"take the lead" in strengthening Commonwealth links and widening 
the scope of consultation on matters of common ground. 
In London, however, the South African United Front headed by Dr 
Dadoo and Oliver Tambo began to organise an international 
campaign for world-wide economic sanctions against South Africa. 
Dr Dadoo was quoted as saying: 
What we want now is an embargo on South Africa - no 
trade, no oil shipments, no port and landing 
facilities for South African transport in fact 
complete isolation of White South Africa from our 
continent. 58 
The Labour opposition newpaper, Tribune, called for the end to 
all economic preferences and facilities which South Africa had 
enjoyed as a Commonwealth member and noted that: "To continue to 
provide these facilities not only negates the result of South 
African withdrawal, but is also unfair to members of the 
Commonwealth. South Africa must pay the full price" . 59 
But only a month after the republic had been inaugurated under 
57 PRO, CAB 129/104, C. (61)40, "Cabinet: The Commonwealth", 
Note by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 5 
April 1961. 
58 Indian Opinion, 31 March 1961. 
H Tribune, 26 May 1961. 
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conditions of virtual martial law, the British cabinet was 
discussing the question of arms supplies to South Africa and was 
arguing for their continuance subject to certain conditions. It 
also discussed how best to preserve its economic interests in the 
country and considered how to placate South Africa over the issue 
of refugees into the high commission territories. It was also 
considered whether repealing the relevant sections of the South 
Africa Act of 1909 was advisable for the territories' future. 
At the June cabinet meeting on defence agreements the British 
defence minister, Harold Watkinson, reported the outcome of 
discussions with the South Africans.@ He noted that the South 
Africans had withdrawn their request for small arms ammunition 
and had thus "saved us the embarrassment of having to refuse this 
on the ground that it might be connected in the public mind with 
measures to suppress civil disturbances". 
A list of other requirements had been submitted by the South 
Africans, including aircraft, and in accordance with the 
conclusions of the cabinet's Africa Committee it was advised that 
the supply of items required primarily ''for military purposes'' 
should continue, subject to usual inter-departmental procedures. 
The Simonstown Agreement would be maintained and the South 
African government would relinquish the radar sites in the 
territories to which Britain was committed under existing defence 
arrangements. It was noted that "It might, however, be difficult 
to dissuade them from pressing for the right to send troops 
through the high commission territories to South West Africa." 
The cabinet agreed that 
although some caution had to be exercised in applying 
in respect of the export of arms a selective policy 
based on political factors, a distinction could 
properly be drawn between items required for defence 
purposes and those which might be used for suppression 
@PRO, CAB 128/35, Part 1, C.C. (61)36, 5, 29 June 1961. 
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of internal disturbances. 
Those required "primarily for military purposes" would therefore 
continue to be supplied subject to usual departmental procedures. 
This was to remain as British policy, despite United Nations 
calls for a comprehensive arms embargo, until the election of a 
Labour government in 1964. (Even the Labour Party, however, on 
grounds of economic expediency, could not bring itself to cancel 
orders for aircraft placed by South Africa during Macmillan's 
premiership) . 
On 2 August the lord chancellor, Viscount Kilmuir, submitted to 
cabinet a memorandum on future relations with South Africa that 
stated that the inter-departmental commission set up in March to 
make recommendations on matters concerning future relations had 
completed most of its work. Matters requiring urgent 
consideration such as political and economic consultations, the 
supply of arms and general defence co-operation had been 
"satisfactorily disposed of" . 61 The Africa Commit tee of cabinet 
was busy considering matters such as sugar exports and tactics 
for discussions with South Africa on future relations. Such 
matters dealt with by the Africa Committee were guided by the 
general principles enunciated by Sandys in parliament on 22 March 
to the effect that ''we should avoid continuing to give South 
Africa 'Commonweal th treatment' unless it appeared clearly in our 
interests to do so". The Africa Committee agreed with this 
principle and with the "flexible" way in which it had been 
applied by officials. 
This "flexibility" was soon demonstrated in matters such as 
citizenship, immigration, economic ties and the high commission 
territories. In all of them the result was to create a situation 
which made it possible for South Africa to continue as a 
Commonwealth member in all but name as far as the United Kingdom 
was concerned. On "Nationality", for example, it had been decided 
61 CAB 129/106, C. (61) 126, "Future Relations with South 
Africa", Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, 2 August 1961. 
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to treat most South Africans as ''aliens'' except for those with 
''strong British connections". The latter would be allowed to 
register as British citizens before a cut-off date of 31 December 
1965. This was not an "Irish Solution" and it meant there was 
"merely a three-year extension of existing provisions of the 
British Nationality Act". But there would also be provisions for 
those South African citizens, ''who through no fault of their 
own•, failed to register by that date. The committee hoped it 
would be possible to persuade the South African government not 
to act against those who registered as British citizens by 
depriving them of their South African citizenship. 
On economic relations the report noted that British financial and 
economic interests in South Africa comprised of £900m of 
investment and £165m of exports annually. 62 In order to 
"safeguard" these interests and to keep South Africa in the 
sterling area the committee recommended that •we should aim at 
maintaining our present trade relations with South Africa as 
nearly as possible unchanged". The Ottawa agreements were not 
affected and South Africa was expected to "help us" on these 
negotiations "since she receives more than she gives" (in terms 
of preferences). If Britain were to join the EEC she would have 
to terminate these trade agreements with South Africa (although 
she "might try to obtain derogations on her behalf"). Britain had 
to be prepared to tell her so at an "appropriate moment". 
As this would largely destroy the value of the trade 
agreement as a general bargaining counter we should 
not vouchsafe such a warning prematurely, although our 
decision to apply for membership of the Common Market 
may lead South Africa to raise the question at an 
early stage. 
On the high commission territories, the report noted that it was 
much in the interests of the high commission territories for 
62 Ibid., p.161. 
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Britain to retain South Africa's goodwill "by being as 
accommodating as possible throughout the negotiations on future 
relations". 63 The commit tee recommended that the aim should be 
to keep relations between the territories and South Africa 
unchanged and if possible "to improve working arrangements". In 
particular it was necessary to continue Part 2 of the Fugitive 
Offenders Act with two modifications - the exclusion of political 
off enders and of offenses not punishable in both South Africa and 
the territory concerned. Britain would also try to improve the 
Swazi sugar industry. It was also necessary to consider problems 
relating to the 1909 South Africa Act, notably Sections 151 and 
150 which dealt with transfer. The committee felt the real choice 
lay between retaining or repealing the whole act. These issues 
were "at present" dormant and the repeal of the act 
might stimulate the South Africans to raise them, 
which would in itself be undesirable. On the other 
hand, to retain the Act would probably arouse 
criticism in the Territories, the Rhodesias and 
Parliament. 
The committee therefore recommended a "deferred decision" until 
the progress of the high commissioner's negotiations became more 
clear. 
On the Commonwealth sugar agreement (CSA), the committee 
recommended that South Africa cease membership after the end of 
1961. It would be necessary to inform South African sugar 
producers of the decision so that they could plan for an 
agreement with the International sugar conference the following 
month. It was recommended, however, to replace the CSA agreement 
with a "bilateral" one which would mean that Britain would buy 
the amount of sugar guaranteed to South Africa under the CSA, of 
150,000 tons per annum, at present or future CSA prices, 
63 Ibid., p.162. 
496 
whichever was lower. 64 "We might further agree to buy not more 
than another 25,000 tons at world prices." The agreement would 
last between four to seven years. The reason for this was that 
it would ''help us in negotiations with South Africa", 
particularly to safeguard the Swazi sugar industry which enjoyed 
a guaranteed market in South Africa and some indirect benefit 
from a high CSA price. It was recommended that the "assurance" 
be given to the Swazi that if their outlet in South Africa were 
reduced, the United Kingdom would ensure alternative outlets in 
the extent of "keeping them no worse off than previously". 
All these recommendations were discussed by cabinet on 3 August 
and general agreement with them was noted. 65 The sugar agreement, 
however, was seen as a ''heavy price'' for Britain to pay in the 
hope of advantages in other areas, especially since there was "an 
embarrassing surplus of sugar produced in the Commonwealth and 
we did not need to import from South Africa". But if there was 
no commitment by Britain before other objectives were sure to be 
secured and since Britain would otherwise have to take Swazi 
sugar which had a guaranteed market at that time in South Africa, 
the agreement could be considered a "reasonably satisfactory 
bargain". 
In September Lord Kilmuir presented cabinet with some additional 
and "minor" problems concerning the future relationship with the 
new republic of South Africa, one of which was the rate to charge 
the republic for press telegrams. 66 The problem was that Britain 
could not continue to charge the same Commonwealth rate of ld per 
word "without strong protests from the Commonwealth 
Telecommunications Board and international press agencies". On 
the other hand, to switch to the foreign rate of 7d would cause 
64 Ibid. 
65 CAB 128/35 Part 2, C.C. (61)47, 2, 3 August 1961, pp.295-
296. 
66 CAB 129/104, C. (61) 143, "Future Relations with South 
Africa", Memorandum by the Lord Chancellor, 27 September 1961. 
497 
a sharp reduction in press traffic thus "weakening our influence 
on South African opinion" and British contacts with those South 
Africans with whom she wished to have contacts. It might also 
"cause friction between South Africa and the High Commission 
Territories'' (who were still on the ld rate) as a result of 
traffic for South Africa being routed through the territories. 
His committee therefore recommended a "compromise" rate of 4.5d 
but that urgent telegrams should go up to lOd which would conform 
with ''international practice''. Commonwealth rates had also been 
withdrawn in the cases of Burma, Israel and Jordan, he added. 
Another concession recommended by Kilmuir was that South Africans 
should be exempt from "aliens control" until 31 December 1962 on 
entry to Britain which would give them much the same grace 
period as that enjoyed by Burma and Somaliland previously; and 
that there would also be no visa requirements. This would be 
subject to the assurance that South Africa would reciprocate. 
Visa provisions would then "conform with our general policy 
throughout the world". 
These policy recommendations were, on the whole, 
with the recommendations that had emerged from the 
in agreement 
South African 
side when government departments had submitted to the interior 
ministry their comments on the possible consequences for South 
Africa of leaving the Commonwealth.m In terms of immigration and 
visa requirements, for example, the South Africans intended to 
keep the situation unchanged and thus were prepared to allow dual 
citizenship to continue and to exempt Commonwealth citizens (of 
the "white" Commonwealth countries) from the restrictions 
applying to aliens. As far as the economic preferences were 
concerned, most of the contractual agreements were to be 
continued unaltered and it was only a few of the non-contractual 
preferences (mostly from New Zealand) that were dependent on 
Commonwealth membership that were in doubt. Essential interests 
of an economic or political nature were to be preserved by both 
m See pp.490-491. 
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sides and, for all intents and purposes, South Africa was to 
continue to be a Commonwealth country, in practice, if not in 
name, as far as the South African government and the old "white" 
dominions were concerned. 
Diefenbaker's Canada proved to be as markedly disinclined to 
alter the substance of bilateral relations with South Africa as 
Britain had been. Peter Lyon quotes the senior external affairs 
adviser to Diefenbaker as saying in a letter to the Canadian high 
commissioner in Ghana that: 
The reaction in Canada has been generally good [to 
South Africa's withdrawal], although there is still 
some controversy over whether the Government should 
follow up by supporting such things as economic 
sanctions against South Africa. There is no so sign at 
all that the Government is willing to do this. The 
Prime Minister's attitude is that we have gone far 
enough in showing what we think of South Africa's 
racial policy, and that economic sanctions, apart from 
being ineffectual, would be harmful to Canada since 
the trade balance is strongly favourable to us. 68 
Towards the end of May 1961, as South Africa's republican status 
outside the Commonweal th approached, the Canadian cabinet decided 
that no change would be made in Canadian policies on the export 
of arms, the existing preferential trade arrangements, or on 
immigration. Diefenbaker did not demur with these decisions 
although he expressed some embarrassment over the publicity given 
to the continued trade preferences and also wondered whether 
enough thought had been devoted by his government to some of the 
possible consequences of South Africa's withdrawal.• Much the 
same could be said for the governments of Australia and New 
Zealand. It was left to the anti-apartheid movements in the old 
68 Lyon, "Changing Commonwealth Policies", p. 38. 
69 Ibid. , pp. 3 8 - 3 9. 
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Commonwealth and to the Afro-Asian countries to take up the 
campaign for the total isolation of South Africa after 1961. 
( c) Verwoerd and the high commission territories the 
Commonwealth connection. 
Reference has been made throughout the above account of South 
Africa's departure from the Commonwealth to the high commission 
territories and their role in negotiations and discussions 
between Britain and South Africa prior to and immediately after 
the 1961 Commonwealth conference. It is necessary to fill in a 
few gaps in the narrative by taking up some aspects of South 
African and British policy towards the high commission 
territories from the end of Strijdom's period and bringing it up 
to 1961. 
It was noted at the end of the last section (Part 3: the Strijdom 
Years) that Verwoerd was moving towards the position of seeing 
the protectorates as eventually falling into the grand plan of 
the homelands system and as being part of a Commonwealth of South 
African states which was partly envisaged 
(Bantu) Self Government Act of 1959. 70 
by the Promotion of 
As plans for the 
advancement of the homelands continued, "the British territories 
became associated in Pretoria's eyes with its bantustan 
policy•. 71 Verwoerd denied that he had ever said that the 
protectorates were important to apartheid or to the expansion of 
the bantustans scheme but he had often added that it would be in 
the interests of the inhabitants to join in. 72 
In the aftermath of withdrawal from the Commonwealth, he said the 
British policy of granting the protectorates separate 
constitutions had "killed" the idea of them joining the Homelands 
70 See page 267. 
71 Barber and Barratt, South Africa's Foreign Policy, p. 95. 
72 Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, p.194 and 
Digest of South African Affairs, Vol 8, No.8, 14 April 1961, p.5. 
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system. 73 This, however, did not end his campaign to try and get 
Britain to hand them over. In 1963, two years after leaving the 
Commonwealth, Verwoerd suggested they become bantustans under 
South African guidance and that they would thus achieve quicker 
prosperity than if they were on their own. 74 
However, as Hyam notes, the departure of South Africa from the 
Commonwealth meant the issue of transfer had "fizzled out with 
a whimper". The "bang" had been in 1948 but now that the South 
Africa Act had lapsed legally the clause on transfer in the 
Schedule "no longer held good" as South Africa was now a foreign 
country. 75 Verwoerd, "being a practical man" realised this but 
still maintained an interest in the territories from the 
strategic, economic and political viewpoint, especially in the 
matter of refugees from South Africa. Hence his attempt to 
persuade Britain in 1963. 
Nevertheless the years 1958 to 1961 saw much speculation in the 
press and also in the ranks of British officialdom about 
Verwoerd' s intentions concerning the protectorates and it is 
clear that the issue was at the forefront of British thinking 
when it came to policy concerning the republic and South Africa's 
Commonweal th membership. John Maud as high commissioner was 
responsible for the administration of the territories and was as 
concerned as his predecessors had been about the implications of 
British policy towards the Union and its effect, in turn, on 
South Africa' s relations with the territories. A "softly, 
softly" approach to South Africa's republican ambitions was as 
much dictated by these considerations as by the more general 
economic and strategic factors. 
The years after 1959, as part of the general decolonisation moves 
73 Digest of South African Affairs, Vol.8, No.8, 14 April 
1961, p.5. 
74 
• 1 6 Hyam, Fai ure, p.19 . 
75 Ibid. 
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by the British, saw a somewhat belated effort to grasp for a more 
tangible positive political assertion of Britain's remaining 
responsibilities in southern Africa. The thrust of British policy 
towards the territories now became one of bringing them to self-
government as a more or less conscious attempt to prevent them 
falling into apartheid hands. 76 At the same time, however, the 
South African government under Verwoerd was still thinking of 
transfer, not only for reasons of national prestige but because 
of the need to have a uniform bantu policy for the whole area. 
The territories were now seen to be a natural complement to the 
homelands system. The issue was made more urgent for both sides 
by the flight of political refugees, particularly after 
Sharpeville, and South Africa's attempts to have the British 
authorities co-operate in their return. This created considerable 
embarrassment for the British government and helped to keep the 
territories ''on the boil" as a highly public issue in South 
Africa and Britain. 
In November of 1958 a minor political storm had erupted over 
Verwoerd's oblique threat of economic warfare against the 
protectorates if South Africa failed to get her way. The British 
had responded that they would find the means to retaliate if such 
threats were carried out.n Verwoerd had reportedly stated that 
in certain circumstances the Union might not •continue to take 
the surplus inhabitants of the protectorates". 
The Rand Daily Mail reported on 14 November that the Transvaal 
Congress of the NP had called on the government to do "everything 
possible" to ensure the protectorates did not become estranged 
from the Union because that would hamper the application of 
apartheid in the Union. 78 However, as the Rand Daily Mail pointed 
out, Verwoerd' s statement to the party congress that the 
protectorates would be freer and more prosperous under his rule 
~ Hyam, Failure, p.195. 
77 Sunday Times, 17 November 1958. 
78 Rand Daily Mail, 14 November 1959. 
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than under British rule was "unlikely" to make an impression on 
the average inhabitant of the territories who was "not by any 
means ignorant of the difference between his status and that of 
the African in the Union". 
In February 1959 it was reported that the minister of bantu 
administration had said in the Senate that "when" the territories 
were incorporated the Africans would occupy half the land area 
of the Union. 79 This, claimed the Rand Daily Mail was a 
"remarkably frank indication that the Government's apartheid 
policy depends on the incorporation of the Protectorates". South 
Africa's chances of incorporation were, however, "close to 
vanishing point". 
In June 1959 the Sunday Times in Johannesburg reported that the 
British had once again rebuffed South African overtures for 
transfer. South Africa had been informed, claimed the newspaper, 
that Britain was no longer prepared to discuss transfer and that 
South Africa had been asked not to raise the question again. 00 
South Africa had def erred to this request and had abandoned the 
subject but would raise it again- at a more propitious time. 
Verwoerd and Louw knew the depth of feeling in London about the 
issue and "appreciated the difficulties of the British 
government" . 
In October it was predicted by South Africa magazine that 
Verwoerd would raise the matter of the protectorates in his talks 
with Macmillan in February 1960 and that he would press Macmillan 
to allow them to join a Commonwealth of South African states 
(Bantustans) because he knew already "the impossibility of 
transfer". 81 As we saw in a previous chapter, the discussions in 
Cape Town did include some mention of the territories by Verwoerd 
and Macmillan and that Macmillan had refused to take note of any 
~Rand Daily Mail, 9 February 1959. 
00 Sunday Times, 14 June 1959. 
81 South Africa (London), 28 November 1959. 
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protests by the Union concerning the policy of granting self-
government by Britain for the territories.u 
In the meantime the Nationalists had been sounding out white 
opinion in the protectorates as a possible pressure tactic to use 
in negotiations. The Verwoerd collection in Bloemfontein reveals 
some correspondence between South African officials and white 
settlers in the territories which could be construed as attempts 
by South Africa to use these settlers as political "Trojan 
horses" concerning incorporation. A letter from Verwoerd' s 
secretary, J.F. Barnard, to a 
Bechuanaland in 1958 assured 
B.J. Wartington of Francistown in 
him, for 
given over to whites in Bechuanaland in 
example, 
the Tati 
that the areas 
and Tuli blocks 
would remain under white control ''when the protectorates are 
incorporated" ( "wanneer die Protektorate ingelyf word") . 83 
Verwoerd also corresponded with a certain Jan van Wyk de Vries 
of Linden Johannesburg who claimed to be an adviser of the Swazi 
King Sobhuza II and who promised to help Verwoerd with "short 
reports" on developments in Swaziland which he would keep 
"confidential" . 84 De Vries was of the opinion that Sobhuza was 
dissatisfied with British control and that there was a "strong 
element" in favour of "toenadering'' with South Africa. Verwoerd 
had also promised to take up the case of the Tuli Block farmers 
in Bechuanaland who wanted to declare independence and then join 
the Union. He told the lawyers acting for these farmers that he 
would try to present their case to Macmillan when he arrived. 85 
However, in a reply to a Dominee D.S. Malan of Mafeking who 
suggested action by the Union to incorporate Bechuanaland because 
82 Seep.355. 
83 INCH, 
(Protectorates: 
B.J.Wartington, 
PV93 (Verwoerd Collection), File 1/42/1/4 
General, 1951-1960), Letter from J.F.Barnard to 
12 December 1958. 
84 Ibid., J. Van Wyk de Vries - Verwoerd, 21 January 1959. 
~Ibid., J.F. Barnard - Wessels en Le Roux, Prokureurs, 16 
January 1960. 
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of white dissatisfaction there with British rule, Verwoerd 
replied that any attempt at annexation by South Africa would mean 
''war'' with Britain but that possibly the Tuli Block areas could 
be "exchanged for some Black areas" . 86 
The refugee question became of heightened importance during 1959 
when rumours of ANC-planned demonstrations, to coincide with 26 
June (Freedom Charter day) and the consequent police crackdown, 
spread. A letter from the resident commissioner in Mbabane, 
Swaziland, to the deputy high commissioner in Cape Town indicated 
police reports of possible •serious disturbances• on the Swazi 
border and he asked for advice concerning refugees fleeing into 
Swaziland. 87 A memorandum drawn up by the high commissioner 
surmised that such rumours might have been deliberately planted 
by the Union police to "provoke incidents• such as the banning 
of the •notoriously moderate ex-Chief Luthuli" which would make 
it easier for the ANC "hot-heads" to get their way and facilitate 
the task of the South African Police.• He stated, further, that 
methods to stop refugees would be "unpopular'' in the territories 
and in Britain and so it would be better, rather, to 
endeavour to keep tabs on any refugees who might enter 
the territories, and we should, of course have to 
surrender any to the Union 
had complied with all 
after the Union Authorities 
the legal requirements 
prescribed by the Fugitives Offenders Act. 
In 1960, after Sharpeville, the danger of incidents between the 
Union authorities and the high commission territories 
intensified. Many protectorate citizens were caught up in the 
unrest that resulted from the Sharpeville incident and the 
86 Ibid. , Verwoerd - Ds D. F. Malan, 27 January 1960. 
87 PRO, DO 119, File 1200 (1959: Native Affairs, the ANC), 
No.2, Resident Commissioner, Mbabane - Deputy High Commissioner, 
Cape Town, 30 May 1959. 
88 Ibid. , No. 2, Memorandum from the High Commissioner, 2 June 
1959. 
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consequent declaration of a state of emergency and this caused 
flurries of alarm in the high commission and in London. On 4 
April Maud told Douglas-Home, the Commonwealth secretary, of his 
letter to Jooste, the Union secretary of external affairs, asking 
for names of protectorate citizens arrested, killed or wounded 
in the disturbances in the Union. 89 He had had no reply yet and 
Verwoerd' s "excuse" for the delay was that many were not carrying 
passes and so could not be identified or were posing as Union 
nationals so as to get jobs. 
Maud had pointed out there would be a "bad impression" in Britain 
if the British authorities were not informed quickly and if there 
were a refusal of access to detainees. The high commission 
instructed attorneys on its behalf to hold a watching brief over 
the judicial enquiry instituted after Sharpeville. By 14 April 
the high commission was reporting the names of refugees from 
South Africa to the territories back to London and was requesting 
security clearance for these refugees from the Special Branch. 
It was noted, for example, that A.H.A. Selby, one of the 
applicants for residence in Bechuanaland, was a "prominent South 
African Communist deemed in 1959 to be a prohibited immigrant in 
Basutoland". 90 
Questions had already been asked in the British parliament on the 
refugee question. On 11 April the Commonwealth secretary reported 
to Maud that a Labour Party spokesman had asked in parliament 
recently whether the same principles as existed in Britain 
applied to political refugees in the high commission 
territories. 91 The minister of state, Alport, had referred the 
reply to the home secretary who said that colonial governments 
were sure "to be guided by the same humanitarian considerations 
which guide HMG in the United Kingdom". When pressed further, he 
89 DO 119, File 1464 (Union of South Africa: Riots and 
Unrest, 1959-60), No.8, Maud - Home, 4 April 1960. 
90 Ibid., No.80, Maud - Home, 14 April 1960. 
91 Ibid., No.57A, Home - Maud, 11 April 1960. 
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had stated that it was a "complicated question" in which "special 
considerations apply''. 
In May Maud telexed Maseru to say that it was 
in Basutoland's interest that the Territory should not 
be used as a base for political activity in Union and 
we must put ourselves in a position to assure Union 
Government accordingly; otherwise Basutoland risks 
retaliation. 92 
He asked whether the paramount chief and the executive council 
in Basutoland would support arrangements whereby applicants for 
residence were required to "abstain from political activity" and 
that this should apply ''even before a resident permit becomes 
necessary". 
During cabinet discussions in London on 1 April 1960 concerning 
the UNO resolution against South Africa over Sharpeville one of 
the reasons advanced for the British abstention on the vote was 
the need to "bring discussions in the Security Council to an end 
as soon as possible''. This was because, if prolonged: "Native 
leaders" would be likely to be asked to "give evidence" and this 
was ''particularly undesirable'' because ''certain African leaders 
had taken refuge in Bechuanaland". 93 Britain had "discreetly 
intimated" to the South African government that it would be 
preferable for them to refrain from demanding the return of 
refugees but, nevertheless, if the demand was made, it would be 
possible to delay action on "technical grounds". 
On 5 April it was noted that the return of refugees could be 
"lawfully demanded" by South Africa and that there was no right 
92 File 1465 (Union of South Africa: Riots and Unrest), No. 
29, Maud - Resident Commissioner, Maseru, 1 May 1960. 
93 PRO, CAB128/34, C.C. (60)22, 3 (Ecuadorean Resolution: UK 
to Abstain), 1 April 1960. 
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of political asylum in the high commission territories. 94 It was 
not certain that local courts could accept the argument that 
refusal to return them was based on the grounds that they would 
be personally imperilled. If, therefore, there were any sign that 
South Africa wanted them ''the best course might be to transfer 
them to this country [Britain]'', although the fact that they had 
no British passports might "cause difficulties". If the South 
Africans were to demand their return the answer should be that 
there were delays on the appeal by local courts or "another 
technical procedure" . The cabinet then authorised the lord 
chancellor, in consultation with the home secretary, to consider 
how the demand for the return o~ "African leaders" who took 
refuge in Bechuanaland ''could best be resisted". 
On 26 May Lord Home outlined the position again noting that 
"some refugees were Communist Party members" . 95 Some wished to 
leave the territories and this would involve their transit 
through the Central African Federation. The Federation government 
would not require passports and was willing to accept travel 
documents from the high commissioner on behalf of the United 
Kingdom, though "not documents issued by the Government of Ghana" 
to which some refugees wished to travel. The issue of travel 
documents on a large scale would 
almost certainly provoke the Government of the Union 
to retaliate against the Territories or to seek to 
recover the refugees under the Fugitive Offenders Act, 
1881. 
(Under this act, Home explained, the Union Government could issue 
warrants of arrest of any fugitive for any offence including 
political offenses and a magistrate in the territories could not 
94 C.C. (60)24, 4 (Arrest of UK Citizens: Statement to be 
made), 5 April 1960. 
95 C.C. (60)33, 5 (SA Refugees in High Commission Territories: 
Proposals approved), 26 May 1960. 
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refuse to return them ''unless, in all the circumstances of the 
case, that would seem unjust or oppressive"). But "public opinion 
in Britain would be hostile'' to a total refusal to issue them 
travel documents and then there was some reason to think South 
Africa would not object to the issue of a limited number over a 
period of time. Meanwhile "private arrangements" were under way 
by a "citizen of Ghana" to transport some refugees by charter 
plane direct to the Belgian Congo without landing in the 
Federation. This was likely to be "unwelcome" to the Union and 
"an attempt should be made to persuade the prime minister of 
Ghana to prevent its recurrence''. 
The discussion that followed showed general support for the 
Commonwealth secretary's proposals. In the meantime he was asked 
to try and dissuade the Union government from proceeding against 
any fugitives under the act but, if it were impossible to do so, 
delays in the operation of the act could be secured by appeals 
to the privy council. An amendment to the 1913 order-in-council 
would meanwhile be prepared so as to exclude political offenses 
from the scope of the relevant part of the act. But the amendment 
would not be made, nor the government's intent announced unless 
the Union actually invoked the act. 
As we have seen, the discussions between Eric Louw and Macmillan 
in September of that year and between Louw and Alport, minister 
of state for Commonwealth relations, seemed to have resulted in 
a temporary respite for the British concerning the refugee 
problem. 96 Louw, in the context of general discussions concerning 
the boycott movement in African countries, agreed to allow the 
exodus of refugees in flights over South African territory and 
promised not to demand the return of any to South Africa. It is 
clear, however, that Britain was not prepared to confront South 
Africa on the issue and, once again, this related to the general 
context of appeasement of South Africa in order to keep relations 
on an even keel and to ensure that she remained in the 
% DO 119, File 1206, No. 93, Home - Maud, 9 September 1960. 
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Commonwealth. 
Anti-government opinion in Britain continued to press the Tories 
not to give in on the protectorates, especially after South 
Africa had withdrawn from the Commonwealth. The Guardian said 
on the day after South Africa withdrew from the Commonwealth that 
the British record was "badly stained" in Nyasaland and in the 
two Rhodesias but Britain should now resolve to "keep it 
absolutely clean" in the protectorates, no matter what the cost. 
''The Nationalists will not last forever."~ 
An article by the academic, Peter Ca~vocoressi, in the Northern 
Echo (Darlington, UK) of 30 May 1961 predicted more embarrassment 
for Britain, not less, now that South Africa had withdrawn from 
the Commonweal th because of the "tensions and disturbances" 
likely to continue in that country. 98 The high commission 
territories remained British responsibilities and could become 
the bases for "revolution" against South Africa. ''What does a 
British Government do then?" 
An example of how concerned Britain remained not to antagonise 
South Africa over the high commission territories, even after 
withdrawal from the Commonwealth, was soon provided. In June 1961 
the United Nations decided to send an investigative committee, 
the Fabregat Committee, to South West Africa to investigate 
charges that South Africa was applying apartheid policies in the 
territory contrary to the spirit of the mandate. The committee 
requested permission from Britain to enter via Bechuanaland and 
to visit some South West African exiles there. The British 
cabinet discussed the request on 6 July and came to the 
conclusion that the visa would have to be refused because the 
committee refused to undertake that it would not try and enter 
South West Africa without South African permission. 99 In 
97 Guardian, 17 March 1961. 
•Northern Echo (Darlington), 30 May 1961. 
99 PRO, CAB 128/35 Part 2, C.C. (61)39,8, p.245. 
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discussion it was recognised by cabinet that to refuse facilities 
would give rise to hostile criticism in UNO but that "great 
difficulties" would arise with the South African government if 
Britain allowed the committee to enter South West Africa "from 
a territory for which we were responsible". It was advised that 
the UN should be told that any such attempt would result in 
"incidents'' on the Bechuanaland/South West African frontier and 
that this "would not be in the interests of the people of 
Bechuanaland for whom we are responsible". 
What the protectorates issue had demonstrated, therefore, was the 
undiminished desire of the British to retain the relationship 
with South Africa on an even keel, even after South Africa had 
officially left the Commonwealth. The fact that Britain later led 
the territories towards independence in no way lessened their 
dependence on South Africa economically and politically and, in 
fact, merely provided Britain a convenient pretext for avoiding 
the responsibility of giving them the necessary support to keep 
them out of South Africa's clutches. In the long-term it would 
become increasingly clear that on this issue and on economic and 
strategic issues in general, leaving the Commonwealth did not, 
as far as Britain was concerned, alter the relationship with 
South Africa's Nationalist government to any significant extent. 
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CONCLUSION 
South Africa' a departure from the Commonwealth in May 1961 
symbolised the end of an association with Britain, the monarchy 
and the empire that had begun with the British take-over of the 
Cape in 1795. It was the psychological and emotional significance 
of this sudden end to some 165 years of history that had struck 
Harold Macmillan so much in the aftermath of the London 
conference and which had been so eloquently expressed by him in 
his memoirs and his speeches to the British parliament. However 
much the British and South African publics had been prepared for 
the eventuality of a break by the preceding twelve years of 
conflict with the international community over race policy, the 
unexpected suddenness of the decision to withdraw had been a 
shock to those who supported the British connection. To the 
Afrikaner Nationalist supporters of Verwoerd, however, it had 
been more of an unexpected relief than a shock - a feeling of 
receiving a ''double bonus'', the restoration of the republic and 
the end of association with the detested British Empire. For them 
it marked the completion of the full circle of history since 1902 
the return of an inheritance taken away from them by the 
British during the South African War at the end of the last 
century. It meant, also, the beginning of a new cycle of history 
as an independent nation. Any anxieties over the new nation's 
isolation and diminishing international legitimacy were dispelled 
by the euphoria of achieving republican independence. The cost of 
isolation and ostracism would only be felt much later. 
The black majority, as we have seen, was never consulted and its 
opinions never heeded by the Nationalist government concerning 
the decision to establish a republic outside the Commonwealth. 
This was nothing out of the ordinary considering the context of 
the previous 300 years of European conquest and subjugation and 
at least one of the liberation movements fighting white rule felt 
it to entirely consistent with this history. The Pan Africanist 
Congress dismissed the republic as just another change in the 
form of white rule but welcomed exclusion from the Commonwealth 
as a blow to the legitimacy of the white state. The largest 
African nationalist movement, however, expressed its distress at 
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the formation of a ''fascist and racist'' republic and actively 
tried to prevent its implementation. The ANC also, however, 
welcomed the exclusion from the Commonwealth as marking one of 
the first steps towards the achievement of international 
isolation of the apartheid regime. 
The manner in which Britain and the white dominions had 
negotiated the continuance of economic and political ties with 
the South African regime after withdrawal attracted considerable 
criticism from the anti-apartheid forces in South Africa and 
overseas. It seemed to confirm what had been suspected since the 
Seretse affair of 1949-52, that Britain was more concerned with 
appeasement of the Afrikaner Nationalist 
loyalty and respect 
government than with 
of the black majority retaining the residual 
in South Africa. This was a constant theme in the rhetoric of 
African and Indian organisations after 1948 and it persisted to 
some extent even after 1961. The history of black disillusionment 
with Britain and the realisation that appeals to the former 
colonial power were falling on deaf ears is a constant sub-text 
in the chronicle of the rise of African nationalism in South 
Africa. By 1961 what little sentimental attachment was left for 
the British monarchy in the ranks of the African majority was 
expressed in terms of memories of a previous era - an era in 
which a modicum of non-racial liberalism had existed under Queen 
Victoria, sometimes referred to even in African nationalist 
circles as ''Victoria, the Good". 
Nevertheless, the foreign policy of the Congress Alliance had 
shifted considerably by 1961 in comparison with the days when Dr 
A.B. Xuma had led an organisation which, while committed to the 
establishment of a non-racial democracy, was still wedded to 
"constitutional'' forms of protest. The increasing influence of 
the Youth League in the executive organs of the ANC and the 
adoption after 1949 of a more radical political programme of 
action against white rule was mirrored in the realm of foreign 
policy by a more militant anti-colonial stance and an inclination 
in favour of the socialist, non-aligned movement in world 
affairs. Inevitably Britain and the white Commonwealth countries 
were to be judged increasingly in terms of their willingness to 
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condemn apartheid, white rule and the perpetuation of colonial 
rule in Africa. When it became clear that these countries were 
not, with the possible exception of Canada, prepared to force the 
South African government to change its policies, the extra-
parliamentary opposition called for South Africa's expulsion from 
the Commonwealth as the first step towards the total isolation of 
the apartheid regime. 1961, therefore, represented one of the 
first significant (although largely symbolic) foreign policy 
victories for African nationalism in South Africa. There was no 
illusion about the difficulties that lay ahead in terms of 
persuading Western nations to follow up this first action with 
other more tangible economic and political moves against South 
Africa. 
The history of South Africa's association with the British 
Commonwealth between the end of the Second World War and 1961 
was, as we have seen, one of increasing tension over racial 
policy and it involved an increasing tendency, inside South 
Africa, to question the very basis and value of Commonwealth 
membership. The Smuts government after the war was confronted 
with the "Indian Question" in the United Nations and with the 
refusal of the United Nations to allow South West Africa to be 
annexed by South Africa. In the Commonwealth context this had not 
yet begun to be discussed officially but a considerable amount of 
bilateral diplomacy between Britain and South Africa, not to 
mention India and South Africa, took place concerning these 
issues and public opinion in the Commonwealth had begun to note 
the effect of South Africa's race policies on the future 
development of the organization. 
In South Africa a gradual rethinking of the Commonwealth 
relationship had not just been confined to Afrikaner Nationalists 
and those hostile to the British connection but was something 
expressed by many of those for whom Commonwealth membership had 
been axiomatic in the past. Whether it was expressed by 
Nationalist politicians in the context of dissatisfaction with 
South African economic aid to Britain after the war or by 
English-speaking businessmen concerned about the effects of 
preferences on trade outside the Commonwealth, there was one 
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aspect in common the realisation that the Commonwealth no 
longer provided for all of South Africa's needs and aspirations, 
whether in terms of exports and import requirements or in terms 
of defence alliances. This had, as we have seen, already been 
noted in the period of General Smuts's post-war premiership, in 
the context of the gold loan of 1947 (which had demonstrated how 
post-war aid to Britain aroused resentments from business 
interests not necessarily associated with the Nationalist Party) 
and in defence discussions that Smuts held with the British. 
It was all a function of the decline in British power and 
influence after the war and was a thing felt, to an even greater 
extent, by the other dominions. Australia and Canada had already 
turned towards the United States for their effective national 
security during the Second World War and the signing of alliances 
outside the Commonwealth ambit (NATO, ANZUS and SEATO) had 
formalised for some countries the fact that the Commonwealth had 
ceased to exist as a self-sufficient defence system. The Suez 
crisis of 1956 had been the watershed in this decline of the 
Commonwealth as a cohesive military system and it had 
demonstrated all too clearly the limits to British power in the 
post-war world. 
What was ironic, as we have seen, in the context of declining 
Commonwealth defence links, was the extent to which South Africa 
had tried to achieve a military alliance with Britain in the mid-
fifties. This was a function of South Africa's growing fear of 
isolation at a time of Cold War tensions and awareness of African 
nationalist stirrings to the north of her borders. The failure of 
what one writer has called the "White Entente" in the late 
fifties' was as much a result of a lack of commitment by both 
the British and South African governments to make it work as a 
military alliance as it was a result of the general context 
provided by declining British power in Africa and the Middle East 
and, of course, South Africa's race policies. 
1 Berridge, "The Rise and Fall of the White Entente", pp.183-
188. 
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The Commonwealth had also ceased to operate as a closed economic 
system during the late 1940's and the value of economic 
preferences had declined considerably compared to pre- war years. 
Nevertheless, the debate over the possible economic effects of 
leaving the Commonwealth was particularly strong in the years 
1958 to 1961 and the danger of a loss of trade and investment was 
played upon with considerable skill by the official opposition 
party. 
Britain was South Africa's biggest trading partner and took 28.1% 
of her exports in 1960. 48.2% of her exports went to all the 
Commonwealth countries together. But less than 50% of her 
exports to Britain qualified for preference (excluding uranium) 
and so the macro-effect on the South African economy was not 
1 ikely to be great if they were lost. The micro-effect for 
certain industries, however, was important - especially wine and 
fruit. Ultimately, however, South Africa's withdrawal did not 
have much effect economically. 3 She lost a few unimportant 
preferences in New Zealand and certain privileges in the 
Commonwealth sugar agreement. The bilateral economic agreements 
continued because they were outside the Commonwealth ambit. They 
could be ended in most cases with six month's notice by either 
side although there were some non-contractual preferences that 
could be ended at anytime without notice. Nevertheless the 
various export industries had been taking steps since the fifties 
to diversify their markets and prepare for greater competition. 
Nationalist government policy had also taken this into account. 
It was more the tendency to formation of economic blocs in Europe 
and elsewhere in the world that was to have an adverse effect on 
South Africa's exports during the sixties and seventies, despite 
GATT and its attempts to lower tariffs world- wide. Leaving the 
Commonwealth made the debate on future options for the country 
more urgent although the preferences in the British market did 
2 Kapp, "Suid-Afrika en die EEG", p.91. 
3 Ibid. , p. 91. 
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not lapse. She had to prepare for that eventuality, however. 4 
The political effect of South Africa's economic link with the 
Commonweal th and with Britain in particular, was a constant 
factor in South Africa's Commonwealth relations. The importance 
of economic links was a constant sub-text of the relationship 
between the Union and Britain and played a crucial role in 
determining the policy of successive British governments towards 
South Africa and in forming its response to the growing moves 
towards republican independence in South Africa. Whether it was 
Clement Attlee's Labour government, worried about South Africa's 
continuec co-operation in terms of gold and uranium supplies or 
Macmillan's Tory government worried about British investments and 
retaining South Africa in the sterling area, the basic principles 
of their respective polices towards the Union were identical. The 
overriding priority was to maintain important economic, political 
and military ties by keeping South Africa in the Commonwealth and 
by preventing any major rupture in the relationship over racial 
policy or over any other potentially disruptive issue. 
The incorporation of the high commission territories by South 
Africa was one such potentially disruptive issue that formed a 
constant background irritant in the relationship between the two 
countries. It was largely a symbolic battle that transcended 
economic or strategic considerations and that involved issues of 
national prestige and honour. South African governments felt the 
existence of such territories within or adjacent to South 
Africa's borders to be an affront to national dignity, and, 
later, as potential "Trojan horses" against apartheid. Even 
Smuts's United Party government had declared its intention to 
incorporate the territories, although its approach to the British 
was less confrontational than that of the Nationalists after 
1948. 
British governments, on the other hand, felt it to be impolitic 
to defy African and world opinion (not to mention strong liberal 
opinion in Britain itself) , by handing the territories over to 
4 Ibid., p.91. 
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South Africa. This did not stop them, however, from constantly 
holding out the possibility of eventual transfer and from 
granting the South Africans political and military concessions in 
the territories in return for South African co-operation on 
broader Commonwealth issues. 
The need for South African co-operation in the Commonwealth meant 
in practice that Britain had to make frequent and ongoing efforts 
to placate South Africa by supporting her in the United Nations 
or by allowing her, up to a certain point, to dictate British 
policy in a whole host of areas. Whether it was the Simonstown 
Agreement and British concessions concerning Middle Eastern 
defence or the matter of South African military access to the 
high commission territories, or British reluctance to move too 
fast on admitting former African colonies into the Commonwealth, 
the underlying rationale was always the same - the need not to 
antagonise South Africa too much in case she decided to leave the 
Commonwealth or in case she ceased to co-operate in important 
areas of British economic and strategic policy. 
This sort of reasoning applied up to and beyond the republican 
referendum. The stated British reason for deciding to stay 
neutral during the republican campaign was the need not to be 
seen to be influencing the result - which could be taken as undue 
interference in South Africa's affairs. That was also the stated 
reason for not giving public approval of South Africa's 
republican application at the May 1960 Commonwealth conference, 
before the referendum had taken place. We know, however, that the 
CRO had already factored into its assessment of the South African 
situation the foregone conclusion that the referendum results 
would be in favour of a republic and that there would not be 
much difference in practice to British-South African economic 
relations thereafter as long as the Nationalists could be 
persuaded to maintain those relations intact. That could best be 
achieved if South Africa remained in the Commonwealth and 
Macmillan's government had already made up its mind that it would 
do everything it could to keep South Africa in the Commonwealth 
after the referendum. 
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Whether South Africa was to remain a monarchy or to become a 
republic, British policy was constant in its determination to 
keep South Africa in the Commonwealth. Macmillan had informed 
Louw at the 1960 conference that Britain would unreservedly 
support South Africa's continued Commonweal th membership as a 
monarchy but before that he had given signals to Verwoerd (during 
his Cape Town visit) that even as a republic South Africa could 
expect British support to stay in the Commonwealth. The fears 
concerning the reactions of the Afro-Asian prime ministers 
prompted him to advise Verwoerd after the May conference that he 
should postpone the referendum until the atmosphere was calmer. 
Verwoerd was also advised that he could not claim that British 
support for the republican application was guaranteed. 
But once the results of the referendum were known Macmillan lost 
no time in writing to Menzies and to the other premiers to 
persuade them to agree to South Africa's membership as a 
republic. He and Menzies devised the scheme to separate the 
constitutional and racial debates in order to increase the 
chances of South Africa's acceptance at the 1961 conference. It 
is a measure of his persuasive powers or perhaps of the 
moderation of the other premiers that most of them, including 
Nehru and Nkrumah, had indicated a measure of agreement with 
these tactics before the conference began. It was only under the 
pressure of circumstances (public opinion in Britain had been 
building up against South Africa ever since Sharpeville and this 
played a part in influencing the demands of some prime ministers 
for concessions from South Africa) that these tactics failed. 
Verwoerd's continued refusal to countenance any talk of reform in 
his apartheid policies virtually doomed the discussions from an 
early stage. Macmillan, who admitted in his memoirs that he had 
known even before the conference began that there was little hope 
of any concession from the South African prime minister (and who 
had not been prepared to apply any meaningful pressure on 
Verwoerd to change his policies), then advised Verwoerd to 
withdraw South Africa's application. 
Macmillan had already been assured of South 
intentions concerning the maintenance 
Africa's desires and 
of the economic 
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relationship with Britain if the Commonwealth connection were to 
be terminated. Verwoerd had indicated that Britain would be 
regarded as a "friend" even if South Africa were outside the 
Commonwealth and Louw had even threatened that if a bilateral 
trade agreement were not to be signed by Britain, South Africa 
could withhold gold and mineral sales. The extent to which this 
threat may have influenced Macmillan's whole approach during and 
after the 1961 conference is of course a matter of pure 
conjecture. Nevertheless the result was the conclusion of 
bilateral economic, military and social agreements with South 
Africa that preserved her as a member of the "old" Commonwealth 
in substance if not in name for many years to come. 
It has been pointed out that South Africa was a product of the 
"old" Commonwealth, not the "new" and that therefore the change 
in the nature of the organisation with its acquisition of new 
members was the "perfect pretext" for South Africa to leave. 5 It 
also meant that there was not much "trauma" when she left. As far 
as Nationalist foreign policy was concerned, it meant greater 
freedom of action in the following years to pursue the "Outward 
Policy" and to react to the Rhodesian crisis in their own way -
actions that would have been difficult in the Commonwealth 
context. But the "darker'' side for South Africa was the "denial 
of legitimacy" which leaving the Commonwealth meant, and the 
increasing focus 
national identity 
on the need for South Africa to change its 
because of its racial 
of the retirement-under-pressure of 
Commonwealth was that it was the first 
policies. "The 
South Africa 
importance 
from the 
aggressive enforcement of 
this doctrine [denial of sovereignty because of questioned 
legitimacy] ". 6 
It was after the Second World War that South Africa experienced 
this crisis of legitimacy. 7 It was mainly a result of the 
5 C. Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.420. 
6 Ibid., p.425. 
7 Jack Spence, "South Africa and the Modern World", in Wilson 
and Thompson (eds), Oxford History of South Africa, Vol.2, 
pp.525-526. 
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challenge provided by the newly decolonised states of Africa and 
Asia to the traditional ''sanctity of domestic jurisdiction" and 
•to the claim of the South African state to speak for the 
majority within its 
colonialism (which 
borders•. The revolutionary ideology 
included apartheid South Africa 
of anti-
in its 
definition of a colonial society) forced South Africa onto the 
defensive. 
Thus increasingly after 1948 South African foreign 
policy was primarily concerned with defending domestic 
policy and by implication the very structure of South 
African society and the values underpinning it. 8 
Notwithstanding the massive challenge to the state's legitimacy 
(and to the national identity provided by the constant 
questioning of the basic unity of South African society) 9 , the 
Nationalist government had, by 1961, successfully defended its 
sovereignty and its ability to exercise effective authority 
within its borders. This was primarily a function of its economic 
and military strength bolstered, in no small measure, by the 
degree of protection South Africa received in the United Nations 
and in the Commonwealth forum from its old Commonwealth partner, 
Britain, and from its main Western trading partners. It was these 
factors that for some three decades after South Africa left the 
Commonwealth prevented the twin crises of national identity and 
government legitimacy from becoming a crisis of sovereignty or, 
in other words, from becoming a real threat to tne ability of the 
South African state to maintain its internal and external 
authority. 
8 Ibid., p.526. 
9 Vale, "The Internationalisation of Apartheid", p.423. 
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EPILOGUE: The Prodigal Returns 
On 1 June 1994 South Africa returned to the Commonwealth after an 
absence of some thirty-three years. The context was provided by 
the holding of South Africa's first truly democratic election in 
its history just six weeks prior to this. With an ANC government 
in power, and apartheid finally defeated, the promise of a return 
to the Commonwealth family was fulfilled. The ANC had for many 
years declared its intention to do so and had claimed that South 
Africa, in theory if not in fact, had never left the Commonwealth 
because the black majority had never been asked about it. 1 In his 
speech which marked the return at a ceremony in London on 20 July 
1994, South Africa's deputy president, Thabo Mbeki, thanked the 
other nations of the Commonwealth and Queen Elizabeth as the head 
of the organisation for all the help given to the struggle for 
democracy in South Africa. 2 A service held in Westminster Abbey 
was attended by over two thousand dignitaries including the royal 
family. The Anglican Archbishop of Cape Town, Desmond Tutu, 
proclaimed the return of the "prodigal" and readings were 
delivered from Alan Paton's Cry. the Beloved Country and Oswald 
Mtshali's poem, ''Love''. 
The attitude of the vast majority of South Africans to South 
Africa's return was shown by editorials in The Sowetan, the 
(heir to the World) which has one of the largest daily 
readerships in the country. The Sowetan claimed that South 
Africa was no longer a "pariah nation" 3 and that after having 
been "out in the cold'' for thirty-three years, she was now ''back 
in the fold" like an ''errant child'' rejoining its family. 4 The 
Commonwealth had carried out a "tireless campaign" for a free 
South Africa and Chief Ameka Anyaoku had welcomed the country 
1 Oliver Tambo, the President of the ANC, had said this in 
a speech to the Royal Commonwealth Society in London in the late 
1980s. (Reported in The Star, 2 June 1994). 
2 Business Day, 21 July 1994. 
3 Sowetan, 3 June 1994. 
4 Sowetan, 22 July 1994. 
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back with the words: 
The return of a non-racial, democratic South Africa, 
working alongside the other fifty members of the 
Commonwealth is a boost for the association, not least 
in the task of making the world safe for diversity. 5 
The editorial went on to rebut the "sceptics" concerning the role 
of the Commonwealth now that South Africa was back. The 
''informality'' and "flexibility'' of the organisation was praised 
as a "strength", not a drawback, and it quoted Anyaoku as saying 
that the Commonwealth was able to cross the "fine line" of non-
interference in the affairs of its members and had in fact "set 
the pace" in that regard. 
There would now be a "mutually beneficial" relationship with 
Pretoria. The Commonwealth would be able to give its expertise in 
developing social and economic programmes for South Africa and 
South Africa in return "had much to give its Commonwealth 
neighbours". Anyaoku saw the Commonwealth as a "microcosm" of the 
UNO without the "rigid structure". The return of South Africa, he 
said, marked a "new beginning" for the Commonwealth. 
The attitude of the large, mainly "white" English-language 
dailies, such as 
and understated 
The Star and Business Day, was far more muted 
than that of the Sowet.an. This, perhaps, 
reflected the fact that thirty-three years of Nationalist rule 
had eroded white English-speaking support for the Commonwealth to 
the point where an attitude of indifference, if not active 
hostility, prevailed. A consensus had been reached as early as 
1961 between the English and Afrikaans communities on racial 
issues and on what they perceived to be an external threat to 
their way of life posed by organisations such as the UNO and the 
Commonwealth itself. This feeling had intensified during the 
turbulent '70s and '80s and the Commonwealth had come to 
represent, for many, the 
Africa. By then, of course, 
5 Ibid. 
Afro-Asian onslaught against South 
the Commonwealth had expanded to the 
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point where the old "white" dominions were hugely outnumbered by 
newly independent African, Asian and Caribbean nations. The fact 
that Conservative governments in Britain had demonstrated their 
(tacit) support for white South Africa was of little consolation 
in this regard. 
The Business Day simply reported, the day after South Africa 
officially joined, government and foreign affairs department 
"sources" as saying that readmittance to the Commonwealth was 
just "symbolic", nothing more. 6 The Commonwealth was just a 
''club". South Africa would have to contribute Rl,Sm annually as 
a subscription to the secretariat and would also be expected to 
contribute between RlOm and R15m to Commonwealth assistance 
programmes. However, it was admitted that South Africa would "get 
out more" than it puts in to the Commonwealth, for example, the 
R2,5m received from Commonwealth funds to help with the recent 
general elections. South Africa would also be sending a team of 
sportsmen and women to the Commonwealth Games in Canada. 
On 2 June, the day after South Africa rejoined the Commonwealth, 
The Star ran an editorial entitled "Back where we belong'' which 
stated that ''South Africa may feel more at home in the new-style 
Commonwealth than the old" . 7 
It is one of history's little ironies that those most 
vocal in bewailing South Africa's departure from the 
Commonwealth in 1961 are now the most lukewarm about 
our readmission. The reason probably has to do with 
Britain's. reduced role and the Third World's much 
increased influence in Commonwealth affairs. 
It noted that Queen Elizabeth remained one of the most 
enthusiastic proponents of the Commonwealth ideal and that the 
organisation was much more "broadly based" than it was thirty 
years previously. Then there were only ten members, now more than 
6 Business Day, 2 June 1994. 
7 The Star, 2 June 1994. 
524 
fifty, many of them "developing countries'' with problems ''similar 
to our own''. ''This suggests that South Africa might feel more at 
home in the new Commonwealth than it ever did in the old". 
Membership "no longer brings unquestioned benefits" in terms of 
preferential tariffs and increased trade, it was noted, but there 
were many other advantages in terms of technical, educational, 
scientific assistance and in other areas ''where years of enforced 
isolation from the world have left us lagging well behind other 
countries of comparable size and influence". 
As long as the costs of membership do not substantially 
outweigh the benefits, South Africa will be better off 
as a member of the Commonwealth than as an "old boy" 
looking on from the sidelines. 
The Eastern Province Herald gave a more wide-ranging editorial 
entitled ''One good turn" which stated that ''South Africa owes 
much to the Commonwealth, though leaving it was the decision of 
Dr Verwoerd's government" . 8 The Commonwealth had "kept up the 
psychological, diplomatic, economic and sporting pressure'' on 
South Africa and "it is surely a mark of its effectiveness and 
of our new government's appreciation that we have rejoined the 
Club so quickly". But it also noted how much the Commonwealth had 
changed since 1961 and how it was no longer the "British 
Commonwealth". Queen Elizabeth had even indicated at the Cyprus 
conference in 1993 that she would step down as head of the 
Commonwealth if the others wanted her to. This was "likely to be 
some time in coming" but it indicated that the Commonwealth was 
now "an association of equal partners not a league under British 
leadership". South Africa's admittance might be the 
Commonwealth's "final achievement of major significance". 
Far more enthusiastic about the return to the Club was the Durban 
newspaper, the Daily News, which, reflecting the fact that Natal 
had remained something of a "last outpost" during the apartheid 
years, welcomed South Africa's readmittance with a tinge of 
8 Eastern Province Herald, 2 June 1994. 
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triumphalism. 9 
Thirty-three years ago yesterday, Dr Verwoerd took 
South Africa out of the Commonwealth and along a stony 
path. Today we return. It is an affirmation that 
apartheid, and the narrow, sectarian nationalism that 
went with it, have been expunged forever ... Dr Verwoerd 
stalked out under the illusion that South Africa was a 
''white'' nation which would not tolerate discussion of 
its internal affairs. We return as a rainbow nation 
with exactly the same spectrum of First and Third 
World, rich and poor, black and white that the 
Commonwealth itself has. The Commonwealth understands 
South Africa better than any other organisation could. 
Noting the many, largely "informal", benefits that membership 
would bring, such as exchanges of information and expertise, it 
was stated that South Africans would once again "train at 
Sandhurst and Portsmouth" and there would be "policemen at 
Scotland Yard again". Young South Africans would be able to spend 
two-year working holidays in Britain. It concluded: 
Only two member states have ever left the Commonwealth 
- Pakistan and South Africa. Pakistan returned years 
ago. We return today. The long night is over. 
The visit of Queen Elizabeth to South Africa in March 1995 
prompted further comments in the leading dailies on the 
Commonwealth connection and on the role of the monarchy as head 
of the Commonwealth. Again the response was muted in comparison 
with the explosion of royalist sentiment seen during the last 
visit of the royals in 1947. The Business Day noted that South 
Africa could prove to be a "lucrative asset to the Commonwealth" 
and that the queen's visit raised issues that were more than 
"symbolic" . 10 There was the symbolism of the recognition of 
9 The Daily News, 1 June 1994. 
w Business Day, 17 March 1995. 
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Mandela as the world's "last hero" and the return of South Africa 
to the Commonwealth club. It was also noted that the monarchy had 
distanced itself from the efforts of the Thatcher government in 
Britain during the 198 0 's to "get closer" to South Africa's 
apartheid government. Furthermore, the Commonwealth had 
intervened actively through the Eminent Persons' Group in 1986 
and had resorted to some punitive measures against South Africa. 
When negotiations began with the leading African nationalist 
organisations in 1990 the Commonwealth had been quick to support 
these negotiations. 
The Star, for its part, wrote an editorial under the heading 
''Royal bonus'' which stated that: 
Surprisingly, the benefits of Queen Elizabeth's visit 
to South Africa are not difficult to quantify. While 
some may have questioned the value of the royal tour, 
there is no doubt that in the short time the Queen and 
Prince Philip were in the country they did a power of 
good, not only in lifting morale in disadvantaged areas 
but in stimulating business and political relationships 
between Britain and South Africa. 11 
The tone of the editorial was warm and approving but somewhat 
detached and business-like. There was no suggestion of an appeal 
to loyalty on behalf of English speakers, a rallying around the 
crown as the symbol of the British connection as there would have 
been during the late forties and fifties as the republican debate 
raged in South Africa between the Afrikaans and English-speaking 
population. Instead, there was an emphasis on what the royal 
influence could do for the "reconstruction" of the country after 
the "damage" caused by "years of isolation". 
The Queen, well informed about South Africa, has spoken 
to economists, educationists, 
businessmen here and has seen a 
indicated that Britain wants 
11 The Star, 27 March 1995. 
industrialists and 
great deal. She has 
to help with the 
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reconstruction work. We could not ask for a better, or 
more influential, friend. We hope she returns soon. 
What this example of mutedly pro-royal sentiment indicated was 
how much the political and social structure of the country had 
changed in the previous three decades. The battles that had raged 
between the white communities over the symbols of the British 
connection had been almost (but not entirely) superseded by the 
overwhelming issue of racial conflict and its consequences for 
the country in terms of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, 
the need for reconciliation and reconstruction. An English-
speaking academic at the country's biggest university commented 
that while the queen's visit brought "a lump to the throat ... A 
small one, but nevertheless a lump", it was not primarily because 
of the British connection. 12 It was rather the remembrance of 
things past and the realisation that, after the intervening forty 
years of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid, "my Englishness, 
whatever that is, is no longer under attack, at least not from 
the same quarter". While it was good to hear "God Save the Queen" 
again, as well as the "thundering resonance of 'Die Stem' being 
rendered in an 'English' cathedral", it was more the "African" 
nature of the service (in St. Georges Cathedral in Cape Town) 
which had brought him pleasure. 
Rather than a symbol of sectional ethnic white interests the 
queen was now seen as the representative of an important, but 
almost foreign power. This reflected the steady erosion of 
British-South African links since 1945 under the pressure of 
Nationalist policies, Britain's diminished post-war role in the 
world and South Africa's increased international isolation. While 
it ,was also recognised that the queen, personally, had some 
sympathy for those who had for so many years struggled against 
apartheid and that she had expressed the desire to welcome the 
country back into the Commonwealth family, she was inevitably 
identified first and foremost, by many in the black community 
especially, as queen of the United Kingdom. Her role as head of 
12 
"A visit to bring a lump to the throat", by Prof. Ken 
Smith, The Star, 31 March 1995. 
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the Commonwealth was not widely commented upon or even known to 
many South Africans for whom the Commonwealth had been a distant 
concept during the years of apartheid. The attitude, for example, 
of one leading daily newspaper with a mainly African readership 
was almost dismissive: 
The difference between this visit and what happened in 
1947 is that there will be fewer people thronging the 
streets just to have a glimpse of the queen. The 
interest is similar to that evoked by popular soap 
opera series . 
. . . Forty years ago there was a political edge in the 
black community about the British monarchy. This was 
sharpened by the opposition Afrikaners showed towards 
the visit and that it came shortly after World War II. 
The political interest today is based more on courtesy 
than a commitment to things royal and more particularly 
to things British. 13 
More hostile was the comment of the PAC, which represented the 
"Africanist" viewpoint in South Africa. It criticised the 
government for over-indulging the queen of England at the expense 
of other leaders from neighbouring countries. "Is it because she 
is white? Or is it because we are reaffirming that she is our 
colonial mother?" 14 was the comment of an official statement put 
out by the party soon after the queen had departed. 
Afrikaner attitudes had, on the other hand, undergone something 
of a sea-change and the old hostility to the symbols of the 
British connection, including the monarchy and the Commonwealth 
itself, had, largely, but not entirely disappeared. There were a 
few demonstrations by right-wing fringe Afrikaner groups during 
the queen's visit, one of which demanded an official apology and 
reparations from her for the Anglo-Boer War. But there was no 
talk by the National Party or even the Conservative Party of a 
13 Sowetan, 22 March 1995. 
14 Quoted in The Star, 3 April 1995. 
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boycott of official functions which were held in her honour and 
F.W. de Klerk, one of the deputy presidents of the new 
government, at tended the banquet on the royal yacht in Durban 
harbour on the last night of the tour. 
In an article commemorating the bicentennial of British influence 
in South Africa (1795-1995), the historian, Hermann Giliomee, 
outlined the history of British colonial rule in South Africa 
since 1795 and noted the contribution to liberal thought and 
economic development that the British had brought with them (as 
well as the seeds of racial segregation and apartheid) . 15 He 
noted that English speakers felt they had been long been simply 
"spec ta tors" ( "blote toeskouers") or onlookers of the power 
struggle between Afrikaner and black nationalism. However, he 
estimated that some "seventy per cent" of them must have voted 
for the National Party in the first all-race elections of 1994, 
although "not with enthusiasm" because there were so few English-
speaking representatives in that party. English speakers thought 
of themselves in individual terms, not "group'' terms and they 
were individuals "in a land where politics is driven and 
bedevilled by groups" ("op groepsbasis bedryf en besleg word"). 
The ''bitter satisfaction'' that the English speakers could enjoy, 
however, was that politicians could not pass any budget without 
the taxes that English South African companies had provided. 
The return to the Commonwealth was reported extensively in the 
leading Afrikaans newspapers such as Beeld, Rapport, and Die 
Burger. While the commentary was not enthusiastic and tended to 
give factual reports of the advantages of membership as quoted by 
others, there were also signs that the return has been greeted 
without any emotional hostility or sense of resentment. 
The largest Afrikaans daily, Beeld, ran a number of articles on 
the return to the Commonwealth, and greeted the event on 2 June 
1994 with the words, "Geagte lid" ("Dear Member") . It was placed, 
undramatically, in the context of South Africa's return to 
15 H. Giliomee, "Die Engelsman se SA tuiste", Insio ( Cape 
Town, Nasionale Tydskrifte), September 1995, pp.16-18. 
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respectability and her admittance to other organisations such as 
the Non-aligned Movement and the Organisation of African Unity 
(OAU). 16 It also noted the benefits that the Commonwealth would 
provide in terms of technical advice, financial co-operation and 
economic development. It concluded by quoting the high 
commissioner in London, Kent Durr, who had said "We have truly 
nothing to lose and can only win''· 
In a separate article of the same day Beeld noted that South 
Africa had now returned to the "deep-rooted 
certain large section of her population" 
Britse verlede van 'n sekere groot deel van 
noted that all Commonwealth countries had 
British past of a 
("die diepwortelde 
sy bevolking") It 
been part of the 
British Empire and the British monarch was still the symbolic 
head of the Commonwealth. In fifteen of them the British monarch 
was represented by a governor-general (Antigua, Australia, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Canada, Granada, Jamaica, New Zealand, 
Papua New-Guinea, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and 
the Grenadine, the Solomon Islands and Tuvalu, a special member). 
It claimed the Commonwealth was "administered" by a secretariat 
based in London and said that the member countries had regular 
meetings of heads of government and ministers of finance in order 
to "co-ordinate policy directions" ("om beleidsrigtings te ko-
ordineer''). They consulted each other on economic, scientific, 
educational, financial, legal and military matters. 
An article in Beeld of 1 June 1994, the day South Africa 
officially rejoined the Commonwealth, summarised the history of 
South Africa House, the headquarters of the South African 
embassy, now high commission, in London. It referred to the 
building as South Africa's ''outpost'' in the international arena 
from the imperial hey-day of the 1930's to the present, noting 
the "Euro-centric" nature of much of the decorations, paintings 
and other symbols of the white-ruled past. It concluded by saying 
that for years the National Party government tried to get the 
post of high commissioner raised to the status of "ambassador". 
Now, with the return to the Commonwealth, it was asked whether 
16 Beeld, 2 June 1994. 
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the title would go back to ''high commissioner• and whether it 
would be mean a ''lowering of status''. 
Die Burger reported on 2 June the easier admission to Britain for 
young people that the Commonwealth membership had now made 
possible. It also reported that South African ambassadors in 
Commonwealth countries would now be known as high commissioners 
and that John Major, the British prime minister, had wished 
Mandela well on the occasion of South Africa's readmission, with 
the words: "For all of us in the Commonwealth this significant 
moment symbolises the interests which we share and the 
opportunities that lie ahead ··.o further those interests 
together•. 17 
The biggest Afrikaans Sunday newspaper, Rapport, commented in 
somewhat less enthusiastic terms, on the Commonwealth concession 
to young South African citizens between the ages of 17 and 27 who 
could now work for two years in Britain. Those of any age with 
grandparents born in Britain could live and work there for up to 
four years. But this was seen as a disadvantage because 
"businessmen• felt that many of the best-trained and most 
promising young people "could be lost'' to South Africa if they 
felt tempted to use this opportunity to stay overseas . 18 Rapport 
also noted that South Africa would have to contribute an amount 
worth up to 
be expected 
4% of the Commonwealth secretariat budget and would 
to make 
vrywillige bydrae•) 
etc. 
"voluntary contributions• (" 'n soortgelyke 
to the technical fund, the youth program, 
On the other hand the public relations officer for the armaments 
producer, "Denel •, was quoted in the same article as welcoming 
Commonwealth membership because of the doors that were now opened 
to South Africa's arms exports in Commonwealth countries. 
Similarly quoted was the comment of the Standard Bank economist, 
Andre' Hammersma, who said: "One must take a much broader view of 
17 Die Burger, 2 June 1994. 
18 Rapport, 5 June 1994. 
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the international community and get away form the inward-thinking 
( "inwaartse denke"} that was a hall-mark of the previous 
government. If we can be seen as a strong and active member of 
the Commonwealth we could heighten our presence in international 
markets, which would be to our advantage". He saw the rejoining 
of the Commonwealth as "largely symbolic" but also "extremely 
important" . 
South Africa, on 1 June 1994, returned to a Commonwealth that was 
continually changing and evolving as an institution and that bore 
little resemblance to that which she had left in 1961. This was 
inevitable in an institution that lacked a constitution and that 
was based on voluntary co-operation between nations in so many 
areas. 
Some regarded this informality as a source of strength, others as 
a source of weakness. What is clear, however, is that its 
flexibility kept it alive during periods of great strain and in 
circumstances where dissolution seemed imminent. Much of the 
organisation's international prestige and influence was owed to 
this ability to weather the many crises that beset the group in 
the sixties and seventies, not the least of which were the 
Rhodesian and South African problems, and, by implication, the 
British response to those problems. Throughout this period 
British influence and control over the organisation declined 
steadily, often by choice rather than necessity. British 
disenchantment with the Commonwealth is a theme in itself and it 
had many and . varied causes, not the least of which were the 
criticisms by the Afro-Asians of the way Britain handled the 
Rhodesian crisis and the apartheid problem. 
During the two decades since 1961 Britain and the Commonwealth 
have faced five major crises concerning southern Africa. Each 
of them involved "not only bilateral relations between Britain 
and southern African countries, but Britain's place and role 
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within the multilateral Commonwealth" . 19 Each crisis came to a 
head at a heads of government meeting. In 1961 at the London 
summit, South Africa withdrew. In 1966, in an extraordinary 
summit in Lagos, British policy towards Rhodesia's UDI came under 
scrutiny and in 1971, at the Singapore summit, intense pressure 
was placed on Britain to try and dissuade her from resuming arms 
sales to South Africa. In 1979, at the Lusaka summit, skilful 
lobbying persuaded the British government to attempt an all-party 
constitutional settlement of the Rhodesian problem. In 1985, at 
the summit in Nassau, and later in 1986 at the mini-summit in 
London, Britain and the Commonwealth were at odds over the issue 
of sanctions against South Africa. The same issue continued to 
dominate the conferences in Vancouver in 1987 and at Kuala Lumpur 
in 1989, the last of the summits before the release of Nelson 
Mandela and the beginning of negotiations in South Africa. 
Stephen Chan has pointed out that successive British governments 
lacked the ability to formulate independent foreign policies 
towards southern Africa because of the very nature of the 
decolonization strategy adopted by Britain in Africa. 20 Instead 
of crafting and manipulating the political relations before and 
after independence in order to maintain the maximum influence 
over her former colonies (as France had successfully done), 
Britain ''conceived of the Commonwealth as providing desirable 
links after independence''. Conditions had been attached to 
membership of the Commonwealth, one of which was that South 
Africa should not be a member, nor, for that matter, should any 
other state deliberately pursuing a "racialist policy", (as 
Nyerere had said in 1961). This meant constraints on Britain's 
bilateral dealings with the rebel Rhodesian government, first, 
and then with the Republic of South Africa. To the other members 
of the Commonwealth, both issues were intertwined and involved 
one central problem, racism. 
19 Stephen Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International 
Organization. Constitutionalism, Britain and South Africa", Round 
Table, No.312, 1989, p.394. 
20 Ibid. 
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Britain wanted to preserve an area of independent action 
concerning what she perceived to be Western and strategic 
interests in the area that were separate from purely Commonwealth 
interests. In the Commonwealth context this proved difficult to 
achieve and because Britain took so long to solve the Rhodesian 
problem she was identified by the Commonwealth as the "central 
actor" in all southern African questions. 21 This explained the 
bitterness with which Edward Heath's attempts to resume arms 
sales to South Africa was greeted in 1971. Arnold Smith, the 
secretary-general of the Commonwealth from 1965-75, described the 
effect of this particular crisis on the Commonwealth: 
I have no doubt that, if Heath had gone ahead with 
large sales of arms to South Africa, he would have done 
even more damage to Britain's standing and influence in 
the world than Anthony Eden did through the invasion of 
Suez in 1956. He was saved from this because the 
Commonweal th had matured into a representative 
association whose leaders acted quickly, spoke frankly 
and finally produced a pair of agreements that saved 
everybody's political face. 22 
The Commonwealth had gone "to the brink of disintegration" but 
"happily" no country left it and the incident had shown the value 
of candid consultation among Commonwealth leaders to head off a 
crisis and ''to save a state from making an appalling blunder''. 
During the 1980's the Conservative government of Margaret 
Thatcher successfully defended the proposition that South Africa 
was important to the West as a bastion of anti-Soviet 
expansionism and refused to contemplate economic sanctions 
despite the opposition of almost the entire Commonwealth to her 
approach. British foreign policy towards South Africa in those 
years was described by G. Berridge as having two major planks: "a 
21 b' d L..L_., p.395. 
22 Arnold Smith and Clyde 
Commonwealth in World Politics 
p.205. 
Sanger, 
(Andre 
Stitches in Time. The 
Deutsch, London, 1981) 
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paranoid fear of Soviet expansionism, and ... a desire to 
strengthen Britain's share of the South African market". 23 The 
Thatcher government, which, he claims, regarded the second of 
these as the most important, had an approach based on the 
forecast that South Africa's apartheid regime would last for some 
time to come and that therefore Britain would have to continue to 
deal with it in the foreseeable future. American policy at the 
time (under the Reagan and Bush administrations) was similar and 
based on the principle of "Constructive Engagement", first 
enunciated by Nixon in the 1970's. Thus it was that the British 
government felt able to continue with a policy rejected by most 
of its Commonwealth partners. 
As Chan points out, the Commonwealth of the early 1960's was very 
different to the Commonwealth of the 1980's.u It had lost its 
British-centric approach to world and Commonwealth affairs, 
largely as a result of Afro-Asian anger with the way Britain had 
handled issues such as Rhodesia, apartheid and the need for a 
principled stand on racism. It was at the 1964 conference that 
Nkrumah of Ghana, suspecting British lack of resolve over 
Rhodesia, had proposed the establishment of a Commonwealth 
secretariat. It would be a counter-weight to what was 
increasingly being seen as British manipulation of the 
organisation through the Commonwealth relations office in 
Whitehall. The idea received strong support from African 
countries in particular and, at a special conference in 1965, the 
secretariat came into being. As Miller put it, the secretariat 
had stepped into a situation (the Commonwealth crisis over 
Rhodesia) in time "to catch ... from failing hands the torch of 
Commonwealth" . 25 
It turned out, however, to be a watered down version of what had 
been originally proposed and which Canada had wanted - a body 
23 Quoted in Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International 
Organization", p.396. 
u Ibid., p.397. 
25 Miller, Survey, p. 415. 
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headed by a secretary-general with strong executive powers. 
British and Australian opposition to the idea of the Commonwealth 
behaving like the United Nations meant that the informal and 
intimate nature of the organisation would continue to be 
expressed through the secretariat and that it would not arrogate 
to itself executive functions. 26 The secretary-general would have 
the status of a high commissioner and would have access to heads 
of state but would not be an "executive actor on the 
international stage". He would, instead, help maintain the 
"unwritten conventions" which had always determined the processes 
of Commonwealth consultation. There were, however, provisions in 
the Agreed Memorandum for adaptation of procedures to meet 
changing circumstances. 27 A Canadian career diplomat, Arnold 
Smith, was chosen as the first secretary-general and under his 
direction the new body developed a widely-respected role as an 
important facilitator of Commonwealth affairs. 28 
For the first time a non-British body, the secretariat, took on 
the task of organizing a Commonwealth conference, that of Lagos 
(which was also the first heads of government meeting outside of 
Britain) in 1965. The Lagos conference resulted in Britain 
admitting that there was Commonwealth interest in how it 
conducted its bilateral relations with Rhodesia (although it was 
also accepted that Rhodesia was primarily a British 
responsibility) . Thereafter, the Rhodesian issue held equal 
attention with matters such as arms sales to South Africa and, 
with the broader question of apartheid. Increasingly, however, 
the concern with economic issues and Third World development 
began to predominate in the dealings of the secretariat. Under 
the second secretary-general, Shridath Ramphal, who was elected 
in 1975 this aspect of economic internationalism was 
26 Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International Organization", 
p.398. 
28 Miller, Survey, p.416. 
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reinforced. 29 Ramphal had been heavily involved in the Lome 
negotiations for Commonwealth access to the EEC once Britain had 
terminated Commonwealth preferences, wound up the sterling area 
and had entered the European Economic Community. 
Chan notes that under Shridath Ramphal the Commonwealth developed 
into more and more of an international organisation with an 
advancing ''constitutionalism'' which was almost directly at odds 
with the Agreed Memorandum of 1965. 30 Much of this was a response 
to Rhodesia and South Africa in the form of declarations of 
principles adopted at various heads of government summits since 
the Singapore conference in 1971. The Singapore Declaration had 
been adopted during Arnold Smith's term of office at the end of 
a stormy summit in which Britain's Conservative government was 
taken to task for its intent to resume arms sales to South 
Africa. It described racial prejudice as a ''dangerous sickness'' 
and included six basic principles identifying a Commonwealth view 
of international relations. It was elaborated upon in 1977 in 
London as a response to the New Zealand government's intention to 
resume sporting relations with South Africa and gave rise to the 
Gleneagles Agreement, or the Commonwealth Statement on Apartheid 
in Sport. 
Chan surmises 
Ramphal must 
that sometime between 1977 and 1979, Shridath 
have "become aware of the constitutional 
possibilities in the summit Declaration format" . 31 A crucial 
meeting at Lusaka in 197 9, in which successful pressure was 
applied on Thatcher's government to allow moves towards majority 
rule in Zimbabwe, produced the Lusaka Declaration of the 
Commonwealth on Racism and Racial Prejudice and referred, 
to the Commonwealth as an "international incidentally, 
organisation". ("The days of an informal and unstructured 
29 Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International Organization", 
p. 399. 
30 Ibid., pp.399-403. 
31 Ibid., p.401. 
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association were fading") 32 . Other declarations that followed 
included the Melbourne Declaration on improving international 
economic conditions (19811, the Goa Declaration on Security of 
1983 (prompted by the US invasion of a Commonwealth country, 
Grenada) and followed up by the Nassau Declaration on World Order 
( 1985 I . 
Also adopted at Nassau was the highly significant Commonwealth 
Accord on Southern Africa which established the Eminent Persons 
Group (EPG) and a package of delayed economic and diplomatic 
sanctions which awaited the EPG report. Generality had begun to 
be replaced by "point-by-point" 
to cause severe difficulties 
programmes of 
with certain 
action. 33 This was 
members, notably 
Britain, which had rebuked Ramphal for allowing the Commonwealth 
to become what ''was never envisaged ... an instrument for joint 
executive action" . 34 As Austin puts it, there was now a "complete 
reversal of roles'' as London tried to stop ''Commonwealth 
policies" from emerging. 
To Austin, it seemed that the days of·collective action were dead 
and that by 1987 Commonwealth governments had begun to draw back 
from confrontation over South Africa. 35 On other wider issues, 
however, such as the Nassau Declaration on World Order, Chan 
notes that the growing Commonwealth "Charter" had begun to 
indicate "both a more formalized organization, and one with a 
more formalized world view which required united action" . 36 The 
constraints of the 1965 Agreed Memorandum, he says, and its view 
of the Commonwealth as an informal grouping, had been modified 
''if not greatly and radically altered''. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Dennis Austin, "The Commonwealth and Britain", Chatham 
House Papers, No.41, Royal Institute of International Affairs 
(Routledge, London, 1988), p.14. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International Organisation", 
p.402. 
539 
Chan goes on to analyse the Commonwealth sanctions campaign 
against South Africa and to assess its significance for the 
future of the Commonwealth. He notes that the polite differences 
over the efficacy of sanctions expressed in the 1964 communique, 
before the secretariat had even been set up, had by 1985 grown 
into a major conflict between Thatcher's government and the rest. 
It resulted in an end to the Commonwealth's ability to achieve a 
rough consensus on southern African issues and thus considerably 
reduced the international impression of the effectiveness of the 
Commonwealth's interventions. Ramphal had tried to introduce a 
strategy for the Nassau meeting which would be seen as a 
compromise initiated by the secretariat. But it had been 
disregarded by Thatcher, despite initial indications of a 
division in her own cabinet concerning the need to stay in step 
with the Commonwealth. 37 
Thatcher's main motivation at Nassau and again at the London 
mini-summit which followed in 1986, had been to preserve a 
"Western" as opposed to Commonwealth interest for Britain in the 
South African dispute, and one which was in step with Ronald 
Reagan's strategy of Constructive Engagement. It meant preventing 
the Commonwealth drive for sanctions and pressing her European 
partners to adopt the minimum degree of sanctions as a precedent 
which would allow Reagan to follow a similar course. It largely 
succeeded, though at the cost of Commonwealth consensus. After 
1986 a type of "binary Commonwealth" emerged with Britain going 
one way and the rest another, with the communiques reflecting 
this state of affairs.u At the London summit a "high point of 
Commonwealth unanimity• was reached in terms of global issues but 
it was at precisely the same summit that "the Commonwealth saw 
slip from its grasp the British support, involvement or tolerance 
in its high-point of development". This, says Chan, was a 
watershed in Commonwealth growth and change. 
In 1993 one British newspaper, The Independent on Sunday, 
37 Ibid., p.405. 
38 Ibid., p.408. 
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pointedly commented on the British attitude to the modern 
Commonwealth under the heading, "Goodbye to the Club". It noted 
how the British government's deliberate neglect of the 
Commonwealth had led to the virtual closure of the Commonwealth 
Institute in London, the end to preferential Commonwealth 
immigration from New Zealand, Australia and Canada and other 
measures which had "left little" for the old Commonwealth 
partners in terms of 
thousand cuts" was how 
Whitehall's deliberate 
benefits of membership. 39 "Death by a 
one Commonwealth diplomat had described 
"undermining" of the Commonwealth. The 
organisation was hardly referred to publicly in any of the 
bulletirs and statements of the ministry of foreign and 
Commonwealth affairs, except in terms of "platitudes", 
Thatcher's rationalisation for her government's stance on South 
Africa had been that sanctions would heighten the chances of 
violence in South Africa and would harm the black majority more 
than the whites. 40 The Eminent Persons' Group, on the other hand, 
had stressed the bloodshed that would result if change was 
postponed and added that it was not sanctions that would destroy 
the country but the persistence of apartheid and the government's 
failure to reform. "Sanctions and peace for South 
become one and the same", they argued. 41 The 
Movement (AAM) in London held the same view as 
Africa have now 
Anti-Apartheid 
did the Labour 
Party opposition and the ANC alliance in exile. At a Canadian 
conference of anti-apartheid organisations meeting at the time of 
the Vancouver Commonwealth conference, an ANC spokesman said that 
mandatory economic sanctions remained the only way by which the 
international community could bring about the dismantling of 
apartheid. 42 
39 Independent on Sunday, 26 September 1993. 
~Interview with the Guardian, 9 July 1986. 
41 The Commonwealth Group of Eminent Persons Mission to 
Africa. The Commonwealth Report (Penguin, Harmondsworth, 
p.14. 
South 
1986, 
42 Reported in the Financial Times (London) ,13 October 1987. 
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But by that time (1987) the failure to persuade Britain had made 
the Commonwealth resigned to the fact that comprehensive 
sanctions were impossible without major British and American 
support. There were also doubts being expressed as to the effect 
of such sanctions on the Front Line states and of South African 
threats to them and their economies if such sanctions were to be 
attempted. Nevertheless, at the Commonwealth conference in 
Vancouver in 1987 it was decided to downgrade the option of 
giving the Front Line states support and instead to pursue the 
sanctions issue as a matter of principle. 43 Thatcher was aware of 
the "element of bluff'' in all this and she knew that, as the 
precedent of 1986 showed, the Commonwealth would in any case 
allow exceptions to the consensus. She did not moderate her 
opposition to sanctions then or again at the 1989 Kuala Lumpur 
conference, when the release of some ANC and other banned persons 
in South Africa was being mooted and which she pointed to as 
justification for her anti-sanctions stance.« 
The local and international context for South Africa's return to 
the Commonwealth in 1994 was provided by the end of the Cold war, 
on the one hand, and by the end of apartheid, on the other. Under 
increasing international pressure in the 1980's as a result of 
the application of limited but effective financial and investment 
sanctions (applied despite the reluctance of her key trading 
partners) , South Africa's siege economy came under increasing 
stress. At the same time, large- scale and almost continuous 
internal unrest made the military interventions outside the 
country, in Angola particularly, difficult to maintain. 45 It was 
the ending of Soviet support for Angola and the general "thaw" in 
international relations during the Gorbachev era that provided 
the final incentive for the Nationalist government, once the 
relatively hard-line president, P.W. Botha, had been removed from 
43 Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International Organization", 
p.408. 
«Reported in the Sowetan, 25 October 1989. 
45 c. Saunders, •war in Southern Angola, 1987-88, and 
Namibian Decolonisation", Paper read at the SA Historical Society 
Conference, UNISA, January 1991. 
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power, to move towards a negotiated settlement of the apartheid 
problem. This then provided one of the necessary conditions for 
the return of the republic to the Commonwealth. 
Soon after the 1989 conference South Africa's new president, F.W. 
de Klerk, moved towards acceptance of a negotiated future for 
the country. In parliament in 1990 he announced the unbanning of 
the main African nationalist organisations and the release of 
Nelson Mandela. Two years prior to this the first steps had been 
taken towards the independence of Namibia. In the wake of Russian 
"Glasnost and Perestroika" the world and South Africa were moving 
into a post-Cold War thaw of co-operation and demilitarisation. 
The Commonwealth had suddenly lost one of its main sources of 
tension and conflict (some even claimed, its ''raison d'etre"). 
The 1991 conference in Harare found itself preoccupied with the 
need for a new focus and the apartheid item was placed at No.37 
on the agenda, "hardly a priority rating", as one South African 
newspaper commented. 46 Nevertheless, the sanctions debate had not 
entirely disappeared and the old divisions remained but without 
the combative presence of Margaret Thatcher to inflame the other 
members. 
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe argued at the Harare 
conference for a continuation of Commonwealth sanctions until 
irreversible signs of change in South Africa were evident. He was 
supported by the new secretary-general, Chief Ameka Anyaouka, who 
argued that the "step-by-step" approach to sanctions should be 
maintained. Nelson Mandela requested a similar Commonwealth 
stance during his visit to Harare at that same time. Britain, 
under the new Conservative prime minister, John Major, who had 
replaced Thatcher the previous year in something of a "palace 
coup'', adopted a softer approach to the issue than before but 
argued that all sanctions except those relating to arms supplies 
should be lifted in order to reward De Klerk for his reforms. 
An independent Namibia had become the organisation's fiftieth 
member in 1990 and it was confidently predicted that South Africa 
•The Star, 7 October 1991, 
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would reapply as soon as a majority government was in place. A 
well-known Commonwealth correspondent and commentator, Derek 
Ingram, argued for a new declaration of human rights for the 
Commonwealth in the aftermath of the defeat of apartheid, one 
that encompassed democracy and the right to basic freedom from 
oppression. 47 
At the October 1993 heads of government meeting in Cyprus the 
Commonwealth prepared itself for the imminent return of South 
Africa to the Club. By then the date had been set for the first 
multi-party elections and despite setbacks such as the "Bisho 
Massacre", and later, the assassina.tion of the Umkhonto we Sizwe 
leader, Chris Hani, and despite signs of security force collusion 
with an anti-ANC campaign inside the country, it seemed that 
there was no turning back on the road to majority rule. 
Commonwealth sanctions against South Africa had been dropped one 
month prior to the Cyprus summit and the consensus of opinion 
(excluding Britain) was that sanctions had been vindicated as a 
means of putting pressure on South Africa to change. 48 Increased 
Commonwealth assistance to South Africa was promised during the 
election period and the ANC executive spokesman on foreign 
affairs, Thabo Mbeki, announced on 23 October that the ANC would 
take South Africa back to the Commonweal th. 49 He said it would be 
important "symbolically" as the Commonwealth was the first major 
international organisation to exclude South Africa as a result of 
internal policy. There would be ''much to gain" for South Africa 
in terms of financial resources and interaction with other 
countries. 
In 1995, the year after South Africa's readmission, it was 
recognised that South Africa's return to the Commonwealth could 
"restore and cement• the organisation and its principles. so 
Mandela could use the Commonwealth forum to pursue the idea of 
47 Reported in The Star, 13 June 1991. 
g The Star, 24 October 1993. 
m Business Day, 17 March 1995. 
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North/South dialogue between rich and poor nations. He could 
"champion" the aim of better access for poorer nations to the 
markets of the First World. He could point to South Africa as an 
"example of political tolerance and democracy", of conflict 
resolution and peacemaking. South Africa could help in the search 
of the Commonwealth for a new set of "post-Cold War" values and 
could offer assistance in co-operative financial and trading 
relations, economic development and educational advancement. He 
could also press for "expanding membership" of the club and 
could "boost the Commonwealth's standing" in the world. The 
Commonwealth in return could help to keep the "fragile National 
Party/ANC coalition in government intact. The ministerial 
meetings on finance and trade could offer much assistance to 
South Africa. 
It was also recognised, however, that there were obvious limits 
to the usefulness of the organisation for South Africa. The split 
between First World and Third World countries made it difficult 
to achieve consensus. There was no guarantee from the 
Commonwealth or any other organisation for the success of a new 
South Africa. Even the negotiations for South Africa to join the 
Lome Convention, which had covered most of the "developing" 
Commonwealth countries in their access to the lucrative European 
market, had no guarantee of success. 51 
The thirty years since 1961 had seen a progressive expansion of 
the Commonwealth in terms of member countries, accompanied by a 
proportionate loss of cohesiveness and effectiveness on the world 
stage. Although it is true to say that the Commonwealth was never 
meant to act "as one" in international affairs and that since its 
earliest days there had been differences between its members on 
international and internal policies, it is also possible to argue 
that up until the mid-1950's there was enough of a consensus 
between its members to maintain something of a united front vis-
a-vis the rest of the world. The Suez crisis shattered that 
fragile consensus and the years that followed demonstrated 
51 J. Stewart, "Stay Loose: South Africa Should Forget about 
Joining a Trading Bloc", Finance Week, 6 February 1994, pp.23-24. 
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increasing fractiousness and internal dissension, a large 
proportion of which was related to the racial problem in southern 
Africa. Underlying this was the problem of a loss of influence 
from the centre, a withdrawal of British responsibility, interest 
and support for the Commonwealth ideal in the post-Suez and post-
Rhodesian eras. 
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth had been rescued from potential 
collapse in the 1960's by the combined efforts of individuals and 
countries (such as Canada, which had a strong interest in the 
continuation of the organisation) , and it went on to develop a 
new consensus based on antagonism to apartheid and racial 
discrimination as well as a commitment to a fairer distribution 
of economic wealth in the world as a whole. The virtual complete 
isolation of Britain in the Commonwealth during the disputes over 
sanctions against South Africa in the 1980's marked a watershed 
in the attempts to develop a new "constitutionalism" for the 
organisation. But the end of apartheid and the return of South 
Africa under the new ANC-led government of Nelson Mandela in 1994 
helped the Commonwealth towards a redefinition of its role in the 
post-Cold War era, a role which was being increasingly defined as 
that of a consensus on the need to support world-wide efforts for 
economic justice and for the promotion of democratic forms of 
government. 
But for South Africa the return to the Commonwealth fold marked, 
more than anything else, the end of isolation and the rejoining 
of a "family" of friends whose moral and sometimes material 
support had been of incalculable value during the long years of 
apartheid. 
Perhaps the most important aspect for South Africa of 
Commonwealth membership in the future is expressed in the words 
of Chief Ameka Anyaouka in 1993: 
I believe the Commonwealth is in a position because of 
its unique attributes to help a very pluralistic South 
Africa to come to terms with democracy and stability. 
So the help the Commonwealth will give to South Africa 
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will not just end with the liquidation of apartheid. I 
foresee the help from the Commonwealth continuing to 
South Africa after apartheid is ended.~ 
In 1989 Chan wrote that much of the future of the Commonwealth 
would depend on its secretaries-general, since they were the 
organisation's major resource. 53 In the aftermath of Shridath 
Ramphal's forceful and sometimes stormy career and in the light 
of with the more prosaic post-Cold War and post-apartheid period 
in which the Commonwealth is operating in the 1990's this seems 
less important as a guide to the Commonweal th' s future. The 
extent to which Britain continues to down-play the organisation's 
value is a more important factor because of the still enormous 
diplomatic and psychological influence that Britain, as the 
"mother" country, exerts. It is possible that the predicted 
change to a Labour government in Britain in 1997 will mark a 
revival in the prestige and effectiveness of the Commonwealth as 
significant as that produced by the accession of South Africa to 
its ranks in 1994. On the other hand, the Labour Party had, by 
1987, abandoned its opposition to continued British integration 
into the European Community and thus, by implication, the 
Commonwealth as the alternative arena for the projection of 
British power and influence in the world. A Labour government may 
also, therefore, allow British indifference to continue. 
Britain had become very much "one among equals" in terms of 
Commonwealth leadership by the 1990's and so the question now is 
whether the many and varied multilateral links that had been 
forged between all the members will be strong enough to maintain 
the fabric of Commonweal th well into the next century. The 
fissiparous and centrifugal pressures remain despite what Chan 
has noted as a growth in the organisation's constitutionalism and 
formalism in recent years. It may, in fact require a return to 
52 Quoted in Peter Vale, "Points of Re-entry - Prospects for 
a Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy", South Africa International, 
Vol.21, No.4, 1991, p.227. 
53 Chan, "The Commonwealth as an International Organization", 
p.409. 
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the more informal and flexible procedures of earlier 
promote the long-term growth and effectiveness 
years to 
of the 
Commonwealth in the context of an unpredictable post-Cold War 
future. 
Perhaps the last word on the significance of South Africa's 
rejoining the Commonwealth in June 1994 and the symbolism 
provided by the commemoration of the two-hundredth anniversary of 
British influence in South Africa in 1995 should be left to one 
of the foremost interpreters of English South African literary 
culture, Professor Guy Butler. In an article entitled ''Home is 
where the heart is", written fc: the Afrikaans literary and 
cultural journal, Insig ("Insight") , on the occasion of the 
bicentennial of the British occupation of the Cape in 1795, 
Butler assessed the legacy of two centuries of British contact 
with South Africa and called it, "a puzzling and sobering 
exercise" . 54 
He noted that in a world community of over 300 million who spoke 
English as tneir home language, in South Africa only a "trifling'' 
3.5 million out of 39 million were mother-tongue speakers of the 
language. These had inherited the "resentment", sometimes the 
"hatred" of all the other groups in the country, "the Boers and 
the Blacks for outright imperial conquest and/or dispossession, 
and the Indians for different reasons". But English was the most 
"needed" language in the new nation although it was the most 
"resented" as well. English speakers had never developed "a 
strong collective sense" and although for much of this period 
they had identified with their country of origin, now they felt 
more at home in South Africa "than anywhere else". 
Furthermore, the Empire had become "Commonwealth" and 
sufficient goodwill and practical benefit had been 
created by Britain in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries to ensure that almost all the ex-
54 Guy Butler, "Home is Where the Heart is", Insig, September 
1995, pp.12-13. 
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colonies, on achieving independence, opted to stay in 
the Commonwealth. We, the one exception, have now 
returned to the Club. 
The Commonweal th was "kept 
almost totally a-political 
"ongoing symbol of community 
going" by virtue of an "archaic, 
institution, the Monarchy'' an 
not immediately subject to the will 
of the people''. This was an ''asset" which no popularly elected 
leader could match. He or she was there "by blood or birth, which 
are archetypal, deeper than the ballot box". The continued 
mystique of the monarchy in South Africa and elsewhere, he 
concludes, was a result, perhaps, of the fact that ''all being 
children of God, we are born with a sympathy for royalty". 
Whether an increasingly anti-monarchical Britain, Australia and 
Canada would agree with this assertion, however, is a moot point. 
But even if the British monarchy, as a symbol of the unity of the 
Commonwealth, continues for the foreseeable future to provide one 
of the most important bonds holding its members together, it is 
the many and varied connections of a social, political, economic 
and linguistic nature that will provide the essential fabric of 
the Commonwealth's continued existence. 
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